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THE ABSTRACT 
 
Developing countries are marred with non-development delivery and rural and urban 
poverty. The largest section of the rural poor population is often involved in subsistence 
farming while the urban poor are involved in cyclic poverty in the informal sector. There 
is a need therefore, for good local governance that is responsive to the needs of the rural 
and urban citizens, particularly the poor. Good local governance ensures that everyone 
regardless of status, gender, race, age or religion, is enabled to participate productively 
and positively in the opportunities available. Stren (2005) emphasizes that social 
inclusiveness is an important goal for local governance as it is just, democratic and 
productive.   
 
Social inclusion is central to sustainable rural and urban development. Development 
thinking is also increasingly stressing the importance of human capital, that is, the 
important contributions all people including the poor, can make to development.  
Decentralization has, furthermore, focused attention on the local level, as good entry 
point for addressing wide range of social issues including poverty but particularly lack of 
local development-services delivery. Hence, this proposed study centres on good local 
governance and participation of the poor in the rural and urban areas in Lesotho as some 
pre-requisites for sustainable human development and development-services delivery 
particularly for the rural subsistence farmers, the landless and the urban poor. 
 
Lesotho’s local government was mainly created to meet the needs of Lesotho citizens and 
reduce poverty through more focussed development delivery and local democratization. 
This thesis examines the evolution of Lesotho local governance, the manner in which it 
has (and the degree to which it has actually) been adopted, as well as its effectiveness in 
local developmental-service delivery and implications towards rural and urban 
sustainable development. The key question is whether ‘developmental local governance’ 
(DLG) in Lesotho precipitates adequate social inclusion of the rural and urban poor to the 
point of real developmental-service delivery and community driven development.  On the 
basis of secondary and primary data, beneficiary assessment and in-depth 
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interviews/participatory evaluation, the thesis argues that local governance has been 
largely unsuccessful in meeting these objectives. 
 
The thesis argues that, in large part, this is due to locally lacking preconditions for 
successful decentralization and the prevailing institutional constraints against it. 
However, the thesis believes that such an impasse of non-developmental-service delivery 
locally can only be surmountable through adequate social inclusion, fiscal-administrative-
political devolution, setting and meeting of the necessary preconditions for successful 
decentralization and effective tackling of the concerned current analyzed institutional 
constraints for relevant and sustainable development locally.  
 
Good local governance without pragmatic social inclusion of the rural and urban poor is a 
recipe for intense rural and urban poverty. The proposed thesis assumes that social 
inclusion which is non-isolation or non-exclusion from the social development process, 
employment opportunities, the economy, mainstream political and cultural processes, 
security net-works and non-vulnerability, is central to sustainable rural and urban 
development and development delivery.     
 
Organized, logical and sound chapters at the pragmatic, various theoretical and policy 
levels have been utilized to construct this thesis. With a view to juxtapose the implicit 
and explicit institutional constraints to DLG, the global and peculiar evolutionary process 
of DLG embracing general and relevant examples and Lesotho in particular as a case 
study are covered.   
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0  General Introduction 
 
This study explores the various socio-political-economic-institutional constraints 
militating against the efficient and effective adoption of decentralization for development 
delivery in Lesotho. The study illuminates the socio-systemic practices in action against 
the proficient execution of this potential development-policy. This is done through the 
use of several assessment-analytic methods. The study’s task intertwines the degree to 
which decentralization has been prosperously embarked upon in Lesotho with 
success/outcomes indicators in developmental-service delivery. That is this policy’s 
contextual evolution, nature, as well as its prospects and challenges.  
 
The chapter concisely firstly states the main aim of this study, secondly, the specific 
objectives and some study’s framework,  thirdly, the study’s research question, fourthly, 
the rationality, arguments and assumptions of the study also serving as the gist of the 
analysis of the study. Fifthly, the chapter provides the structure of the research report, 
that is how chapters are organized and their summary contents in relation to the study’s 
aim, question and objectives. The type of data used to achieve the analytic purpose of this 
study is also given in this section. Sixthly, the research methodology utilized and case 
studies used are discussed.  The chapter also provides theoretical arguments for and 
against decentralization briefly to indicate the merits and demerits of decentralization and 
why it was embarked upon in many countries including Lesotho.    
 
1.0.1 Specific Study’s Aim, Objectives and Assessment Framework 
 
The study aims at assessing the evolution of decentralization in Lesotho. The assessment 
encompasses the nature, relations between democratic local authorities and traditional 
authorities and central government, financing, electoral-political systems, extent by 
process and outcomes indicators vis-"-vis efficiency and effectiveness in adoption and 
local rural-urban developmental impact of such decentralization in Lesotho.    
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This research study specifically intends to; 
• trace the progression of Lesotho’s policy of decentralization to local 
authorities/local government units (LGUs) since 1997,  
• examine the role and the extent to which Lesotho’s decentralization contributes to 
the main objectives of the Lesotho local government including; (i) the provision of 
a democratic and accountable government, (ii) sustainable services (iii) the 
promotion of social and economic development by giving priority to basic 
community, (iv) the promotion of the involvement of the community and 
organizations and individuals in local government issues, (v) the enhancement of 
participation in national and community programmes, (vi) and the combination of 
the municipality and urban boards which are to be combined to the rural and urban 
areas, thus creating a mechanism which will integrate
1
 the historically separate parts 
of economies (Mapetla et al 1983, GoL Reports, 1997 and Wallis, 1999).  
 
The assessment of these objectives will be within the context of the efficient (optimal 
utility of resources/inputs for maximum positive results) and effective (obtaining 
appropriate intended results through the right measures) implementation of development. 
This study intends to systematically contribute to knowledge by investigating and 
analyzing the role of and the extent to which the 1997 decentralization has contributed to 
the attainment of development in Lesotho in line with such objectives. This will provide a 
critical public and political-development administrative analysis of pros and cons to 
decentralization functions and development attainment in Lesotho. The general objective 
of this study is to;  
(1) understand why LG is supposed to impact positively on development, 
(2) consider the implementation and experience of decentralization in Lesotho, and 
against this experience, assess the extent to which benefits claimed have been realized, 
(3) examine the question of whether decentralization is efficiently and effectively 
appropriately adopted in Lesotho and whether this is able to assist Lesotho to attain 
development delivery. The question of efficiency of decentralization refers to making the 
                                                
1
 
. The 1997 LG Act transforms and combines the local rural administrative structures (i.e. former village development committees, ward commiittees and 
chieftaincy) with the urban boards (town or municipal top representation) into district councils now encompassing top representatives (elected chairpersons and 
members of local councils) from the community councils.   
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economic optimum use of national resources in the local communities so as to achieve 
the highest level of welfare or development for the beneficiaries or society as a whole in 
terms of certain inputs incurred and maximum output or economic growth gained. The 
positive impact of such an efficiency of a policy is usually seen in increased productivity 
and equity especially in income distribution, more employment opportunities and poverty 
alleviation in general at the local community level. The efficiency of decentralization in 
relation to development attainment in Lesotho needs to be viewed as a policy change that 
is socially desirable provided such a change makes every member of the society better off 
if not at least some members but without making anyone worse off. This is about the 
optimal use of decentralized governance system as a policy in obtaining improved 
maximum growth or productivity and development service delivery. The study measures 
the degree to which decentralization has efficiently and successfully been adopted in 
pursuit of development. It is thus a developmental local governance policy impact 
analytic study dealing with decentralization/local governance capacity in implementing 
the particular developmental objectives of Lesotho. 
 
1.0.2  Research question 
 
The gist of the analytic question here on the basis of these specific objectives on 
decentralization in Lesotho as our research question is whether decentralization is 
efficiently and effectively / appropriately adopted in Lesotho and whether this is able to 
assist Lesotho to attain development delivery
2
? The measurement of such efficiency and 
                                                
2. Development delivery/distribution of services encompassing an upliftment of socio-economic life at an individual, household and 
national level, in the context of Lesotho as a developing country, at least includes addressing these non-exhaustive signs of lack of 
development: (a) low income compounded by limited educational opportunities resulting in inadequate managerial skills, low labour 
force productivity, poor attitudes to work, poor health and nutrition. All worsened by high unemployment, underemployment, low 
labour demand resulting from low investment per capita, low savings and dependence on inappropriate technologies, widespread 
diseases and high mortality. (b) Poor levels of living characterized by absolute poverty (inability to address basic needs like adequate 
food, housing, clothes and others), insufficient life sustaining goods and poor social services. (c) Underdevelopment process 
characterized by non-control of own destiny, limited freedom as seen in external dominance in trade with imbalance in exchange-
terms whereby labour and its produce are devalued by particularly foreign direct investors especially in the textile industry, public and 
other private sectors. (d) Inequity with rife social and gender differentiations, powerlessness, vulnerability, neglect, marginalization, 
deprivation, social exclusion and environmental problems seen in resources’ depletion, arable land loss from 13% to 9% and long 
drought spells (See Todaro, 1992:92 and GoL Reports, 2000-2006). 
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effectiveness in the adoption of decentralization and its impact on development 
attainment in Lesotho has required the use of indices that are objectively verifiable, 
qualitative and quantitative for an illuminative analysis of such argued prevalence of 
socio-political-economic institutional constraints against this policy in Lesotho. 
 
1.0.3 Why Local Government/LG? Study’s Rationale, Arguments and Assumptions 
 
The rationale for decentralization’s worldwide-adoption encompassing Africa and 
Lesotho generally includes being seen as a means of developing the administrative 
capacity of central and local institutions so as to promote more effective planning and 
implementation of developmental projects and programmes. This decentralized 
governance for development (DGD) was also expected to speed up delivery of services 
needed by the rural and urban poor. It has also been seen as a means towards attaining 
increased popular participation. Failure of many development programmes was seen as 
mainly caused by central government planning with little knowledge of the needs and 
problems of local people. DGD was also justified on grounds of being a means of 
creating institutions for participation of local people in planning and decision-making of 
development programmes and projects. This would also result in relevant and 
community-driven-owned development as local decision-making and participation could 
address local needs, acceptance and commitment maintenance for implementation. Hence 
donors justified it on grounds of facilitating local initiative and participation by the poor. 
In some cases DGD was viewed as a national unity and integration strengthening strategy 
as it gave some degree of autonomy to regional/tribal groups desiring to secede. It was 
therefore justified for democratic peace and stability (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989).  
 
This rationale has to be accompanied by the pre-conditions to be met if DGD is to 
succeed, if not met they serve as additional constraints towards failure. They often 
include existence of; political will
3
 to really decentralize and administrative support by 
the central government, enough popular support mobilized for DGD, political stability 
and popular support for the current central government, a clear statement of 
                                                
3 . Political will among others involves an action or pursuit and implementation of the policy at hand through projects and programmes and series of activities to fulfil the desired policy outcome enabling good 
governance to empower and cultivate political inclusion, participation and decision making by the low sectors of the population. It embraces political function, i.e. community or local participation to achieve service 
delivery, social economic development and healthy environment, protection and promotion of local councils to govern their own areas and assert their rights (Chipkin, 2002:71-72 and Mohanty  and Tandon,2006:25)   
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decentralization policy and objectives and the form it will take and identification and 
creation of a strong institutional mechanism for management and coordination of DGD. 
Such pre-conditions also include a clear identification of the levels and institutions to 
which specifically defined responsibilities, power or authority is decentralized and 
available human and financial resources with enabling social and physical infrastructure. 
DGD is easily implemented if there is financial, political and administrative 
decentralization with strong communicative relations between the local authorities and 
the central government (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989).            
 
Besides this Lesotho-specific rationale for DGD, there have been general factors 
motivating it, particularly in Africa. Firstly, the failure of centralized public sector 
management has been evidenced by economic, fiscal and political crises. The 
consequential recession in state resources increased pressure for economic, institutional 
and political reforms. Secondly, non-state domestic pressures for change have been 
effective for this reform. The civil society has become more politically active as 
economic crisis bit harder. Thirdly, external donors have exerted pressure towards DGD. 
Good governance comprised this DGD and was seen as appropriate for growth and 
poverty reduction. This made implementing DGD a condition for receiving aid. Many 
African countries had to adopt it to qualify for aid. Fourthly, Africa is experiencing rapid 
urbanization calling for more effective local urban governance responsive to needs of the 
increasing urban and rural poverty. Unfortunately, the institutional mechanisms for 
effective urban management still remain poorly managed and developed. Fifthly, DGD 
has been used to solve long conflicts whereby ruling groups craft compromises with 
regional or local elites. Globalization has also been a motivating factor for DGD as cities 
are enabled to compete for foreign investment (Mabogunje, 1995 and Olowu, 2003:43).    
 
According to L’Oeil (1989:71-72) there are four arguments in favour of decentralization: 
Firstly, it is assumed that the demand for local public services varies from place to place. 
Only decentralized provision of local development services will adjust to the multifaceted 
demands. Secondly, the important political nature of local government serving as a 
valuable training ground for democracy was needed for newly independent countries that 
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were colonies. Thirdly, stronger regional or local governments can control the tendency 
of central government to become all-powerful. Local government is seen as a defence 
against an all-powerful central government and the abuse of power. It is argued that 
strong local government system helps to disperse political power and diminish the danger 
of an over-centralized state. Furthermore the diffusion of decision-making power is 
justified on the grounds that numerous errant policies among a variety of local authorities 
cause less harm than one policy failure. 
 
Fourthly, there is an institutional reason, coordination at the local level is necessary and 
local public services cannot and would not be treated independently. Local government 
can coordinate these services much more easily than national government. The other 
basis for decentralization has included arguments that it brings the government closer to 
the people. One more justification is that indigenous knowledge concerning local needs is 
tapped resulting in better information for relevant local planning. There is also a hope 
that it brings about improved accountability as local units become answerable to the local 
citizens (Parnell et al, 2002). 
 
The other justification for decentralization is that of having a fair degree of autonomy, the 
local authorities can take initiatives and experiment. The justification is that local 
government encourages citizenship democracy and promotes political education in its 
widest sense. Local government is also seen as a means of representing tax payers. Since 
local authorities impose taxes, then the tax payers are represented in a body that 
determines how the tax should be spent (Parnell et al, 2002).                   
 
According to Reddy (1996) and Mark (2001:1-12) decentralization policy direction is 
followed in one way or another in pursuit of good governance due to the following 
political potentials and factors: 
• an apparent post-cold war ‘consensus’ that some sort of democratic mode of  
governance is the most appropriate way to structure intra-state and state-society  
relations in developing countries, 
• the serious economic crisis the globe faces that will, by virtue of the power of  
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the international economy, need to be addressed according to market principles  
structured by international economic regulations set by World Trade Organization  
(WTO) and other international economic agreements, 
• although Africa was the least urbanized in 1990 with about a third of the  
population in the urban settlements, it experienced the highest average urbanization  
rate in the world at just below 5% per year, 
• the severe negative pressures placed on natural environmental resources for  
fuel, building material, food and water, and on the capacity of the environment to  
absorb liquid, aerated and solid waste and  
• the increase in demands for sustainable livelihoods, services and goods that will  
emanate from enfranchised populations created by liberalization and democratization. 
 
The rationale of this study is that decentralization is often seen and officially declared as 
a tool for alleviating rural-urban poverty in Lesotho. It has further been argued that 
decentralization can help develop a poor country economically, socially, culturally, 
politically and otherwise. As a catalyst, supporters argue that it can facilitate the 
following; transforming subsistence farming into commercial farming, credit availability, 
guaranteed market and storage facilities provision and incentives to produce more, 
teaching of business management techniques, selling of production inputs and organized 
government support (Van Rooyen and Machethe, 1983: 12-16, Rondinelli et al, 1986 and 
1989, GoL Reports, 2000-2006 and Olowu et al, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006). 
 
The study argues and assumes that there are institutional constraints against 
decentralization in Lesotho. One further argues that if development delivery is to be 
attained in Lesotho, it is imperative to have a socially and politically inclusive 
decentralization that has clear delimitation of powers and roles. If not, decentralization 
and its developmental objectives will be like many other previous governance 
development policy programmes that never attained sustainability and development 
delivery in Lesotho, especially at the community grass root level. Basotho  have intrinsic 
social, behavioural and traditional political systems which are at times not fully 
understood by development partners (World Bank and African Development Bank).  
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These systems including traditional chieftaincy and other various obstacles serve as 
institutional constraints to effective and efficient development administration and thus 
decentralization and its attainment of development. While Olowu et al, (2000, 2002, 
2003, 2004 and 2006) have somehow in many ways put such a somewhat similar notion 
forward, institutional constraints against decentralization particularly in Lesotho have not 
yet been well investigated and analyzed for understanding its evolution, nature, 
limitations/failure and potential remedies and for substantive knowledge contribution 
towards measurement of decentralization, effective adoption lessons of this policy for  
development delivery and LG’s institutional reforms and capacity for development 
delivery.  
1.0.4 Some Challenges or Risks of Decentralization 
 
There are arguments that justify centralization on the basis of the challenges against 
decentralization, particularly in the developing world. Such challenges may be 
summarized in a self-explanatory table (1.1) as below. There are also other challenges 
that could be regarded as contextual problems to decentralization including; Severe 
scarcity of money in the developing world. Lack/insufficiency of skilled human resources 
too, lack of political legitimacy, equipment, vehicles, electricity, fuel, information and 
reliable theory regarding pressing development problems. Scarcity is also characterized 
by severe competition among the people for survival and civil societies tend to be 
captured by individual’s private interests and control (Olowu et al, 2004 and 2006).    
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Table1.1: Challenges of decentralization inducing centralization perpetuation 
Challenges/ 
Constraints 
Brief description Consequence Possible way forward 
Sustained consent 
of national elites to 
devolve authority, 
resources, and 
accountability 
arrangements 
Donor pressure or 
political coalitions that 
led to adoption of 
decentralized 
governance incapable 
of sustaining support to 
implementation phase 
Stalled or frozen 
decentralization  
Local government constitutional 
protection, tackle major 
dilemmas, undertake stakeholder 
analysis and identify effective 
incentives and sanctions ; assist 
central actors to appreciate that 
decentralized government is 
positive sum (win-win) not zero-
sum (win-lose) game through 
dialogue.  
Scarce cash/capital National governments 
are cash-strapped, 
difficulty of funding 
and supporting 
decentralized 
government  
Cash-strapped or 
highly fiscally 
dependent local 
governments-either 
on central 
government or donor 
grants. 
Effective decentralization should 
stimulate local economy, capture 
untapped social capital and 
promote regional equity. 
Scarce capacity Limited trained human 
resources and 
organizational and 
institutional capacities ; 
best utilized in a 
centralized way 
 
Decentralized 
governance 
dependent on central 
officials/organization 
but loyalty is with the 
national government, 
in the absence of 
capacity, local 
government’s 
inconsequential.    
Decentralized governance 
involves planned transfer of 
capacity from national to locality 
over time. 
Potential for 
conflict 
Local governments 
generate fresh political 
conflicts between 
centre and periphery 
and between 
communities over 
resources sharing. 
Local government 
structures and sizes 
that pay little or no 
attention to local 
government’s 
effectiveness or 
available social 
capital of trust.  
Good governance norms 
(transparency, participation, anti-
corruption, rule of law, e.t.c.) 
essential at central and local 
levels. 
Local elite capture 
and corruption 
Beneficiaries from 
decentralized 
governance are the 
local elites-they capture 
new found powers to 
oppress the poor 
Decentralized 
governance increases 
poverty and does not 
attenuate it 
Effective upward and downward 
(multidirectional) accountability 
Internal and 
external 
coordination 
Within national 
governments, between 
donors and recipient 
country, strategies, 
e.t.c.   
Uncoordinated 
decentralization and 
recentralization 
Separation of production and 
provision of services, co-
production and effective planning 
at all levels, harmonization of 
donor inputs through Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programmes/ 
PRSP  and budget support  
Source: Adapted from Millet Karin, Dele Olowu and Robert Cameron, 2006:12. 
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Furthermore there is economic and social turbulence due to scarcity of resources, 
poverty, government ineffectiveness, currency crisis, collapse in commodity price, 
structural adjustment programmes with no local-level defences and so on. Social 
turbulence is caused by ethnic, religious or other conflicts. These together reduce 
resources availability to local governance, which are personnel, institutional experience 
and ability to sustain effective programmes. There are also severe asymmetries in wealth 
and power, and the powerful informal political and economic structures of patron-
clientage that grow from them, often existing outside formal state structure yet 
dominating decision making closing open political processes. State collapse, lawlessness, 
non-functioning of bureaucracies, infrastructural decays, inconsequential government 
actions and chronic instability characterize variably a number of the developing 
countries, hampering decentralization and thus justifying centralization. There is 
insufficient sustained political support for decentralized governance. Power brokers at the 
centre resist decentralized governance subtly and at times not so subtly. Decentralization 
extending democratic rights has resulted in many African capital cities being controlled 
by the opposition (Botswana, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Ethiopia e.t.c.). Decentralization 
policies are usually poorly designed and often not carefully thought for over long-term, 
complex, and iterative process of governmental reengineering (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004 
and Millet, Olowu and Cameron, 2006).     
1.1 The Structure of the Dissertation and the Required Data 
 
There are three main parts to this dissertation. Part one consists of chapter one as a 
general introduction to the study. It is also composed of chapter two, three and four. 
Chapter two provides the theoretical framework with conceptualization, three deals with 
synthesized practical experiences of the world in decentralization while four is on the 
methods of measurement of decentralization. These chapters’ aspects are to be applied in 
the analysis and assessment of decentralization in Lesotho on part two and three. Part two 
is about the nature of the decentralization of our major case study Lesotho whereas part 
three is on its contextual measurement. Chapter five and six as part two have their thrust 
and focus on the evolution/experience of Lesotho in decentralization, including its 
cultural-socio-economic-institutional constraints. Thus part two assesses evolution of 
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decentralization in Lesotho encompassing its structure, relations between democratic 
local authorities and traditional authorities and central government. The last third part, 
still on Lesotho, is chapter seven and eight dealing with the nature of the policy of 
decentralization and the assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of the adoption of 
such decentralization, respectively. This third part among others deals with financing, 
electoral-political systems, extent by process and outcomes indicators vis-"-vis efficiency 
and effective local rural-urban developmental impact of decentralization in Lesotho  
 
Specifically, chapter one is an overview of the study entailing theoretical reasons why 
decentralization was adopted in many countries, this includes the intended 
decentralization benefits and its risks. Chapter two includes a detailed review of the 
literature on decentralization and development. It explains why countries actually 
decentralized, providing a complex interplay of external and internal factors for its 
different political processes and the relevance of its various strategies. Periodization of 
the waves of decentralization adoption globally and in Africa is done here. Chapter three 
focuses on the potential benefits as well as the constraints faced by countries that embark 
on a process of decentralization. This chapter also deals with the political realities of 
decentralization. That is the political challenges to decentralization.  
 
Chapter four explores the theoretical debate on what is needed to adopt decentralization 
efficiently and effectively, as well as the various measurements that can be employed to 
monitor the extent of decentralization and its impact on poverty alleviation.Chapter five 
is a debate about the evolution of decentralization in Lesotho and its challenges. Chapter 
six focuses on the role of traditional leadership in Lesotho, and its impact on the process 
of decentralization. 
 
Chapter seven includes the field findings on the main features of the new local 
government policy and its efficiency and effectiveness. Chapter eight constitutes a 
practical application of the theoretical chapter four. It is about the actual measurement 
and the other dimensions of decentralization in terms of more indicators of efficiency and 
effectiveness in Lesotho. This involves examining the field findings on the progression of 
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Lesotho’s decentralization policy since 1997, and the impact of decentralization on 
development. It also focuses on the forms of participation by locals, constraints and 
prospects in relation to poverty alleviation. Chapter nine provides a conclusion and 
overview of the study. It identifies lessons for Lesotho and looks how decentralization 
might be rethought for efficient and effective poverty alleviation.  
 
1.2.0 Research Methodology 
 
1.2.1 Data Collection and Analysis 
 
In light of the study’s rationale and objectives concerning decentralization in Lesotho, it 
was decided to adopt three out of the ten districts in Lesotho as case studies. Noting that 
Lesotho has already experienced, albeit with limited success, various forms of 
decentralization in the past (pre-colonial, colonial, independence and post-independence 
era).  The type of information to be used to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the adoption of decentralization and illuminate the constraints against decentralization 
includes the decentralization indices on its actual process and outcomes since the 
inception and declaration of this policy hoped for development attainment in Lesotho. 
That is the extent to which it has been adopted efficiently and effectively and its impact 
on development delivery. Data collection will focus on assessing the evolution of 
decentralization encompassing its nature, relations between democratic local authorities 
and traditional authorities and central government, its financing, electoral-political 
systems, extent by process and outcomes indicators against efficiency and effective local 
rural-urban developmental impact. Data analysis will focus on the impact of 
decentralization as a developmental policy, embracing Todaro’s (1989) framework for 
assessing development delivery, local democratization and development objectives 
versus real implementation, policy effects on production, prices, consumption, trade, 
government budget, equity in income and development services distribution and social 
welfare developmental benefits. 
 
The study’s aim is to assess the degree of decentralization and its contribution towards 
development attainment in Lesotho; thus indices which have been used for such 
measurement through a questionnaire included the degree of local government autonomy 
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in the selection of local staff, the ability of local government to access national 
government and influence national local government policy, the range of local 
government functions, the degree to which local political parties can make decisions 
independently of their national structures and the degree to which local governments can 
raise their own sources of revenue independently of higher tiers of government. 
Determined decentralization process and outcomes indicators from such a questionnaire 
helped to define and analyze its extent, effectiveness, efficiency and developmental 
policy impact in Lesotho. Hence the public and developmental administrative assessment 
of the nature, type of relations between Local Government Units (LGUs) and customary 
chieftaincy and central government, financing/budget, political and electoral systems and 
institutional and human developmental effects of decentralization have been obtained for 
policy’s constraints identification and improvements. 
 
In-depth interviews and key informant interviews entailing asking questions, listening to 
and recording the answers and then posing additional questions-probing to clarify or 
expand on a particular issue of enquiry have been used. Some questions were open-ended 
to promote expression of own perceptions of decentralization elected and staff officials in 
their own words (See Appendix F (Questionnaire)). In-depth interviews had a purpose of 
comprehending the insiders’ view-point about this policy of decentralization and its 
impact on development in their own terminology and judgments. The standardized open-
ended interview and semi-structured interview questions were combined for thorough 
details and good data analysis. Standardized open-ended interviews allowed one as an 
evaluator to collect detailed data systematically and facilitate comparability among all the 
respondents. The difficulty with this method, while it was focused and disciplined 
towards studying the depth of targeted issues, was that it reduced the extent to which 
individual differences and circumstances can be fully incorporated in the assessment. Key 
informant interviews targeted knowledgeable respondents of the topic and those included 
experts or public officials in the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) highly involved 
in the designing and implementation of the decentralization policy in Lesotho. The basis 
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for the selection of respondents was thus on expert
4
 sampling, that is on LG daily 
practitioners and experience. This also included purposeful sampling to attain a less 
costly and least time-consuming study exercise, ease of administration in conducting 
interviews and high participation rate as well as generalization in data analysis as similar 
subjects are used with an insurance of receipt of needed relevant information. 
  
The rationale behind questions asked during the interviews can be seen within an 
assessment method/formative evaluation that was mainly adopted. The typical questions 
involved in formative evaluation included; what parts of the ‘programme/policy’ are 
working? What needs to be changed/improved and how? Formative evaluation is often 
meant for improvement of the policy/programme. Programme administrators and staff are 
usually the audience or the internal evaluators through in-depth interviews. Summative 
evaluation method has also been used to complement the formative evaluation. Unlike 
formative seeking to improve, summative seeks to certify policy’s/programme’s 
utility/efficiency/effectiveness through use of various methods of analysis like objectives-
oriented evaluation/logical-framework analysis which in this case included local 
governance stated functions and extent of development attainment. This again justified 
limited staff interviews and case studies as given below. The generic summative 
questions include ‘what are the results/impacts of the policy/programme? In what/how 
are situations the policy/programme is implemented? What are the 
requirements/constraints of the implementation of the policy (e.g. costs, materials, 
training e.t.c.)? Formative and summative evaluation helped to maintain some assessment 
objectivity and promoted reliability and validity of this policy implementation evaluation 
study. This included at least an assessment on the decentralization process/evolution in 
Lesotho in relation to its poverty reduction functions, implementation of decentralization 
policy, decentralization modification or revisions and on decentralization effectiveness 
and efficiency (See Schumacher, 2001:525-559). Evaluative studies are usually justified 
on grounds of aiding planning for the installation of a policy/programme, aiding in 
                                                
4
 
.
 Expert sampling complements key informant sampling in this study, whereby respondents are chosen purposefully 
on the basis of their informed and practically experienced opinion and knowledge as they are also representative of the 
studied population (Schumacher, 2001).  
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decision making about policy modification and about policy/programme expansion or 
continuation. They contribute towards obtaining evidence for policy support or rejection 
and comprehension of the political processes within the policy’s programme and external 
influences. They determine effect of the policy in an aggregated representative manner 
through samples or few representative case studies, effectiveness and efficiency of the 
policy and facilitate effective practices’ feedback sharing and benchmark data for 
performance rating and comparing purposes. 
 
Documents review for secondary data was also relevantly used on archival material and 
‘administrative’ statistics from MLG, Government Printing Unit, UN Library, 
decentralization consultancy reports (GTZ), Central Bank of Lesotho, academic 
institutions, Parliament documents, bills, gazettes, orders, Acts and various legislative 
documents on decentralization and relevant ‘grey material’(government records/reports). 
These were used to redress and counter-check possible study limitations and biases usual 
in in-depth interviews, expert and purposeful sampling including over-generalization in 
results analysis, less representativeness of the Basotho population and results depending 
on unique characteristics of the expert-purposeful interviwed sample.  
 
1.2.2  Three Districts as Case Studies (Maseru, Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek) 
 
 
Some primary data through semi-structured interviews involving face-to-face in-depth 
interviews with questionnaires enabling respondents’/subjects’/policy formulators’  
participation in the study, analysis and high response rate, were collected from the 
decentralization/local governance structures’ staff. Selection of the districts was based on 
the fact that Maseru represented the urban areas or towns of Lesotho as well as the 
lowlands of this country. Mokhotlong represented mainly the highlands while Qacha’s 
Nek included the foothills and the Senqu/Orange River Valley zone. The four landzones 
of Lesotho including rural and urban areas have thus been fully covered embracing a full 
sample of the range of local government institutions in Lesotho. These three districts 
were also most relevant and useful to the employed purposeful-expert sampled in-depth 
interviews. The first step was to conduct interviews with councillors belonging to the 
thirteen community councils (CCs) from Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek districts. 
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Interviews also included municipal councillors in the urban area/city of the district of 
Maseru.  Each CC had a councillor interviewed. Mainly, these were chairpersons of the 
CCs though ordinary members of the CCs were also interviewed.  This meant that there 
would be at least 26 councillors (CCs’ chairpersons and District Council’s (DCs) 
members denoted as CC and DC on table 1.2 below under council level though others are 
also DCs chairpersons and their deputies) interviewed in all, constituting at least 20% of 
the CCs’ representativeness in the entire country bearing in mind that each CC serves at 
least 10,000 households. There are 128 community councils in all as already indicated. 
Fortunately, this target was exceeded as CCs interviewed in all turned out to be 47 
excluding the other ten interviewed municipal councillors in the MCC, where there is this 
only one municipal the country is having as a pilot project for all the towns in the ten 
various districts. Actually this response rate has given this study, 37% of council’s 
representativeness, thus ensuring statistical significance for data reliability and validity in 
inferential analytical generalizability and conclusiveness.   
 
At the district level face-to-face in-depth individual interviews with the main membership 
of (urban) DCs consisting mainly of all CCs’ chairpersons and their deputies/any CC 
member included the (1) District Secretary (DS) of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek 
districts, though the latter was represented by his well knowledgeable Legal Officer as 
was on annual leave during data collection, (2) administration and (3) finance were 
represented by both the DSs and two Community Councils’ Secretaries/CCSs (CCs’ field 
administrators), though the (4) Qacha’s Nek personnel manager still participated (human 
resources manager), (5) representative of the CCs were the DCs deputy chairpersons, 
(6)two chiefs as ex-officio DC members, (7) Senior district planner in the District 
Planning Unit, chairman, represented by two other CCSs (8) secretary and (9and10) two 
other members of the District Development Coordinating Committee well represented by 
three other DCs. There has therefore been at least 20 interviews in all from senior district 
council membership of both districts (Mokhotlong and Qacha’Nek). 
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Table 1.2: Interviewed LGUs’ Councillors and Staff (Maseru, Mokhotlong, Qacha) 
 
Respondent’s  
name                 
 Area’s/Council’s Name                                           
 
Chief’s Name
(Principal/main) 
 
District  (and ward) 
 
Council level                                                                                                         
(Community                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Council/CC,     
District                                                                                                                                 
Council/DC,                                                                                                                    
Maseru City                                                                                                              
Council/MCC) 
1. Teboho Mokhoane 
2. Kizito Makumbi 
3. Hiren Najiar 
4. R. Lekoane 
5. M. Morahanye 
6. M. Nthako 
7. T. Ncheke 
8. M. Mokooane 
9. M. Lempetje 
10.M. Chuene 
11.M.Motiki 
12.M.Tuoane 
13.P. Monaheng 
14.M.Letsapo 
15. M. Leneha 
16.A.Matsoso 
17.K.Matsoso   
18.’Maphakiso Moseme 
19. T. T!enase 
20.‘Makatleo Makhasane 
21.M. Leuta 
22. L. Lerato 
23. M. Mohasi 
24. M. Lesia 
25.L. Makoko 
26. Tokelo Mohlophi 
27. ‘Manapo Matlali 
28. Thabo P. Thatho 
29. M. Moloi 
30.Mothepu Sebilo 
31.Tsebo Lerotholi 
32. ‘Mualle Letsie 
33. L. ‘Mat’sepo 
34. Katiso Mabusela 
35. M. Mamotlatsi 
36. Pheello Rapase 
37.M. Ramoeletsi 
38. M. Mohale 
39.Tsepang Motakane 
40. Maatang Sekati 
41. Masoabitana Thamana 
42.Tefo Faatle 
43.Morojele Qoo 
44.Masechaba Limema 
45.Malebohang Mothokoa 
46.Borane Thapeli 
47.Makhaphela Sekonyela 
48.Reentseng Sekantsi 
49.Naha Hopo 
50.Thabiso Maqalaka 
51.Mamohato Posholi 
52.Muso Moahloli 
73.Thabang Phakane 
54.Bakang Lesala 
55.Lebakeng Ratabane 
56.Moshasha Likhale 
57.Matlholiso Mohlafuno 
58.Malerato Mosola 
59.Matifi Matete 
60.Malefane Tjakata 
61.Thabo Khetheng 
62.Mothepu Mothae 
63.Makabelo Tikiso 
64.Mamofokeng Tsilo 
65.Retselisitsoe Morojele 
66.Tsielo Lekobane 
67.Lira-ha-li-bonoe Setoko 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Maseru City 
Qacha(DC’s Office) 
Qacha (Ha Sekake) 
Qacha (Whte Hill) 
Qacha(DC’s Office) 
Qacha (Patlong) 
Qacha (Rat!oleli) 
Qacha (Whte Hill) 
Qacha KhomoPhat!oa 
Qacha (Rat!oleli 9) 
Qacha (Patlong 1) 
Qacha Mosenekeng 
Qacha Thaba-Khubelu 
Qacha Ha Sekake 
QachaThabaLit!oene 
QachaThabaLit!oene 
Qacha Rat!oleli 9 
Qacha Ramat’seliso 
Qacha Maseepho 4 
Qacha Maseepho 4 
Qacha Thaba-Khubelu 
Matsoku * 
Matsoku 
Matsoku 
Khubelu 
Khubelu 
Mapholaneng 
Mapholaneng 
Pae-la-itlhatsoa 
Pae-la-itlhatsoa 
Pae-la-itlhatsoa 
Popa 
Popa 
Molika-liko 
Molika-liko 
Khalahali 
Khalahali 
Moremoholo 
Moremoholo 
Sakeng 
Sakeng 
Mateanong 
Mateanong 
Liphamola 
Liphamola 
Liphamola 
Rafolatsane 
Rafolatsane 
Rafolatsane 
Rafolatsane 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
Napo Majara 
M. Makhaola 
M. Tautona 
L. Ofihlile 
M. Makhaola 
Makoko Makoae 
Fako Masopha 
L. Ofihlile 
M. Makhaola 
Fako Masopha 
Makoko Makoae 
M. Mpiti 
M. Makhobalo 
M. Tautona 
‘Mualle Letsie 
Petlane Pelei 
M. ‘Malireko 
L. Makhokolotso 
M. Rapase 
M. Tsepa 
M. Mohale 
M. Sekonyela 
M. Sekonyela 
M. Sekonyela 
M. Sekonyela 
M. Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M. Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
M.Sekonyela 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Maseru-MCC 
Maseru-MCC 
Maseru-MCC 
Maseru (Lithoteng ward 11) 
Maseru (Mabote ward 1) 
Maseru (Mabote ward 2) 
Maseru (Motimposo 3) 
Maseru (Stadium Area 4) 
Maseru (Stadium Area 5) 
Maseru (Central/CBD 6) 
Maseru (Qoaling 8) 
Maseru (Qoaling 9) 
Maseru (Lithabaneng 10) 
Maseru (Lithoteng 12) 
Maseru (Abia 13) 
Maseru (Abia) 
Maseru (Likotsi) 
Maseru (Central 7) 
Qacha’s Nek (Town) 
Qacha’s Nek (Ha Sekake) 
Qacha’s Nek (White Hill) 
Qacha’s Nek (Town) 
Qacha’s Nek (Patlong) 
Qacha’s Nek (Rat!oleli) Qacha’s 
Nek(Whte Hill2) 
Qacha’s Nek  Khomo Phat!oa 
Qacha’s Nek (Rat!oleli 9) 
Qacha’s Nek (Patlong 1) 
Qacha’sNekMosenekeng6 
Qacha’s Nek Thaba-Khubelu 7 
Qacha’s Nek Ha Sekake 
Qacha’s Nek Thaba-Litsoene 
Qacha’s Nek Thaba-Litsoene 
Qacha’s Nek Rat!oleli 9 
Qacha’s Nek Ramat’seliso 
Qacha’s Nek Maseepho 4 
Qacha’s Nek Maseepho 4 
Qacha’s Nek Thaba-Khubelu 
Mokhotlong Matsoku 
Mokhotlong Matsoku 
Mokhotlong Matsoku 
Mokhotlong Khubelu 
Mokhotlong Khubelu 
Mokhotlong Mapholaneng 
Mokhotlong Mapholaneng 
Mokhotlong Pae-la-itlhatsoa 
Mokhotlong Pae-la-itlhatsoa 
Mokhotlong Pae-la-itlhatsoa 
Mokhotlong Popa 
Mokhotlong Popa 
Mokhotlong Molika-liko 
Mokhotlong Molika-liko 
Mokhotlong Khalahali 
Mokhotlong Khalahali 
Mokhotlong Moremoholo 
Mokhotlong Moremoholo 
Mokhotlong Sakeng 
Mokhotlong Sakeng 
Mokhotlong Mateanong 
Mokhotlong Mateanong 
Mokhotlong Liphamola 
Mokhotlong Liphamola 
Mokhotlong Liphamola 
Mokhotlong Rafolatsane 
Mokhotlong Rafolatsane 
Mokhotlong Rafolatsane 
Mokhotlong Rafolatsane 
MCC’s City Engineer 
MCC’s Treasurer 
MCCs Parks-Director 
MCC’s Mayor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
MCC’s Councillor 
Abia Chief in MCC 
Likotsi Chief in MCC 
MCC’s Deputy Mayor 
DC’s Legal Officer 
CC Secretary (CCS) 
CCS 
DC’s Personnel Manager 
CCS 
CCS 
CC and DC 
CC and DC 
CC and DC 
DC Deputy Chairperson 
CC and DC 
DC Chairperson 
CC and DC 
Chief in DC 
CC and DC 
CC and DC 
CC and DC 
CC and DC 
CC and DC 
Chief in DC 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
DC Chairperson 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC Member 
CC Member 
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Source: Field Survey/Interviews July, 2009 to July 2010. 
 
(*intersecting with other legal boundaries e.g. administrative districts (of Leribe) and other 
chiefs’ territories)  
 
At the municipal council in Maseru, the City Council’s (1) chairman/mayor, (2) secretary 
in the form of the deputy mayor, (3) finance manager officially called the Treasurer, (4) 
human resources manager representative, (5) two chiefs as ex-officio members (6)   and 
actually ten other elected City Council Members have been individually interviewed. The 
ten City Council representatives were expected to increase the number of individual 
interviews in three districts to 30 in all and 26 Councillors in CCs (56 interviews). 
However, high response rate resulted in 18 interviewees in the MCC and greater 
participation by the CCs increased such individual interviewees to 73 as on table 1.2 
above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Location of the Case Studies (Maseru, Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek) 
(Maseru district covers the lowlands and some foothills, Mokhotlong the highlands, Qacha’s Nek, the remotest foothills and Senqu 
valley as the main land-zones). 
68.Mathabo Nkone 
69.Retsana Seala 
70.Mapulane Moleko 
71.Nkoebele Makhakhe 
72.Stephen Tsoinyane 
73.Khalema khoabane 
 
Marung 
Marung 
Linakaneng 
Linakaneng* 
Tekeseleng 
Mokhotlong DC office 
 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
Mathealira Seeiso 
 
Mokhotlong Marung 
Mokhotlong Marung 
Mokhotlong Linakeng 
Mokhotlong Linakeng 
Mokhotlong Tekeseleng 
Mokhotlong DC Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
CC and DC 
CC Member 
DC Deputy Chairperson 
CC Member 
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The types of interviews used on the respondents in the above table 1.2 included face-to-
face in-depth interviews with the questionnaire being filled by the researcher, informal 
interviews, and formal group interviews during regular monthly meetings of all the CCs, 
DCs and the MCC. Informal and group interviews were meant to revalidate accuracy of 
the data from individual interviews. The used structured questionnaire encompassed both 
 20 
open-ended and closed-ended questions to facilitate both free expression of opinions and 
guided opinion for relevant data and better quality qualitative and quantitative data 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER TWO: AN OVERVIEW OF DECENTRALIZATION 
2.0  General Introduction 
 
The chapter  provides background on the process of decentralization globally and locally. 
It is intended to provide an analysis on why countries are decentralizing. It aims at 
conceptualizing the study’s key terms to set up the study’s theoretical framework. Firstly, 
in order to enable contextual use of the key terms, conceptualization of such concepts is 
done beginning by comprehending decentralization concisely as the transfer of powers 
and functions, along with fiscal responsibility to carry out such powers and functions, 
from the national to the local level of government possessing own budget, separate legal 
existence and authority (autonomy) to allocate substantial resources on a range of 
different functions and representatives to make decisions on behalf of the local 
community (Mawhood, 1983:9-10 and Stren, 2003). The attempt of thoroughly 
understanding the depth of decentralization entails its relationship with development 
delivery (which is also diagrammatically analyzed in chapter 7 and 8) as contextualized 
for Lesotho. The key question in this chapter which is why countries are decentralizing 
has also been, secondly, tackled by debating the validity of the functions of LG which 
justified decentralization even further. The chapter also examines the World Bank’s and 
other authors’ convictions on why countries ought to decentralize. Thirdly, 
decentralization and its challenges in the Third World are discussed. The last two tasks 
confirm the argument in this study that decentralization has both prospects and challenges 
particularly in the developing world. Fifthly, operationalization of the related concepts to 
decentralization, to be applied as a theoretical framework in this study including local 
governance, decentralized governance for development (DGD) and good governance are 
discussed. Lastly, the periodic incidental waves of decentralization (as strategies for 
administrative, democratization, economic and reforms or restructuring (state institutions 
and market opportunities) reasons) are discussed. This section thus also includes factors 
to decentralization globally and in Africa encompassing Lesotho. 
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2.1 Contrasting Definitions of LG and Decentralization 
 
There are different stances with regard to decentralization due to varying perspectives 
based on various circumstances, analyses, definitions and interests, all probably not 
completely immune from subjectivity. One’s conviction on the basis of the secondary and 
primary data to be used through this thesis is that decentralization could be the 
appropriate policy for development delivery in Lesotho but such appropriateness does not 
turn it into a panacea without inherent risks and constraints requiring precautions and 
remedies and efficiency and effectiveness in its proper adoption to effect its success in 
development/service delivery.  
 
This then brings us to various definitions and pragmatic applications of decentralization 
which also portray such different stances to it. For instance, Faguet (2000:2) points to the 
vagueness of the term itself, and points out that the term, ‘decentralization’, has been 
“used in the policy literature to refer to everything from the administrative 
deconcentration of executive agencies in autocratic regimes to privatization in 
democracies…the devolution by the central (i.e. national) government of specific 
functions, with all of the administrative, political and economic attributes that these 
entail, to local (i.e. municipal) governments which are independent of the centre within a 
legally delimited geographic and functional domain.” Rondinelli et al (1986:5) view it 
from the administrative point as “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management, 
and the raising and allocation of resources from the central government and its agencies 
to field units of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, area-
wide, regional or functional authorities, or non-governmental private or voluntary 
organizations.” Rondinelli et al (1989:59) further regarded it “as a situation in which 
pubic goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of 
individuals by market mechanisms.”On the other hand, some people view 
decentralization as simply “a fashion of our time” (Manor, 1999:1)”, or an exogenously 
inspired ‘neo-liberal’ economic policy approach connected to privatization and targeting 
the poor for social programmes (Vilas, 1996:1), or part of the pressure exerted by the 
international lending agencies as an antidote to the accumulated costs of over-
centralization (Willis et al, 1999:16), or a conditionality of aid.   
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Still in the same vein of clarifying one’s stance to decentralization, it needs to be stated 
that one fully consents with the understanding of Faguet (2000:2) and Rondinelli et al 
(1986:5 and 1989:59) as well as Olowu et al (2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006) who 
rightly link decentralization to LG which is self-government involving the administration 
of public affairs in each locality by a body of elected representatives of the local 
community. It is indeed one form of decentralization.  
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2004) perceives decentralization 
as the restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between 
institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the 
principle of subsidiarity. Based on such principle, functions are transferred to the lowest 
institutional or social level capable of completing them. Decentralization relates to the 
role of and the relationship between central and sub-national institutions, whether they 
are public, private or civic. 
 
Cameron (1996:397 and 2001:99 and 2003:106-107) and Mawhood (1993:9-10) perceive 
decentralization as encompassing devolution/democratic decentralization, 
deconcentration and delegation. Decentralization is defined as the transfer of planning, 
decision-making and administrative authority from the central government to LGs 
(Training manuals 5
th
 July 2005). These various authors (Mawhood, 1983:1, Cameron, 
1996 and 2001, Manor, 1998:4-11) agree that decentralization involves a context-
determined combination of the following: Deconcentration, Devolution, Delegation and 
Privatization. These four forms of decentralization are primarily distinguished on the 
basis of the powers that central governance transfers to the local units. The different 
forms reflect different arrangements for representation of the local community, different 
degrees of decentralization of government power, different approaches to 
decentralization, different climate of rules, regulations and expectations and different 
resource control arrangements.  
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Devolution is the “conferment of rule-making and executive powers of a specified or 
residual nature on formally constituted sub-national units (Vosloo et al, 1974:10)”. 
Devolution has these characteristics: 
• LG ought to be separate constitutionally from central government and be 
responsible for a significant range of services. 
• Local authorities ought to have their own treasury, a separate budget and accounts, 
and their own taxes to produce a significant part of their revenue.  
• Local authorities should have the right to allocate substantial resources, including 
the power to decide over expenditure, to vary revenue, and to appoint and promote 
staff. 
• Policy should be decided by local councils, consisting mainly of elected 
representatives. 
• Central government administrators should play an indirect, advisory and inspection 
role only (Cameron, 2003 and Mawhood, 1993).  
 
Devolution is the transfer of discretionary decision-making, planning, administration and 
financial management to independent LG units with powers to sue and be sued. The 
political base of officials in these units is the locality not the centre. They spend or invest 
resources at their discretion; provided they are operating within the legislative limits and 
that their actions do not conflict with the constitution and other laws of the land 
(Mawhood, 1993). 
 
Deconcentration involves the transfer of workload from the central government head 
offices to regional branches. Major policy control rests with the central government 
control. Deconcentration is the shifting of responsibility and workloads from central 
government ministry headquarters to staff located outside the national capital. It also 
refers to institutional changes that shift the authority to the national civil service 
personnel posted at dispersed locations. In this arrangement, staff and resources are 
transferred from headquarters to lower units of administration to take operational 
decisions without reference to the headquarters. With deconcentration, the central 
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government is not giving up any authority but relocates its offices at different levels or 
points in the territory (Crook, 1998:7, Mawhood, 1993 and Cameron, 2003).   
 
Delegation is the transfer of broad authority to plan and implement decisions concerning 
specific activities to organizations such as LG technically and administratively capable of 
exercising them with some autonomy (Rondinelli, 1981:137-138). For decentralization to 
be effective councillors as elected local representatives must form local policy and be 
accountable to local voters. The councils must also have sufficient financial resources to 
perform their functions. Delegation is the shifting of responsibility for administering 
public functions previously done by central government ministries to semi-independent 
organizations which are not wholly controlled by the government but are ultimately 
accountable to it. Such organizations include marketing boards and other parastatal 
bodies, public corporations, regional planning and area development authorities, housing, 
project implementation units and single multi-purpose functional bodies (Illinois, 
1980:1).  
 
Privatization as suggested by various authors is often linked to decentralization in 
implementation. Since this study mainly treats decentralization in a sense of 
administrative devolution/LG, examining the link between privatization and 
decentralization is not of paramount importance here. Privatization is seen when units of 
government promote ownership of assets and service delivery by private/non-public 
individuals/institutions for efficiency. It is a World Bank initiated policy which is usually 
accompanied by deregulation, reducing state intervention in a market. It is done primarily 
for reasons of efficiency of certain functions and services to various sections of private 
sector namely; business entities, community groups, co-operatives, associational groups 
and non-governmental and community based organizations. Reddy (1999:17), equates 
privatization to out sourcing by the LG in the supply of services.   
 
Olowu and Wunsch (2004:2) also connect local governance to decentralization as they 
state that, 
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“decentralization reforms only make sense if they lead to a working political 
outcome: effective local governance…(whereby firstly) decentralization is a 
lengthy and complex process of reform that, beginning with constitutional and/or 
statutory changes at the center, ideally progressively distributes responsibilities, 
resources, authority, and autonomy from center to periphery…(and secondly) 
local governance, is the situation that obtains when localities are able effectively 
to manage their public affairs in a way that is accountable to local residents.”  
 
Furthermore, according to Cameron (2006), political decentralization in the 1980s and 
1990s has resulted into LGs being given more powers by central governments, globally. 
LG reforms, particularly in Africa, have been influenced by the economic crisis that led 
to political and economic reforms. Such reforms have been supported by World Bank.  
 
2.1.1. Local Governance and Validity of Justification for Decentralization 
on the basis of LG’s functions 
 
Local governance by definition involves a degree of decentralization. Meyer (1978:10) 
perceives LG as “local democratic units within the democratic system…which are 
subordinate members of the government vested with prescribed, controlled governmental 
powers and sources of income to render specific local services and to control and regulate 
the geographic, social and economic development of defined local areas.” Its inherent 
characteristics include locality, being a legal personality, autonomy, government power, 
participation and representation through the local electoral process (Mushi, 1992, Reddy, 
1999, and Meyer, 1978). LG generally refers to the government of an area smaller than a 
country, state or province. Such areas include cities, towns and villages. Each unit of LG 
has some important responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and provides certain 
services. LGs may usually be run by elected officials though at times in some countries 
(Zambia) are run by the professional bureaucracy only. Zambia’s central government has 
decided to recruit and appoint only the professional bureaucracy as local councillors to 
attain and maintain staff competency by using only qualified/educated personnel and 
reduce costs by not including and using elected local uneducated councillors in LG. They 
have some power of taxation. Unlike in Zambia where only the recruited bureaucracy by 
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the central government is used, Lesotho uses both the locally elected councillors and the 
bureaucracy recruited by the central government. The 1997 Act on decentralization in 
Lesotho is still silent about the specific taxes, levies and fines councillors can use. This 
has stifled any little financial capacity the LGUs could ever have to finance local 
development delivery. The main functions of LG vary from country to country. They 
often include road building and maintenance, regulation of building standards, public 
health, refuse collection and local amenities like public parks (Ismail, Bayat and Meyer, 
1997).  
 
LG is self-government involving the administration of public affairs in each locality by a 
body of elected representatives of the local community. It is one form of decentralization. 
According to Byrne (1986:2, 60-61) LG is a multi-purpose institution, every local 
authority has many jobs to do and a variety of development services to provide. The 
range of LG responsibilities is extensive. The development services it typically performs 
may be grouped into five categories as (1) protective, (2) environmental, (3) personal, (4) 
recreational, (5) and commercial. Protective development services include fire, police, 
consumer protection, animal diseases, and licensing. Environmental development 
services include highways, environmental health, transport and planning. Social services 
encompass education, careers, housing, social work, homes, aids and meals. Recreational 
services comprise sports facilities, camp sites, theatres, museums, galleries and libraries. 
Commercial services include provision of markets, transport and small holdings.  
 
Vosloo (1974:10) states that, “Local Governance is generally used to refer to a 
decentralized, representative institution with general and specific powers, devolved upon 
it and delegated to it by central or regional governance in respect to a restricted 
geographical area within a nation or state, and in the exercise of which it is locally 
responsible and may to a certain degree act autonomously”. This suggests a local political 
process which is analytically separated from the nation-wide process because the issues 
around which it revolves have local characters. UNDP (2004) describes local governance 
as comprising of a set of institutions, mechanisms and processes, through which citizens 
and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and 
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exercise their rights and obligations at the local level. The building blocks of good local 
governance are many:  citizen participation, partnerships among key actors at the local 
level, capacity of local actors across all sectors, multiple flows of information, 
institutions of accountability, and a pro-poor orientation.   
 
Byrne (1986: 5-8) views LG as very important and difficult to imagine its disappearance 
thus it is worth taking into account some of the reasons advanced to justify it. The first 
justification is that LG is an efficient method of administering certain development 
services. This justification is based on the following grounds: (a) Local authorities consist 
of members who are drawn from local populace and thus have local knowledge and a 
commitment to the local area and its people. (b) Local authorities are multipurpose bodies 
and can therefore secure a greater degree of coordination and policy integration, (c) 
public administration generally benefits from the existence of local authorities because 
they off-load responsibilities from the central government departments and civil servants 
who would otherwise be overburdened with work if not become more inefficient. LG 
develops management capacity among LGUs and provinces, doing functions not 
efficiently and effectively done by national departments and develops capacities of local 
officials. In a way, it increases national government’s efficiency by relieving top 
management of routine tasks. Local officials also develop their management and 
technical skills. It provides a coordinating structure for ministries and development 
agencies in various districts/provinces/regions. In that way, it also strengthens national 
policy and planning by freeing ministry staff from administrative and routine 
responsibilities. In this way it allows central governance to play the supervising and 
setting of standard roles and supports attitudinal behaviours and cultural conditions 
(Illinois, 1980, Mawhood, 1993, Crook, 1998, Crook and Manor, 1998, Reddy, 1999:18-
21 and World Bank, 2000:23-24).  
 
LG facilitates political and administrative ‘penetration’ of national government policies 
in remote areas where support for national policies is weak. DGD can contribute to 
greater coordination of policies and personnel from numerous line ministries especially at 
intermediate levels (provinces and districts) rather than at local levels. LG allows local 
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people a greater chance to participate in development planning and decision-making. It 
permits convenient provision of services locally for which they travelled long distances to 
obtain. As thus it facilitates development from the grass roots. LG increases public 
participation in the development process thereby increasing a sense of community 
ownership of projects. It also allows special interest groups to be represented and 
participate in decision-making in local councils, for instance, youth, women and the 
disabled. As a result it ensures better representativity for different groups in development 
decisions and promotes equity in resources allocation. This promotes political stability 
and national unity through participation of groups in different parts of the country in 
developmental decision making causing them to accept the political system. Officials are 
also enabled to have more knowledge and sensitivity on local problems and needs and 
insight on possible solutions (Illinois, 1980 and Mawhood, 1993).  
 
So, LG allows for mass participation by local citizenry and facilitates exchange of 
information relative to local needs and channels them to the national government directly.  
It creates an alternative means of decision making and may offset influence and control 
of insensitive or unsympathetic elites on development activities, in national governments. 
It thus promotes flexible, innovative and creative local management relative to policies 
which if successful may be replicated or costs minimized to a limited jurisdiction if 
failure occurs. LG can increase the number of public goods and services rendered and the 
efficiency in that they are delivered at reduced cost by reducing diseconomies of scale 
inherent in over concentration in the national capital. LG also enables local leaders to 
locate services more effectively within communities, integrating areas that are isolated 
into regional economies, to also monitor and evaluate implementation of development 
projects more carefully (Illinois, 1980, Mawhood, 1993, Crook, 1998, Crook and Manor, 
1998, Reddy, 1999:18-21 and World Bank, 2000:23-24).  
 
DGD can enhance local political participation and quicken local associational activity. It 
therefore activates civil society drawing it into structured and moderating political 
processes giving them a sense of owning government policies, processes and projects.   
DGD can encourage partnerships between government agencies and the private sector, 
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usually small-scale, local partnerships. It thus can make government processes more 
transparent to ordinary citizens though this at times leads them into incorrect thinking 
that the government has become corrupt. DGD makes government institutions more open 
by providing opportunities for elected representatives at lower levels to influence official 
decisions and the design and the implementation of government programmes. DGD can 
enhance the accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives and the 
accountability of elected representatives to citizens. These aspects hoped for in DGD can 
reduce overall corruption in the political system through greater transparency and 
accountability. DGD enhances citizens’ understanding of government health, education 
and sanitation programmes. Locally elected representatives can explain these details 
better than government employees. DGD can help programmes be more responsive and 
appropriate to local conditions and as such increase an uptake on such programmes and 
reduce absenteeism among LG employees in schools, health dispensaries and so on, 
strengthening service delivery. It makes the government appear more legitimate in the 
eyes of its people through accountability, transparency and enhanced effectiveness and 
responsiveness of government more generally. It can also help scale up successful 
projects and occasionally replicate them (Illinois, 1980, Mawhood, 1993, Crook, 1998, 
Crook and Manor, 1998, Reddy, 1999:18-21 and World Bank, 2000:23-24). 
 
The second justification is that of having a fair degree of autonomy, the local authorities 
can take initiatives and experiment. They can seek a variety of solutions to society’s 
problems, that is, they may innovate and pioneer new services or methods of 
administration and successful ideas may spread to other authorities. LG encourages 
mutual approach in solving local problems. The justification is that LG encourages 
citizenship democracy and promotes political education in its widest sense. It does so by 
involving large numbers of people in the political decision-making process. It gives local 
politicians and the public a chance to practice, learn and understand democratic practices. 
Fourthly, LG is seen as a defence against an all-powerful central government and the 
abuse of power. It is argued that strong LG system helps to disperse political power and 
diminish the danger of an over-centralized state. It cuts bottlenecks or red tape imposed 
by an over-centralized system. As thus DGD reduces delays in decision making. LG 
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promotes inter-sectoral collaboration at the local governance level. Furthermore the 
diffusion of decision-making power is justified on the grounds that numerous errant 
policies among a variety of local authorities cause less harm than one policy failure.  
There are also other people who justify it on the grounds that it has stood the test of time. 
LG is also seen as a means of representing tax payers. Since local authorities impose 
taxes, then the tax payers are represented in a body that determines how the tax should be 
spent. LG makes it easier for the local people to relate taxes to development (Ibid and 
Shah, 2000: 22).                  
 
Some countries were attracted to decentralization in order to realize its advantages when 
successfully implemented. Such advantages were concerned mainly with party politics 
especially at city level. Countries adopted decentralization realizing that in it: 
• There are more candidates and fewer uncontested areas in local elections. 
• There is clarification of issues as parties challenge each other to defend and 
justify their assertions and arguments. 
• Citizens develop more awareness of and interest in LG, reflected in a higher 
electoral turnout. 
• Change and initiative are stimulated, as parties, with principles and resources, 
develop policies to put before the electorate. 
• Accountability is enhanced as parties and their candidates individually make 
public commitments and promises which if elected will seek to implement and 
account for.  
• Government coherence is achieved through majority party existence able to carry 
out policies it was elected for. 
• Democracy is enhanced through existence of electorally endorsed policies and 
programmes thus reducing influence of unelected and unaccountable officers 
(Cameron, 2003 and Shah, 2000).  
 
Decentralization has been adopted on grounds (especially in multi-ethnic nations, since 
the diverse needs of the various ethnic groupings are locally addressed) that it can defuse 
conflicts since local/regional governments a) improve public services, b) are better 
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acquainted with the local causes of conflict, c) facilitate participation and co-
determination by minorities and d) enable the reconstruction of failed states from the 
bottom up. Decentralization can further have the following positive impacts on conflicts: 
• Compared with a centralist government apparatus, local/regional capacities are both 
more efficient (cost savings and greater flexibility) and more effective (proximity to 
local needs). This improves public service delivery, raises the satisfaction of the 
population with public administration and can bolster the legitimacy of the political 
system. This in turn can contribute to stability and the peaceful settlement of 
conflicts. 
• Local authorities are more familiar with the local causes of conflict, can analyze these 
more precisely, take measures to balance interests and raise the chances of non-
violent settlement through participatory approaches. 
• Handing over power to local/regional levels can give minorities more say. They can 
participate politically directly where they live and preserve their local ethnic identity 
better. This can avert demands for autonomy and secession (GTZ, 2004). 
 
Decentralization can contribute to rebuilding failed states. Local/regional levels have the 
necessary proximity to the local population and the organizational and spatial capacities, 
which is why they can liaise between donors and the population in reconstruction. Civic 
participation and the provision of the necessary services at local level can also renew 
legitimate government from below. These beneficial effects of decentralization on 
conflicts can be contravened by adverse impacts, though. In a comparative analysis of 
fifteen decentralized states, it can be refuted that increased codetermination and 
autonomy prevents violent conflict around secession (GTZ, 2004). 
 
In summary, this thesis regards decentralization as the devolution of political, 
administrative and resources capacity and power from the central government to the 
lower legitimate socio-politically-economically inclusive government tiers characterized 
by local government autonomy in the selection of local staff and control, ability to access 
national government and influence national local government policy, range of local 
government functions, local political parties making decisions independently of their 
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national structures and LGUs raising their own sources of revenue independently of 
higher tiers of government. These qualities basically constitute the framework used in 
chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9 to assess the degree and the efficiency of the adoption of 
decentralization and its development delivery in Lesotho. 
 
2.1.2 Decentralization and its Challenges 
 
The validity of these justifications is not overwhelming and absolute. The fact that 
council members are local people does not guarantee efficiency in development delivery. 
Byrne (1986:8-9) also argues that many local authorities are felt to be too small to be 
effective in provision of some or all of their development functions. They are of multi-
purpose in nature and this does not ensure greater amount of coordination. It takes good 
management skills to coordinate a wide variety of activities and integrate them. If the 
personnel in the council is not endowed with such skills good coordination cannot be 
expected. In fact this is one of the reasons why many attempts at decentralization have 
failed. LG is also seen as either too bureaucratic or too party political to be efficient or 
sufficiently responsive to public opinion. Though local authorities may be progressive 
and pioneer new development services when given enough autonomy, equally they may 
drag their feet and be closed to new ideas. Thus decentralization encourages narrow 
attitudes and policies. Furthermore, it is an exaggeration to say that the presence of LG is 
a barrier against excessive state power and a catalyst to the release of simmering 
community participation. On the contrary and in reality the central government exercises 
considerable control over the policies of LG. According to Griffiths (1976:10-11), the 
system of exchequer grants is itself a measure of control on the activities of local 
authorities. It is true that local authorities use the advices from central government at 
their discretion but some advice is couched in such forceful terms that local authorities, 
who are after all dependent on the continuation of grants ignore it at their peril.          
 
The problematic situation is that beside these above possible benefits of decentralization, 
many authors have indicated that local governance/decentralization, particularly in the Third 
World, including Lesotho, is often confronted with the following challenges: lack of 
leadership provision/training and capacity building for development and service delivery 
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and institutional support by the Ministry of LG (MLG).  The MLG is supposed to conduct 
field studies to get feedback from the LGUs and be able to amend legislation for efficiency 
and effectiveness in development and service delivery on time but it has been blamed for not 
conducting such studies. Since 2005 to date, MLG in Lesotho has not yet conducted any 
monitoring and evaluative study to improve local development delivery. LG in the Third 
World is incapacitated itself and fails to provide human and infrastructural resources to local 
authorities. The case of Lesotho, as explored in the chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9, illustrates how 
decentralization in the Third World often suffers from a failure to specify roles and 
sufficiently sensitize decentralization stakeholders of their roles in such decentralization 
process (Olowu, 2000, 2003 and 2004).  
 
LG in the Third World lacks human resources capacity and financial management capacity 
and may therefore not positively impact local governance. This local governance system 
often introduced lacks fund raising capacity, the educational background of councillors is 
also often too low, relations with the central government are also not often clear. Local 
councillors lack the required human resources and financial resources to effectively meet 
public service requirements. Local authorities often lack political and administrative 
capacity to inject development. At times the MLG introduces decentralization with the 
political expediency of accessing donor funding without proper consultation and 
participation of the needy rural-urban citizens (See next chapters 5 to 9 on Lesotho as my 
case study) (Olowu, 2000, 2003 and 2004).  
 
Furthermore in the Third World, disadvantages of decentralization have been seen to include 
national costliness, inefficiency from local authorities’ incompetence and lack of adequate 
funds/revenues, inertia or conservativeness and possessiveness due to traditional likings by 
community members, regional and social inequalities as affluent groups and areas become 
in a better position to use their devolved powers, selfishness by change evading  
unrepresentative dominant oligarchies on LG, weakness tendency in enforcing obligations 
especially on the strong local elite enjoying protection from national government ministers, 
corruption and separatist tendencies by the once repressed who may then seek complete 
sovereignty. In the case of Lesotho (Chapter 5 to 9), field data confirmed that at the 
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city/municipality level constraints also include great difficulty in having minority party 
candidates and independents elected due to more party candidates; as a result there is a 
narrower debating of issues due to party rhetoric playing a major role. This leads to less 
public involvement and mainly party involvement and nationalization of local elections 
focussing on national issues and personalities. The winning party takes all the seats leading 
to reduced representation and exclusion of others. Issues are over politicised and consensus 
is difficult even when necessary for universal gain. Councillors are disciplined into voting in 
line with party interests and not own sound convictions and judgements, hence reduced local 
democracy and professional advice as effective decisions are made by party groups without 
following expert opinion  (Mawhood, 1993, Cameron, 1999:26 and 2003:109, Reddy, 
1999:19-20, Wallis, Crook and Manor in World Bank working paper, 2000:19,Pycroft, 
2000 ‘in differential challenges’,  Stren et al, 2003:1-4,17-21,24 and Hadenius,2003,). 
 
Lutz and Linder (2004), Azfar et. al. (2001: 75) and Prud'homme (1995) have argued that 
decentralization faces various constraints constituting its demerits. They state that local 
elites are not necessarily more responsive to local demands. It is not clear whether 
decentralization has made local governance more efficient. Prud'homme (1995) finds that 
decentralization runs against redistribution and stabilization because it has strengthened 
and increased the influence of the local elites and not the local people. Decentralization 
can then bolster the power of the local elites instead of facilitating equality in 
participation and representation. Crook and Manor (2000:24) also state that “though 
decentralization can help adapt social programmes to local conditions, it is susceptible to 
elite capture, meaning benefits get diverted from people in need to clients of elite 
politicians. This, and strong prejudices against poor, low-status, and minority groups in 
local areas often mean that decentralization does not alleviate poverty”. Chapters 6, 7, 8 
and 9 for our case study Lesotho do confirm that decentralization in Lesotho is 
experiencing political elite and (traditional) chieftaincy elite capture impeding its 
development delivery. Just in this context, it could be confirmed that at times, DGD does 
little to encourage long-term development perspectives or to assist promote sequencing 
and pacing of reforms. So, it ends up not leading to greater resource mobilization and 
revenue collection necessary for pro-poor policies. Crook and Manor (2000:24) also state 
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that there has so far been no evidence that decentralization does assist much in enhancing 
the state’s financial capacity by mobilizing local resources, or in promoting economic 
growth. Schneider (2003) makes a clear distinction between administrative 
decentralization that is positively related to pro-poor policies and political 
decentralization that is negatively related to pro-poor policies. He finds that political 
decentralization actually lowers the capacity of the LGs to collect taxes because the local 
elites often need to favour those with greater influence and wealth. This means that there 
will be fewer resources available for re-distributive, pro-poor policies (for similar 
findings see Crook and Sverisson, 2001). 
 
Furthermore, central governments and administrations in Third World, which are often 
weak, do not want to give up control, power or resources to the lower levels and so do not 
substantially support attempts to decentralize (Olowu, 2001). This can have various 
reasons, one of which is that governments may fear the loss of national cohesion. But 
governments may introduce and favour decentralization policies if it will improve their 
political support. Assessing a number of case studies, Crook and Sverisson (2001) 
conclude that decentralization meets its goals when central governments have a 
commitment to pro-poor policies in order to broaden their support among the poorer 
population. In this case, governments are prepared to actively engage in local politics, 
both to challenge the local elites and ensure the implementation of such policies. If the 
central governments’ decentralization goal is to consolidate its power through the local 
elites, the central resources are directed on a clientelistic basis rather than on actual needs 
(See chapter 7 and 8 confirming this in Lesotho). 
 
Decentralization in the Third World experiences lack of resources and limited reach. It is 
often the case that power and responsibilities have actually shifted, but without reliable 
resources and transfer mechanisms. The new LGs are established without obtaining the 
necessary resources to function as expected. Even where there are clear rules of inter-
governmental fiscal transfers, central governments do not transfer financial resources 
regularly or reliably. This insecurity hinders proper and sustainable planning at the local 
level. Furthermore, many central governments lack resources and only limited amounts 
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of money can be transferred to the local level. Consequently there is not enough to 
distribute among different LGs within that country. Hopes for the local population are 
therefore not met. Under-resourced decentralized governments do not have much to offer. 
It might be a little progress in education, or a marginally improved health system. Both 
the scale and reach of such amelioration attempts is often very small and insignificant. As 
a consequence, it is not surprising that LGs have often not succeeded in playing a 
dominant role in the community with their disappointing performance. In addition, the 
possibility to increase revenues for LGs through taxes or other forms of tributes, 
especially in poor rural areas, is very limited (Prud'homme, 1995, Crook and Sverisson, 
2001, Azfar et. al. 2001, Olowu, 2001 and Lutz and Linder, 2004). 
 
This is worsened by the fact that decentralization is very costly. With decentralization, 
new institutions must be built and staffing and training carried out at the local level, all of 
which incur significant transfer costs. In government or development agency programs, 
usually only a small number of decentralized units can be financially covered in capacity 
building activities. Project management costs are far too high for most development 
agencies to run projects in a large number of LGs. Furthermore, the need for basic 
infrastructure is in some LGs very great. Donor agencies hope that by working in one 
local area, it will have an impact and spill over effect on others. But these hopes are not 
often granted. These difficulties must be taken into account when examining the possible 
role of traditional authorities in local governance. One of the further problems with the 
attempts at decentralization is that the existing social, economic and political structures 
are often neglected when decentralized political and fiscal structures are designed on the 
drawing board. Traditional power and ruling structures are an existing reality that cannot 
be ignored. Every society has its own norms of production and economic regulations, as 
well as social norms and values, but are often not recognized (Lutz and Linder, 2004). 
 
The idea of traditional rule raises interesting questions about western democratic theories. 
In the history of Western Europe, democratic governance replaced the traditional rule of 
nobles and monarchs. The constitutions of the newly independent states from colonial 
rule were also strongly influenced by democratic theories. Communist and socialist 
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ideologies also did not recognize traditional authorities, because the distribution of power 
to the local areas and to other forces was not compatible with the concept of a single 
party, centralized state characteristic of socialist regimes. Taking into account the 
problems with decentralization, relying on traditional structures could be an attractive 
option to improve local development. Compared to state administrations, traditional 
structures do not need to be built from the start. Establishing new political and 
administrative institutions on the other hand can be difficult, costly and time consuming. 
If there is a structure already functioning at the local level, it is logical to include them in 
improving governance at the local level (Ibid). 
 
Other possible adverse effects of decentralization include abuse by central government 
(divide and rule): Decentralization does not always facilitate political participation; it is 
also used by central governments as a means of safeguarding power and fragmenting 
interest groups. This strategy can be successfully applied in situations with many 
different, equally powerful groups. In Uganda each of the major political groups accounts 
for less than 10-17 percent of the population and is divided along religious lines. This 
constellation enables Uganda's central government to misuse decentralization for the 
preservation of its own power base. The case of Ethiopia also shows how wide the rift 
can be between constitutional principles and reality. In the partly federal state, 
troublesome issues are shifted to local levels to distract attention from co-responsibility 
by central government (GTZ, 2004:7-18).  
 
Decentralization can create losers and new conflicts: Decentralization entails the 
redistribution of power. This gives rise to new, perhaps unprecedented, latent conflicts. 
This can happen, when local elections are held for the first time and local majority 
relations between hostile groups turn out differently to those at national level. This was 
the reason for the unrest in Port Limbe, Cameroon after the district council elections in 
1996. An opposition party emerged as the clear winner of the elections but the lead 
candidate of the former ruling party was appointed mayor by the president. Security 
forces occupied the town, five deaths were recorded. In post-conflict situations former 
rebels are usually among the biggest losers with a considerable potential for violence. 
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Usually, methods and mechanisms for the non-violent settlement of these new conflicts 
yet need to be established. For Lesotho, there is still an impasse on the clear 
redistribution of power and functions between the chiefs and the councillors (see next 
chapter 6 and 7). 
 
The other problem of decentralization is that central government forfeits its arbitrator 
role: In some countries, central government is seen as taking a neutral position in an 
ongoing local conflict. When central administration relinquishes competencies through 
decentralization and can no longer act as arbitrator, opposing interests collide head on. 
This could occur in West Cameroon, where local conflicts surrounding land rights are 
still contained to some extent by central government. This is why leading local 
representatives are deliberately assigned from another region (GTZ, 2004). 
 
Decentralization has often caused inequitable regional development in the Third World 
countries: Regions and municipalities can drift further apart through decentralization. The 
transfer of fiscal competencies, for example, can bankrupt some municipalities with 
incompetent political and administrative personnel. On the other hand, some regions 
could receive preferential treatment from central government when it comes to financial 
resources. This inequitable development in already polarized societies can have a 
destabilizing effect and foster resentment amongst the different regions (Ibid). 
 
Decentralization suffers from the disadvantage of local despotism: Decentralization can 
cement local ethnic majorities. It can worsen the marginalization of local minorities by 
local majorities and lead to so-called local despotism. This is particularly likely when two 
to three large ethnic groups are concentrated geographically.  The risk of a renewed civil 
war in such regions is 50% higher than in areas with very diverse or completely 
homogeneous ethnic patterns. This is the case for about half of all developing countries, 
including Ethiopia or Sri Lanka. This places an enormous constraint on decentralization's 
impact on mitigating conflict (GTZ. 2004). 
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2.1.3 Decentralized Governance for Development (DGD) 
 
According to the UNDP (2004:4), “decentralized governance for development”(DGD) is 
used as the term that links decentralization to development or service delivery, which is 
the focus of this study, unlike other links like privatization.  It is deemed as the best way 
to bring human development at the local level through prioritization of the development 
objectives by the locals. It is regarded as ideal for citizen-participation which can result in 
local empowerment and increased productive capacity. The basic goals, actors, functions, 
dynamics, entry points, principles and levels of DGD are presented in Figure 2.1 below;  
 
Figure 2.1:  Decentralized Governance for Development (DGD) 
  
 Source: UNDP, 2004, Decentralized Governance for Development Report. 
 
DGD is said to enable joint implementation of locally set development objectives/goals 
by actors like the civil society, the private sector and the government that has 
decentralized so as to attain such goals of poverty eradication, gender equality and 
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environmental sustainability. The functions of decentralized government units or elected 
local authorities include policy formulation, service delivery and resource management. 
Dynamic input-activities to the set goals include participation by the local communities in 
partnerships with the government, civil society and the private sector through the micro 
and macro connections. DGD’s entry points include the used systems or 
institutions/practices, social units/structures/organizations/groupings and individuals 
maintaining values of accountability, equity and sustainability. DGD is often 
characterized by devolution of powers at the central/national government, sub-national or 
provincial level and at the local community level (Ibid, 2004).     
 
Urban and rural development implied in DGD covers the broad range of specific issues 
affecting dwellers in cities, towns and villages such as shelter, jobs and income, water, 
and HIV/AIDS at the local level.  Rural-urban relations promote a spatial integration of 
these concerns through policy-making and policy implementation for the flows of people, 
goods and capital between urban and rural areas.DGD offers opportunities for achieving 
cost-effectiveness in service delivery, economic efficiency, national unity, poverty 
reduction and other goals of human development (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Initiatives that are poorly designed and implemented may create unnecessary risks and 
more serious problems, given particularly the highly political nature of DGD. For 
instance, lack of efficient and effective adoption of decentralization including absence of 
prerequisites for successful decentralization in Lesotho has resulted in more structural 
power contests between chiefs and councillors (chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9), recentralization, 
poor citizen participation, non-developmental delivery and other various consequences. 
DGD involves changes in the existing allocation of powers and resources.  Some may 
lose (e.g., central governments) while others are expected to gain (e.g., LGs and the 
communities themselves) from the process.  This can particularly be the case where some 
perceive themselves to be losers, that is if they do not accept the goals of DGD and focus 
only on what power they themselves enjoy, they may see DLG as a stripping of their 
powers. Exactly what is happening in Lesotho with chieftaincy (chapter 6). In other 
words, a paradigm shift/change in perception is required. If people continue to think in a 
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least broad (zero-sum) way they will not be able to explore the optimum/most ideal 
alignment of powers and responsibilities. Win-win (i.e whereby every differentiated 
grouping level gains without losing any priviledges/benefits/entitlements) solutions are 
also possible as power is increased throughout the societal system. Without appropriate 
accountability mechanisms, however, abuse of power, corruption, and capture by elites 
are likely to happen. Conflicts may also arise when DGD reforms fail to address issues of 
social inclusion and respect for local customs and traditions.  Any DGD initiative, 
therefore, should be preceded by a risks analysis.  In general, the challenges facing DGD 
supporters are real: poor capacities, poor culture of participation, and lack of economic 
viability to secure mobilization of resources, among others (UNDP, 2004).  
 
2.1.4 Good governance 
 
According to Mabojunge (1991:24, 40), ‘good governance’ has the following 
characteristics; participation, accountability, and transparency. It is about being able to 
see what decisions are made and how they are made, as well as how decisions are 
implemented once they are agreed upon. Transparency is strengthened when: critical 
decision making is open to the public and the media, obligations are placed on political 
office bearers to disclose their interests, the right of the media to disseminate information 
on the government is protected, regular, accurate and user friendly information on 
government plans, proposals and policies is available to the public and media, the 
executive has a duty to provide regular accessible reports on its performance in the public 
domain, and there is public access to independent spending. Other characteristics are the 
rule of law, strategic vision, consensus orientation, effectiveness and efficiency, 
responsiveness, equity and inclusiveness and corruption minimization. World Bank 
(1994, vii) perceives good governance as synonymous with sound development 
management and the overall quality of government. It is epitomized by transparent and 
enlightened policy making, that is transparent processes; a bureaucracy imbued with a 
professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for its actions, and a 
strong civil society taking part in public affairs, and all behaving under the rule of law 
(McCarney, 2003:4).   
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Jonker (2002) also states characteristics of good governance as openness and 
transparency: community involvement and consultation as to how people will be 
governed. As well as adherence to the values and principles of the supreme law, the 
constitution. The democratically elected office-bearers are also expected to consult the 
electorate to review execution and achieve prioritization of the electorate’s needs, wants 
and interests (Deliberation and consultation). 
 
Capacity to act and deliver: that is there is need to create structures for efficiency and 
effectiveness in the delivery of public services. Efficiency and effectiveness: requires 
people’s needs identification and continuous review of the way in which government 
delivers services for efficiency and effectiveness. Answerability and accountability: 
Constitution needs to provide for creation of structures that facilitate elected officials to 
answer and give an account of how they performed. There is need for clear separation of 
powers between legislative, executive and judiciary authorities to avoid an autocratic 
dictatorial state, and promote fairness. Co-operative government: The distinctive 
hierarchical levels of government, that is the national, provincial and local need to co-
operate, be well coordinated and avoid duplication, that is be optimal in the use of their 
resources. Distribution of state authority and autonomy: (Decentralization) Devolution of 
power and authority is necessary for execution of decisions, especially power to pass 
legislation for implementation of decisions to serve local interests. Constructive response 
providing resolutions by engaging both the government and the business sector through 
various forms of action: Civil society must work hand in hand with government to meet 
needs of the society. Influence on manner in which politicians work: Pressure by interest 
groups, pressure groups, NGOs, CBOs. Monitor government activities to ensure 
continuous answerability and accountability: Constitution must provide for creation of 
independent statutory institutions ensuring answerability and accountability. This 
framework of good governance is important in this study as it serves to be a yardstick 
against which the efficiency and effectiveness of the adoption of decentralization in 
Lesotho will be examined and analyzed in chapter 7 and 8. This includes assessing the 
extent of such decentralization and its contextual challenges in development delivery. 
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Fieldwork findings in chapter 7 and 8 in this study confirm among others least 
community involvement, lack of capacity to act and deliver in LGUs, non-accountability, 
unclear separation of powers and autocratic dictatorial central government in the 
decentralization process of Lesotho. Good governance values and principles as indicators 
of successful or effective decentralization seem to be lacking in Lesotho’s 
decentralization.  
 
2.2.0  Historical Global Context of Decentralization, Factors and Some 
Limitations 
 
Decentralization involving territorial reforms in Europe has mainly been effected by 
national governments’ response to a rapid demographic and physical growth of the cities. 
The reforms usually aimed at rationalizing the administrative map, limiting municipal 
fragmentation and at generating economies of scale in the planning and development of 
local public services. The first of this incidence occurred at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, then again in the 1960s and 70s as suburbs got massively developed. The 
European states stated new reforms to introduce urban institutions as their territories 
coincided with the new urbanized spaces. Then in the 1980s and 1990s, LGs in European 
states especially the cities were endowed with significantly more authority by their 
central governments as new institutions to new territories. Decentralization reforms can 
thus be globally viewed through three main moments of the 1920s and the 1960s-70s and 
then the 1980s-90s. The whole objective was to move from urban government to urban 
governance as required in economic growth and urban explosion of those times. The two 
former decentralization reforms were top down but the latest one of 1990s encountered 
rejection and failure as local communities resisted the reforms on account of unwanted 
imposture of development projects that did not have their say. This included rejecting 
fusion of territories under LGs for development service organization and delivery. People 
sought their power in decision making. Such people mainly included urban elites, civil 
societies and political parties acting against the then over centralization and government 
inefficiencies in local service delivery. People sought local governance and not 
government. This became widely accepted especially when tied with judicial powers and 
strong budgetary and fiscal incentives. Instead of state coercion, citizens preferred urban 
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governance which also resulted in the creation of metropolitan cities for effective 
coordination and management of urban institutions (Jouve, 2005:285-294 and Stren, 
2003).         
 
In the developing world likewise there has been three historical moments of 
decentralization, particularly in Africa and Asia. The first one consolidated itself just 
before and at the point of independence, that is from the late 1940s through the early 
1960s when local and state authorities were being established by mutual agreement 
between the colonialists and the to be independent colonies. After independence, various 
pressures of the one-dominantparty state, military regimes, and the ideology of central 
planning deprived local authorities of their powers and original autonomy. In some 
nations strengthening local authorities was seen as reinforcing regional sentiments with 
differences that might oppose the central governance. As such restricting local authorities 
led to over-centralization that resulted in widespread state inefficiency in development 
and service delivery and thus increased poverty as jobs were not being created and needs 
of localities not addressed. This actually represented removal of decentralized 
government in sub-Saharan Africa. Political and administrative centralization resulted in 
stressed central planning for development (Ibid).    
 
This centralization had to react to itself by the second wave of decentralization of 1970s 
and 1980s in response to its dismal failures in terms of development delivery. 
Centralization had problems of local projects implementation failure, and so central 
governments in the developing world had to look for relocating the development 
committees, technical ministries and large projects at the district level, that is closer to 
peoples’ sustained access and participation.  The justification for this move was to enable 
local planning and control of development as the central governments could not know 
and have a sense of urgency in addressing local demands. The incapacitated inefficient 
centralization was seen as compromising the national goals of development (Nyerere, 
1972: 1).  
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The bringing in of officials from the central government to local authorities often resulted 
in the official elite dominating the local planning and administration and other 
proceedings of the decentralized councils. The official elite still continued to dwell in the 
capital despite moved physical structures like offices and residents and other commercial 
facilities. Finance and skilled professionals were given to representative local authorities 
for own unrestricted use. This resulted in the failure of large projects, mismanagement 
and absence of finance. The top-down decentralization was marked by the need of strong 
local bureaucracy which lacked. The other challenge to this decentralization was its 
complex administrative implementation. The poor countries were expected to implement 
decentralization to be able to respond to local demands. This is strange in that the poor 
governments would be expected to release lacking finances, lacking skilled manpower 
and inefficient political structures to the local communities. National governments that 
lacked the capacity could not bring about LGs with adequate capacity as the latter needed 
the former to have more capacity in terms of resources. Beside lack of resources, this 
decentralization was an administrative initiated top-down one without local political 
support or need and thus lacked sustenance. Communication between the central and the 
local was also weak and local units did not have enough guidance, backing and training 
so that they could be effective (Jouve, 2005:285-294 and Stren, 2003). 
 
During the 1970s these decentralizing initiatives were again largely overcome by 
centralizing forces. Despite established local structures at district levels or provincial and 
community levels, the central government planning government agencies continued to 
play the dominant role in planning and administration. To make it worse, in Lesotho (as 
in many other developing countries) a one-dominant party state (the Basotho National 
Party/BNP) suspended the national constitution creating a human rights crisis and long 
undemocratic political era and also replaced such local structures with illegitimate 
appointed ones only affiliated to the undemocratic dictatorship. This also affected the 
civil service and all the ministries. Centralization became then a tyranny and an era of 
prolonged imposed emergencies. This period was mainly characterized by either 
centralized political tyranny through one party state and/or military regime or dormant 
local councils with no capacity to do anything (Ibid). 
 47 
 
The third wave of decentralization in the developing world came as an influence of the 
growth of urban civil society and the strong wind of democratization and re-
democratization that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These two reinforced 
decentralization and created political support for it. This time urban governance was seen 
as a proper response to worsening urban poverty observable through poorly or not 
serviced urban land. Cities were also centres of political conflicts and instabilities. One 
way to curb urban political instability, widespread informal sector occupying 60% of the 
African urban population and urban terrorism and poverty was this re-democratization 
through local governance. In some countries like Lesotho, the military regime came to 
terms with the ideology of re-democratization as they realized that political instability 
would otherwise never come to an end as they would naturally be toppling each other 
endlessly on grounds that every dictatorship lacks legitimate authority and is always 
under permanent threat, pressure, criticism, resistance and possible attacks by the civil 
societies especially the political parties. Many military regimes as thus had to restore 
democracy or re-democratize. Such political initiatives also received international 
assistance (donor funding) though this concentrated on large-scale formal projects, 
extensive state and parastatal employment and widespread regulation of the economy. 
Many regimes also realized that if economic growth and poverty alleviation are to be 
addressed as the civil society also emphasized, re-democratization was essential as it 
would facilitate creation of tax sources for development and civil regulations with 
political support and stability (Ibid).  
   
Many governments in the developing world, two decades after their independence era 
experimented with new political and administrative (DGD) arrangements for planning 
and managing development programmes and projects at local levels. DGD has thus been 
increasingly perceived as a progressive and proper strategy for managing rural and urban 
development by fully utilizing local institutions and promoting participation of the local 
people in planning and administration of services needed for social and economic 
development in the developing countries (Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983:14).  
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Many African countries, after getting political independence, dismantled LG structures 
that had been created during the end times of such colonial era. Centralization was 
resorted to, firstly, because the local authorities created during that colonial era were 
modest in scale even in terms of their contribution to development. They tried to perform 
their administrative duties and responsibilities for own local projects but the colonial 
governments had provided them with little financial assistance. These local authorities 
had to raise own revenue to meet their costs. They became financial liabilities and had 
weak financial base. This made it necessary to centralize revenue collection (Mapetla and 
Rembe, 1989:7-9). These included for example Senegal, Guinea and Ivory Coast 
demolishing elections for municipals. Central governments appointed their own urban 
administration officers. Zaire removed the autonomy of the provinces and replaced urban 
communes with administrative units answerable to the central government. The Basotho 
National Party/BNP after winning the first (1965) national elections after independence 
also progressively centralized form of governing by abolishing the middle autonomous 
government sphere of the pre-independence district councils in 1968. The elected 
majority membership of these local authorities affiliated to the main party of opposition, 
the Basotholand Congress Party/BCP, thus posing limitation to the desire of only 
consolidating central power and political influence by the central government 
uninterested in political autonomy for self-development (Ibid). 
 
The second reason why other African countries after independence dissolved local 
authorities was the want to achieve rapid economic development. Rational planning and 
prioritization with strong coordination for scarce resources/funding was seen as needing 
one centralized strong control system of government.  The third reason was that there was 
also a general lack of adequate financial and manpower resources to support increasing 
service delivery demands on the local authorities. The more skilled personnel also joined 
the central government that was better paying and had more privileges. This left local 
authorities with low salaried personnel and poorly staffed and thus became widely 
ineffective. This justified and reinforced centralization. The fourth reason for dismantling 
local authorities in Africa was that the national leaders and central government officials 
had a political desire to stay in power for long and become the only one centre of power. 
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They perceived local authorities as building up opposition which would erode their 
central power (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989:7-9) 
 
Consequences of centralization included expanded bureaucracy and impairment of local 
self-government. This resulted in concentration of skilled personnel at the national capital 
but contributing little in developing the local communities and their initiatives. 
Furthermore decision making had to go through many created levels of increased 
centralized bureaucracy, the red tape delaying delivery and implementation of 
development programmes. Moreover, recruiting qualified personnel became more 
difficult because most of the people preferred to work only in the national capital and the 
headquarters as there were virtually no incentives. The debates from the academic 
community and the international donors heightened and made governments realize more 
of the disadvantages of centralization and advantages of decentralization. This then 
caused a paradigm re-shift to many African countries and started re-tracking to 
decentralization for attaining local participation, sustainable development projects and 
locally created livelihoods  (Ibid).           
2.3 Summary 
 
This chapter has conceptualized the key terms of this study and provided a general 
overview of decentralization globally, in the developing world and Africa. This provides 
context for the chapters that follow, and clarifies the extent to which LG in Lesotho is not 
really, despite claims to the contrary, a distinct or autonomous sphere of government 
easily able to deliver development effectively. 
 
This chapter has concisely given the arguments that are for and against decentralization. 
It has also set a necessary explanatory preliminary background to chapter 3 in this study 
that deals sufficiently with the pros and cons of decentralization and its necessary 
preconditions for its success and the methods for measuring adoption of decentralization 
as well as challenges involved in such methods in chapter 4. The effort managed to define 
and link decentralization to local governance and development delivery particularly 
where DGD is discussed. Besides decentralization, good governance is discussed. The 
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indicators, values and principles of good governance discussed also form the theoretical 
framework applied in chapter 5 dealing with the experience of decentralization in 
Lesotho, chapter 6, 7 and 8 where fieldwork findings on Lesotho, our case study, are 
mainly used. The chapters referred to deal with the nature of decentralization showing 
and arguing how inelegant is the draftsmanship of such decentralization in Lesotho. They 
also deal with its measurement of adoption and efficiency in Lesotho. They reveal 
through the use of these key concepts as an explanatory conceptual paradigm that LG in 
Lesotho is not necessarily promoting devolution of political, administrative and economic 
capacity, citizen participation or social inclusion and development delivery in terms of its 
adoption, implementation and unmet necessary preconditions elaborated in the next 
chapter and in conclusive chapter 9 contextual to Lesotho. All these key concepts form 
the conceptual framework applied in the following chapters in this thesis. The review has 
discussed the justification of decentralization and also challenged the validity of such 
decentralization by way of analytically and critically debating and exposing its 
institutional constraints and implications of such constraints in relation to poverty 
alleviation/development, particularly in the context of the developing world 
encompassing Lesotho as a country. This further helped to affirm this study’s argument 
that decentralization has developmental prospects but not without challenges requiring 
attention if efficient and effective development delivery is to be attained. The debate has 
shown how decentralization has evolved globally, then in the developing world and in 
Africa including Lesotho and why countries decentralized. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
CHAPTER THREE: DECENTRALIZATION, PROS AND CONS 
3.0 General Introduction 
 
After discussing why countries decentralize, it is an ideal attempt to reflect analytically 
on the experience of decentralization in developing countries. The substantive effort on 
how to actually measure the degree of the adoption and the efficiency and effectiveness 
of decentralization and its extent in development delivery will be in the next chapter, 
further providing the theoretical framework of measuring decentralization and its 
preconditions for success in development delivery.  This chapter argues that while 
decentralization has potential developmental benefits, developing countries have adopted 
it in the mist of severe practical socio-political-economic-institutional obstacles and in 
the context of lacking preconditions for its success in development delivery. This chapter 
chiefly intends to synthesise theoretical debates on the practical experience of developing 
countries with decentralization, and explore the potential as well as the institutional 
constraints of this policy for development delivery.  It debates the potentials and the 
limitations of Decentralization and Developmental Local Government (DLG). It further 
justifies the adoption of democratic decentralization and development delivery.  
3.1 Democratized ‘Developmental Local Government’DLG, its 
Role/Opportunities/Political Promises and Constraints 
 
DLG refers to the LG committed to working with citizens and groups within the 
community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic and material needs 
and improve the quality of their lives (see, for example, the definition and approach set 
out in the RSA’s White Paper on Local Government, March, 1998). They are democratic 
semi-independent LG institutions with legislative powers to attain relevant community 
driven development. Their political authority originates from the middle level of the 
government, which is the provincial level or the district level in the case of Lesotho, 
under the central level/higher sphere within a unitary system. The democratic aspects of 
the DLGs include requiring, according to the national legislation, to be financially 
accountable, adopting integrated development, politically autonomous and having 
 52 
democratically elected citizens’ representatives involved in the management of the local 
area, coordinated by the national legislation as an individual elected municipal to be in 
line with national developmental goals, local community participation also offering 
feedback together with experience to the legislation and procedures reviewing and 
community empowering in development processes or community based decision making. 
The findings in chapter 8 confirm that at the moment, decentralization in Lesotho has not 
yet achieved involving citizens and their groups in the LGUs for community-driven 
development. The current legislative power (chapter 7) does not seem to make the LGUs 
autonomous. They are directly controlled by the central government to increase the 
political influence and control of the one dominant ruling political party at the local level 
and thus nationally. They just seem to be an appendage of the central government without 
sufficient legislative powers to perform or meet the above indicated democratic aspects 
though they have elected representatives but mainly from the ruling political party 
(Parnell and Pieterse, 2002:79-81, 83-84). 
 
DLG, in principle, is also regarded as a form of democratic decentralization, whereby 
governments promulgate and implement revised rules and responsibilities for 
administrative and political personnel and on establishing the framework for local 
accountable political institutions as an essential prerequisite for participatory 
developmental local governance. (As we see in chapter 7, this has not always applied in 
Lesotho.) This is the existence of the effective and efficient working local systems of 
collective action managing a locality’s public affairs and is accountable to local residents. 
It thus embraces reforms with constitutional and statutory changes at the centre, 
progressive distribution of responsibilities, resources, authority and autonomy from 
central to the periphery/localities actually becoming effective in managing their public 
affairs in a community driven development manner and locally accountable. DLG is the 
state’s design which creatively embeds the different tiers of the state into a governance 
framework intended to negotiate the tensions of development, reconstruction and 
democratization (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:1, 22).    
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The democratic prospects of the DLG seem to be ambitious. They include attaining good 
and effective governance, participatory local democratic governance, viability, capability, 
accountability purpose-driven municipalities and participatory development, integrated 
development and equitable access to resources and opportunities (Pieterse, 2002:3-10). 
The viability issue is basically about sustainable financial and administrative capacity of 
the DLGs or local councils. The implications of this include re-demarcating the spatial 
coverage of local authorities with an objective of encompassing both places with more of 
revenue sources and ‘barren’ ones to achieve equitable distribution of services and 
therefore redress spatial inequalities created by comparative advantage factors or past 
discriminatory policies. This is to strategically include viable and unviable areas 
resources-wise to form a self-sustaining municipal or local authority area. The other 
aspects include participatory or democratized budgeting process for viable participation 
and better performance in delivery. Performance budgeting dependent on departmental 
previous year’s accomplishments in terms of implementation and outcomes is also an 
additional aspect. The local authorities in the same vein are enabled through various 
technical systems to regain control over credit control functions. Such capability has to be 
a transformation that achieves improved performance in service delivery. For example by 
introducing systems that overcome the culture of non-payment for supplied services and 
ensure accurate billing on the consumer and information provision concerning 
consumer’s rights and responsibilities. Prospect in pursuit by DLG also include 
accountability. This refers to both national financial accounting standards and 
international ones conforming to national norms. The integrated development plan also in 
a way promotes the prospect of oneness in purpose and thus a participatory consensus in 
development priorities and planning for the future and problem solving (Ibid).     
 
The basic initiatives of DLG also include the political indicators of its success but lacking 
in Lesotho (chapter 8) to be a (a) sub local authority, that is devolution of decision 
making power to the level below the local authority itself which is local people’s 
empowerment and citizen participation, (b) politically motivated as a process, (c) area-
based and (d) of multiple local authority service. Political motivation refers to addressing 
concerns about the role of the state, nature of professional welfare services, bureaucracy’s 
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role, the potential for community control of public services, for example. Area based 
refers to statutory geographical units with clear political demarcations accompanied by 
proper statutory framework of political decentralization. Local legal autonomy of the 
clear official territorial neighbourhood must be established as a political unit for the 
jurisdiction, distribution of developmental services, local citizen participation and self-
rule. The local authority need not be limited to a single service provision as it should 
indeed have an independent integrated development plan and a locally funded budget to a 
significant extent. It should be a multi-service decentralization which has properly 
considered alternative ways of decentralizing encompassing physical and organizational 
considerations. Physical ones concern themselves with the geographical and design 
issues, which is geographical choices concerning the size of the areas and the definition 
of boundaries for clear relationship with political electoral boundaries, jurisdiction and 
distribution of services and clarity of political accountability including strategic locating 
of neighbourhood offices for accessibility to all the public. Organizational considerations 
touches on the scope, that is which services are to be decentralized and what are the 
activities to be undertaken by the neighbourhood staff, should the relinquishing of service 
provision be incremental or integrated and done at once and devolution of relative power 
to neighbourhood staff on control over (i) daily operations, (ii) strategic decisions and 
(iii) finances (Hambleton and Hoggett, 1986:1-3, 10-11).  
 
While DLG process may be vulnerable to local elite political capture as is also the case in 
Lesotho (chapter 5, 6, 7 and 8) whereby local traditional leadership, chieftaincy and local 
political membership of one dominant ruling party are the only ones who have occupied 
all the seats in the LGUs, Dasgupta et al (2007:231-234) perceive it as local community 
self-governance with a process of community driven development involving (1) 
decentralization, (2) democratization and (3) collective action which believes in groups of 
individuals acting in a coordinated and cooperative manner for an economic interest 
shared together with an agency to control reached agreements, create systems and 
institutions of management to curb tragic outcomes like ‘free riding’, shirk, opportunistic 
conduct,  power abuse and individual funds misuse and other forms of impropriety. This 
is enhanced by social and economic heterogeneity, small/manageable group size, non-
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linear relations and mediating role by institutions. All supplemented by trust, reciprocal 
exchange, social networks and at times social capital (Ibid). Community driven 
development describes projects that increase a local community’s control over the 
development process for local poverty alleviation. It is about community-based and 
community participatory approaches to development as also affirmed by Chambers 
(1997). The type of decentralization in DLG is to enhance (a) design of contextually 
appropriate development projects, (b) targeting of beneficiaries, (c) accountability to 
local residents, (d) good governance. Such decentralization is statutorily relinquishing 
political power to the provinces (districts in the case of Lesotho) together with financial 
resources for local self-governing/autonomy to pursue local developmental aspirations 
which were usually ignored by the central governance that formerly used to control all 
the resources utilization ignoring local needs. Statute reform involves in this process 
dismantling centralized governance control structures and levels to attain local 
community governance to focus on ‘diversity, participation, genuine autonomy, 
democratization and people’s empowerment. The challenge of local elite capture is 
created by the fact that participants in community governance/DLG enter this process 
from unequal positions. In Lesotho, others enter it as chiefs while others enter it as 
political domineers. The powerless, voiceless and poor are not really included.         
 
Democratization referred to embraces use of political rights by local citizens, issues of 
citizen participation, representation, accountability and transparency. Elite capture refers 
to local elites’ seize of power and control over the community governance, elitism may 
emanate from large land holdings, kinship, lineage, employment, political party 
affiliation (eminent problem in Lesotho compounded by some chieftaincy problems-see 
more details in chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9) or tenure in the community. Internal and external 
accountability procedures with strong written ethics of conduct, elections, conflict 
resolution agencies and participatory budgeting are essential to strengthen 
democratization of community governance and prevent elite capture (Dasgupta et al, 
2007:231-234). 
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Noteworthy and contrary to Martin and Mallen (1987:39-40), DLG is greatly about 
political and resources devolution entailing legislative devolution-whereby provincial 
assemblies own power to determine policy, make laws and implement them within the 
statutory framework/selected range of subjects. Here the central authorities may (albeit 
rarely) veto the regional assembly, unlike in federalism where such vetoing is not 
provided. It is less about executive devolution whereby central parliament legislates for 
the intermediate governments which only set unoffending policies/decisions to the central 
only including how best to execute Central’s formulated policies. It is also less about 
administrative devolution, where central parliament still legislates on all matters and 
arranges for administration of functions of government to be carried out within a regional 
setting. This only calls for (deconcentration) creation of national government departments 
and not locally or regionally democratic provincial assemblies or input. DLG is also less 
about advisory devolution-whereby bodies (committees for/to the central parliament) are 
established in the provinces to consult with various local authorities and organizations for 
considering appropriate policies and advise central parliament accordingly. It may then 
be concluded that DLG as a political institution is the lower structure of the National 
Government with semi-independent authorities recognized by law and elected by the 
local people. It is supposed to be legally responsible for the planning and implementation 
of specific functions. Examples are the Rural District Councils and Urban Councils. It is 
a form of governance with the process of involving local people in the making of political 
and administrative decisions which affect their livelihoods in a transparent and 
accountable manner. It is also a form of developmental governance determining how 
political and administrative decisions are made. As a process it promotes participation, 
recognizes the diversity of communities and encourages openness trying to eliminate 
corruption in managing public resources (Martin and Mallen, 1987).    
 
In essence the promises of DLG could embrace (a) shifting public investment into social 
services and human capital formation, at the expense of national physical infrastructure, 
(b) shifting resources to smaller, poorer, rural districts, (c) distributing investment more 
equally across space, (d) making investment more responsive to local developmental 
needs, (e) increasing local investment while holding running costs steady (f) and 
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increasing local tax revenues. The challenges to these, particularly in Lesotho (chapter 5 
to 9), have so far been with the lack of proper political design of the process of the DLG, 
its implementation, monitoring and evaluation whereby deconcentration was politically 
more preferred than the real devolution. That is lack of political will to comprehensively 
launch legislative devolution instead of executive, administrative or advisory devolution  
(Faguet, 2008 and Pieterse et al, 2008:1). 
3.2 Developmental Local Governments’ (DLGs) Challenges in the LDCs 
 
The new holistic development vision of DLGs is often marred by a lack of expertise and 
resources to deliver, especially in the rural/remote areas and small towns. (In Lesotho, 
approximately 80% of the population live in these areas.) Skilled personnel generally 
prefer being in bigger or capital cities in many nations.  
 
The aspects of the challenges of DLG in terms of local revenue mobilization include:  
• the efficiency/cost to yield of most local taxes is low, except in cities with broader 
commercial revenue base than the rural areas (chapter 8, interviews on Lesotho),  
• inherent lack of resources unless local authorities outside urban areas are delimited at 
a large scale,  
• trying to increase taxes by local politicians has often deepened political cynicism and 
distrust. The tax payers are usually unwilling to pay taxes and resist unless there is a 
direct benefit and pump-priming (this is the actual fear of LG in Lesotho making it 
unwilling to impose any taxes and/or user fees, (chapter 7 and 8)),  
• local resources are also limited and unevenly distributed and relying on them thus 
creates spatial inequality, lack of administrative capacity increases the difficulty of 
developing new tax bases. Revenue autonomy may need to be distinguished from 
expenditure autonomy and so supportive monitoring and auditing from the central 
other than the source of income for autonomy may matter most (Crook Richard and 
Manor James, in World Bank Report, 2000:19).     
 
Excessive centralization remains a fact of life in LDCs because little of any consequence 
occurs in LDCs administrative setting without knowledge and direct consent of the 
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supervisor/leader/ruler. As we shall see in chapter 5, Lesotho practiced policy reversals 
and abolished such local authorities. It will also be confirmed that loyalty to supervisor is 
more important than meritorious performance in the LDCs. Subordinates are discouraged 
from being responsible and initiative. Their incompetence and corruption reinforce 
unwillingness of senior civil servants to delegate authority. Seniors are timid,  this stifles 
local and regional governments. Decentralization policy reversals and national 
government vision imposture constitute this (Werlin, 1992). 
 
Another challenge to DLG is that LDCs still prefer excessive centralization due to 
hostility to all forms of decentralization including delegation of authority to local and 
regional governments and financial institutions, public utilities, cooperatives, state-owned 
enterprises, NGOs etc. The imperative for stability, in many developing countries with 
some nations divided along ethnic groupings competing for political power and 
resources, brings strong urge for central administration and control ensuring stability. 
LGs are as thus only given powers to plan and manage functions but are denied adequate 
incentives, financial resources and qualified personnel to execute such powers (Chapter 
7, 8 and 9 on Lesotho). But most interestingly, in Lesotho, centralization/recentralization 
seems to be maintained mainly for the sake of one-ruling-dominant political party system 
and its entrenching and extension nationally through the politically loyal submissive only 
advisory local councils. LDCs’ cities are often threatened by decentralization due to 
danger of intensifying ethnic and kinship loyalties. Colonialism left weak national 
identity, as such, decentralization and liberalization undermine national unity. It is 
sometimes feared that decentralization will open doors wider to local elites to capture 
local administrative and political structures in the absence of strong central authority and 
use structures in an antidemocratic and antiegalitarian ways. LDCs’ leaders often prefer 
deconcentration (transferring responsibility to field staff) to devolution (empowering 
LGs) because local councils tend to be dominated by field staff of central government. 
Positions are often owed to those controlling military/one-party systems like in Lesotho 
(chapter 7 and 8), turning distinction between deconcentration and devolution 
meaningless (Ibid, 1992).     
 
 59 
LDCs’ bureaucracies are often too weak to facilitate decentralization or DLG. Conducted 
interviews in this study on councillors and staff confirm that in the case of Lesotho 
(chapter 8), the ministry of LG has not provided enough and effective facilitation of 
decentralization for local development delivery. The LGUs’ staff and councillors have 
not had needed training in development, technical and financial management issues, not 
to talk of needed working facilities and space. LDCs’ LGs in remote and rural areas also 
find it difficult to attract qualified personnel thus programmes tend to be undertaken by 
temporary unskilled inexperienced staff. Regional or LGs may have powers to recruit but 
suffer from brain drain by the central governments. This is a clear sign of a weak 
bureaucracy in the ministry of LG. Administrative system has declined to the lowest ebb 
in efficiency and integrity yet LGs and service providing agencies rely on central 
government’s unresponsive insensitive bureaucracy that has deteriorated. Bureaucracy’s 
incompetence is encouraged by well developed ‘market for public office’ at senior levels 
of administration. Efforts to facilitate LGs and independent agencies fail because central 
bureaucracies are so weak. Matching grants are often used to stimulate LGs’ resource 
mobilization but because of the weakness of the ministries of finance, they cannot be 
relied upon (Werlin, 1992 and Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:240-254).   
 
The interviews (discussed in more detail in chapter 8) conducted readily confirm that in 
Lesotho there are weak mechanisms for accountability.  Grants-in-aid have become 
generous but lose usefulness due to lack of information about what is available, slowness 
to release funds, ‘use it or lose it’ budget provisions, multiple budgetary requirements, 
unsuitable accounting requirements, rigid stipulation about use of funds, corrupt 
practices, lack of qualified personnel and inadequate supervision. The weak 
accountability traits including among others rent seeking, non-accountability and corrupt 
practices behaviour of the bureaucracy in Lesotho has also been confirmed by the very 
minister of Finance in Lesotho who stated that,  
“Institutionalized corruption has become endemic in this country... We 
are looking at financial irregularities in general. This is an ongoing process... 
The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and the forensic department in 
the ministry are working closely to deal with the corruption. The forensic 
audits will not be limited to the procurement departments only...more 
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forensic audit firms will be hired to investigate more departments suspected 
of involvement in the scam (Minister of Finance, Timothy Thahane, ‘Sunday 
Express’ newspaper, Vol. 2, issue 33, November 14-20, 2010:2).   
 
The ‘Sunday Express’ (November, 14-20, 2010:2) has further confirmed weak 
accountability as well as weakness of the ministry of finance reporting that, Lesotho has 
been losing millions through a procurement scam orchestrated by corrupt government 
officers who give government business to companies they are linked to through shares, 
their co-owning relatives and friends and bribery receiving for unprocedural illegal 
giving of tenders or business contracts. Government officers fabricate orders so that the 
government pays for services and goods not rendered. They have briefcase companies 
they use to supply the government at exorbitant prices with mark-ups as high as 400 
percent on their invoices. This weakness directly affects any possible efficient 
implementation of decentralization in Lesotho. This is further worsened by the fact that 
according to the interviews in this study (chapter 7 and 8); only the minister can instruct 
an (targeted) audit exercise in his or her ministry. Key informants have reported that such 
very ministers are not innocent and immune from these very unethical practices of funds 
mismanagement and improper personal politically biased incompetent staff recruitment 
in the LGUs. As such, auditing and proper financial accounting practices have not been 
maintained in the ministry of LG in Lesotho. This has badly affected quality of local 
development delivery and proper management of funds and resources as contracts are 
arbitrarily offered to incompetent unknown service providers in this ministry and LGUs.    
 
The other challenge to DLG is that, LDCs’ private sector is under-developed. Some 
private agricultural production (e.g. tea, sugar mill) have used some of their profits to 
construct and maintain roads, in some cases communities through local councils have 
contributed monetarily enough to maintain and construct new roads through the private 
sector. Nonetheless, excessive centralization has undermined community initiatives, 
when they voluntarily want to contribute in cash, skills, local knowledge, appropriate 
technology and resources in coops, CBOs, construction-maintenance teams for 
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schools/roads, at times local councils have redirected such contributions into 
governments’ unsuccessful sponsored activities and projects (Werlin, 1992). 
 
The other constraint to DLG in LDCs is that there are no effective bureaucracy and 
management practices. Effective bureaucracy is needed for weekly senior staff 
management meetings where progress reports are discussed and problems solved, 
monthly review meetings where senior staff joins junior and technical staff to discuss 
affairs of individual communities. Every three months one day conferences need to be 
held to review progress, share experiences and receive training. Where top 
bureaucracy/management often visits communities, talk with them and staff about 
programme implementation. Where use of ‘problem-management’ is adopted but 
avoiding to direct resources and time by being directly involved in community’s 
disputes/problems instead a ‘demonstrate effect’ and facilitating problem-solving are 
used. That is where two way communication of written and oral methods are used. Day-
to-day responsibilities are to be delegated by bureaucracy to village-based technical 
assistants and village residents, linked by elected committee structures but when 
bureaucracy is weak as is the case in LDCs including Lesotho, DLG is stifled. DLG 
needs to include methods of popular involvement, extent of quality training to 
participants, communication style between participants and supervisory staff, 
commitment to set goals by all but there is no effective bureaucracy to effect all these in 
LDCs including Lesotho (Werlin, 1992).           
3.2.1 Theoretical and Pragmatic Challenges to DLG’s Political Success 
 
In practice, national priorities are often expected to take precedence over local priorities 
identified by the relevant LG. This situation imposes problems of coordination, 
duplication and confusion on how to allocate resources.  
 
The accountability of public services involves as well devolution of influence and 
authority and democratic local citizen participation. Such democratic local citizen 
participation is to have the following objectively verifiable indicators: 
• stationed officials in localities finding out what is going on in the field, 
• seeking out opinions of local people, 
 62 
• making local people administrative agents, 
• establishing elected officials at the local level as representatives of local interests, 
• making neighbourhood administrators accountable to local citizens, 
• giving localities control over policy and development programmes, 
• giving localities control over fiscal resources (Werlin, 1992).  
 
The political reality at times is such that the national government, particularly in the once 
colonized developing countries, gets tempted to clinging to influence and authority in 
fear of either local majority political/tribal opposition, conservative local resistant 
traditional leadership, ethnic divisions and dominance, or due to mainly the evil desire to 
stay in power ‘forever’. This includes not devolving power if not directing excessive 
control on the local authorities and perpetuation of such means of sticking to political 
power and control emanating from strategic constituencies formed by wards in which the 
ruling party commands majority membership (very common in the ‘first-past-the-post’ 
election model or political parties dominated local authority). This stifles fair and equal 
citizen participation as almost then a ‘political’ elite capture seizes the process of 
participation. That means party politics’ interests of power emerge to overplay and 
repress local development priorities and interests. 
 
The other challenge to DLG is that while participatory development and community 
involvement are often effective channels for donors and NGOs, they tend to undermine 
local democracy because they are essentially depoliticized in the sense that they are naïve 
about power and power relations just viewing rural Africans as 
undifferentiated/homogeneous ‘communities’. The donors and NGOs are often made up 
of non-elected bodies operating in insulation from local authority structures or with 
limited linkage being highly gender imbalanced, self-appointed leadership, addressing a 
specific development issue, ad hoc and short lived. They are externally driven and often 
end up in unsustainable development projects in the long-run. Group or collective action 
of these Community Based Organizations/CBOs is also blamed for stifling individual 
achievement or aspirations that may be emphasized by the villagers (Ibid, World Bank, 
1992 and Ribot, 1999:27, Brett, 2003:5 and Lange, 2008:1124-1128).   
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3.2.1.1 Citizen Participation and LGUs’ Councillors’ Role, Their Challenges in DLG 
 
Participatory development has been in the fore in development policy issues after the 
1980s’ economic crisis in Latin America, Africa and South Asia. Crisis that included 
living conditions that had plummeted in these LDCs are blamed on the central 
governments for not involving the poor locals in the decision making processes. Citizen 
participation, LG partnerships with the civil society, and advocacy for prioritizing local 
democratization and poverty reduction/development delivery, have became dominant 
elements of decentralization. The belief is that participatory development is good as it 
facilitates participatory governance. That is bringing all the stake holders including the 
powerless, voiceless, vulnerable and poor together in decision making processes that 
affect their lives. That ultimately legitimizes state actions through locally relevant 
appreciated/accepted development delivery forging local compliance with national 
programmes and policy. The end result of such participation is also the empowerment of 
the citizens and civil society as well as local democratization. Citizen participation 
entailed in participatory development and governance embraces deliberate formal and 
informal actions by citizens through instituted procedures, arrangements and 
opportunities to attain local quality development delivery, good governance, local policy 
formulation and maintained good order at the LG level. It involves communication of 
local preferences and influence of policy making so as to help in the execution of the 
public good and its preservation and continuity. In the case of Lesotho, (see the 
discussion in chapter 7 and 8) such instituted procedures, arrangements and opportunities 
or mechanisms for citizen participation/participatory development/governance are legally 
lacking. It is left as a discretionary issue by the councillors and LGUs’ staff. When 
mechanisms for citizen participation are examined in a number of African countries, the 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2009) notes that only 45% of respondents in 
Cape Verde feel that their LGUs are moderately effective mechanisms for citizen 
participation. As high as 70% of respondents in Egypt, 66% in Gabon and Kenya, 69% in 
Nigeria, 62% in Togo and 67% in Zambia rate LG low with regard to citizen participation 
(Oldfield and Parnell, 1998, Pieterse, 2002 and ECA study, 2009).       
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The desired citizen participation in DLG in the LDCs is also constrained by lack of good 
living conditions, sensitive, accountable and trustworthy leadership, political awareness, 
commitment and skills, vibrant community institutions and organizations, just and fair 
resource management, regular free and fair elections for councillors and village and ward 
elected officials, involvement of citizens in financial matters at all levels-local and 
national, involvement of disadvantaged groups , the very poor, the disabled, women, 
youth and the children. One other element that tarnishes the political promise of citizen 
participation is that in developing countries local people have at times been compelled to 
participate particularly in political meetings or deceived into participating in doubtful 
ventures. There is still also a lot of apathy in the developing countries. The word 
participation is also used as to offer inadequate development programmes some 
respectability. The continuation of the top down approach renders it rare. Bureaucratic, 
professional and political blocking often impedes citizen participation as citizens also 
lack material conditions. Participation has also been criticized for raising expectations 
that can be frustrated by the ones with more power and resources if their conservative 
interests are threatened. Many institutions are also too weak to support participation. It is 
also constrained by negative attitudes like superiority, inferiority and dependency 
syndrome. Participatory development is demanding as it involves more work on the 
participants and is difficult to measure. Local authorities tend to accept participation on 
trivial issues like village politics and not on vital issues involving choosing 
developmental priorities, deciding on major political, economic and military decisions. 
Participation is not in itself sufficient conditions for democracy; the statutory system has 
to also be effectively operational. Participation may never be given, it has to be 
demanded by the excluded for it to be effectively attained but the silent marginalized 
groups may forever be silent. Several structural limitations like lack of compensation, 
lack of information and skills hinder and reduce local participation (Barth, 2006).      
 
Perfectly representative local authorities may still over-exploit resources and ignore 
minority interest if granted the unbridled power to do so. The local elite lack interest in 
including ethnic minorities in political processes as their loyalties and future election 
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hopes are on the majority communities with different development priorities and desires 
than the ignored local minority interests. The often result has been that of social 
exclusion and marginalization of the minority groups in decision making processes. 
Minority groups are believed to be incapable of effective governance and are therefore 
discriminated upon and denied fair participation in DLG. UNDP study (2006:35-36) 
made a finding that the minority groups in DLG are repressed, ignored, marginalized and 
socially excluded on feelings that they are of “low capacity” and a “low intellectual 
level.” While DLG could be shifting authority to lower levels of local communities’ 
governance, it does not often result in the social inclusion of all indigenous minority 
and/or weak vulnerable needy groups. Due to the fear of not being re-elected, local 
leaders favour the dominant majority and pursue their interests. For this same reason of 
fear, they seldom raise any issue of tax policy and just rely on indirect taxes and grants 
from the central government. The fear also unfortunately usually results in no discussions 
of how revenues are collected and used and there are no tax payers to hold DLGs’ 
officials accountable. Where taxes are collected and used, the rare request for public 
services is responded to by service provision through political patrons at local or national 
level. In the transfer of financial responsibility, local politicians also lack impetus to 
transform the clientelistic relationship between the national government and the local 
people. Local taxation is constrained by locals’ unwillingness to invest in a non-delivery, 
non-accountable, clear financial participatory plans, responsibilities and budgets and 
policy. They opt to invest their monies in networks and relations that improve their 
individual lives (Juul, 2006).   
 
At times legal devolution of services, power and resources from the national governance 
is hindered on grounds that a political locality in question is either ‘politically 
inappropriate’ or ‘too small’ or ‘too big’ population wise or geographically to manage 
some developmental functions. Such political hindrances by central state 
(re)emergence/interference consequently unfairly (re)distribute political autonomy and 
developmental functions to either inefficient state service delivery authorities/public 
enterprises/corporations or other government tiers/levels to the regression of the DLG. 
This is greatly a difficulty in countries formed of various states with a political sense of  
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‘state/provincial-nationhood’ like in the United Kingdom with Scotland, Wales, England 
and so on (obscurely/secretly seeking complete separate ‘state/national’ independence or 
federalism-absolute autonomy except for military and foreign and few other functions to 
the central). This has often created national governance unclear reactions and policy 
framework with regard to comprehensive devolution to DLGs. Apparently what may 
matter most is whether the Central’s power base is threatened or not and hence political 
obscurity between regionalism/localism and nationalism degree of policy adoption. At 
times the central may have most of the (shared/distributed) resources thus offering an 
exploitable opportune moment to Central’s greater dominion (Martin and Mallen, 1987).  
 
Elected representatives/councillors are usually constrained to implement their fresh local 
political mandate of development priorities by the Central’s stringent financial rules 
controlling spending levels and preventing budget expansion at their time of taking 
DLG’s office differing with the start of the already Centrally approved fiscal year 
budgets. This is in view of the fact that generally the local authorities lack the capacity to 
raise local funds. Their role includes being representative, specialized and broad policy-
maker. New councillors with current local developmental demands often have to wait 
long for the next fiscal year budget estimates to limitedly include new demands for 
financing. This frustrates the local electorate and leaves them disillusioned in DLG as 
election promises remain barred by national government institutional procedures and 
remote budget controls. A change of political control of the local council is not in proper 
timing with the inflexibly disciplined national bureaucratic systematic practices 
unresponsive, insensitive and unconscious to the local peoples’ needs. This imposes 
barriers to implementation of effective and efficient DLG, local citizen-participation and 
local pro-activeness. Basically this constrains crucial decisions by the local council. This 
renders local programmes in vain and freedom to decide limited. Besides budget 
problems, institutionalization of local elections to have representative councillors is 
usually constrained by endless controversies as majority party at the state constrains their 
authority by being heavy handed and pursuing party’s interests and not local interests. 
While local elections could promote local autonomy, this is usually clamped as it is not 
politically desirable to the one majority party state. It also creates an environment 
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whereby political localities experience uneven fiscal spending and thus spatial 
inequalities. The fair and even distribution of conditional transfers from the central for 
use by locally elected authorities is also constrained by the opportunistic behaviour of the 
political elites. They distribute more funds to local areas with more voters for the 
dominant political party; in addition, localities with a higher number of swing voters also 
receive more resources. Resources distribution is thus based on political lines continuing 
to exclude the real poor local areas ultimately. This worsens poverty in the remote areas 
and further spatial inequality as it unevenly strengthens local councillors. This 
discretionary distribution of resources to the local authorities has constrained DLG 
greatly in many countries (Martin and Mallen, 1987:81-82, Shuna and Yao, 2007 and 
Hernandez-Trillo et al, 2008). 
 
Local councillors are also constrained in their effective functioning by lack of experience, 
training and formal education in local governance as already indicated. It is important to 
note that party-politics also badly affect their delivery. Councillors may form the local 
opposing majority to the national government and thus concentrate on frustrating 
Central’s policies ignoring local needs. They also tend to pursue interests of their local 
party and not implementation of the local developmental needs. At times their loyalty to 
local party overrides goodwill to pursue and support good locally relevant national 
government’s policy and may vote against locally favourable decisions for party politics 
gain only. They often have to act in line with the wilful political desires of their political 
constituencies to avoid not being nominated in the next election of the party. This creates 
councillors into representatives not of the local interests but of the local party politics that 
may be have slid into political party-elitism capture (political-elitist-capture) dictating or 
seeking to exercise dominion in the local authority. Viewed politically, local authorities 
tend to be a forum for LG elections used simply to preserve party machines well-oiled for 
general elections (Martin and Mallen, 1987 and Napier, 2007).  
 
Furthermore, councillors as local candidates are only chosen due to their party record and 
not their ability. Local councillors may also tend to hold locally meaningless debate thus 
discouraging the local electorate. Officers are also demoralized by the decisions 
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irrelevant to local needs but based on insensitive party political grounds. The party 
politics constrain councillors in that chairmen of the local council may be chosen from 
the majority party ignoring to use the able members of other groups. Party-politics tend to 
overwhelm and overshadow real felt needs of the ‘independents’. Even where such do 
happen to lead the local authority, party-politics at a later stage overtake either through 
voting system or agenda setting. The other problem with councillors is that as individuals 
they have own interests and may not prioritize needs of their electorate. Some have been 
found to lose contact and availability to their constituencies. This keeps the electorate 
uninformed and lacking feedback and an effective opportunity for participating in local 
decision-making. Participatory-decision making is also complicated by the fact that the 
constituents with whom the councillor keeps contact are not a fairly representative 
sample of the population but are mainly constituted by self-selected citizens. This puts 
fair representation in question. Local authorities as they operate through councillors are 
also constrained, as already alluded to, by the central parliament through so many 
legislative controls, the courts that to which they may be called for cases answering and 
public demands and the judicial powers of command and control by the ministers 
directly. This is to say the freedom of the local authorities and councillors is politically 
limited in effectively implementing DLG process.  Fair representation by these 
councillors is also constrained by the fact that the delimitation of wards/constituencies 
boundaries is a complex process. Expertise required to undertake delimitation process is 
lacking, spatial issues like manageability of the ward by inclusion or exclusion of 
unpopulated areas and access to reliable data concerning where certain communities 
should best be accommodated make delimitation more complex. Wards cannot simply be 
bent or shaped at will. These delimitation challenges have resulted in unfair 
representation by the councillors as evidenced by discrepancies in ward size and the 
location of ward boundaries (Martin and Mallen, 1987 and Napier, 2007).  
 
The performance of local authorities in effective developmental service delivery, other 
budgetary and other above constraints may further be impeded by external factors on 
which they lack control. These include (a) social constraints on their performance. Let us 
remember that DLG is meant to respond to local needs within the welfare or public utility 
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provision context and not strictly in accordance with the market principles of responding 
to cash-backed needs only. At times such needs are of too high quantity due to the large 
needy population sector, for instance primary education facilities for too many pupils. 
This usually results in poor performance of the local authorities because the social need is 
of great unaffordable magnitude. That is the quantity of service needs is negatively 
related to local authority performance. (b) The diversity of service needs in terms of 
differing (ethnic) groupings complicates attaining efficiency in that too many different 
preferences have to be addressed leading into a greater variety of services, all which 
increases expenses for service delivery, making effective responsiveness more difficult. 
That is the diversity of service needs is negatively related to the performance of the local 
authority. (c) There are also economic constraints on its performance. The economic level 
of the households in the political locality determines the number of accessing and 
consuming a service on offer. Poorer local communities result in reducing distribution of 
the service as this economically constrains them from more access and hence poor 
performance by the local authority in delivery. This is also compounded by the economic 
ability of the locality to provide more or less financial resources. Therefore, the 
prosperity of the local service recipients and the political locality is positively related to 
the local authority performance. (d) The level of discretionary resources is also 
exogenously influenced as it is historically determined rather driven by current needs. 
The scope for budgetary adjustment from one year to another is very small and constrains 
the performance of the local authorities in delivery. (e) Population density and size is one 
other variable that externally affects the performance of the local authorities. Sparse 
population creates lack of cost effectiveness in service delivery but too dense one also 
creates an overstretch on the available resources, all resulting in poor performance of the 
local authority. (f) Some constraints are purely political; a hostile political climate results 
in management being busy protecting their decisions instead of being progressive with 
the development plans. At times the local political environment can favour central state’s 
support and benefit provisions from this but the locality may never receive a really 
improved service (Hussein, 2003 and Andrews et al, 2005).             
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The political interrelations within the DLG in developing countries often constitute its 
weaknesses as a local governance structure. The relationship between different 
institutions and tiers of DLG is commonly found to be complex. National governments 
do not adopt necessarily significant decentralization of functions to DLG structures with 
all forms of real political, resources and administrative devolution. Creation of certain 
structures at different lower/middle tiers caused confusion, whereby provincial level 
authorities wanted to act as local community authorities. Confusion was also seen in the 
allocation of tasks and responsibilities. They were not well and adequately defined and 
demarcated. Statuses of some of the structures were lacking in clarity and functions. 
Members of the parliament were often not represented or coordinated in the structures 
and tended to bypass such structures, worsening confusion and political conflicts 
(Halfani, 2001).  
 
Elected local leadership in the existence of local traditional leadership caused confusion 
and conflicts and resistance to DLG. The chiefs resisted new democratic demands of 
doing things like being democratically voted into village development committees for 
resources allocation instead of becoming automatic chairmen (land) and frustrated DLGs 
implementation efforts. They were underrepresented in the middle tier and thus opposed 
provincial plans or district plans in their wardens. Local authorities also happen to be 
dominated by party leadership. That created confusion in the relations of the political 
party and the local governance structures. Accountability got misdirected to the dominant 
party instead of the local population-local political elitism. These poor internal relations 
with confusion reduced the quality of participation to a very low level due to reluctance 
of local authorities to fully decentralize their powers down to the community level. The 
local communities also generally lacked political and public awareness their citizen rights 
and responsibilities. These poor internal relations are also worsened by electoral 
problems including apathy, vote buying, intimidation and violence during the elections, 
lack of clear criteria for selecting leaders, unfree and unfair party primary elections and 
imposed candidates and biased electoral institutions and media and very few women 
being elected. The problem of interrelations against DLG tends to be more of a 
formidable challenge to DLG in the face of too rapid rate of urban growth creating 
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problems of governability in urban areas, rife poverty, increasing marginalization and 
global competitiveness underdeveloping and exploiting weaker states and a crisis of 
municipal administration (Halfani, 2001).   
 
Generally, the obvious challenges or deficiencies of DLG have been that it has not and 
does not meet the material and cultural needs of its communities, services that are 
supposed to be functionally consolidated or placed in the hands of the local 
authority/DLG are fragmented among several bodies thus increasing the difficulty of 
meeting the needs of communities and many local authorities are too small in size and 
revenue and consequently fall short of adequately qualified personnel and technology to 
execute their activities to an acceptable standard (Reddy, 1996:4). 
3.2.2 The Politics of DLG and the Critical Lessons for Management 
 
Management in LG needs to be perceived as part of the public domain. Such perceptions 
reflect on the nature of the DLG as political institutions established for local choice in 
government and as institutions for public service delivery. It is a political requirement for 
DLG’s management to back the legitimate political processes of the authority as set 
within such a political-management system. These processes are dynamic and need to be 
understood and accepted. This dynamism poses a challenge to the management in terms 
of comprehension and acceptance as the local authority can change with party politics or 
the trend to an assertive politics, for example from; 
• a politics of geographical independents to party politics, 
• control by one party to control by another, 
• a safe conservative/labour controlled authority to a hung authority (no party 
with clear majority, decisions depend on committee and council votes), 
• majority party leader control to an authority in which political group asserts its 
power over the leader, 
• politics of consensus changing to politics of conflict, 
• an authority in which social and liberal democrats have little influence to an 
authority in which they form its administration, 
• officer led authority changing to one in which councillors assert their control, 
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• moderate politics to radical ones (Reddy, 1996). 
 
These changes may be quick and unexpected, requiring adapting by proper attitudes as 
former practices can mislead the management membership. Management need to 
attitudinally and professionally conform to the new political processes due to the 
changes. It needs to be politically sensitive to the current political climate and aware of 
the new political manifestos and other changes and requirements. This also calls for new 
skills, communication and behavioural patterns understandable to the councillors in 
charge and in line with newly introduced conventions. It suffices to state that some 
African countries experienced massive resistance to the DLG policy framework by 
management derailing, delaying, and frustrating or simply obscuring service delivery due 
to their political affiliations in opposition to the ruling party. Some staff members from 
the ruling party tend to control and dictate terms to the local authority. At times 
dictatorial governments just made a ‘clean-sweep’ expelling all the non-affiliates to the 
ruling party in working positions resulting in employment opportunities and LG staff 
along political lines. A politicized bureaucracy may never be fair, neutral, 
impartial/unbiased, efficient and competent in service distribution. These management 
political dimensions also include the fact that management members have to be able to 
properly handle public protests. Almost every developmental activity involving (re) 
distribution of scarce resources can raise political conflicts and thus public protests 
requiring hearing, listening and proper responding. It is important to also note that one of 
the greatest political challenges to management of the DLG is the activation of effective 
citizen participation followed by the citizen’s access to the provided public service. These 
bring in the need for the quality service provision measurement through performance 
management and measurement (Steward and Clarke, 1988 and Pieter, 2008).       
 
Performance measurement, which is basically utilizing the set of measures to assess the 
individual staff and DLG’s programme performance by comparing the planned (specific, 
measurable, achievable, realistic, time-bound objectives) versus the actual performance 
(outcomes/accomplishments), is politically demanded in DLG as a result of public 
demand on accountability and pressure for better quality service and transparency or 
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feedback. DLG in Lesotho has systematically excluded public involvement through non-
civic and non-community participation and the first-past-the-post electoral system giving 
all seats to one dominant ruling political party. In practice, this has cemented political 
loyalty to the ruling central government political ministers and political clientelism in 
Lesotho. As such, public participation and accountability can only be a wish in the LGUs 
of Lesotho (Chapter 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 on Lesotho).  
 
This political demand for programmes’ and staff performance evaluation is often 
constrained by (1) the very lack of qualified or skilled staff to conduct such evaluations to 
improve service delivery and address public dissatisfactions, particularly in the rural 
councils. The staff here is unlikely to have gone for college training in public 
administration, planning or management. This hampers this political need and thus 
effective good governance. (2) The other obstacle to the public pressure for accounting is 
that decisions reached by the administrators are time-bound. Whatever develops 
afterward is out of their sight and scope and disintegration and needed maintenance of 
facilities (e.g. potholes on the roads, broken drainage/sewerage systems becoming a cause 
for danger to the public) may be outside their focus but be critical for an evaluating 
researcher on sustainability and safety aspects later. Courts also require the DLGs and 
their staff to account and thus increased political pressure for the demand for accounting 
by the DLGs. These are at times required as part of the DLG’s funding process, or as a 
way of painting a picture that the DLG is professionally examined or may be forced by a 
legislative body for various political purposes. (3) This political demand may also be 
constrained by lack of accurate data or limitations in accessing such statistics especially 
in the developing world where data are not easy to capture. (4) The other pitfall 
constraining DLG’s accounting as a political requirement beside lack of qualified 
evaluators, internal evaluations are made without supplementary external independent 
objective professional evaluations for validity, more accuracy and reliability in data 
collection and useful recommendations for effective quality service delivery 
enhancement. (5) Furthermore, evaluations are usually made for the convenience of the 
evaluator or the administrator and not for the needs of the citizen. That is participatory 
evaluation process or beneficiary assessment approaches are overlooked and therefore 
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service delivery for the citizen is never improved though irrelevant evaluation records or 
yearly reports could be in place. (6) Recommendations of the evaluations are at times not 
helpful to the decision-makers. It is a report that is not usable for decision making. (7) 
For instance in the case of Lesotho, where poverty reduction constitutes national priority, 
reports need to balance between such without neglecting progress made on local needs 
(Terry and Coulter, 1987:3-30, Pieter, 2008 and Clemens et al, 2007: 735 and Easterly, 
2009).       
 
It remains essential for the technocrats, development agencies, academics and all 
development stakeholders, particularly the bureaucracy and the central government to 
note that DLG is said to have succeeded in development delivery where: 
• national centralized developmental restructuring of programmes took a turn and 
only followed locally driven developmental focus, 
• local democracy was made compulsorily transparent, fair and competitive, 
• DLGs faced hard budget constraints, 
• the central governance was truly scaled back, 
• significant tax raising powers were devolved, 
• DLG followed a distinct separable components as a process of implementation in 
a sequential manner and not (political/donor-driven) expediency 
• national governance proper behaviour before and during the handling of the 
process of the implementation of the DLG to invite effective support other than 
severe oppositions (Jean-Paul, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, the management needs to stay focused and confined to managing basically 
involving deciding what is to be done and getting it done through people; that is 
establishing needs of the area, setting objectives, defining policy, developing plans, 
testing plans, formulating the programme and implementing it, monitoring and evaluating 
success and reviewing the set objectives. On the issue of corruption by management of 
local authorities, there is a conventional wisdom that DLG brings management closer to 
the service recipients and may likely reduce corruption, this has been disputed as it may 
be more than at the higher government tiers due to discretionary powers and non-
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effective accountability characterized by non-monitoring, non-inspection and non-
auditing (Martin and Mallen, 1987 and Anand, 2008).  
 
3.3.0 The Experience of Decentralization in the LDCs 
 
Many LDC central governments regard decentralization as a process to enhance 
democracy and economic development. These low income countries have been observed 
to be of limited economic diversification and thus greatly vulnerable to international up 
and down swings in commodity prices, recession and natural disasters whereby long 
severe drought spells are often for the Lesotho case causing food insecurity and more 
poverty. This indeed has been the dilemma of LDCs having to forego benefits in 
economic efficiency derivable from fiscal devolution/autonomy for urgent national 
economic stability, disaster management and redistributive programmes for equity 
requiring strong central governance or re-centralization. The dilemma is worsened by the 
fact that the industrialized European countries that had a powerful central governance to 
effect decentralization contributing towards sustainable human development form an 
example of development success through devolution/decentralization while LDCs with 
weak central governance are a failure in decentralization (Bahl and Linn, 1994, Fur, 2000 
and Rondinelli, 2000). Table 3.1 below demonstrates some of the incapacitating 
institutional challenges commonly prevalent in most of the developing countries but 
mainly using African case studies. The table affirms the argument that contrary to the 
developed world, where the central government is typically (powerful) institutionally 
capable (had effective institutional variables) to effect effective local governance, the 
developing (African) countries actually lacked the indicated institutional capabilities due 
to the adopted deconcentration instead of political-administrative-fiscal devolution and 
lack of effective political will to actually decentralize. All these make it difficult for 
decentralization to overcome its concerned challenges in the LDCs;   
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Figure 3.1: Lack of Institutional Pre-requisites Effect on Local Governance Effectiveness in Africa 
 
Source: Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:238. 
 
We can realize that ‘high’ (unlike in the developed world) is scarcely noticeable from the 
scale and table/figure 3.1 above, only two times in Chad and Botswana. This in itself 
provides the actual experience of the developing world in decentralization and how 
severely the variable institutional constraints have inhibited successful implementation of 
decentralization. Such constraints include mainly low or limited self-control and 
authority, low resources’ capacity in the LGUs and lacking effectiveness of LGUs in 
collective choice and openness/transparency, local political processes and local 
governance in general. The following table also affirms the same argument focusing on 
other institutional incapabilities.     
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Figure 3.2: More Institutional Competencies Lacking in Africa for Effective DLG 
 
Source: Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:238. 
 
Many councils in LDCs are seen to be serving as servants to the master the central tier as 
consultative/advisory bodies only. The local structures for decision making may have 
been created, there could be a claim of democratization and decentralization which 
mainly bear deconcentration/re-centralization expansion and as thus institutionally 
constrained development delivery through decentralization (Metzger, 2001, and Tanzi, 
2000).  
 
Administrative efficiency has also been foiled by shocking reports of rampant corruption 
in the LGUs particularly in the municipals and the opportunistic senior politicians. 
Accountability and other essential elements of good governance beside the establishment 
of good structures and legislations for decentralization lack implementation and 
enforcement capacity in the LDCs (Olowu, 2000 and 2002).        
 
Evidently from the above authors and others, the developing countries have not really 
addressed the constraints/challenges and required preconditions for the successful 
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implementation of the decentralization process. This has put the efficient and effective 
implementation of decentralization for development delivery at risk. While, Watson 
(2002:5-6) prescribes requirements for such a successful implementation of 
decentralization, the LDCs have continuously lacked LGUs with (a) clearly defined roles, 
responsibilities and mandates for certain categories of service delivery; (b) adequate and 
reliable financial resources in order to exercise those responsibilities, with enough 
discretion to ensure that resource allocation is responsive to local priorities; (c) autonomy 
in staffing and adequate human resource management policies to ensure that staff are 
deployed effectively, loyal and accountable to their local authority, their councillors and 
the citizens they serve; (d) planning and management capacities and systems to support 
all the basic functions; (e) communication and accountability mechanisms linking LGUs 
with both the local people and the central government. Azfar et al (1999) and Manor 
(2001) also affirm that there are factors critical for decentralization implementation. They 
further indicate that there are additional critical success factors such as transparency of 
government actions, citizens’ participation in service delivery, and the effectiveness of 
civil society, all which are lacking in the LDCs. They lack a comprehensive strategic 
framework addressing all aspects of decentralization.  
. 
These countries have no effective political will to effect the real process of 
decentralization (Smoke, 2003 and Kulipossa, 2004). There is no pragmatic 
implementation strategy with a vision of decentralization, incrementally and strategically. 
Instead, there are non-enabling legal, political and financial frameworks formulated by 
the central government. There is no thorough creation of constitutional bodies and 
pressure from the civil society for delivery, there is no supportive state control and proper 
judiciary interventions including enlightenment, Auditor-Generals’ actions are bullied by 
senior politicians to off-set exposure of their corruption even on funds for effecting 
decentralization. The mass media has also been utilized limitedly if ever used to enhance 
citizen participation. Such a little success has been reported in only a few countries; 
Bolivia and RSA (Cameron, 2003). 
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LDCs have often adopted decentralization due to local and external pressures, including 
conditions linked to continued financial assistance from the World Bank, IMF and other 
international development agencies (Olowu, 2001; Olowu, 2003; World Bank, 2003b and 
Ouedraogo, 2003). Strikingly Romeo (2003:92) in contrast argues that decentralization 
was not adopted due to pressures, instead, ‘central level political motives have been 
predominant particularly in Africa rather than concerns with efficiency in local service 
delivery,’ like expansion of political domination by single monopolistic political parties 
to disintegrate opposition from the grass root level composed of religious and ethnic 
groupings. Cases include Nigeria, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Angola (Watson, 2002; 
Romeo, 2003). One may argue that both stances qualify as justification for and thus also 
challenges against decentralization. In Lesotho the opposition that mainly precipitated 
this is the opposition that was based on both religious (protestants-the BCP against the 
Catholic BNP government) and the commoners who used to be referred to as the ‘council 
of the commoners’/the Congress (‘Lekhotla la Bafo’/council of the subjects/commoners) 
that was rising against the domination of the ruling royal grouping heightening and 
entrenching exclusive undemocratic customary chieftaincy, which was the BNP mainly 
led by the principal/main chiefs and their conservative following. Let it be noted that 
Lesotho’s reports (Mapetla et al 1983, GoL Reports, 1997 and Malcolm Wallis, 1999) 
indicate that BNP (chiefs’ oriented political party) in the first and second phases of 
decentralization sought to extend its influence and get rid of ‘commoners’ opposition 
(BCP) altogether seizing and sticking to power undemocratically while in the third and 
mostly in the current phase (LCD) the commoners/congress legally through 
decentralization obviously in retaliation/transformation/restructuring/reforms reversed the 
former deconcentration of power on chiefs tremendously back to the 
subjects/commoners/’ordinary people’ together with the motto, ‘governance! democracy! 
(Puso! Ea sechaba ka sechaba!’), all which also again resulted into deconcentration and 
the capture by the political elite. That is capture from politically organized chieftaincy 
(BNP) and then capture by the ruling political elite (dominant LCD). It brings us to the 
realization that Lesotho being a small country with a small population has limited 
opportunities. Politics is therefore an inept means of power and self-enrichment with 
severe contests mainly between the political elites/commoners and chiefs and among 
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themselves with often power struggles and main political parties’ splits for senior parties’ 
leadership being the LCD, the newly formed All Basotho Convention (ABC) party just 
three months before the 2007 elections in protest against the collapse of systems of 
delivery including LG and the BNP together with the remnants of the old split BCP. To 
date, in 2009 not one of the above political parties has not suffered major internal splits 
over who should be the leader of each party.       
 
Generally, it can be observed that both internal and external pressures, particularly 
economic crises and money lending international financial institutions for development 
especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa played to be the main factors to the flawed adoption 
of decentralization. Let one also safely think that decentralization in the eyes of the 
political elites may be declared a ‘success’ in line with their undeclared political missions 
like continued clinging to centralized power and functions (in one NGOs’ conference that 
one attended in 2006, one political minister in conference proceedings, after giving an 
opening speech was put under pressure to answer why as the relevant minister of LG the 
central government does not really devolve power politically, administratively and 
financially for local development attainment, responded saying “power is so nice, it is 
difficult to part with and every human being is like that”. To the worst shock of these 
NGO’s delegates the minister in question had graduated in PhD in Local Governance).      
 
The context of ‘institutional constraints’
5
 against the implementation of decentralization 
in LDCs, particularly in Africa, has severely affected this process. Developing countries 
have very weak institutions that battle to implement decentralization (Litvack et al 1998). 
Institutions, like markets for land, labour and capital, systems for information, fiscal, 
legal and regulatory including democratic institutions and processes are powerless. Weak 
institutional capacity that could not implement DLG in many of the developing countries 
is demonstrated and confirmed by the figure below; 
 
                                                
5.  It is generally known that institutions constitute a set of formal and informal rules of conduct that facilitate coordination or govern 
relationships between individuals, when their natural conduct poses constraints to poverty alleviation/development/DLG, such 
impediments are termed ‘institutional constraints’ (Ellis, 1999:3, 4,21,280,325,327). 
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Figure 3.3: Ideal versus Real Cycle of Decentralization in Developing Countries 
 
Source: Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:6. 
 
The realization is that all have been constrained by lack of institutional capacity (or 
institutional constraint) in that the transfer of authority, resources and accountability to 
LAs as well as development of an open local political process and local political-
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administrative institutions, contrary to the developed world, are functioning in ways that 
demonstrate that local priorities and needs are not actually driving local decision making.  
The table in a concise manner has summarized what became eventual due to lack of 
institutional capacity as there is clear contrast between decentralization intentions of 
many developing countries and actual policy outcomes/outputs of DLG. The policy has 
clearly not brought the expected developmental benefits in many of such developing 
countries as opposed to the developed world (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004:6).       
3.4 Summary 
 
The combined effect of accelerated growth, pervasive poverty, historical forms of 
marginalization, huge dependency ratios (big family sizes with too few ‘bread winners’ 
and too many vulnerable ‘dependents’/unproductive children, the unemployed and the 
aged without any pensions), macro-economic policies, municipals’ reliance on unstable 
market to distribute resources and services and other various challenges to DLG have 
rendered it almost a failure in alleviating rural and urban poverty through development 
delivery. Lack of resources and power devolution have worsened the problem including 
rapid population growth and urbanization. National development/economic priorities 
within the context of partially devolved powers to DLGs stifle local social participation 
and thus local development prioritization (Halfani, 2001:13-24 and chapter 7 and 8 on 
Lesotho). Furthermore, the challenges that confronted DLG in Africa include problems of 
lack of proper reorientation of central government personnel, chronic staff shortages, thus 
incompetent LG developmental service delivery, inadequate and irregular training of the 
DLGs’ personnel which therefore lacked qualified advisory and support services. 
Generally, factors constraining the democratic process of DLGs include lack of 
supportive national political context, effective systems of intergovernmental relations, 
demand for public goods and social capital at local governance level and well-designed 
local governance institutions (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004).       
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CHAPTER FOUR: DECENTRALIZATION MEASURING AND CHALLENGES 
 
4.0 General Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters have considered the world’s historical experience in 
decentralization. They argue that decentralization has pros and institutional constraints 
with implications. This chapter aims at answering what the generic risks and challenges 
decentralization has to overcome in its adoption are? What are the 
preconditions/requirements to be met for its success and what are the proper methods of 
measuring its adoption? It also deals with the limitations of such methods to be 
specifically used in our case study of Lesotho. The chapter argues that DGD has risks and 
challenges to overcome, all setting in certain requirements to be met to ensure its success 
in sustainable development delivery. It further argues that there are also limitations 
against such requirements as well as those proper decentralization measuring methods.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to consider such preconditions serving as objectively 
verifiable indicators for the efficient and effective adoption of decentralization. This also 
constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. The limitations against such 
requirements are also discussed. One will first concisely give preconditions for the 
successful implementation of decentralization. The second attempt is on the challenges 
and risks that decentralization ought to overcome. The third effort conceptualizes 
indicators as the mainstream method for measuring decentralization’s efficiency and 
effectiveness in its adoption.  This task includes debates on the methods of measuring 
decentralization entailing (a) indicators in measuring the degree of decentralization, (b) 
equity and creating enabling environment as measurement in decentralization, (c) 
measuring decentralization within ideals, principles and values of good governance. 
 
The chapter is therefore about the measurement or indicators of decentralization towards 
development delivery and the concerned challenges. Such measurement is important 
because it gives an idea of the extent to which decentralization has actually occurred and 
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enables the study’s examination of the extent to which it effectively improves the 
government and assists with development delivery as shown in the next chapters. 
 
This study is also on grounds that, “At all stages of developmental local government 
(DLG), we must be able to accurately and flexibly assess…socially, economically, 
politically and environmentally...we need to know if the local government system is 
really successfully doing its job for all… (Oldfield and Parnell, 1998:35, emphasis 
added)”. When the Lesotho government (GoL) embraced decentralization and instituted 
the norm of local governance in 1997, it then becomes a legitimate research question to 
unearth the role and the extent to which such local governance functions contribute 
towards development delivery. This therefore calls for a political-developmental 
assessment study like this, intended to reveal the extent to which decentralization has 
contributed towards development attainment in Lesotho.  
 
In essence this is the chapter that provides us with the operational yardstick against which 
DLG can be assessed. This fourth chapter also illustrates the assessment framework for 
examining efficiency and effectiveness of decentralization in Lesotho. The framework is 
applied in chapter 8. This involves measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of 
decentralization management in Lesotho, as well as indicating the political-
developmental impacts and some constraints of this developmental policy in Lesotho.  
4.1 Preconditions for the Successful Implementation of Decentralization 
 
The measurement of decentralization/DGD involves assessing the extent to which local 
authorities are  
• constitutionally separate from central government and responsible for a 
significant range of services, 
• have their own treasury, separate budget and accounts, own taxes as significant 
part of their produced revenue, 
• have their own personnel with the powers to employ and discipline or fire own 
employees; 
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• local policy being elected by local councils, predominantly consisting of local 
representatives; 
• have central government only playing an indirect advisory, supervisory and 
inspectorate role (Mawhood, 1990:1-2, Cameron, 1995:397, 1999:99-100 and 
2003: 106-107) 
4.2 Risks and Challenges to be overcome by Decentralization 
 
The measurement of DGD has to adopt the principles and values of both actual local 
governance and good governance. Beginning with these two as encompassed by 
decentralization, their effectiveness can be seen and measured in overcoming the 
following challenges of decentralization; 
 
Firstly, local governments’ ability to provide services is in part contingent upon their 
ability to raise revenues locally, as national transfers are often inadequate, delayed  and 
resulting in local plans getting outdated, disproportionate to local areas’ needs, 
population density and various (socio-political-economic-developmental-historical 
spatial) disparities,   and/or oriented more towards national political goals.  This ability 
depends on the taxes assigned to them to collect, the size of the local tax base and how 
buoyant those taxes are in terms of whether they increase over time in line with 
population increase, inflation, real income growth and the extent to which local taxes 
impinge on the poor (Devas, 2003). 
 
Secondly, central governments are often forced to take austerity measures which often 
restrict central government expenditure in sufficient national transfers.  This may have a 
ripple effect on the amount of resources that may be transferred to local governments. For 
example, in the case of Lesotho, as field findings confirm in the next chapters, there is no 
evidence of funds transfers for either sustainable local community owned and driven 
development projects or credit and/or training to individual entrepreneurs except very 
limited delivery of infrastructural and waste disposal services with limited rotational 
casual jobs. 
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The third major challenge to good local governance is capture by local elites.  Local 
governments may be vulnerable to local elites who then receive a disproportionate share 
of public spending on public goods.  The challenge then becomes the extent to which 
decentralization processes enable the poor to access publicly provided goods.  Indeed, as 
noted by the World Bank (1990), quoted by Goetz and O’Brien (1996:27), “In general, 
the poor have less access to publicly provided goods and infrastructure than other groups. 
On the whole governments fail to reach the poor. This is not to say that elites should not 
participate in local governance”.  Indeed their participation is often critical because of 
their power, knowledge and networks (Olowu, 2003); however, this needs to be balanced 
against the threat of elite capture. 
 
Fourthly, the effective and efficient delivery of public goods and services, at the local 
level, depends on the co-ordination of delivering agencies.  In this respect, Peters (1998) 
identifies three areas of coordination failure, namely redundancy, lacunae and 
incoherence.  Redundancy results when two or more organizations or agencies perform 
the same task in which case resources are wasted.  Lacunae results when no organization 
performs a necessary task, in which case service delivery gaps occur.  Incoherence results 
when policies, programmes, projects or agencies with the same clients have different 
goals and requirements in which case this may trigger conflicts between agencies and 
organizations over resources and clientele.  The synchronization of policy across 
ministries and departments, at the local level, is therefore a major challenge. 
 
Fifthly, decentralization may lead to a loss of economies of scale, the direct implication 
of which is a loss of efficiency.  The decentralization process therefore needs to take 
careful and calculated consideration of the tier of government to which specific service 
delivery functions are decentralized so as not to compromise efficiency emanating from 
economies of scale. 
 
Sixthly, for decentralization and local governance to be effective, there is a need for 
individuals who are not only knowledgeable about the running of local government but 
must also be available to undertake such tasks. However, in many instances the most 
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educated individuals are gainfully employed by central governments (Hope, 2000; 
Chambers, 1983).  This is often further exacerbated by the practice of assigning rural 
posts as a means of ‘penal posting’ (Chambers, 1983) in which case being posted to 
decentralized positions is often seen as being posted to inferior positions.  
 
Seventhly, changing the attitudes of public servants as providers of public goods and 
services shall be a major challenge in improving the quality of goods and services 
provided.  Citizens are often badly treated by clerks, shielded from the public by an 
enormous bureaucracy, to deny them better quality goods and services.  The 
improvement of this situation requires: (1) training in professional skills; (2) 
improvement of facilities – buildings and equipment; (3) opportunities for promotion or 
at least some form of recognition of work well done, as well as punitive measures for 
work poorly done; and (4) providing citizens with responsive avenues for raising 
complaints over goods and services poorly delivered.   
 
The threat of corruption: Once the structures for local governance are in place, the 
greatest challenges to practices of good governance emanate from corruption.  Some 
authors have argued that as more funds and more powers are devolved to a new, 
untrained local leadership and a local administration with limited capacity of financial 
management corruption is also decentralized (Fjeldstad, 2003; Doig and McIvor, 2003; 
Matovu, 2003).  It is also a major impediment to the broader goals of development and 
poverty alleviation.  Corruption can be broadly defined as “… an illegal act that involves 
the abuse of public trust or office for private benefit (Fantaye, 2004: 171)”.  As further 
described by Heidenhemer, Johnston and Levene, as cited by Werlin (2002), it comprises 
three main categories: (1) the misuse of money or favours for private gain; (2) 
inappropriate exchanges of money or other goods and services for undue influence or 
power; and (3) violations of public interest or norms of behaviour for special advantages 
or self-serving purposes.   
 
Thus defined and to be examined in measuring the success of decentralization 
operationally in chapter eight, there are six areas in which corruption becomes a major 
 88 
challenge to the implementation of decentralization policies.  Firstly, there is a problem 
of tax evasion as the transaction is not reported by either party, thus denying the treasury 
or tax revenue authority income (Seligson, 2002).  Secondly, corruption results in the 
inequitable distribution of public resources as public services become disproportionately 
accessible to those who pay bribes, denying those services or similar quality of services 
to those who do not pay bribes (Seligson, 2002).  Thirdly, bribes enable service providers 
to ignore established standards of provision of goods and services offered in two ways: 
(a) contracts for example are not awarded to the highest quality provider at the bid price 
but to the firm that offers the highest bribe; and (b) it is often difficult for those who have 
received bribes to ask providers of services to provide better services or rectify problems 
associated with services already rendered.  Fourthly, corruption undermines the rule of 
law and scares away potential investors as it arbitrarily increases transaction costs 
(Collier, 2000).  Fifthly, corruption is anti-developmental as it reduces the opportunities 
available to people, particularly the poor.  Among the poor, in particular, it also increases 
their sense of insecurity, which is in itself a defining characteristic of poverty.  Sixthly, 
corruption in the form of nepotism, bribery or patronage, stifles meritocracy, the result of 
which is an increasingly inefficient and brutal bureaucracy (Seyf, 2001).  Within such a 
context, the normal bureaucratic processes are used as punishment for those who follow 
the letter of the law, primarily through the frustration of dealing with bureaucratic hurdles 
(Olowu, 1999, 2000 and 2003, Cameron, 2004). 
 
4.3.0 The Indicators for Efficient and Effective Decentralization Adoption 
 
Indicators form the mainstream method for measuring decentralization’s efficiency and 
effectiveness in its adoption for development delivery or poverty reduction. Such 
indicators are relevant in this study as they help to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the adoption of DGD in Lesotho. It is therefore crucial to have a good 
comprehension of indicators for their proper use of also measuring the degree and the 
success/failure of decentralization in development delivery in Lesotho. Parnell and others 
(2002:251-260) define indicators as “a measure of the level of development that allows 
for comparison across space and time…Within local government…to present information 
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in the best possible manner to enable policy formulation, the setting of goals and 
objectives, and the monitoring of the policies being implemented.”  
 
This study has used outcome indicators because they are relevant to the policy process 
and its assessment. Outcomes look at whether policy goals are achieved and whether 
people are content with the results. They promote targeting needy groups, political and 
financial accountability and transparency as they translate aims into objectively verifiable 
quantifiable measures of attainment on set performance and management and delivery. 
So, indicators are there to provide local government with a common language for the 
many interest groups that exist, assist them in decision-making and policy setting, 
establishing targets and monitoring the implementation of policies and performance of 
the departments and policies. They also assist local units to become politically, 
financially accountable, transparent and efficient in delivery and balancing between 
poverty needs and economic growth or globalization.    
 
Some of the indicators include (partly used in chapter 8): (1) an income indicator-the 
number of household heads earning less than a stipulated minimal expressed as a 
percentage of the household heads in the smallest sub area of enumeration (sub-district 
level). (2) Education indicator- which is the number of adults 18 or older with less than 
standard 6/primary education as a percentage of adults in the smallest sub area of 
enumeration (sub-district level). (This is the minimum educational level required for 
post-school training and a constraint on employment opportunities). (3) Unemployment 
indicator- representing the number of adults 18 or older who are unemployed but actively 
seeking work, as a percentage of all adults in each enumerated sub-district/area. This 
excludes all non-work seekers, students and retired people. (4) Welfare indicator-the 
number of household heads who are single mother with three or more children as a 
percentage of all household heads in each enumerated smallest sub-area as aggregated. 
This can be the primary criterion for eligibility for a state welfare grant- proxy for the 
quality of family life. (5) Overcrowding indicator-the number of households with over 
1,5 per habitable room, as a percentage of all households in each smallest enumerated 
aggregated sub area. Overcrowding indicates increased risk of transmission of infectious 
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diseases and reduced privacy within the home but excludes bathrooms, toilets, kitchens 
and passageways. This includes habitable rooms like bedrooms, sitting rooms and other 
similar ones (Ibid).  
4.3.0.1 Challenges and Possibilities/methodologies/Indicators in Measuring the 
Degree of Decentralization 
 
Parnell et al (2003:259) also indicate that indicators have limitations in really measuring 
decentralization. They are too easily taken to be an end in themselves. It is thus important 
that local government plays a role in the design and selection of indicators, as generic or 
“international” indicators may be irrelevant to the local situation. The other limitation 
with indicators for measuring DGD is that they use a household as a basic unit of 
analysis, often ignoring its unequal gender relations right at the heart of poverty in the 
households and the unaffordable cost of data gathering that has to be done after long 
periodic intervals.         
 
According to the United Nations/UN (1962: 48-51; 1966:7-25), Smith (1979:221), 
Mawhood (1983: 18-20), Wallis (1989: 131-132), World Bank (1989:119-120) and 
Cameron (1991), there are certain identified and examined indices that can measure 
decentralization. They include the personnel, access, functions, party politics, finances, 
hierarchical relations and size: 
 
Recruited personnel (as another indicator of decentralization) is important in this study as 
its nature of control will help expose and overcome the risk of recentralization in 
adopting decentralization. Many developing countries have often reversed 
decentralization by excessive deconcentration leading to recentralization. Personnel 
control type thus determines the nature and the degree of decentralization in our case 
study of Lesotho. Personnel is generally accepted as a measuring principle that the more 
the centre controls the selection and deployment of local personnel, the less decentralized 
the organization is. There may be three different types of local government personnel 
systems on this basis though some countries mix these models. Separate system: This is 
seen when each local authority acts as a completely autonomous employer. Personnel are 
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not transferable to other jurisdictions by a central body. It is not uncommon for the 
central government to provide the main impetus for sound local government practices 
under the separate system through, for example, the setting of maximum salaries, 
pensions, standards of local civil service systems and qualifications of certain technical 
personnel. The separate model is conducive to devolution of power. Permanently based 
local officials are likely to know local conditions better and develop more interest in 
community affairs than would employees recruited elsewhere. The limitation here and to 
using personnel control as an indicator of the degree of decentralization is that less 
affluent, smaller and rural local authorities find it difficult to attract competent personnel. 
Also, nepotism and corruption seem to abound under certain separate systems, especially 
where there is no central impetus for ensuring sound personnel practices. Separate system 
is mainly found in developed countries with the strong customs of local government like 
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, France and New Zealand.     
 
Decentralizing staff recruitment through local authorities serves as a good indicator of 
proper adoption of decentralization. This is usually a case in an integrated personnel 
system whereby local authorities’ staff are employed locally but are organized 
nationwide in a single service. They are civil servants and can be transferred to other 
local authorities or other government departments by the bodies responsible for the civil 
service as a whole. It’s advantages are that it allows for the most extensive area base for 
the recruitment to the service, it makes quality staff available to all local authorities, it 
also facilitates the optimal use of trained personnel, presence of trained staff allows 
central government to devolve more functions to local authorities and minimizes local 
corruption and nepotism though there is no guarantee against central corruption and 
nepotism. The limitation is that this system is highly centralist because career loyalty of 
officials is to the central government and not the local authority. The other limitation is 
that no ambitious local authority officer is likely to defend the council’s interest where 
this is in conflict with the viewpoint of a Minister/civil service. Countries using this 
system have a challenge of the tendency by the system to have centralized governments 
with no strong tradition of decentralized local authorities (Ibid).    
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The unified system also has the risk of central control that often disempowers the local 
authorities in determining rewards for competent staff retention at the local level. This 
system is existent when local authority’s staff are employed locally but organized 
nationwide by the central government in a single civil service parallel to the central civil 
service. The responsibilities of such a parallel civil service include the establishment of a 
national grading system, procedures for the recruitment of senior officials and control of 
the promotion and discipline of these officials. In certain unified systems the central body 
has the power to transfer staff to local authorities. This model exists often in respect of 
senior local government employees only. Its strengths include; helping smaller local 
authorities to attract more qualified staff than would be the case under a separate system, 
facilitating the creation of nation or state-wide career services founded on merit 
principles and reducing corruption and nepotism. The weaknesses are that there is central 
control involved, though it provides for the delegation of personnel functions to local 
authorities to the maximum extent practically possible. Responsiveness of the employees 
may be a problem at the initial stages but those that make local government a career 
service are likely to develop skills and attitudes conducive to sound relationships with 
their councils. But this system is not conducive to the autonomy of the local government 
as a separate system; individual local authorities do not have control over the personnel 
conditions of their officials. Under certain integrated systems, staff can be transferred to 
and from local authorities without their consent. This unified system is recommended for 
the developing countries wanting to adopt decentralized local authorities but have severe 
lack of trained staff (Ibid) 
 
According to Stephens (1974: 61-64) and Smith (1979:221), there are other personnel 
indices, including those that distinguish between elected office-bearers and those 
appointed by the higher-tier governments. Functions employed by elected members are 
more decentralized than those performed by appointed officials, which in turn are more 
decentralized than those performed by deconcentrated field administrators. It is more 
conducive for decentralization to have directly elected members than indirectly elected 
councillors. One other index is looking at the total distribution of administrative 
personnel between the different levels of government. The proportion of total public 
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servants employed on relevant government functions viz. those handed at local level in 
either a decentralized or deconcentrated fashion, needs to be calculated. The greater the 
proportion of people employed at local level on these relevant functions, the greater is the 
degree of decentralization (Cameron, 1991).  
 
While a country may declare and adopt decentralization, the process still has the risk of 
the central government being inaccessible to the local authorities for local and national 
policy influence. This inaccessibility renders decentralization ineffective and without 
impact on development delivery locally and nationally. It is the nature of contacts 
between central and local government actors. It is the ability of local government to 
penetrate national politicians and influence policy-making affecting local authorities. 
Important is the frequency of direct forms of access between individual and central actors 
involving bilateral direct relationships between individual local authority actors and 
central actors, in contrast to indirect forms of access by which local actors have their 
views and interests represented to central actors through the mediation of national 
associations or interest groups of local officials and politicians or through party networks. 
National associations of local authorities are very important here. How effectively do 
they represent their members’ wishes? Or alternatively do they represent central 
government’s view to local governments? One other issue of government decision-
making processes is involving the affected. This also includes the secrecy or openness 
policy by the central government to the local government on consulting them on issues 
affecting them (Page and Goldsmith, 1985:181 and Rhodes, 1980:577, 1981: 31, 
Cameron, 1991).  
 
Stephens (1974:59-61) has argued that the range of local government functions is an 
index of decentralization. He constructed a service index to measure the state/local 
distribution of services based on the proportion of total expenditure on a public service 
allocated to state and local governments in the U.S.A. His formula is based on the 
proportion of total expenditure on a public service allocated to state and local 
governments. A service is classified as ‘state’ where the state spends 60% to 100%; as 
‘local’ if the state spends 0 to 39%; and ‘joint’ if the state accounts for 40 to 59%. Thus 
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the more relevant functions (performed in either devolved, deconcentrated/delegated 
fashion), handled by devolved methods, the greater the extent of decentralization to local 
government (Smith, 1979: 20). Methodological problems encountered in drawing up a 
list of functions include; the fact that each function has a number of detailed activities 
and quantifying the minute sub-activities could be highly time-consuming. This thus 
complicates application of this index. A more feasible still limited approach is to look at a 
single major function in detail. One other important issue involves examining historically 
why certain relevant functions ended up at local level and others at central level. For 
instance some functions are deemed basically local due to different demands from 
different communities with therefore minimal spillover whereby the service may be 
managed efficiently within a small community. Other functions are assigned to a higher 
tier of government because of the importance of administrative or financial economies of 
scale or because of the likelihood of spillover effects. One other problem is the 
distinction between the number of functions decentralized and the overall scope of a 
state’s activities. Obviously, liberal governments will prefer restricted public sector 
provision of services but social democratic and socialist ones will favour a more active 
role of the government (Stephens, 1974:59-61, Smith, 1979:216; 1985:86, Page and 
Goldsmith, 1981:177; 1985:178, Cameron, 1991). 
 
One other developmental local government indicator is the autonomous financial 
capacity. The relationship between finance and autonomy can be divided into three 
different categories: (1) the nature of revenue base, (2) elasticity of sources of revenue 
and (3) amount of financial discretion in the use of revenue sources. Mawhood (1983:14-
15) has formulated some indicators of decentralization on the systems of local financing, 
ranging from the ‘most autonomous’ to the ‘least autonomous’; (a) own revenues 
emerges when the local council has broad discretion to vary the rate of the tax collected. 
This means that the taxation level can be adjusted to balance with expected expenditure 
needs. (b) General grants are unconditional grants. They are often based on a formula 
calculating the resources and needs for each local area. (c) Assigned revenues are 
prescribed and collected by central government and then handed over to local 
government. They tend to be less favourable to local discretion than above general 
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because they do not embody any calculation of resources and needs. (d) Incentive grants 
embrace a stated proportion of the cost of a particular activity. This grant is often a 
centrally induced incentive to persuade local authorities to adopt some central policy. (e) 
Specific grants emerge when the local authority has virtually no say as to when and how 
money for a particular programme is to be spent. This is one form of delegation. (f) 
Deficiency grants, these are paid by the government simply to offset the difference 
between a local authority’s expenditure and revenues often treated as a subordinate 
government agency. It is important to raise the limiting factor in intergovernmental grants 
as an indicator in that most part of the revenue could be raised locally and yet the council 
be controlled in other several non-financial ways.  
 
Elasticity of sources of revenue/tax base also serves as one other decentralization 
indicator. Local authorities can want sources of revenue that can expand beyond the rate 
of inflation. This is important in financial capacity and autonomy. Elasticity refers to 
“where the taxable base expands of its own accord in keeping with the growth of the 
economy, the rate of inflation and demands of expenditure (Davey, 1971:147)”. The 
usual limitation is that countries that have adopted local government system often 
experience a shortage of income at local level. Rates/property tax is extremely inelastic 
and lags behind the inflation rate as Hepworth (1984:15) has indicated. Local income 
taxes are better because they tend to keep pace with increasing urban population and 
rapid urbanization with increasing demands on the local government with limited 
declining property tax in relation to population growth and urbanization (Smith, 
1985:102). 
 
The amount of financial discretion over expenditure serves as an indicator of the extent of 
decentralization. Expenditure controls and approvals by the central government over 
local authorities runs the risk of directing local authorities in mostly pursuing national 
political goals instead of local needs. According to Davey (1983:120-121), the financial 
discretion of local authority in respect of expenditure has these two elements; (a) scale; 
the amount of money they are allowed to spend; (b) purpose, the objects on which they 
are allowed to spend their revenue. The descending order of discretion using both 
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dimensions is as follows: (1) local authorities have complete freedom to spend as much 
as they like on what they like. (2) They can spend as much as they like but only on a 
prescribed range of services. (3) They may allocate money between different services 
unlimited or prescribed but with a fixed ceiling on expenditure. (4) They may allocate 
money between services provided they spend a mandatory minimum on certain functions. 
This mandatory minimum may be laid down by statute or be a condition of a higher tier 
government grant or loan. (5) They are free to allocate money but only within total 
amounts prescribed for individual functions by higher tier government. (6) A higher tier 
of government prescribes levels of sectoral expenditure and details allocations within 
these. Local authorities execute only centrally prescribed budgets and exercise choice 
only over the lowest level of detail. Restrictions can apply to all levels of local authority 
expenditure or certain parts of it viz. capital expenditure only, current expenditure only, 
expenditure on certain functions only, certain types of expenditure like personnel costs 
and so on, amounts received from central government allocations, a fixed percentage of 
total expenditure, expenditure up to a certain basic level. One other expenditure control is 
statutory requirements obliging local authorities to set aside fixed sums or percentages for 
specific purposes. A common requirement is that a certain percentage of revenue must be 
set aside for capital development purposes (Davey, 1983:156).     
 
Smith (1979:219) and Page and Goldsmith (1985:177) have identified another indicator 
of decentralization. This is the level of local expenditure as a proportion of total public 
expenditure. The greater the percentage of local government expenditure, the greater the 
extent of decentralization. This indicator is not very helpful because it does not tell us 
who has control over the critical policy making or the difference between delegation and 
devolution. For this index to be analytically useful, one has to subtract expenditure which 
could never be devolved, for example defence and foreign affairs from the total 
expenditure. It needs to concentrate on relevant functions which could be the 
responsibility of either central or local government.  
 
Hierarchical relations also do serve as an indicator of decentralization. Formal 
administrative mechanisms through which higher tier control over local authorities’ 
 97 
powers can be maintained include; (1) Approval of decisions, decisions can only come 
into effect after approval by the higher authority. (2) Directives/instructions; ordering 
local authorities to do or refrain from doing some act. (3) The power of suspension; this 
is where higher tier authority has the power to suspend the activities of the local 
authorities. (4) The power of annulment; decisions of the local authority can be 
overturned. (5) The power of reformation; decisions of the local authority can be 
modified. (6) The power of substitution; the higher authority can act in place of a lower 
one (De Forges, 1975:127). Other mechanisms to ensure higher tier control include 
circulars laying down policy, inspectors, and the requirement of reports on progress in 
specific services. This extent of control may also be limited, firstly, by the legal 
framework of local government-whether the local government services are decided 
locally or whether they are explicitly granted by the central government. Secondly, one 
other control is whether the general supervisory powers are vested in a higher tier 
government official such as the Prefect in France before 1982. Thirdly, it is whether 
services are mandatory that is whether local authorities are legally obliged to offer 
services or permissive, that is whether local authorities by virtue of a special grant or 
powers or a constitutional provision of general competence, have the freedom to offer 
services. Fourthly, the extent to which central government attempts to issue nonstatutory 
advice to local government also affects the degree of decentralization. The complication 
to be noted is that in many cases the legislation granting duties on local authorities does 
not specify the level of activity or the way the activity should be carried out. Central 
intentions are not always uncritically translated into policy outcomes at local level. 
Extensive central supervision notwithstanding, local authorities can retain a certain 
amount of discretion (Page and Goldsmith, 1985:178-180 and Steward, 1983:147).   
 
The other problem is with regard to different forms of supervisory patterns. Griffith 
(1966:515-528) differentiates between three different types of higher tier government 
supervisory patterns over the activities of local authorities, viz. laissez-faire, regulatory 
and promotional. Laissez-faire is about minimum intervention within the necessary 
fulfilment of departmental duties. Regulatory control is somewhere between laissez-faire 
and promotion of local authority, viz. the middle way. A major worrying factor is to see 
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to it that statutory regulations are abided by. Otherwise the supervisory tier government 
does not interfere excessively in local authorities’ affairs. Promotional supervision often 
implies local authorities executing functions under the close control and direction of a 
government department. The more politically important the functions are for central 
government, the greater the likelihood that this form of supervision will be promotional.  
More levels in an areal division of power make it more difficult for central government to 
ensure enforcement of its policy at the local level. It needs to be reiterated that delegation 
leads to discretion and thus the more levels then the greater the delegation and discretion 
(Smith, 1979:220).  
 
Many problems associated with the sheer demographic borders in larger countries are 
solved through decentralizing powers to sub-national tiers of government. Modern 
systems of communication have also reduced the extent to which size inhibits 
decentralization in developed countries but some findings prove that there is no 
correlation between the physical size of the country and the devolution. It is generally 
believed that larger local authorities will be more autonomous on the grounds that they 
have stronger revenue bases, more professional organizations, greater political power 
when dealing with central government and greater expertise at performing functions. 
Counter arguments are that there are no studies confirming this supposition and that 
larger local authorities imply fewer units for the central government to control. So, there 
is no guarantee that larger ones will be under tighter control by the central government. 
Size is thus an uncertain index of decentralization and still needs empirical scrutiny 
(Clark, 1974:29, Smith 1979:222 and in 1985:48 and Cameron, 1991).                                                                 
 
Ismail, Bayat and Meyer on Local Government Management, (1997:5-6) have also put 
features of local authorities that may intently be used to measure the extent of 
decentralization to supplement other qualitative measures as following; (1) firstly local 
authorities/LAs must have a well-defined area of jurisdiction, except where ‘agency 
agreements’ are agreed upon by the two local authorities, that help each other and thus 
operate in one another’s area. (2)  Secondly, local authority must have a legal mandate 
and obligation to serve all its inhabitants with basic services, in particular localized or 
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contextualized development objectives besides the normal legislative functions, that is be 
poverty-reduction oriented and responsive enough to local needs (3) thirdly; LAs operate 
in conformity within the legal framework of the national and middle-level framework. 
They may not pass laws in contradiction with those of the above levels. The important 
feature here is they have autonomous power to pass some laws, (4) that is they have 
legislative powers to pass by-laws or regulations for orderly development and well being 
of the urban or rural area. (5) Fifthly, while they are to provide and promote provision of 
the social, political, physical, educational, cultural and economic development to the 
citizens; they are to provide safety in terms of road safety, traffic control, civil protection, 
fire brigade, ambulance services and so on. (6) Sixthly, they are to employ own staff to 
do their daily business. (7) Seventhly, they must produce an annual financial plan/budget 
showing sources of income and intended expenditure. They must have plans and be more 
income-generating-oriented than expenditure/budget-deficit oriented. (8) They should 
determine, prioritize, and translate local development needs into financial plans. (9) 
Ninthly, they need to promote local participation. They must be consultative in any 
decision they take and thus involve local people in decision-making. (10) They need to 
regularly communicate and inform the locals of their policies, decisions and plans so as 
to have an informed local citizen. (11) They must have regular free and fair elections to 
elect new councillors.  
 
Olowu and Smoke (1992:1-19) and Millett, Olowu and Cameron (2006) have also  
formulated success indicators of decentralization on the basis of the various real 
characteristics of some successful case studies of Local Governance/LG in Africa. Such 
qualities or indicators/dimensions of success concisely included among others LG (1) 
being located in the area with an adequate economic base, (2) well-defined 
responsibilities in a satisfactory legal framework, (3) capacity to mobilize sufficient 
resources, (4) supportive central government activities, (5) appropriate management 
practices, (6) development of productive internal and external relations, (7) satisfactory 
responsiveness to constituents, (8) specified/expected quantity and quality of services and 
other outputs delivered, (9) good fiscal (success) performance characterized by (a) the 
budget balance sheet with more surpluses than deficits within 5 years, (b) major local 
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revenue sources, that is direct local taxes, user charges or intergovernmental transfers 
with growth relative to inflation and population, (c) local expenditures, both recurrent and 
capital local expenditure supporting a range of significant social and infrastructural 
services with reasonable growth rate, and the (10) institutional parameters encompassing 
(i)‘the management of financial information, that is compilation, storage and retrieval of 
such financial information, (ii) the relationships between the central government and 
local governments, (iii) the financial management system with revenue collection, 
budgeting, auditing and debt management, (iv) the staffing situation with quantity and 
quality of local government staff, training, turnover rates, salary conditions and 
manpower planning, and the (v) relationship between the local government and the 
community including non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
 
In order to supplement comprehensively the objectives analysis framework and good 
measurement of DGD, this approach will also include other strategic indicators of 
decentralization and good governance as formulated by Millett, Olowu and Cameron 
(2006:179-225) on the basis of other successful local government case studies in Africa. 
They are all discussed in a captioned format here below, appropriate for development 
analysis approach on development objectives. Such indicators were developed at the 
workshop on Local Governance and Poverty Reduction in Africa, held in Tunis, June, 
2005 under the auspices of the Joint Africa Institute, in partnership with African 
Development Bank (ADB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, 
also financed by the German Development Bank (KfW).  
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Illustration Box 4.1A: Strategic Indicators of Decentralization and LG 
1. Political decentralization indicators (a) fair and free regular interval local council 
elections (b) regular and frequent meetings of the local council (c) approval of plans and 
budgets by the local council (d) local council selects its own chair 
2. Administrative decentralization indicators (a) percent of total government expenditure 
in LGU jurisdiction controlled by the LGU (b) the LGU hires, manages, and evaluates 
government personnel working in the LGU area (percent) and records are available (c) 
LGU personnel perceives donors and government to be supportive, coherent and 
coordinated in their work with the LGU.  
3. Resource decentralization (Fiscal) (1) total revenue of the LGU (2) per capita revenues 
of LGU (3) percent of revenues LGU raises from local sources, and specific taxes used 
(4) percent of revenues transferred to the LGU with only general guidelines and goals 
(Personnel) (1) LGU uses standardized procedures in all aspects of personnel 
management (2) percent of LGU senior/managerial slots filled with qualified persons (3) 
number of person-days of visits by national personnel for training and other assistance to 
local personnel and other support of LGU 
4. Transparency (1) Local council meetings are publicly posted and announced and open 
to the public (2) audits are performed, published and posted on a regular basis as required 
by law 
5. Rule of law  (1) LGU personnel follows national and locally required procedures for 
meetings, personnel actions, planning, tenders, service standards, budgeting bylaws etc. 
(2) LGU executive follows lawful instructions of local councils and other organs of the 
government (3) election requirements and procedures are followed (4) citizens can bring 
grievances regarding the LGU to independent adjudicatory bodies 
 
6. Accountability (1) LGU elected and sector management personnel attend open meetings 
to consult with the public on a regular and frequent basis (2) LGU personnel provide 
regular reports to national government ministries regarding local conditions, its 
compliance with national plans and service standards, LGU operations and activities, and 
LGU plans, budgets, revenues, expenditures and audits. (3) national ministries respond to 
LGU reports with suggestions, recommendations, and/or assistance  
7. Participation (1) percent of the electorate that votes in LGU elections (2) number of 
local organizations (NGO, private, sub- LGU) that attend open LGU forums  
8. Empowerment (1) number of NGOs active in LGU (2) number of sub-LGU community 
and neighbourhood governance organizations active in LGU (3) number of meetings 
between LGU senior or elected personnel and representatives of NGOs, sub- LGUs and 
women’s/vulnerable groups. 
9. Production of key services, public goods and regulatory functions (1) percent of 
capital budget spent in areas outside the LGU seat (only for rural LGUs) (2)percent of 
LGU population with access to potable water (3) level of local conflict (4) number of 
local business persons trained or otherwise assisted by the LGU (5) LGU’s role in 
regulating access to and use of natural resources such as water, forests, grasslands, etc 
10. Opportunities for women and vulnerable groups (1) percent of local elected offices 
held by women, members of religious, ethnic minorities, or by non-home peoples’ groups 
(2) number of women and members of vulnerable groups receiving occupational, 
organizational, or governance-related training (3) in rural areas, percent of children 
enrolled in elementary schools, in urban LGUs, the percent of all children enrolled in 
elementary school (4) in rural areas, the percent of the LGU budget spent on programmes 
focused on small or marginal farmers; in urban LGUs the percent spent to assist small 
and medium enterprise (Excerpted and modified from Karin Millet, Dele Olowu and 
Robert Cameron, 2006:179-225). 
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Illustration Box 4.1B: Local Government Indicators 
Political/Institutional 
Dimension 
Resource Dimension Developmental Dimension 
-institutional autonomy of LG 
-quality of participation in LG 
-depth of democratic 
participation in elections 
-transparency of information 
flows between public bodies 
and civil society and  
-accountability of public 
officials; staff and elected 
personnel 
-ability of local 
institutions to mobilize, 
allocate and manage 
funds 
-fairness and efficiency of 
LG institutions’ 
procurement of goods and 
services from the private 
sector and 
-ability to attract and 
retain motivated  
personnel  
-provision of basic 
infrastructure and  
services which contribute 
to reduction in poverty 
-facilitation and/or 
authorization of private 
economic initiatives 
-facilitation of use of 
community resources such 
as land, water, forests e.t.c 
and  
-effective resolution of 
conflicts among local 
citizens   
 
 
Illustration Box 4.1C (i): Framework Analysis for Local Governance and the Log-Frame 
Analysis 
Inputs Outputs Outcomes Goals 
Programmes, activities, 
changed  
constitutional, statutory, 
facilitating 
and supervisory 
procedural frameworks  
for local government 
units (LGUs)  
Increased  
-administrative 
decentralization 
-political  
Decentralization 
-resources  
(human + 
financial) 
decentralization 
 
-transparency 
-accountability, 
upward 
and downward 
-participation 
-rule of law 
-empowerment 
-enhanced 
production  
of key public goods 
and  
services 
-enhanced 
opportunities  
for the poor and 
marginalized 
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Illustration Box 4.1C (ii): Framework Analysis for Local Government and Log-Frame 
Analysis 
Inputs Outputs Outcomes Goals 
-Legal statutory 
reforms to strengthen 
local governance: 
administration, 
political 
and resources 
dimensions 
-local governance 
focused projects and  
programmes 
sponsored by central 
governments, 
donors and NGOs 
-coordination among 
donors, governments 
and  
NGOs in local 
governance projects 
and  
programmes 
 
 
-legitimate lawful  
LGUs and 
democratic 
participation 
-strengthened local  
finances, revenue  
sources and their 
management 
-transparent, effective  
and accountable local 
administration 
-effective 
partnerships 
among LGUs,  
governments, NGOs 
and donors    
 
-percent of children 
enrolled in schools 
-percent of LGU  
population with access  
to potable water 
-percent of children  
who survive to five 
year old 
-percent of increase in  
number of business  
licensed in previous 
year  
in LGU 
-percent of change in  
number of violent  
incidents from previous  
year in LGU       
-education 
-environment 
-health 
-good 
governance 
-gender 
equity 
-poverty 
reduction 
-local peace  
and 
tranquillity 
 
This will consolidate the yardstick against which Lesotho’s Local Governance will be 
assessed, including features, principles and values of good governance and local 
governance (see Ismail, Bayat and Meyer on Local Government Management, 1997 and 
Cameron, 2003 and 2006).   
 
Cameron (2006:5) has also argued that ‘the role of party politics in gauging the extent of 
political decentralization is also very important. The existence of non-centralized party 
system could be the most important element of the true extent of political decentralization 
because effects of such decentralization are often negated by party centralization’. The 
same author (Cameron, 2003:107-108) formally developed distinctive features of party 
politics for gauging decentralization as follows;  
• Candidates have to be selected by the party. 
• A distinct policy programme is formulated for a local party group. 
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• A party election manifesto, to which all party candidates are expected to adhere, 
both during the election campaign and once elected, is produced. 
• An attempt is made to implement the manifesto in the event of the party winning 
a majority of seats on the council.  
• Councillors are organized into party groups for the purposes of allocating 
committee places and other positions of leadership and responsibility, to develop 
and co-ordinate party policy, to determine strategy and tactics and to ensure group 
discipline.  
• Group leadership, comprising an individual leader and usually a committee of 
group executive officers, is elected by the members of the group. 
• Pre-council and pre-committee party group meetings are convened to enable party 
group members to agree on policy and plan their debating and voting tactics. 
Cameron (2001:99) also states that ,“There have been attempts to measure 
decentralisation in the past…Indices which have been used include the degree of 
local government autonomy in the selection of local staff, the ability of local 
government to access national government and influence national local 
government policy, the range of local government functions, the degree to which 
local political parties can make decisions independently of their national 
structures and the degree to which local governments can raise their own sources 
of revenue independently of higher tiers of government.  
 
Millett, Olowu and Cameron (2006: 9-13) and Crook and Manor in World Bank working 
paper, (2000:17, 23) have argued that there is a broad consensus today in the development 
literature concerning the importance for developmental and good governance outcomes for 
the achievement of poverty alleviation. The World Bank (2004) also perceives 
decentralization as a tool for local governance and poverty reduction. They argue for 
decentralization support because delivery of crucial services associated with development 
objectives’ attainment is not possible without effective local institutions through deepened 
decentralized governance. They also argue that powerlessness of the poor citizens can be 
overcome through trusted local governance organs which are less threatening and less 
oppressive to them as the poor, other than the central governance. Decentralization 
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entrenches commitment to democracy, local political training, effective governance and 
democratic conflict resolutions. It promotes local governance within the organs of central 
governance that lacks the capacity to do so and promotes citizenry accountability, 
governance and poverty reduction. Nonetheless, it is confronted with the lack of sustained 
consent of national elites to devolve authority, resources and accountability arrangements, 
scarce capital/cash, scarce capacity, potentiality for conflicts, local elite capture and 
corruption and internal and external coordination problems, political patron-clientelism and 
mismanagement.  
 
More of the limitations especially with municipality often include lack of sufficient legal 
framework requirements and guidelines and advisory services including allocation of 
powers and functions and time-bound projects, unclear demarcation and conflicts over 
municipal’s boundaries and district management or chiefs’ areas. Municipalities also suffer 
from capacity problems, controversial use of service providers and consultants in terms of 
real need, appropriateness and transparent tendering procedures, corruption and lack of 
proper maintenance of financial accounts, lack of baseline information for planning 
purposes, many paper projects not existing on the ground, not targeting of poverty 
alleviation or sustainable development and urbanization problems, lack of capacity and 
initiative to attract investors and plan for economic growth and address HIV/AIDS and 
various factors constraining participation of the poor (Also see Cameron, 2006:6-7 and 
Olowu, 2000:162).        
     
4.3.1 Measuring the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Decentralization 
Management in Lesotho: The Political-Developmental Impacts and 
Some Constraints 
 
Has Lesotho’s LG adopted and managed some of the critical and main factors of 
decentralization’s success efficiently and effectively for development deliver? In order to 
measure and assess the degree to which LG in Lesotho succeeded in developmental-
service delivery, the above integral question forms the subject matter for analysis through 
the relevant framework discussed (table 4.1) below in the subsections of this above 
section.  
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Table 4.1: Illustrative Criteria for Decentralization Efficiency Indicators 
EFFICIENCY INDICATORS 
Decentralization management 
process at  central government 
LGUs’ policy planning and 
execution capacity  
Efficient fiscal and administrative 
devolution 
• demonstration of 
commitment and supportive 
leadership. 
• clear promulgation of legal 
framework for jurisdiction. 
• devices for LGUs’ monies 
and procedural monitoring  
• competent personnel 
availability 
• management procedures for 
coordination 
• technological instruments for 
policy execution 
• capital/resources provision 
for LGUs 
• income raising 
• cost-effectiveness  
PARTICIPATION INDICATORS 
Consciousness/sensitization or 
preparedness for participatory 
local democracy 
Answerability/accountability and 
responsiveness of LGUs 
LGU’s technical capacities 
• emancipation of civic culture 
and local political leadership 
• information access and 
transparency 
• representation and elections 
• financial/resources transfer 
procedure 
• some jurisdiction 
Source: Adapted and modified from Olowu, 2000 and 2002. 
 
The process of managing decentralization at the central government level needs to attain 
criteria and efficiency indicators including really sound management of political 
relationships. Real decentralization needs to be about power devolution, constituting the 
main essential feature of any successful decentralization in terms of political 
relationships. Such devolution normally includes power redistribution with potential 
conflicts generated but requiring real demonstration of commitment and supportive 
leadership by the central government. The central has to efficiently execute the 
responsibility of clear promulgation of legal-regulatory-framework for jurisdiction solid 
demarcation and formulate and apply procedural mechanisms for financial and technical 
monitoring of LGUs as illustrated above. The procedural mechanisms in financially and 
technically monitoring the LGUs ought to prevent corruption and other unlawful 
behaviour in the LGUs. The central government has to overseer this still maintaining 
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responsibility for overall macroeconomic stability (Agrawal, 2000, Nagel, 2000 and 
Olowu, 2000, 2002).  
 
4.3.1.1 Demonstration of Commitment and Leadership as Criteria for  
LG’s Success 
 
On the basis of the above illustrative 4.1 table, serious political commitment and 
supportive leadership in the decentralization process are displayed when the 
decentralization policy is treated as the government priority. If viewed as a simply a 
single-sector policy then it may not be regarded earnestly enough by senior officials 
expected to implement it. Support for decentralization need not be limited to only one 
line ministry; rather, all other concerned ministries need to express and actually lead and 
support its implementation. Its strategy for implementation has to be in conformity with 
the national development objectives and other policies if poverty is to be reduced (Ibid).   
4.3.1.2 Establishment of a Clear Regulatory Framework by the Central  
Government for LG’s Success 
 
Again with reference to the above criteria on demonstrative table, the establishment of a 
clear regulatory framework is primary to the smooth functioning of the newly introduced 
political and administrative structures by LG. The national government remains to be the 
only one with authority and capacity to formulate and put into effect such a legal 
framework with regulations clear and comprehensible to the stakeholders. 
Decentralization policy development needs to consider the demand for envisaged changes 
and concerns of the needy groups. Establishment of the regulatory framework through 
laws and decrees has to be complete so that citizens, politicians and officials can fulfil 
functions expected of them. This goes with the challenge of transition process as 
restructuring spends long periods needing timely preparation and information for policy 
implementers. Tentative/provisional regulations are required to solve transition/reforms 
period problems (Agrawal, 2000, Cameron, 2000, Nagel, 2000 and Olowu, 2000, 2002 
and 2003).  
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4.3.3.3 Devices for Monitoring LGUs’ Monies and Procedures for 
LG’s Success  
 
The above table (4.1) indicates that the central government needs to possess the capacity 
to formulate firm monitoring and controlling mechanisms for the local budgets 
concerning reasonable funds utilization still with un-interfered LGUs’ legally provided 
political autonomy. This embraces establishment of accounting procedures and standards, 
regulations promoting transparency on tendering, preventive systems against use of funds 
for non-eligible reasons and corruption, legalization of LGUs’ activities and sanctioning 
procedures against illegal practices. In order to maintain continued liquidity and 
functional capacity by LGUs and the macroeconomic stability the central tier needs to 
overseer the economic soundness of the LGU’s budgets and borrowing (Ibid).  
 
4.3.4 LGUs’ Policy Planning and Execution Capacity for LG’s Success 
 
It is critical as affirmed by the criteria above that for effective decentralization policy 
outcomes through LGUs’, owned capacity to execute the preferred policies and 
accomplishment of the allocated developmental responsibilities to reduce poverty 
constitute innate characters of such LGUs
6
. Such capacity
7
 primarily originates from the 
availability of competent and reliable government workers. Stable institutions and 
management systems to ensure proper horizontal and vertical coordination with other 
administrative units are also needed. It is also necessary to have efficient cooperation of 
different government tiers to guarantee technical competence in the realization of 
                                                
6.Observably in the African context, there is a perception that decentralization implies a hollowing out or a reduction in the role of the 
state, especially the central state since the policy embraces privatization for efficiency. Decentralization can only work if there is a 
strong state in place. It is a realignment of state departments, structures and priorities; not a reduction in the role of the state. This 
helps to explain why decentralization has been so much more successful in developed states with greater state capacity. In states 
without proper capacity, decentralization often results in a passing of the buck whereby different levels of the state simply blame each 
other for not doing things. There is a fragmentation of authority, not a realignment of authority structures within a coherently planned 
state framework.  
7 Competent bureaucrats remain needed even after decentralization with privatization, for regulation to curb externalities, income 
inequity/poverty and monopoly, remove political obstacles and create enabling environment for LG. That is play the transitory role in 
running and regulating production towards divestiture for efficiency which is profitability, productivity and savings. They need to 
devise and implement strategies for decentralization, build strong institutions underpinning well operating market economy and the 
legal system, property rights, capital markets and regulatory institutions. This is the capacity that has made the developed world more 
successful in LG but its lack in Africa constitutes constraints to LG’s efficiency and effectiveness. Such capacity is a prerequisite to 
LG’s success and need to encompass developed capital markets, appropriate legal and judicial framework, reduction of low per capita 
income and conducive regulatory structures (Ramamurti Ravi, 1999, George Yarrow, 1999 and Ademola Ariyo et al, 1999).    
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intricate local development projects. Furthermore, the prevalence of sufficient 
expenditure management and accounting system tends to be paramount for transparent 
planning and professional execution of local policies. For low income countries like 
Lesotho, the availability of a minimum technical infrastructure also constitutes efficiency 
in decentralization management (Oates, 1998, Tanzi, 2000:242 and Olowu, 2000). 
4.3.4.1 Competent Personnel Availability for LG’s Success 
 
Political-developmental-service delivery fundamentally requires the availability of 
reliable and competent staff in the administration if decentralization is to be effective. As 
such decentralization needs to possess incentives to attract and retain well qualified 
workers. This criterion emphasizes competitive remuneration schemes and career 
opportunities. The staff need to be deployed according to their qualifications. Good 
incentives motivate good staff performance and thus political-developmental delivery 
through decentralization policy. Personnel management needs to be professional and 
maintain the existence of reliable compilations of numbers and qualifications of the 
workers. The total number of employees needs to be adequate so that allocated functions 
can be accomplished (Ibid).  
4.3.4.2 Management Procedures for Coordination to Effect LG’s Success  
 
As another indicator for efficiency in policy planning and implementation capacity by 
LGUs there is a need for the existence of management systems for horizontal and vertical 
coordination.  Firm institutions were indicated as critical for efficiency in the public 
sector. Lesotho’s decentralization involves an organizational reforming process 
restructuring institutions and their roles. Institutional stability may therefore not be 
looked for in the short-term outcome of the policy strategies. Furthermore, institutions 
and their relations need to be crafted and managed rationally to avoid endangering the 
working capacity of the administration. Vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms 
should be in place to enable sound interaction and cooperation between the institutions. 
The criteria of efficiency include the exchange of information between the administrative 
units and the adequacy of the expenditure management and the accounting procedures for 
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planning and budgeting of LGUs’ tasks (Agrawal, 2000, Cameron, 2000, Nagel, 2000 
and Olowu, 2000, 2002 and 2003). 
4.3.4.3 Technological Instruments for Policy Execution or Successful LG  
 
As part of the basic indicators for efficiency in policy planning and implementation 
capacity, technical equipment for decentralization policy implementation needs to be in 
place. This includes availability of basic transport, communication and office 
infrastructure, which is often lacking in poor countries like Lesotho, stifling political-
developmental delivery at the smallest administrative units of local level. Minimum 
office equipment and access to telecommunication infrastructure enable efficient 
administering of a local community (Oates, 1998, Tanzi, 2000:242, Olowu, 2000 and 
Wolf, 2000). 
4.3.4.4     Efficient Fiscal and Administrative Devolution for LG’s Success 
 
One more critical factor for the efficient administration of decentralization towards 
successful development-delivery includes pragmatic fiscal decentralization and 
maintained devolved administrative efficiency. Decentralization strategy needs to attain 
an appropriate level of fiscal decentralization. The central government has to play an 
important role here because it has a superior control over public resources. LGUs need to 
be supplied with resources in conformity with the functions transferred to them. Local 
autonomy in expenditure decisions in allocation of funds for locally consumed goods and 
services by LGUs is necessary if there is to be efficiency in decentralization. LGUs can 
do this better than the distant central or higher tier centralized government. It is important 
to note that non-rhetoric fiscal autonomy is robust if LGUs depend on own revenues 
instead of government grants (Oates, 1998).   
4.3.4.5 Capital/resources Provision for LGUs to Effect LG’s Success in 
Developmental-Service Delivery 
 
It is also an important indicator for decentralization success as illustrated on table 4.1 
above for the central government to effectively play the role of the provision of resources 
to LGUs. This has to be adequately and fairly done in a transparent system of 
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intergovernmental transfers considering regional differences in demand for services. The 
distributed capital resources need to cover the expenditure needed to implement the 
assigned functions but also give room for the LGUs to allocate funds according to their 
own local political-developmental priorities (Ibid). 
 
4.3.4.6 Income Raising/Generation for LG’s Efficiency 
 
LGUs need to be legally empowered to generate revenue for themselves. This can 
strengthen the fiscal autonomy particularly if the intergovernmental transfer system is 
complemented with an incentive structure to mobilize own resources. Reference is made 
here to the opportunities to generate revenues granted by the legal framework and to the 
prevalence of revenue sources in the LG jurisdiction (Oates, 1998, Tanzi, 2000:242, 
Olowu, 2000, and Wolf, 2000). 
4.3.4.7 Cost-effectiveness or Production Efficiency 
 
Political-developmental-delivery is also efficient when it involves optimal-maximum 
utility of input resources. That is efficient service delivery requires a minimum of 
resource pooling. For example administrative overhead costs of LGUs need to be in 
correspondence with the scope of delivered developmental services (Ibid).  
 
4.4 Citizen Participation/Participation Indicators for LG’s Success 
 
4.4.1  Preparedness for Participatory Local Democracy 
 
According to Oates (1998) and Wolf (2000), decentralization to be effective requires the 
use of participatory-development approaches. The targeted needy people need to know 
the constitutional framework and understand how institutions are functioning and what 
opportunities for participation are granted. Promotion of a civic culture conducive to 
constructive participatory decision making remains essential. The instruments that can be 
used to influence policy making must be known. This is important where decentralization 
involves system changes, low levels of experience with the concept of participatory 
development and rights for citizens. Functioning of local political institutions needs to be 
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above all those people who are involved in local politics directly. That is attention needs 
to be given to the formation of local political elites to promote representative citizen 
participation. 
 
One more aspect is the promotion of a civic culture, referring to high levels of 
participatory experience in self-organized community owned development projects for 
the assumption of an overall responsibility for local affairs and effective local 
development-delivery. This encompasses the legacy of local political bodies and all 
forms of independently organized associations formed to attain common socio-economic 
objectives to reduce local members’ poverty. Civic culture may be considered as 
fundamental for political capacities of the people. Decentralization policy involving 
reforming of political institutions needs to be complemented by substantial efforts on 
civic education aimed at creating openness and supportive attitudes towards participative 
local democracy. Most importantly if decentralization policies are meant for 
development-delivery as is the case in Lesotho, particular efforts should target the 
poorest of the poor, that is the vulnerable, disabled needy groups. Targeting needs to aim 
at empowering them to possess capacities to express their political-developmental 
priorities. 
 
Furthermore the existence of empowered local politicians representing all the sectors of 
local communities emancipates the functioning of local democracy. Elected councillors 
and representatives of local civil society need to have the motivation and the means to 
control their local executive. That is there is need for extensive trainings for local 
politicians and other key stakeholders like the civic society.  
4.5 Answerability/accountability and Responsiveness of LGUs  
 
Among other indicators useful for measuring the success of decentralization are the 
accountability and responsiveness of LG institutions directly to the local people. Broad 
participation in local decision making and development constitute locally owned 
community driven development. Decentralization has to establish institutional 
mechanisms for considering citizens’ concerns in political decision making, in the policy 
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formulation and implementing bureaucracy and in monitoring and evaluating such 
policies. Administrative institutions and political bodies have to be transparent for the 
public and to provide access to all information necessary for constructive and informed 
participation from outside the politico-administrative system. Trust in the political system 
can resultantly grow. Corruption can also be prevented. Holders of public offices also 
need to be accountable to the public. If there is no such accountability mechanisms 
allowing for the exercise of pressure on public institutions there would be no incentive 
for them to respond seriously to the needs of the local communities (Wolf, 2000:35). 
 
Answerability and responsiveness to local communities by the LGUs encompass 
transparency and access to information by the communities. Citizens need to be in the 
light about budgets, planning documents and minutes of council meetings for them to 
form their opinion in their local affairs and be able to make informed decisions. Such 
information need to be easily accessible. Council meetings with their agenda ought to be 
announced publicly, citizens should be allowed to participate as guests. Local media need 
to be useful in distributing such information. Public hearings on huge projects generating 
much public interest and the properly representative electoral models need to be adopted 
if decentralization is to be inclusive. Among the good personalities of the elect, there 
should be availability of information and procedures from them (Ibid). 
 
Accountability and responsiveness are also fostered by the proper conducting of elections 
and sufficient representation of the local population. Accountability mechanisms between 
the electorate, local politicians, the local administration and their political leadership need 
to be capable of giving reasonable account of how the community is administered. The 
major mechanism for rewarding or sanctioning politicians is holding an election that 
offers alternatives for political leadership. The citizens should be able to influence local 
politics through the local elections including direct participation like referendums and 
legal petitioning. Accountability of civil servants can also be attained by the management 
introducing performance oriented remuneration and trainings on facilitation of 
community participation workshops (Oates, 1998 and Wolf, 2000). 
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4.6  Competences of Local Governments 
 
Participation and self-administration need not be limited to just consultation and 
discussion. Defined powers and resources must be transferred to the authority of 
legitimate political bodies fully accountable for the exercise of their powers and their 
budgets. The issue for assessment in the framework of this analysis is the procedure of 
how functions are decentralized. The implementation strongly depends on the clarity of 
the definitions and on the rules for handling the remaining functional overlaps (Oates, 
1998, Tanzi, 2000:242, Olowu, 2000, and Wolf, 2000). 
 
A carefully staged transfer of competences to LGUs that leaves time to gain experience is 
the appropriate option. The capacities of the local governments must not be 
overextended. LGUs need a predictable and realistic schedule and guidance when 
overtaking these functions and powers. LGUs also need to posses jurisdiction in choices 
and decisions. They need to competently allocate resources for local development. This is 
then referred to having some substance of powers. Size and design of community 
boundaries, constituencies and electoral divisions play an important role. Local identities, 
settlement structures, boundaries of previous traditional politico-administrative units and 
geographic barriers have to be considered (Fuhr, 2000:43). 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
We may conclude that there are qualitative and quantitative measurements to DGD, 
which all as indicators of decentralization have limitations. Principles and values of 
DGD, objective and logical framework analysis have been discussed in this chapter as 
forms of current measurement of DGD for development. Some indicators are of greater 
value while others are of limited value. Those of greater value are those that help DGD to 
plan, monitor and assess its relevance, performance, management, impact on and social 
inclusiveness of the poverty stricken vulnerable rural and urban groups in order to 
achieve sustainable development, local democratic participation and economic growth. 
Indicators used in the measurement of decentralization need not be an end in themselves 
but need to be useful outcome based indicators. The chapter started by providing 
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preconditions for the successful implementation of decentralization, risks and challenges 
that decentralization need to overcome for development delivery and discussed the 
various methods for measuring the degree to which decentralization is efficiently and 
effectively adopted interlacing the challenges to be controlled.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: LESOTHO’S EXPERIENCE IN DECENTRALIZATION 
 
5.0  General Introduction 
 
 This chapter has two main objectives. The first one is to consider the nature of the 
Basotho people and their political economy. The second is to provide a background 
overview of the history of LG in Lesotho. Together, these serve as a bridge between the 
theoretical overview of LG in the preceding chapters and the case study of LG in Lesotho 
that follows. That is, the purpose of this chapter is to debate Lesotho’s experience with 
decentralization and the concerned challenges which the study argues that if they are not 
well addressed, they do impede a proficient execution of this policy and counteract 
development delivery. This synthesizes some theoretical issues from part one with an 
analysis of decentralization in Lesotho. It thus serves as a critical analysis of peculiar 
institutional constraints to decentralization in Lesotho.  
  
 Though the real major adoption of decentralization can be marked by the 1997 Local 
Governance Act of 1997, this chapter suggests that Lesotho has had ‘glimpses of 
decentralization’ since the pre-colonial era, although the evolution of these was always 
hampered by socio-political-economic institutional constraints. It also argues that such 
obstacles if not sufficiently addressed impede the efficient and effective adoption of 
decentralization for development delivery as is now the case in Lesotho, further revealed 
in the following chapters (6, 7 and 8).  
 
 The chapter’s debate is done, firstly, through the discussion of Lesotho’s poverty status. 
Secondly, the history of governance with limited decentralization traits before and during 
the colonial epoch, in Lesotho is discussed. Thirdly, the chapter debates the history of 
decentralization/Local Governance in Lesotho: Post-independence era/1966-2008. This 
also entails the historical nature of Lesotho’s LG, its legacies and traditions. Besides 
determining the progress of decentralization, thus giving its critical analytic evolution and 
success/limitations, LGUs’ development delivery, will also still be used to examine the 
possible or non-possible positive developmental impact of such decentralization. 
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Fourthly, the challenges and implications of urban governance as some form of local 
governance in Lesotho are debated. Lastly, the challenges and implications of 
participation in Lesotho’s LG are unearthed.  
 
Since the post-independence era, successive governments of Lesotho (GoL) have been 
trying to alleviate poverty through the launching of the 
decentralization/LG/Decentralized Governance for Development (DGD) targeting the 
urban and the rural poor-mainly the subsistence farmers. Most of the Lesotho population 
(80%) is still rural and is characterized by widespread poverty. The quality of life for 
poor subsistence farmers in the rural areas still remains unchanged, despite such GoL’s 
efforts of DGD. Only 14% of the farmers are still commercial as ever before LGUs. In 
fact such agricultural production has declined from 14% to 7% of the country’s GDP. 
The deficit in grain food production since 1960s till today has usually been above 60% 
with unchanging 50% of the population below the poverty line   (GoL Reports, 2009). 
This is also confirmed by Table 5.1 indicating that even after the 1997 LG Act and 2005 
LG elections, Lesotho’s development delivery indicators including among others life-
expectancy, accessibility to health services, safe water and sanitation remained either 
unchanging and/or worsened. 
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Table 5.1: Lesotho’s development indices, prior 1997 LG Act and after 
Years of UNDP 
Reports on 
Lesotho’s 
development 
indices 
Life-
expectancy at 
birth (years) 
Human 
Devel-
opment 
Index 
%  of Population 
with access to 
health services 
%  of Population 
with access to 
safe water 
%  of Population 
with access to 
sanitation 
Adult 
literacy rate 
(%)  
Real 
GDP 
 per 
capita    
1990 Report 57 (1987) 0.580 80 % (1985-87) 36% (1985-87) 15% (1985-87) 73%  (1985) 1,590    
(1987) 
1991 Report 57.3 (1990) 0.432 80% 48% 14% 73% 1,390 
1992 Report 57.3 (1990) 0.423 80% 48% 21%  (1988 NR 1,646 
(1989) 
1993 Report 57.3 (1990) 0.423 80% (1987-1989) 48% (1988-
1989) 
21% (1988-
1989) 
NR 1,646 
(1989) 
1997 Report 57.9 (1994) 0.457 
(1994) 
80 (1990 - 1996 ) 56(1990 -1996) 28 (1990 - 1996) 70.5 (1994) 1.109 
1998 Report        
1999 Report 56 (1997) 0.582 
(1997) 
80 (1981-1992 62 (1990-1997) 38 (1990-1997) 82.3 (1997) 1,860 
2000 Report 55.2 (1998) 0.569 
(1998) 
80 (1981-1993) 62 (1990-1998) 38 (1990-1998) 82.4 (1998) 1,626 
(1998) 
2001 Report 47.9 (1999) 0.541 
(1999) 
 91 (1999) 92 (1999) 82.9 (1999) 1,854 
(1999) 
2002 Report 45.7 (2000) !"#$#%
&'!!!( 
 91 (2000) 92 (2000) 83.4 (2000) ')!$*%
&'!!!( 
2003 Report 38.6 (2001)  80-94 (1999) 78 (2000) 
(sustainability) 
49 (2000) 83.9 (2001) 2,420 
(2001) 
2004 Report 36.3 (2002) 0.493 
(2002) 
80-94 (1999) 78 (2000) 49 (2000) 81.4 (2002) 2,420 
(2002) 
2005 Report 36.3 (2003) 0.497 
(2003) 
80-94 (1999 76 (2002) 37 (2002) 81.4 (2003) 2,561 
(2003) 
2006 Report 35.2 (2004) 0.494 
(2004) 
 79 (2004) 37 (2004) 82.2 (2004) 2,619 
(2004) 
2007-08 Report 42.6 (2005) 0.549 
(2005) 
 79 (2005) 37 (2005) 82.2 (2005) 3,335 
(2005) 
Source: Human Development Reports, 1990s to 2008. 
 
The rural poor are still subsistence seasonal farmers. Their 35% constitute male migrant 
labour force mainly in the mines of the RSA, generally earning low salaries. They might 
thus be dubbed ‘proletariat-peasants’, taking into account their lifestyle and 
characteristics. These characteristics indeed include their wage-earning from the RSA 
mining industry, seasonal household farming, the lowly, subordinate and marginalizing 
relationship they have been experiencing through the selling prices of their produce by 
the produce price determining state. At the same time, heavily subsidized food imports 
pushed food prices further down creating free market volatility with dumped 
‘cheap’(subsidized) food imports stifling their transformation to sustainable commercial 
growth locally or nationally as they could not earn enough profits. Their local produce 
experiences unfair competition from the subsidized food imports and too low prices set 
by the state to benefit other (higher) social groupings in this society, particularly the 
urban dwellers. The term proletarian-peasantry is therefore used in a descriptive manner 
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to portray that the rural people are caught up between peasant and proletarian lifestyles
8
 
(Murray, 2001).  
 
Lack of effective and efficient decentralization country-wide is one of the main factors 
that has condoned the rural poor to play a subordinate role as proletariat-peasants in 
Lesotho and thus perpetuate poverty. The ineffective and inefficient implementation of 
decentralization is further confirmed by field findings in chapter 6 illustrating the 
hampering conflictual role and power struggle between chieftainship and the newly 
launched LGUs. Field findings in Chapter 7 and 8 through the recentralized or non-
devolved decision making power/policy making, resources and administration as well as 
in-existing indicators of efficient and effective decentralization execution in Lesotho also 
magnify a poorly implemented LG that condones non-development delivery.  
 
Murray (2001) and Legassick (1984) observe that the migrant labour system that was 
introduced by the discovery of the mining industry and secondary industry in RSA (Boer 
Republics) effected rural proletarianization in the neighbouring countries to RSA. That is 
“a population separated from direct access to the means of production and 
subsistence,...‘A population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the 
self-expansion of capital’. Much of this proletariat existed, whether as wage-labourers or 
labour tenants, immobilised on the farms where it worked, although it was supplemented 
seasonally by labour migrating from areas still in the communal possession of African 
communities, coming to earn money to buy guns, pay taxes, e.t.c. As a subordinate 
tendency, both in areas of communal possession and in areas under rentier landlords, a 
proletarian-peasantry was also emerging (Legassick, 1984:144, 145).” 
 
There is indeed proletariat-peasantry in Lesotho forming (80%) most part of the poor 
population. Peasant is normally a term referring to a small farmer mainly engaged in 
crops production. Proletariat-peasants may generally be regarded as households deriving 
their livelihoods mainly from wage-earning and agriculture, utilizing mainly family 
                                                
8. It is interesting to realize that Ashton (1952:176-7) on whom Murray (Families Divided, 2001:16) heavily relied on in his writing, 
still continues to call Basotho men who are migrant labourers as ‘proletariat-peasants’ as well. He does so because it still remains 
indeed, a real feature even today, that a male Mosotho migrant worker is a seasonal farmer. 
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labour in farm production having some partial engagement in input and output imperfect 
markets. They are often characterized as a society in transition half-way between 
primitive and industrial society. They form part of larger societies but still retain distinct 
cultural identities. They are often associated with a low socio-economic status in a social 
system to which they are a part. They practice some dual economy, they simultaneously 
engage in both consumption and production, they are a household constituting a family 
and an enterprise at the same time. They obtain their livelihood predominantly from the 
land through its cultivation and raising livestock. They may sometimes also have or hire 
the landless or some resourceless seasonal or permanent labourers (often rewarded in 
kind/harvest-part just for survival) from within their community though most of the 
family labour is the one provided in own small farming. It is disheartening to realize that 
proletarian-peasantry is into being when the cultivator gets subjected/subordinated to the 
demands and sanctions of the ruling elite external of such proletariat-peasants' local 
social stratum. They are rural producers whose surplus is transferred to a social group 
with more economic and political power. They are therefore an exploited social group 
also characterized by inner social differentiation and exploitation. A sense of transition 
refers to a historical transition from relatively dispersed, isolated and self-sufficient 
communities towards fully integrated market economies. This transition indicates gradual 
continuous change and adaptation in traditional and subsistence survival methods but not 
completely remaining traditional and subsistence and not wholly being commercially 
transformed a producer (small-scale household farm production) (Ashton, 1942, 
Legassick, 1984 and Murray, 2001).  
 
5.0.1 Problematic Dynamic Historical Developmental-Economic-Poverty 
Situation of Lesotho 
 
Lesotho was ruled for 63 years as a protectorate under colonial policy by the British High 
Commission. The country gained its political independence in 1966 from the British 
colonial rule. All in all Lesotho has experienced almost a century of colonialism. The 
Dutch settlers alienated land (now known as the Free State province of RSA) from the 
Basotho from the 1830s to the 1860s. King Moshoeshoe the 1st founded the Basotho 
nation through forged alliances and peace treaties among the southern Sotho speaking 
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people of various tribes. He also absorbed many remnants (Ngunis) of the Mfecane wars 
(series of wars with widespread famine) in 1820s. Moshoeshoe the 1st has been described 
as a diplomat and a negotiator for his kingdom building. He negotiated with the British 
colonialists to remain a British Protectorate through the Evangelical Missionaries (the 
Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, Roman Catholic Missionaries) he had adopted. 
Missionaries were good collaborators with the British colonialists. The southern Sotho 
people spread from the south of the Drakensburg Mountains through the Caledon and 
Orange River south valleys. However, the known political boundaries were reduced 
inwardly squeezing Basotho/Basutuland to what is now known as Lesotho. Much of the 
annexed portion is now known as the Free State province in RSA. This annexation of 
land from Basotho is considered as one main factor to their poverty justifying LG 
(Kimble, 1978). 
 
Trekboers and Vootrekkers descended on the area occupied by the Southern Sotho people 
around the Caledon and Orange rivers and expropriated their land in the 1830s. The 
Basotho had to be constricted to the mountainous, foothills and little lowlands left for 
them. Missionaries exposed the Basotho to new ways and inputs for farming. This 
resulted in a self-sufficient nation in food production for a moment, which is 1870s to 
early 1900s. However, RSA imposed tariffs on Lesotho cereals and livestock exports. 
This curbed the economic boom of Lesotho and caused a pure dependent migrant labour 
system on RSA. Maloka (2004:7) argues that ‘the turning of Lesotho into a ‘native labour 
reserve’ was not the initial objective of the colonial rule, but the result of the failure of 
the Cape government’s attempts in implementing its direct rule policies including 
disarming Basotho and opening Quthing (in the south) to white settlement’.  Changes in 
climate have also been blamed for perpetual low yields and continuous national food 
(cereals) deficit of 40% per year, disabling proletariat-peasants from being self-sufficient 
anymore. One other factor blamed for low yields is the communal land tenure system 
whereby land cannot serve as collateral (See Leduka, 2000, Murray, 2001, Pule and 
Thabane, 2002, Harris, 1993, Mafeje in Kwesi Prah, 1981:102, Kimble, 1978 and Bundy, 
1979).  
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The European settlement among the Basotho was little but traders usually followed hard 
wherever missionaries went. This started an early economic incorporation and trade links 
in 1850s. The best land expropriated by the Trekboers and Voortrekkers, Lesotho’s 
annexation by Cape Colony in 1850s together with taxation legislation transformed 
Lesotho into a labour reserve for the mining industry in RSA. Men (50%) had to go and 
work in the mines for cash to pay tax and had the best portion of their land alienated. One 
other pressing need that forced migrant labour system was that Basotho chiefs wanted 
Basotho men to also access cash from the mines for buying guns to fend off further land 
alienation and annexation. Guns’ collection through cash from the mines enabled Basotho 
nation to mount a war of resistance to Cape Colonial rule in 1880-81 (War of Guns). 
However, in the interest of controlling impeding Dutch settlers to the British expansion 
and dominion, British colonialists managed to annex Lesotho (Basutoland), Botswana 
(Bechuanaland) in 1884 and Swaziland in 1903 as protectorates. The Basotho then 
continued to be migrant labourers and seasonal producers and traders in wheat, sorghum, 
maize, wool and mohair for the Free State farmers and its mining industry. This kept 
Basotho as both a peasant and migrant labour society (See Pule and Thabane, 2002, 
Harris, 1993 and Kimble, 1978). However, the aspect of Basotho as a migrant labour 
society is now dwindling as only 35% of the country’s labour force is still migrant but 
continues to decline per year due to the decline of the RSA goldmines, advanced labour 
displacing technology, aspirations of profit maximization through privatization of mining 
industries devaluing and downsizing labour.  
 
The old notion that Lesotho is entirely a ‘labour reserve’ to RSA’s mines, nonetheless, 
now requires cautious revisiting. “Employment on the South African mines, for so long a 
reliable source of jobs for many Basotho, began to shrink (table 5.1) as many marginal 
and erstwhile successful mines all battled to adjust to the failing price of gold (Pule in 
‘Essays on Aspects of the Political Economy of Lesotho 1500-2000’: 245-246).”  The 
declining GDP (remittances) and GNP in response to the reported continuous 
retrenchments on table 5.2 affirm such shrinking of mining jobs.    
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Table 5.2: Miners' Shrinking Remittances and National Product 
 (GDP and GNP in millions of Maloti/Rands) 
Year GDP GNP Miners’ remittances/ 
GDP 
Miners’ remittances/ 
GNP 
1989 1300 2348 0.63 0.35 
1990 1564 2805 0.61 0.34 
1991 1800 3099 0.58 0.34 
1992 2131 3506 0.52 0.31 
1993 2476 4167 0.46 0.27 
                                 Source: IMF, 1994. 
 
May it also be noted that it is not every male Mosotho and it has never been every male 
Mosotho that became a migrant labourer, especially if figures of such male migrant 
labour system never exceeded 50%. It is important to also really consider that currently 
only around 30%-35% of the male labour force of Lesotho may be said to be still migrant 
labour while 70% of the rural households still hold more or less an acre of arable land 
(GoL’s Economic Review Report, 2006, Ketso, 1995 and GoL’s/MAFS Reports, 1995). 
Most of this very percentage (35%) survives by short contracts in RSA mines, not 
exceeding six months so as to cut on various labour costs from long services and labour 
benefits and retrench continuously. This is labour devaluation. Severe retrenchments 
caused by gold depreciation in the world market resulting in many jobs cuts by the RSA 
mines and advanced technology displacing labour have now left Lesotho currently 
classified as a service economy country by the World Development Reports of the United 
Nations (1999, 2000-2006) on the basis of the highest contribution in yearly percentages 
of such service economy to the GDP and GNP of the country in the dwindling migrant 
labour system. The other actual incidental trend is once more the rise of the establishment 
of the various Agricultural Marketing Corporations/AMCs for the Basotho retrenched 
mineworkers in RSA.                  
 
In so far as the political economy of the migrant labour is concerned in Southern Africa, 
particularly for Lesotho, Murray (1981) and the other scholars having relied on the 
accuracy of the old colonial and apartheid era documents are in the modern day, after 
apartheid limitedly accurate due to so many socio-political-economic changes. There is 
still the failure of peasant self-sufficiency in Lesotho due to land shortage, inequity and 
lack of access to capital probably which DLG could offer if effectively adopted. Whether 
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indeed Lesotho is still an entire labour reserve to RSA, Pule and Thabane (2002) in 
‘Essays on Aspects of the Political Economy of Lesotho 1500-2000’, provide us with a 
changing perception of the phasing out of old migrant labour system for the mining 
industry but now ‘brain drain’ of the professional manpower and increasing rural 
unemployment due to RSA’s mines retrenchments.   
 
The ultimate analytical end is that the poor rural proletarian-peasantry still remains poor 
in Lesotho. This rural poverty is characterized by some social differentiation due to 
income and assets (arable land and livestock) inequalities from scarce contractual-
employment opportunities in the urban areas and dwindling RSA’s mining industry 
employment sector. Rural proletarian-peasantry population in Lesotho is mainly led by 
traditional authorities, at the lowest community level including the Headman who reports 
to the Chief/Chieftainess with a larger area of jurisdiction and number of Headmen under 
him/her, also reporting to the Principal Chief with many chiefs under him/her. Principal 
Chiefs report to the King the Head of the State who is without executive powers but 
reigns through the legislative ruling powers of the democratically elected Parliament, 
Senate and the government. While more than 55% of the rural population is below 
poverty line with 80% unemployment rate, chiefs who receive monthly gazette 
allowance, Principal Chiefs and ruling politicians are far above the poverty line enjoying 
obviously daily luxurious life from the luxurious properties they posses. Elected 
councillors working hand in hand with the chefs and headmen on development issues are 
still below poverty line from their monthly government paid salaries/allowances and their 
poorly serviced communities by LG.     
 
The response of the government of Lesotho (GoL) and the proletariat-peasants ever since 
1993, in the clear light of dwindling migrant labour system and end of apartheid, has 
been mainly the launching of LG for local resources mobilization and management to 
attain locally prioritized development goals. This effort has also been complemented by 
an enhancement of the Cooperative Act and massive campaigns on encouraging 
proletariat-peasants to establish Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives/AMCs and 
participate in LG. GoL’s extension service was also transformed and retrained so that it 
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could provide extension services on how to establish and manage AMCs. Radio 
programmes on LG and on concepts of (‘temo-mmoho’)/’Joint Community Irrigation 
Schemes’, ‘Joint Commercial Farming’, ‘Joint Cash Cropping Schemes’, ’Joint Livestock 
Farming’ and ‘Intensive Production’ all through AMCs were resuscitated within the 
political atmosphere of LG. This has resulted into a new wave of millions of dollars of 
funds by United Nations Development Programme/UNDP, Food Agricultural 
Organization/FAO, World Health Organization/WHO, NGOs, GTZ/German International 
Development Agency, World Bank, African Development Bank, various European 
bilateral assistance and GoL on the institutionalization of decentralization, newly 
established AMCs and revived ones for poverty alleviation despite their former failures. 
AMCs are trusted for serving as vehicles of socio-economic development and 
environmental conservation while decentralization is expected to empower locals in 
taking such own initiatives and attain community driven development. In the advent of 
rife rural poverty with decentralization not really delivering for example in range 
management and long procedures of launching AMCs for income generation and range 
management/pastures improvement, proletariat-peasants neighbouring the political 
boundary between Lesotho and RSA have continuously forcefully drove their livestock 
for grazing in the nearby RSA’s farms. Some RSA’s farmers have given in by controlling 
this through granting of temporary/periodic grazing permissions because the influx was 
not easy to control as it mostly took place in the night times. Some proletariat-peasants 
raided and robbed livestock in massive numbers from the nearby RSA’s farms. This 
resulted into armed skirmishes between RSA’s farming communities and Basotho 
farming communities separated by the boundary of these two countries. Here again 
peasant resistance for their long time ago alienated land by the Dutch/settlers is seen 
(Scott, 1985 and GoL, Reports, 2000).      
 
Since the year 2000, the GDP and GNP of the country indicate economic growth rate of 
hardly more than 3%. These are just aggregated monetary economic growth indicators 
that do not reflect worse income inequality, 80% unemployment rate and real poverty 
within the rural and urban sectors.  The population living below the poverty line is more 
than 49% and with the advent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic this is expected to increase in 
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terms of vulnerable groups including orphans, widows and widowers and the inactive or 
disabled labour force. This will increase the household dependency ratio and the absolute 
rural and urban poor, which mostly consists of the elderly poor.  
 
The GDP composition by sector is 14% from agriculture (this is the lowest sector yet it 
involves most of the poor proletariat-peasants), 42% from the textile industry entirely 
owned by foreign hands thus stifling any multiplier effect for local development. Services 
constitute 44%. Inflation has been ranging between 5% and 8%. Besides these nominal 
increases of GDP and GNP, the country has been receiving economic aid and servicing 
debt from year to year, usually in hundreds of millions of US dollars. Introduction of LG 
expected to reverse and improve these conditions is arguably improperly or inefficiently 
done (GoL, Economic Report, 2001). 
 
Gold depreciation in the world market and its depletion as a resource and technology 
advancement displacing human labour have resulted in severe retrenchments in the 
mining industry. This has also resulted in migrant labour devaluation through short-term 
contracts. This promotes job insecurity in the foreign labour market. Migrant labour 
exploitation, short-term contracts and retrenchments in the mining industry deprive 
workers an opportunity of assets/capital accumulation. This worsens the national poverty 
of Lesotho of which LG is expected to counter but without conspicuous results (GoL 
Economic Report, 2001).    
 
A gamble against the unfavourable climate has 86% of the resident population engaged in 
subsistence agriculture, based in the rural areas. As a result there is usually a national 
food deficit of over 40% for several decades compelling the country to depend on food 
imports and food aid. Household food insecurity is prevalent, exacerbated by 
unemployment rate of around 45% nationally and 80% in the rural sector. The Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) Executive Secretary, Prega Ramsamy (21
st
 
May, 2002, Lesotho News Agency) once stated that Lesotho is in a very serious state of 
poverty because around 50% of people out of a population of 2 million people are 
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affected by a shortage of food. Corruption in the use of national resources also continues 
to worsen and cement this poverty situation. LG would be expected to curb this situation. 
 
The country’s economy is dependent upon the limited market of tinned food (low value 
asparagus, export cash crop), beverages, textiles, handicrafts, construction, tourism, and 
wool and mohair. The country has only two national parks bordering on the Drakensberg 
Mountains, for eco-tourism. This country’s economy is also dependent upon (trade-blocs) 
national regional trade areas. For example, it is a member of the Southern African 
Development Community/SADC. The country’s economic integration is prominent 
through Southern African Customs Union (SACU) meant to facilitate trade free from 
tariffs between Lesotho and South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Swaziland. Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Namibia and South Africa also form a common currency and exchange 
control area known as the Rand Monetary Area that uses the South African ‘Rand’ as the 
common currency thus making the Rand more robust and convertible, promoting South 
African market. Lesotho limitedly exports textiles to North America and Asia under the 
terms (quotas, tariffs, sole use of inputs from country trading with-USA for example) set 
by her export partners as developed countries and not necessarily on World Trade 
Organization’s terms. This makes her textile exports to be very cheap at the expense of 
her labour exploitation as more than 90% of the involved industries belong to these 
developed countries. Imports include food, building materials, vehicles, machinery, 
medicines and petroleum products. Imports-partners include South African Customs 
Union providing 90% of such imports and Asia with 7% and 3% from elsewhere. 
Lesotho always has a trade deficit because her exports are always far less than imports, 
that is more of her money goes out than coming in, indicating lack of economic 
ownership and control or least development (GoL, Economic Review Reports, 2001-
2002).  
 
Various services like electricity, health, education, roads, and telecommunications and so 
on are (urban-biased development) mostly in urban areas but skewedly and scantily 
provided. The country has nearly 6,000 kilometres of unpaved and modern all-weather 
roads. There is a short rail line (freight) linking Lesotho with South Africa that is totally 
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owned and operated by South Africa. Most of the electricity is imported from RSA. The 
greatest part of Lesotho’s population has no access to potable piped water, especially in 
the rural sector, though water is Lesotho's only significant natural resource. While the 
local rural majority is deprived of this water, the water is being exploited through the 30-
year, multi-billion dollar Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP), which was initiated 
in 1986. The LHWP is designed to capture, store, and transfer water from the Orange 
River system and send it to South Africa's Free State and the greater Johannesburg area 
where there is a concentration of South African industry, population and agriculture. At 
the completion of the project, Lesotho is expected to be almost self-sufficient in the 
production of electricity and may also gain income from the sale of electricity to South 
Africa. The World Bank, African Development Bank, European Investment Bank and 
other bilateral donors are financing this project. There is still a need for diversified 
sources of power and revenue (GoL Reports, 2000).  
 
All land in Lesotho is held by the king in trust for the Basotho nation and is apportioned 
on his behalf by local chiefs together with elected village development 
committees/councils. Only 9% of Lesotho's land is arable. Maize, sorghum, beans, peas 
and wheat are cultivated and much of the workforce is engaged in subsistence farming. 
Many staples, however, must be imported from South Africa, the country's main trading 
partner. Agricultural production has been reduced by soil exhaustion, erosion and 
recurring drought. Sheep are bred for wool, cattle as draughts animals and some (Angora) 
goats are raised for mohair. Wool and mohair prices have been going down in the 
international market due to the massive adoption of synthetic products. This has 
increased rural poverty. Livestock production is constrained by poorly maintained 
pastureland and armed livestock robbery, which escalate poverty. These indicators of 
poverty are also highly observable amongst the proletariat-peasants in Lesotho (GoL 
Reports, 2000).  
 
LG is not wholly good in responding to the needs of citizens, in particular the urban and 
the rural poor.  Every government has policies that it uses as its guidelines on how to 
serve its country but basically the government has to see to it that incomes are equally 
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distributed. Nonetheless, there are cases where the fruits of development go to a small 
group of people while masses live in poverty. On economic grounds it is a well 
established fact that a skewed distribution of income distorts the pattern of consumption 
towards luxury goods which necessarily have to be imported, against the basic 
necessities/goods which could be manufactured locally. In effect the country undercuts its 
chances for development. If the money used for luxury items would be spared on the 
urban and rural poor through relevant projects establishment, the poor would at least be 
able to benefit over such incomes.  Recently the government of Lesotho purchased 
imported fleets of extremely luxurious vehicles using millions of money in both local and 
US dollar currency which were peculiarly auctioned only to most senior government 
officials and ministers at the rate of 1% real value of these vehicles that were only a year 
old in use. The rich desire to utilize the income or tax money as they wish, having 
protected themselves with legal clauses, is the main reason for the poor to have their 
needs not addressed. This is reflected by practices like this and severe under funding of 
LG and Maseru City Council/MCC which also lacks specific urban poverty reductive 
projects. The urban and rural poor are legally powerless and lack entitlements.  
 
One of the potent factors causing more inequality has been government’s policy with 
respect to agricultural prices disparity in relation to urban wages. Many of the urban poor 
sell agricultural produce in the informal sector but the problem is that agricultural prices 
are often kept much below their world prices while urban wages are continually pushed 
up. Tariffs and licensing fees the poor have to pay for informal trade networks are too 
high and down press them to cyclic urban poverty, there are too many market entry and 
operating and intermediary costs they have to pay and therefore remain incapacitated as 
lowest or non-income earners. As a result, the urban poor including mainly small 
agricultural produce retailers and farmers as a group fall considerably far behind wage 
earners and other groups generally.  As far as the Lesotho economy is concerned there is 
some evidence to believe that farmer’s terms of trade have fallen, that is agricultural 
prices remain unfairly too low, worst of it all lacking any subsidy. The urban poor that 
sustain their lives on crop products they get from the rural or the other local surrounding 
the urban suffer heavy losses.  This is because these crops they buy and sell to the urban 
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people make meagre income that can sustain them for no reasonable time as non-
agricultural commodities are too expensive. The too low agricultural prices problem is 
further complicated by heavily subsidized agricultural imports from the RSA. On grounds 
of economies of scale and (hidden) subsidies imports are often of too low prices thus 
stifling local efforts of profit making and thereby ultimately perpetuate urban and rural 
poverty by the short-lived unsustainable desired food security. This creates a private 
sector that condones impoverishment of the poor who wherever they may be employed 
earn below minimum living wages. This is extreme income inequality.  
 
One of the most powerful sources of restraint to the poor in utilizing economic 
opportunities is the government of Lesotho itself. Local authorities/LGUs apply 
regulations inappropriately or strictly for their unfair gain through the ‘under the table 
costs’ like in licensing, hygiene and other required standards the poor cannot afford to 
maintain. This is further complicated by over policing well intended, again, for bribes 
collection from various small income generating activities in which the urban poor are 
mostly involved. The ‘legal’ constraints on the income earning activities of the poor 
amount to abuse of power rested in government officials. Licenses for the street vendors 
are seldom obtained without bribes being paid to the relevant officials. Similarly the 
exploitation in illegal and risky activities such as prostitution, alcohol making and selling 
and trading in certain goods, also child labour, offers opportunities for powerful 
government employees to abuse the system and the poor, even where the state policies 
are designed to help the poor as no one is there to enforce them.  
 
The urban poor in Lesotho are those people who do not have access to quite a number of 
basic services. Actually, there are a number of indicators that can be used to measure the 
extent to which the poor urban and rural inhabitants experience poverty. These all focus 
on hunger, poor health, no education, improper shelter and too low income from inequity 
worsened by joblessness. The urban poor in this country are actually found in squalid 
places characterized by unsanitary conditions, lack of or contaminated water and 
improper disposal of domestic and body waste. The rural poor are penniless, experiencing 
80% of unemployment rate and are but similarly the worst hit. 
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Lesotho has had since independence an experience of various development projects’ and 
co-operatives’ assistance. There is little evidence of sustainable progress from such 
interventions not excluding LG. This disappointing incidence is among others worsened 
by declining development assistance, environmental problems, general constraints to 
development for change and lack of gender-aware planning. Environmental degradation 
is mainly due to change in land use patterns. Factors to the change include encroachment 
of rangelands by cultivation escalated by high population density, loss of arable land 
through expanding settlements, urbanization aggravated by sprawling character of towns 
and villages and soil erosion. This degradation is also caused by partial collapse of 
traditional and ecologically sound seasonal grazing patterns put in danger by increased 
stock theft, transhumance discouragement, too many new settlements disabling herds’ 
mobility and confusion about authority concerning land use. Burning of pastures by the 
herd boys and ineffective methods of cultivation that is just cultivating for fear of loss of 
traditional right of use of arable land also worsen degradation. Soil loss, widespread 
shrub encroachment reducing wool and mohair production and toxic weeds characterize 
this degradation. There is still a problem of destructive agricultural practices, combined 
effect of extensive grazing and marginal agriculture.  
 
General constraints to developmental local governance/DLG are the attitude, political and 
financial constraints. Attitudinal problems calling for transformational and sustainable 
development include a lost sense of responsibility of a community for its own 
development destiny and disintegration of government (GoL) mainstream support 
services for development project services. Negative attitudes to change are also caused by 
a lack of commitment by beneficiaries to the project objectives, the handing out of 
development assistance unconditionally and unwillingness of the government ministries 
to intervene appropriately when development process is in jeopardy. Sufficient political 
devolution including administrative and financial and human resources and capacity are 
still lacking. If all these conditions could be met, probably poverty alleviation could be 
obtainable, but there is no real political commitment on the part of the central 
government as the next chapters confirm by this study’s data collected and analyzed. 
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Political structures have been fragmented at national and local levels. This led to 
confusion and impeded progress of coordination towards achieving community 
development goals. Decentralization, LG and community-based development have 
become more urgent to remedy this situation. Respective roles of traditional leadership 
versus Village Development Committees (VDCs) and/or local government institutions 
are not yet well understood if not well defined. This creates tensions, conflicts and 
struggles for power disabling development initiatives. This includes farmers’ associations 
and NGOs’ in land and range administration and management. Farmers associations/co-
operatives and NGOs are not yet transformed into inputs and outputs producers for 
effective price instability tackling either for inputs or products and as such consumer-
welfare is non-existent. On the part of financial constraints, land and livestock holders are 
not motivated by commercial opportunities. They act like people not conversant with the 
ideas of production costs and profit. This financial management attitude in livestock and 
crops production is premised on cultural attitudes. The effectiveness of farmers 
associations is constrained by lack of proper maintenance of financial accounting and 
integrity (GoL Reports, 2000-2008).  
 
Though it has now become the official stand of GoL that development designs need to 
accommodate the private sector in the pursuit of overcoming mismanagement, many 
development agencies have not yet significantly integrated this element. Insufficiently 
addressed gender and herd boys development issues and relations partly contribute to this 
stagnant position. The outlook of development initiatives has so far not visibly 
considered gender and herd boys in development planning. Livestock production is still a 
male dominated sector. The gender division of labour allows women to be in-charge of 
home-based animals or intensive livestock (mostly poultry). Men are responsible for 
extensive grazing livestock. In the event of increased male mineworkers’ retrenchment, 
women’s de-facto household headship is diminishing, meaning their diminishing user-
rights as well. Development projects and co-operatives still function within unreformed 
discriminatory practices and regulations, group lending is not yet massively done, 
gender-aware planning is still lacking among development officials and institutions. 
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Skills impartation programmes and co-operatives are not gender sensitive and female and 
herd boys’ participation not only in implementation but in policy formulation and 
decision making levels is not yet effectively practiced (GoL, 2000, Seers et al, 1980). 
 
5.2.0 The History of Governance in Lesotho: Decentralization Experience 
 
5.2.1 Lesotho’s DGD in the colonial era 
 
The effort by Lesotho to adopt measures of increasing democracy in government by 
giving power to the people through local governments known as local authorities (LAs) 
can basically be categorized into the colonial (before 1966 when Lesotho gained her 
political independence from Britain, i.e. in the years of 1800 when Britain colonized 
many countries), the post-independence (after 1966), the integrated development (early 
1970s to early 1980s) and the military rule (1986-1992) era as forms of organizational 
developments and then the current or new (1993-2008) organizational measures.  
 
Previous attempts at decentralization can include the establishment of the Basutoland 
Council for the 1930s, the establishment of District Councils in 1943, the establishment 
of the District Secretariat with different Development Councils and Committees at 
district and village/community levels in the 1970s and early 1980s, then the 
establishment of the Maseru Municipal Council in 1989. These forms of DGD had own 
institutional constraints disabling them to effectively bring about development. The 
British colonial regime started breaking down the existing indigenous governmental 
institutions and introduced direct rule. Lesotho was divided into four districts, Leribe, 
Berea, Thaba-Bosiu and Cornerspruit. There was a resident assistant Magistrate 
responsible to the governor of the Cape Colony. The magistrate was maintaining law and 
order, civil and criminal jurisdiction, land administration and taxes collection and headed 
each of the four districts. The Basotho traditional ‘Khotla’/court (community consultative 
council made up of the hereditary chief and with his appointed advisory elderly men’s 
council, this was the main local governance system of the pre-colonial era) system was 
not totally abolished but had been scrapped and remained with limited powers and 
specific various functions relevant to the then time. The scrapped Khotla system was 
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placed to enhance local government administration. In 1884, Lesotho became a (British) 
High Commissioner Territory and Khotla system was replaced by the type of 
administration known as the ‘indirect rule’. This colonial administration was concerned 
with tax collection and maintenance of law and order. Indigenous local government 
administrations were revived. Public meetings became the main way of local 
participation. This tended to centralize the chieftaincy and weakened its responsiveness 
through public meetings (lipitso). When public meetings lost quick responsiveness and 
lessened popular participation the first National Council through long negotiations was 
established in 1903. It became a statutory body in 1910 intended to discuss domestic 
affairs of Basutoland. It comprised of 100 members, ninety four (94) appointed by the 
member the Paramount Chief and the Resident Commissioner another five (Wallis, 1999 
and Mofuoa, 2005). 
 
This local government was criticized and Alan Pim’s Commission of Enquiry was set to 
constitute the found weaknesses in 1930s. Thus the Proclamations of 1938 were passed 
aiming at the provision of an integral place in the machinery of administration for 
indigenous institutions which had previously derived their authority from the custom. 
Resultantly chiefs were gazetted by the colonial administration for recognition. The 
gazetted recognized chiefs received statutory powers and law and order maintenance 
function. The general welfare and agricultural practices also formed their function. The 
Paramount chief had powers to issue rules to maintain peace, good order and welfare as 
also approved by the High Commissioner. In this way, since 1938, the legitimacy of 
chieftaincy became no longer derived from the traditional political structure but from 
being gazetted. It then became a statutory institution needing selection of chiefs to be 
gazetted though ungazetted chiefs continued to function. The power base of chieftaincy 
drastically became curtailed as a statutory body with powers on judicial and 
administrative issues only. In 1944, the Treasury was established and further cut their 
power as they could no longer collect fees and fines from court proceedings but all had to 
be paid to the Treasury. The Pim’s commission had done nothing to improve popular 
participation except to reduce powers of chieftaincy and establish the unrepresentative 
Basutoland Council as its membership was largely based on chieftainship. This 
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intensified the commoners’ struggle for increased participation in the government. As 
thus in 1943 the District Councils were established with chiefs as ex-officio members 
including other nominees at the public meeting (Pitso). Chiefs served as advisory 
personnel and electoral forums for the Basutoland National Council. Since these councils 
were unrepresentative they lost their importance and peoples’ interest and support. Then 
in 1959 Proclamation No. 52 was passed revising the District Councils into corporate 
bodies. They became directly elected institutions but responsible for a very small range of 
functions. People continued to demand increased participation in the government. In 
1960 the Basutoland National council was replaced by the reconstituted Basutoland 
Council.  They had little difference in terms of functions though. They were still 
unrepresentative and lacked jurisdiction as they had no power conferred upon them to 
perform governmental functions (Mapetla and Rembe, 1989, Wallis 1999 and Mofuoa, 
2005). 
 
5.2.2 The History of Decentralization/Local Governance in Lesotho: Post-
independence era/1966-2008 
 
The evolution of local governance in Africa is said to have followed two colonial phases 
and four post-independence ones. These included, respectively, the indirect rule, that is 
colonial authorities ruling through traditional institutions in the Anglophone Africa. 
Colonial district commissioners supervised traditional leadership. The Francophone 
African areas experienced assimilation and direct rule which later changed to the same 
Anglophone indirect rule in 1918. The discretionary trends then followed as a phase 
when colonial authorities introduced controlled democratized native councils. The 
colonial purpose was to create locally efficient and democratic governments. Some 
countries overtook the process and gained owned political independence.  These localities 
as a third phase but after political independence were replaced by field administrators 
who restored centralization and used resource less committees for local ruling. The 
central through field administrators penetrated the created localities. Then the 1970s 
centralized decentralization followed in pursuit of self-reliance and local participation but 
districts remained centralized in the hands of the civil servants who dominated decision 
making and resource allocation. The declined local participation then prompted a phase 
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of return to devolution track. This was in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Autonomous 
district councils were introduced but resources allocation continued to remain centre 
orientated. Then late in the 1980s with the collapse of the USSR, one party system 
corruption and failure in economic performance and service delivery revived 
decentralization with good governance and multi-party system (Mushi, 1992: 32-34 
Mawhood 1993, and Olowu, 1995: 2-5).            
 
After gaining political independence in 1966, Lesotho centralized governing. The District 
Councils that had been established in 1948 by the British colonial government were 
abolished in 1968. These councils were statutory bodies which functioned as avenues for 
popular participation, electoral colleges for representation to the National Council, an 
advisory body to the National Council in local affairs and as local authorities with powers 
to make by-laws, manage local finances and carry out various responsibilities related to 
agriculture, livestock, maintenance of bridle paths, and selected roads, fisheries, public 
order, health and regulation of trade (Wallis, 1984:66). District Councils were being 
blamed for complicating lines of communication between the central government and the 
districts. Kotze (1972:57) has stated that the councils ‘disrupted a well established 
deconcentration system of administration to which most people were comfortably 
accustomed. The strong district Councils had become centres for political dissension and 
opposition.’ The councils were largely dominated by the membership of Basotho 
Congress Party, the then opposition party to the then ruling Basotho National Party. This 
formed a competing political structure over loyalty and local resources with the central 
government though they lacked financial management.   
 
The third Five Year Development Plan of 1980-85 immediately became a response of 
decentralization to intensifying problems of centralization that included failure of too 
many development projects without local participation in development and in the 
government. This development plan re-introduced the then lost decentralization for 
popular participation in local affairs and in government development programmes. This 
included the creation of the office of the District Co-ordinator in 1980 and the District 
Co-ordinators (Vesting Powers Act) 1984; the creation of the Thaba-Tseka (1980) as the 
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tenth district serving as the experimental model for decentralization. The Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) and the government of Lesotho joined hands 
to decentralize this district through the ministry of agriculture. The District Co-ordinator 
was later given the responsibility of looking after this district. When CIDA phased out 
funding agricultural and infrastructural developments that were taking place came to a 
halt because many of the qualified personnel lacked an incentive to pursue such 
developments. This model could not be replicated anywhere in the country (Mapetla and 
Rembe, 1989).        
 
So, the beginning of local government in Lesotho emerged in 1948 when under the then 
British Protectorate of Lesotho district councils were established.  These councils had no 
legislative or revenue raising powers and did not control their own finances. They were 
merely consultative bodies with very little input into their district development. In 1959 
with the issuing of the Local Government Proclamation No. 52 the district councils 
became of age with power to make decisions at district level, have local financial control 
and make bylaws. This situation carried on through the period when Lesotho gained 
independence in 1966. In 1969 the Local Government Repeal Act and the Local 
Administration Act were passed and an era of decentralization was born on paper. 
District councils were abolished on the grounds that they were politically unacceptable to 
the then ruling Basotho National Party that had fewer elected membership in them. It was 
then cited that there was a lack of financial management and control with a major part of 
the district finances being spent on salaries and wages and little being directed to the 
provision of services and capital development (Mapetla et al, 1983, GoL Reports, 1997 
and Wallis, 1999).  
 
There was also difficulty in the lines of communication between central and local 
government. The district councils were also deemed to pose an additional bureaucratic 
burden in the running of the government. They were replaced by a centralized system 
with the responsibility of district administration given to the Ministry of Interior, 
Chieftainship Affairs and Rural Development. The centralization period continued for 
over twenty years but an informal development of the emergence of Village Development 
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Committees (VDCs) by communities to coordinate their small local development 
activities was seen. This development was later formalized by the Development Councils 
Orders No. 18 of 1981 and No. 9 of 1986 providing for development committees at 
district, ward and village levels. VDCs supplement to the inundated chieftaincy that could 
not sufficiently address all the local social and development needs. As this initiative 
occurred at the local level, two major items of legislation were introduced at the centre; 
the Valuation and Rating Act of 1980 providing for a modern system of valuation and 
rating of property to raise revenue for the payment of public services. The other item was 
the Urban Government Act of 1983, providing for the establishment and regulation of 
urban local authorities. These Acts led to the establishment of Maseru City Council 
(MCC) in 1989. MCC has since had a chequered history with donor assistance at its 
inception and formative years but afterwards having to rely solely on self-generating 
revenue to fund its services. MCC has already received charges of mismanagement and 
non-provision of services. It has problems in staff appointments, lack assistance from the 
central government and bureaucratic structures in its operations. This has resulted in 
many of its financial weaknesses. In 1993 national elections resulted in the Basotho 
Congress Party winning all the parliament seats (First Past the Post). This government 
introduced the constitution including the provision of the establishment of the local 
government. Chapter VIII-section 106 of the constitution indicated that ‘parliament shall 
establish such local authorities as it deems necessary to enable urban and rural 
communities to determine their affairs and to develop themselves. Such authorities shall 
perform such functions as may be conferred by an Act of parliament. Any enactment 
providing for the establishment of a local authority and in force immediately before the 
coming into operation of this constitution shall continue subject to repeal/modification by 
parliament (Mapetla et al, 1983, GoL Reports, 1997 and Wallis, 1999).  
 
The Ministry of Local Government (MLG) was then created in 1994 by dividing the 
functions of the Ministry of Interior, Chieftainship and Rural Development between the 
Ministries of Home Affairs and Local Government. The Departments of District 
Development; Rural Development and Land Surveys and Physical Planning passed to the 
new Local Government Ministry. The department of chieftainship affairs remained with 
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the Ministry of Home Affairs until September 1997 when transferred to the portfolio of 
the MLG. This decentralization move by the Basotho Congress Party/BCP government 
caused an ideological conflict between itself as the ruling government and the chieftaincy 
structures. The Basotho National Party/BNP, pro-chieftaincy party held protesting 
demonstrations at the palace and demanded that the then King dissolve the parliament to 
later call the elections. The King did dissolve the parliament on the basis of the 
‘constitutional loophole’ that was not well written which said the King could prorogue or 
dissolve the parliament and then after a semi-colon, stipulating the consultative 
procedures and conditions, which was deliberately ignored. Severe political massive 
protests and SADC non-military intervention served to reinstate the BCP elected 
government. The dissolution was on grounds that the King had powers to do so but the 
real expressed political campaigns by the BNP were to salvage chieftaincy which seemed 
to lose too much power and control under the Development Councils Order of 1991 with 
subsequent amendments of an Order of 1992 promulgated by the Military regime that had 
toppled the BNP dictatorship of since 1970 and then reinforced and formalized by the Act 
of 1994 legalizing elected Development Councils as local authorities. The other ‘cry foul’ 
campaign was that BCP had manipulated the electoral system to win the elections. At 
least this political complaint has never yet been proven real. The formalized development 
councils were structured as follows: District Development Councils (DDCs) consisted of 
21 members per council with the following functions; -promote socio-economic 
development at the district levels, -formulate and implement development projects in the 
district, - ensure that district projects are in compliance with the national development 
plan, - monitor the implementation of development projects, - raise funds for 
implementing development projects, - utilize economically all the district resources for 
the betterment of the people in the district,- Consult through its secretary, with 
appropriate Government Ministries on matters relating to development and planning, - 
coordinate the activities of Ward District Councils (WDCs). The WDCs consisted of 
thirteen members per council with the following functions; collate development proposals 
from VDCs for scrutiny and submission for consideration by the DDC and, -monitor the 
implementation of development projects at the village level. VDCs consisting of 8 
members per council had the following functions; plan, formulate, implement and 
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maintain development activities and social services, - represent and guide the local 
community in its efforts to identify village development needs, -raise funds for local 
development, - stimulate local participation in development activities and inform 
government on local development priorities. A conflict with the chiefs at the time of the 
establishment and the election of the DCs, delaying and non-cooperation tactics were 
used so that many DCs could not take place or function. Chiefs formed the mouth of the 
government for public gatherings to effect elections of such bodies. Chiefs never 
cooperated. Then the BCP government continued to the effort of introducing local 
governance through a July 1996 white paper under three sections, the nature and structure 
of local government, human resource development, staffing and institutional 
development and the financing of local government. Consultations on the white paper 
were made and the new Local Government Act was approved by the Parliament in April 
1997 and gained royal assent in June 1997. The new Act made provision for the 
establishment of local government in the form of Community Councils, Rural Councils, 
Urban Councils and the Municipal Councils to be discussed in detail here later (Mapetla 
et al 1983, GoL Reports, 1997 and Wallis, 1999)                 
 
According to Malcolm (1999), Lesotho has had some experience of local government. 
District Councils were once introduced during the colonial rule that took effect from 
1868 by the British treating Lesotho as a protectorate. These councils were abolished by 
the new government due to political and administrative differences. That is because 
councils largely consisted of the then opposing political party elected membership, BCP 
and were seen as a blockade to centralized influence of the different ruling party, BNP.  
During the 1980s donor driven limited efforts, to reintroduce local government, were 
made. This resulted into one council known as Maseru City Council, in the capital city, 
Maseru. A limited form of deconcentration by district administrators and district 
coordinators who represented interests of the ruling government in the districts was also 
seen around the 1980s. Ministries provided services through these officials on ad hoc 
basis. Chiefs continued to play essential functions of local ruling in the communities. 
This could not promote local democracy. Basically the country experienced dictatorship 
civilian rule by the Basotho National Party usurping power from 1970 until being toppled 
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by the 1986 military rule that was replaced by democratic general elections of 1993. The 
Basutoland Congress Party won all the parliament seats and was very eager to initiate the 
process of local government and reintroduce councils in which it used to command 
majority membership. Inadequate management capacity delayed the introduction of the 
local government. Traditional chiefs in the senate resisted the introduction of this 
Decentralization Act as they perceived it to be a tool meant to take the ruling power away 
from the traditional chiefs into the democratically elected councillors.         
 
Malcolm (1999:91-112) further indicates and clarifies that, as of 1997, there existed only 
one local authority in Lesotho, the Maseru City Council/MCC. The country was covered 
by a network of development councils which only served as consultative bodies. 
Lesotho’s local governance may be traced back to 1943 when a national consultative 
body called Basutoland Council (BC) sought increased popular participation by 
establishing district councils that were to elect two representatives to the BC per district. 
The councils were formed and made into statutory bodies in 1948. They were enhanced 
by the 1959 proclamation that dealt with their powers to make bylaws, finance, 
organization and proceedings. The principal chief and ward chiefs in a district served as 
ex-officio members while other members to the council were elected. Their membership 
ranged between 15 and 28 according to the district size. Councils had power over 
agriculture and livestock, bridle paths and minor roads maintenance, fisheries, public 
health, public order, and regulation of trade, commerce and industry (Kotze, 1968).  
 
Some perceptions insist that the nine district councils were an unnecessary expense, 
complicated administration and hence be abolished. They could be needed in future not at 
the time. BCP also controlled these councils and as such the new incoming (1965) BNP 
realizing this basis for intense central-local conflict decided to abolish the councils in 
1968. This was a strategic move to undermine BCP in the next 1970 elections which BNP 
lost but hijacked central governance by not conceding after destroying local governance. 
The coup enjoyed the paramilitary support. Then the BNP created the office of the 
District Coordinator in the districts, responsible for coordinating the various departments 
and ministries at district level in 1980. The appointed civil servants as district 
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coordinators were BNP representatives. District coordinators were to pursue 
governments’ policies and explain them, develop and maintain cooperation between the 
departments and ministries, inform government of the wishes and efforts of local people, 
liaise with the ministries and departments on planning, look after agricultural projects, 
attend to border problems as all the districts border the Republic of South Africa and 
maintain financial administration standards in the districts. This provided no room for 
democratic participation. The created village development committees (VDCs) in the 
communities only served as limited consultative bodies (Kotze, 1968). 
 
It is important to note that Lesotho’s decentralization efforts have to a certain extent been 
donor driven. The United Kingdom together with World Bank attached their funding to 
the creation of local government for the main urban area, Maseru. This resulted into the 
1983 Urban Government Act, already indicated. The Netherlands aid agencies helped 
with research funding and decentralization planning. The aim was to give the minister of 
interior power to create local authorities structures for the capital city Maseru. Power to 
the minister included having to describe the number of councillors to be elected in each 
ward, set the method of election of councillors, determine which principal chiefs will be 
ex-officio members to the councils, divide municipalities into wards and vary their 
boundaries and determine a method by which councillors would choose one of their men 
to be the chairperson. The removal of the BNP from power by the military in 1986 meant 
that district coordinators would have to be replaced by the military partial rule. ‘Military 
commissioners’ took up the role of the district coordinators.  The military was interested 
in keeping World Bank funding and therefore did not temper with the 1983 Urban 
Government Act of 1983 which resulted into the Maseru Municipal Council later known 
as the Maseru City Council/MCC. The municipal in Lesotho started in 1989. It was 
established through the Urban Government Act of 1983. It was a pilot project financed by 
the World Bank but the bank stopped financing the project because of corruption 
allegations in the project. From there the government of Lesotho took over. Now the 
municipal falls under the government under the ministry of local government. The 
municipal is financed and controlled by the central government, thus making it 
unaccountable to the urban poor. The military rule restricted the urban council to Maseru 
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urban area only. The council in its election for inception had a discouraging turn out of 
less than 10% voters. It encountered institutional and service delivery problems that 
ended up having municipality in Lesotho confined to Maseru city only, while other nine 
smaller urban areas/towns in the nine districts had urban councils introduced as local 
government structure in them but still continued to have town clerks and district 
secretaries now known as district administrators (DAs) for the purpose of representing 
the ministry of local government and the central government.  
 
The problem is that DAs lack powers over line ministries in the district. District team 
meetings for coordination are held monthly for coordination and information exchange 
and planning and staff transport allocation purposes. Urban councils are for smaller urban 
areas/towns while the municipal is for larger urban areas currently being the Maseru 
Municipal. Community councils serve an average of 10,000 rural people while Rural 
Councils serve the whole population of a district except those in urban areas who are to 
be served by the Urban Councils. Efforts to enhance coordination and capacity in 
planning and delivery have also resulted in the creation of District Development 
Coordinating Committee (DDCCs) as ‘mixed authority’ composed of representatives 
from all the councils in a district. The Districts Planning Units (DPUs) have also been 
introduced. It is hoped that they will address lack of planning capacity in the district 
councils. They are to work with councils on development proposals, formulate 
development plans and submit them to the DDCCs (See Wallis, 1999).  So, some other 
experiment by the Lesotho government in decentralization was the introduction of the 
Urban Government Act of 1983.  The Act was generally aimed at making provision for 
establishing and regulating urban local authorities. This Act entrusts certain powers to the 
Minister of Interior.  He/she was responsible for declaring any area to be of the 
municipal, to assign a name to and alter the name of a municipality defining the 
boundaries and declare that any area shall cease to be a municipality and how a municipal 
or urban council shall be constituted. 
 
It may then be noted and clarified that Lesotho Local Governance has been steadily 
promoted for several decades and culminated in the establishment of district councils in 
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respect of the country’s nine districts in 1959 (Quthing district still included the now 
newly separate district, Qacha’s Nek). However, these councils were abolished after 
about eight years and their functions were taken over by various government departments 
and traditional chiefs under the political supervision of a local government appointee with 
cabinet status. The country was ruled by a council of ministers and a king as a nominal 
head of state (without executive powers). Parliament was suspended in January 1970 
during the second general election held after attainment of complete independence in 
1966. Although the constitution had also been suspended, the council of ministers ruled 
in the spirit of the old constitution. A number of “orders” replaced certain parts of the 
constitution, clarifying matters such as position of the king and chieftainship (Cross, 
1971:20). Later on, various advisory bodies were established, which Wallis (1999) 
perceives as only consultative bodies. In each case the main objective was to obtain 
representative expression of public opinion and consultation between central government 
and local people. The second objective was to encourage public interest in the 
management of public affairs through the creation of opportunities to elect the 
representatives and to express public opinion in local public meetings.  
 
It can then also be realized that, at independence in 1966, the District Councils had 
disagreements with the central government. The result was Government Notice No.8 of 
1966 which suspended the Councils and new councillors were appointed. The Local 
Administration Act of 1969 was now more than a framework for further regulation 
providing the Minister of Interior with a basis to make provision for the execution of 
functions formerly performed by the District Councillors. In 1970s, District 
Administrative Secretary became the District Administrator and Assistant Ministers were 
appointed as District Government Agents. The districts now had political and 
administrative heads combined in one office. The politicians were supposed to supervise 
the execution of government policy and to facilitate communication between grass roots 
and the centres of policy formulation in Maseru city. It proved very difficult to fill the 
posts as incumbents tended not to live up to expectations of combined offices. As a result 
the post was quietly abolished in the 1970s and the District Administrator became the 
head of government in the districts. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s decentralization 
 145 
received more attention. In 1977 the Institute of Development Management organized a 
national seminar on local administration and Local Government and in July 1980 a 
Government Workshop on Decentralization, held on the campus of the National 
University of Lesotho prepared proposals on decentralization for consideration by 
Cabinet. As a result of these continuing discussions, further changes took place. In 1980 
the District Administrator was abolished and its functions were split into two other posts. 
Those functions directly concerned with the Ministry of the Interior were taken over by 
the newly created Local Administration Officer, whose post was part of the established 
Ministry of Interior and responsible for, among others, the administration of land and 
chieftainship affairs. The head of Government at district level was then the District Co-
ordinator, part of the establishment of the Cabinet Office and responsible to the Senior 
Principal Secretary. When central government in 1986 was taken over by a Military 
government the Head of Government at district level became a Military officer. This was 
the case until early April 1993 when the civilian government came to power. The head of 
government at District level is now the District Secretary/Administrator.  
 
Some local authors state that today there is decentralization of power from main 
governance to local level as good entry point for addressing wide range of social issues 
including poverty. There are 128 Community Councils, each serving an average of 
10,000 households, since the April 2005 local authorities’ elections (Sekatle, 2000, 
Shava, 2004, Shale, 2004 and Likoti and Shava, 2006). The new government (of 1993, 
BCP having won all the constituencies) lacking political opposition experienced 
leadership internal conflicts in the party’s Executive Committee. There became incidents 
of sole individual’s party running and decision making by some main leaders without 
party’s consultative constitutional practices and procedures. This later led to the 1996 
ruling party split through a ‘parliament-cross-floor’ of the ruling majority of seats in the 
Lesotho Parliament, resulting into an immediate new ruling party, the Lesotho Congress 
for Democracy (LCD) which later won all the 1997 general elections that were bitterly 
protested through violence and massive burning down of Maseru City and other smaller 
towns in 1998 by the opposing political parties’ unruly membership. SADC forces from 
South Africa and Botswana had to intervene to restore peace and order. The LCD then 
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remained a ruling party that pursued putting in place a more democratic Local 
Administration which involves participation of local communities in the management of 
their affairs. The management of urban centres was thus structured along the 
Anglophonic lines which vested power for urban development control in the local urban 
authorities as mandated by Lesotho Local Government Act 1997. The Act empowers 
local urban authorities to control urban development and provide services which include 
solid waste management; opening and rehabilitation of roads; development control; 
primary education and public health. 
 
Objectives of the Lesotho local government include; the provision of a democratic and 
accountable government, the provision of sustainable services and the promotion of 
social and economic development by giving priority to basic community, the promotion 
of the involvement of the community and organizations and individuals in local 
government issue, the enhancement of participation in national and community 
programmes, the combination of the municipality and urban boards which are to be 
combined to the rural and urban areas, thus creating a mechanism which will integrate the 
historically separate parts of economies. 
 
5.2.2.1   Titles and Roles of Senior Councillors and Staff of Local Authorities  
   in Lesotho 
 
The titles and powers of key office holders in local authorities are prescribed in law. The 
titles of the chairman and most senior staff member of councils will be as follows: 
 
 Table 5.3: Council Type and Senior Staff Membership 
Council Types Most Senior Elected 
Representative i.e. chair 
of Council 
Chief Executive of 
Council 
Community Council/CC CC Chairperson CC Secretary (CCS) 
Municipal Council/MCC Mayor Town Clerk 
District Council/DC DC Chairperson DC Secretary (DCS) 
   Source: Field Interviews, May, 2010. 
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Local government is constituted by councillors, civil servants and statutory bodies such 
as tender board. However, according to section 4 of the local government Act of 1997 as 
amended in 2004; representatives of gazette chiefs shall be members of local authorities; 
therefore, chieftainship is part and parcel of local government system (Local government, 
2005). Councillors are the pillars which support functionality of local government. Needy 
people are supposed to be able to raise their concerns and views during their meetings 
with the councillors held before the council meeting. This is representative participation 
because they are represented by the councillors in the decision-making body and 
practically remain outside decision making domain. The councillor notes everything 
raised by the society and during the meeting of the council, he/she presents such issues 
before the council. For instance, society may agree on addressing the issue of electricity 
or water. Then they will tell their councillors what they have agreed on as a community. 
The councillor will then talk about that issue during the council meeting. A councillor 
sets aside at least a day in a given period for meetings with the community (needy) in 
his/her electoral division. During this period, both parties share views about emerging 
issues. The needy are free to present before the councillor their different problems and in 
turn the councillor tries to solve their problems where necessary. This is because the 
councillor sees himself/herself as a leader who is in a position to solve problems. 
Councillor reports to the community the general decisions of the council and the actions 
it has taken to solve problems raised by those people who are needy in the electoral 
division. Then the needy are in a position to criticize the decisions taken if those 
decisions fail to address their problems.   
5.2.3 The Historical Nature of Lesotho’s LG: Legacies and Traditions 
 
The newly introduced 1993 constitution promoted local self-administration and provides 
for the creation of local government structures stating that;  parliament shall establish 
such local authorities as it deems necessary to enable urban and rural communities to 
determine their affairs and to develop themselves. Such authorities shall perform such 
functions as may be conferred by an Act of Parliament. Then in 1994, a Ministry of Local 
Government/MLG was established while legislation that introduced local government/LG 
was effected in 1997. The 1997 Local Government Act (LGA) still remains, with recent 
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amendments, the legislative premises for the new LGUs being the MCC, DCs and CCs 
replacing former councils (Constitution, Chapter VIII, Section 106 (1)). 
  
The main pillars and the development strategy of the newly introduced decentralization 
included Cabinet approving programme for implementation of LG in Lesotho in 
February, 2004. Time frame was set with allocated funding for LG elections in 2004/05 
government budget. The developmental objectives of decentralization include:  
• to deepen and widen public access to the structures of government; 
• to bring services closer to the people thereby improving service delivery; 
• to promote people’s participation in decision making, planning and implementation of 
development programmes giving electorate more control on the development process; 
• to promote equitable development in all parts of the country through the distribution 
of human, institutional and infrastructural resources (Thomi, 2002 and GoL, 2004). 
 
The central government perceives LG as a pivotal strategy towards implementing the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy/PRS and therefore the realization of the national vision. The 
introduced LG is expected to attain poverty reduction and obtain the following; 
• provide for good governance, ownership and accountability in public policy matters; 
• facilitate democratic control over the development planning process; 
• move decision making, resource allocation and local level development planning into 
the hands of the people; 
• provide for equitable distribution of human, institutional, infrastructural and financial 
resources across the country; 
• enhance the effectiveness of developmental activities by creating opportunities for      
      elimination or reduction of duplication in development efforts; 
• facilitate sustainability by matching development decisions with local conditions;     
• and facilitate greater speed and flexibility of decision making as a result of reduced 
central direction and control (Constitution, VIII, 106 (1) and GoL Reports, 2004:23). 
 
As indicated on the diagram below, a clearer nature in terms of the structure of the 
current Lesotho’s LG, it may be learned that on the basis of the size, a CC consists of 
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nine to thirteen councillors elected by popular vote and two chiefs elected by all gazetted 
chiefs of the community area. DCs consist of two representatives from each CC, 
normally a CC’s chairperson and another member and two chiefs. The District 
Development Coordinating Committee/DDCC, is made up of the DC and representatives 
of a number of district governance stakeholder groups and institutions. It remains a 
district level advisory body that usually meets only once a year. Demarcated councils are 
128 in all and then the MCC as already highlighted. There is no explanation as to why 
boundaries cut through urban areas like Butha-Buthe and Hlotse. Chief executive officer 
of the DC is the DC Secretary/DCS to overseer the CCs with a local administrator called 
CC Secretary/CCS while District Administrators/DA serve as the structure to 
“…represent the interests of the Central Government at district level… responsible for 
coordinating the duties and functions of all public officers in that district, other than those 
employed by local authorities (Local Government Act, 1996:410).” Let us here, for later 
analysis, hold for a moment the realization and observation that this structure for all 
intents and purposes, is preserved for solidifying centralization, again, in decentralization 
process from the above clear wording of the quotation and declared functional purpose. 
All whose implications have constituted a severe institutional constraint among other 
main ones against decentralization and/or poverty alleviation to be studied in here, at a 
later stage. The first local elections were held on April 30th, 2005 and were generally 
accepted as free and fair. Lesotho Congress for Democracy/LCD won 76% of the seats, 
different political opposition parties won only 5% of the seats as the rest was taken by 
independents. Reportedly, 53% of elected community councillors are women. The overall 
turnout was very low (30%). Council’s boundaries in several cases cut through urban 
areas. They often do not correspond to national constituencies and principal chief areas 
(Constitution, Chapter VIII, Section 106 (1), GoL Reports, 1997 and 2005, Thomi, 2002 
and Pfeiffer et al 2005). 
 
Hierarchical relations of the Lesotho’s LG on the diagram (5.1) below are such that at the 
higher tier, MLG, together with the other line ministries ought to be offering technical 
support and supervision to the District Secretariat and Community Secretariat at the 
district and community level respectively. This hierarchical structure puts the top level as 
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an overseer to the next lower level (top-down chain of command) (GoL, 1997:1-2, 
Thomi, 2002 and Pfeiffer et al 2005). 
 
This structure (5.1), below, in itself reading through the powers of policy making in the 
LG Act (1996), hardly goes more than three sentences without referring to MLG’s 
minister as the main policy formulating, rejecting and/or approving paramount political-
chief in command. Clear aspects and at least observable and reported, of local policy 
designing, implementation, self-monitoring, evaluation and accounting to the electorate 
by the councils are still only a much desired political environment. This issue of 
devolution of powers by legislation, to be revisited later in this chapter, is so critical for 
the successful nature of decentralization towards poverty alleviation in any country (LG 
Act, 1996). The Lesotho’s LG structure (5.1), below, informs that there are generally 
three vertical spheres of governance. The first is the customary chieftaincy hierarchical 
column, with the constitutional monarch as the head of the state, reigning through the 
loyalty of 22 principal chiefs ruling through area chiefs and grass root village headmen 
who administrate and rule in local political-developmental affairs together with the 
second middle vertical hierarchical sphere (LG), the district secretariat/DC at district 
level and CCs at community level. The third vertical hierarchical sphere is the central 
government consisting of the MLG now combined with chieftaincy working through the 
DA below and District Administration line departments and line ministries as released by 
the central sphere. The practical view point from the diagram 5.1 below, observations and 
conducted interviews with various councillors, this has added more on 
structural/institutional arrangement constraints to decentralization and poverty alleviation 
because the central is vacillating. Too many functions as well as resources and power are 
still centralized though the stated function on the above structure is technical support and 
supervision. Effort’s duplication, confusion, re-centralization and decentralization stifling 
have been reported. This decentralization’s nature is institutionally constrained and may  
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not deliver development efficiently and effectively. Tendency for clinging to power in 
many forms like political parties (BNP), being an opposition in the Senate, for access to 
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and control of resources and functions, also done by central government through 
political-elite domination (LCD’s dominance, exclusive electoral model), the two often 
scrambling over power exposes Lesotho’s decentralization to vulnerable impoverishing 
policy-reversals, particularly the incidental deconcentration/re-centralization (Ibid).  
        
5.3.0   The Challenges and Implications of Urban Governance in Lesotho 
One of the challenges facing Lesotho today is to cope with the adverse consequences of 
rapid urbanization, which include a deteriorating living environment and high 
unemployment. According to the Human Development Report (1992)of the United 
Nations Development Programme/UNDP, the rate of urban poverty is expanding at about 
7%, particularly in urban slums and squatter settlements. Poor people living in these areas 
face social and economic exclusion, with limited access to basic social infrastructure and 
services. Little credit is provided for improved housing, thus further reducing their 
capacity for productive activities.     
By the 1970s, towns in Lesotho were estimated to have over 40% of their population 
living in slums and squatter settlements. The situation seems to have shown little 
improvement during the 1980s. The failure on the part of Lesotho governments to address 
these problems is largely due to the challenge of: lack of resources; designs of 
infrastructure and services set at levels unaffordable to the urban poor; rapid urbanization 
exceeding capacities to implement city development plans/proposals; measures that have 
often not reached the urban poor; non-involvement of beneficiaries/communities in 
planning and implementing urbanization and absence of policies and flexible by-laws to 
deal with problems of urbanization such as squatter and informal settlements.   
A clear challenge to Maseru City Council/MCC is that it lacks direct inclusion of the 
urban poor. Budget control is still centralized. The urban poor do not participate, neither 
in the inexistent urban poverty reductive projects nor in the decision making council 
meetings. The urban poor beside the electoral vote for the councillors cannot further vote 
to enforce implementation of their proposals or decisions and priorities addressing their 
poverty/needs. Urban management requires capacity to fulfil public responsibilities with 
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knowledge, skills, resources and procedures that draw on partnership. Decision making in 
MCC lacks partnership with the urban poor in any projects’ management and 
implementation and council level.    
The government finds itself under pressure of international policies and having to face a 
new phenomenon of good governance which by definition sounds simple but is 
practically extremely complex, largely new and potentially a source of high social 
tension. This is because the top-down kind of governance practiced in Lesotho and 
inherited from colonialism only sought after its own interests. This has resulted in quite a 
number of conflicts along political affiliations in Lesotho among citizens, government 
officials and political parties at large. Political parties used to fiercely strive for 
centralized political power where the winner of the general elections took all of such 
power, whether local or national as power was not decentralized (the first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) electoral model) though mixed member proportional electoral system at national 
level introduced after 1998 political unrest partly blamed for first-past-the-post 
weaknesses has provided relative political stability. The challenge is that Lesotho urban 
governance is still inclined towards first-past-the-post which excludes significant 
percentage of voters thereby consequently creating exclusion and instability. Urban 
council in Lesotho lacks cooperative action with the urban poor at planning, 
implementation, management and evaluation levels, either in the programmes or in the 
councils. This naturally creates social unrest as poverty needs remain unaddressed. Good 
urban governance must enable women and men to access the benefits of urban 
citizenship.  
The principle of citizenship affirms that no man, woman or child can be denied access to 
the necessities of urban life, including adequate shelter, security, safe water, sanitation, a 
clean environment, health, education and nutrition, employment and public safety. 
Through good urban governance citizens are provided with the platform which allows 
them to use their talents fully, to improve their social and economic conditions. Citizens 
either as the poor urban youth or adults, with their various talents and skills still lack any 
platform to compete at least in international markets for better income. Urban council has 
not yet liberated and upgrade its urban poor/informal sector into international trade other 
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than stifling them with difficult prohibiting regulations. This is contrary to the view that 
good urban governance implies liberal, free market-orientated democracy, legitimate 
enlightened and competent leaders who are committed to drive the process of sustainable 
governance even against huge odds. These must be followed by the relevant structural, 
functional and behavioural changes that are needed including access to and the 
appropriate and strategic use of all available resources.             The world is faced with expansion of cities and growing urban centres.  According to Bromley and Gerry, (1971, 33) the urban poverty worsened because of the continuous  
There is overcrowding in Maseru city and there is emergence of squatter settlements and 
pavement dwellers in streets, street vendors also increase each day. Urbanization rather 
seems to be characterized by increasing poverty. Maseru urban growth has been 
characterized by challenging problematic high rate and haphazard nature unleashing 
tremendous agglomeration of unplanned settlements. Most settlements have sprung up 
without proper planning and development control requirements. Consequently, these 
settlements are not recognized by the city authorities and have been described as ‘illegal’. 
To this effect, the Municipal authorities have also tended to ignore them in the provision 
of the necessary services such as water, refuse collection, electricity and sewerage 
disposal.        
The rate of urban growth in Lesotho as already mentioned is determined by natural 
population increase coupled with urbanization, which is the result of commercial, 
industrial and administrative development in the urban areas. There is a fairly direct link 
existing between the size of a city and housing conditions. The rate of urban growth in 
Lesotho has an effect of creating an imbalance – this is in terms of demand and supply of 
urban housing as well as between the income of families and housing costs. Although the 
imbalance in urban housings demand and supply has not been critical after independence 
with also less scale of squatters, the urban authority still has failed to keep up with the 
demand for urban housing. In his report on housing in Maseru, Metcalf (1981: 24) refers 
as follows to the relation between demand and supply of urban housing: 
“The Maseru housing market has been poorly served by the economics of 
demand and supply. There is a service shortage of decent, safe and 
sanitary shelter for low and middle-income families that cannot be 
alleviated in the near future.” 
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When looking at the position regarding the relation between demand and supply in urban 
housing it is evident that it is in no way improving. There are still some very considerable 
problems in the housing sector, e.g. poor conditions, lack of physical planning and 
infrastructure, lack of finance for private house construction, land tenure problems e.t.c. 
The most central problem is the high cost of housing. The heavy cost of acquiring land 
impinges on municipal financial resources. It is not in every case that the municipal has 
extra or access amount for the people who need land or houses. In the case of Lesotho, 
such is particularly impossible since the country itself is in debts and crippled by 
corruption and embezzlement of public funds. 
 
Although the current government does not recognize the informal economic activities in 
the city, the informal sector workers have organized themselves into civic associations 
and have secured licenses to operate within the city. These include inter alia: street 
vendors and hawkers. Urban governance is to a greater extent, encountering a big 
problem of confrontation between the city council and the legal as well as the ‘illegal’ 
vendors in and around the city centre. The Urban Council dominates the decision-making 
but the civic organizations also exert a substantial pressure through protests and use of 
the media in determining direction of urban development. 
 
As Municipal has extended into areas that were formally agricultural settlements under 
the jurisdiction of traditional authorities (chiefs), it has become difficult for the municipal 
authorities to enforce laws and standards that regulate urban life. Town encroachment has 
resulted into conflicts between the Municipal land allocating department for urban 
settlements and the chiefs who with their swallowed up ‘rural’ community strive for 
retaining control over land. This usually happens in cases where land for urban 
settlements has been officially declared as part of Municipal’s property for urban 
development and allocated without consent of the traditional leadership which later 
opposes by refusing the new urban settlers with among others graveyard sites and allow 
grazing of animals on their residential sites (The Ha-Matala case, June-July, 2005). 
Moreover, in Ha-Foso location, chiefs continued to haphazardly allocate for residential 
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purposes land earmarked for urban development regardless of several warnings by the 
Municipal land-allocating department. In this context urban governance in Lesotho lacks 
a sufficiently clear policy at least to the chiefs about their role in it, other than only being 
elected into urban councils.           
 
Although urbanization has resulted in increased economic activity and competitiveness of 
the economy, it has also widened social inequalities. This has resulted into low income 
and vulnerable populations, which are now classified as the ‘urban poor’. Poor urban 
governance and the political turmoil, which have fuelled further deprivation, have 
worsened the situation. The intensity of the problem is epitomized by slums, shanty 
housing with lack of proper sanitation and water facilities in urban centres. 
 
These challenges defy the good theoretical view of both good governance and local 
governance which is regarded as a way of making the government more responsive to 
local needs and preferences.  Improved local governance is critical for better service 
provision and greater responsiveness to urban poor people’s priority problems, still 
naught concerning Lesotho’s urban governance. According to Mabojunge (1991:24), 
good governance has the following characteristics, which unfortunately Lesotho urban 
governance is constrained by inherent limitations of the FPTP model, budgetary 
constraints and requisite inadequate administrative infrastructure being;  participation, 
accountability, transparency, rule of law, strategic vision, consensus orientation, 
effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, equity and inclusiveness and corruption 
minimization. The challenge is that MCC lacks these aspects and there is incomplete or 
asymmetric information concerning municipal decisions and opportunities that could be 
available to the urban poor. 
 
One other challenge it faces is globalization regarded as the intensification of free 
movement of services, capital, information and other factors of production like labour 
across national boundaries.  Globalization has proved to be the major driving force in 
shaping urban development, while many effects have been positive it has been imposed 
unevenly thus exacerbating inequalities within and among cities. Due to globalization 
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urban management responsibilities have been shifted from the central to local 
governments which have become actors in urban decision-making. However, the majority 
of the poor people are often excluded in decision-making. For example, when the ‘Mpilo 
road’ was constructed there were many poor people who lived along the hill across which 
the road passed; their squatter settlements were destroyed without any alternative 
dwelling place given. Intensified international trade has brought about physical 
development that is socially exclusive and disruptive to networks of the urban poor. 
Government is also faced with a set of new challenges in alleviating poverty. There has to 
be creation of jobs for the majority of urban poor. Migration to Maseru urban leads to the 
majority of people seeking jobs but in vain and resort to criminal activities.  
 
The government is also faced with a pressure on environmental issues which have 
become a global concern. The government of Lesotho has to implement policies for 
environmental protection and also sensitize the masses about the environmental issues. 
Air pollution from Thetsane and Station industrial areas, traffic congestion from 
inadequate roads, squalid places, non-maintained sewage spilling over on streets, noise 
pollution, inadequate mechanisms to cope with garbage and littering, insufficient sanitary 
facilities and so on have added more to Maseru city environmental problems.   
 
While MCC to a large extent of around 30% of membership is women, the other major 
challenge relates to strategies intended to address the gender question of leadership. One 
commonly articulated strategy to increase women’s participation in leadership roles is the 
allocation of quotas in the constitution of leadership bodies such as local councils, 
parliaments, development boards, civil society organizations and the business sector.  In 
this respect, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (1990) 
recommended that at least 30 per cent of leadership roles should be occupied by women 
(UNDP, 1995). The argument behind this was that where representation on leadership 
bodies is not mandated, women have generally been poorly represented (Blair, 2000).  
Tickell and Peck (1996), nonetheless draw attention to the fact that women’s 
representation is a qualitative as well as quantitative matter.  The inclusion of women in 
local councils through quotas is only a starting point.  The location, structural influence 
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as well as constraints to women’s participation need to be taken into consideration 
(Tickell and Peck, 1996: Geisler, 1995). 
 
The presence of women in public office of MCC does not guarantee that the interests of 
poor urban women will be represented.  Political beliefs, ideology and class all intersect 
and sometimes compete with claims of gender, thus complicating the relationship 
between women in power and their presumed female constituency (see Beall, 1996). As 
argued by Geisler (1995:546) “…this raises questions about the efficacy of increasing the 
political representation of women as a way of increasing influence on policy formulation 
and about the nature of the representation of women’s interests as such”. This gives rise 
to what Geisler (1995) sees as a serious predicament as to whether women’s interests are 
better served in independent lobby groups in civil society or in national political party 
structures.  In the case of political party structures, Geisler (1995) argues that party 
divisions often outweigh gender divisions, in which case even when a ‘critical mass’ of 
women is achieved in decision-making bodies, it does not guarantee that they will speak 
in one voice on issues relating to women.   Here allegiances to the party often prevail 
over the need to speak in one voice on women’s issues.  She very clearly notes that 
… the majority of women politicians … do not see themselves as 
representing women only, nor do they stress their gender unduly.  They 
campaign on a party ticket and not a women’s ticket.  They contribute to the 
discussion of women’s issues if and when that is appropriate (Geisler, 1995: 
574). 
 
More radical approaches to the gender question on leadership have thereby argued that 
women’s specific needs are better served in women’s organisations, in which case 
women need to focus their leadership efforts in women’s civil society organizations 
(Geisler, 1995).  Such lobby groups are often particularly attractive to professional 
women who feel alienated by the lack of influence in political party structures, where 
they have to comply with particular templates that do not necessarily enhance women’s 
interests.  A major challenge in this approach is that such organizations are often weak in 
status and budgetary endowment and are weakly linked to formal policy formulation 
arenas (Geisler, 1995). 
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5.3.1 The Challenges and Implications of Participation in Lesotho’s LG 
 
One of the profound signs of social inclusion is the participation of the urban inhabitants 
including the poor. Participation can be either formal or informal. Formal participation is 
the type of participation where members of the public or individual groups, property 
owners or investors exercise participation by law. Formal public participation may be 
initiated by decision makers or by independent public initiatives. Examples of formal 
participation are public meetings of local authority organizations such as town councils, 
obligation to inform the public in good time about major planning projects at local 
authority level and finally, polls. The informal participation is seen as a type that has 
various forms. No restrictions are placed on the extent or nature of such participation 
provided it does not contravene legal regulations. Participation of this kind is voluntary 
and supplementary in character. It helps the authorities such as the city council in 
decision making power .The urban poor must feel that involvement is worthwhile, that 
they will be listened to and that arguments and ideas they put forth will enable them to 
exert an influence. Some informal public participation has different forms such as 
municipal forms, round-table discussion, future prospects workshops, local referenda, 
public experts’ reports, future search workshops.  
 
While participation is regarded as good regardless of who participates or gains, 
councillors who participate in MCC and gain are only a local elite, the poor and 
disadvantaged still end-up worse, not taking part in real decision making and resources 
distribution. This is one other limitation of representative participation.  The natural 
tendency is for those who are empowered to be men and few female condoned elites   
rather than poor urban women, the better off rather than worse off and those of high 
status gaining rather than those of lower status. In a brief sense, the focus of social 
inclusion calls for attention to the need for active intervention by government and social 
processes of resources allocation to rectify inequality. However, in MCC the urban poor 
are not effectively included in strategic planning and decision-making on how the 
resources are going to be allocated within their society, rather these ‘representative’ 
officials determine and decide on their behalf with least consultation and accountability.  
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Elitist oriented representation as in MCC has limited knowledge of local problems 
concerning the urban poor. Statistical data or information about the problems of the urban 
poor cannot exactly express how the urban poor feel about their problems or how the 
suggested solutions fit into their cultural traditions. Often times this representative 
decision-making does not take complaints of urban poor seriously. There are no specific 
projects targeting the urban poor by the MCC. The political climate is therefore 
unfavourable for the functioning of grass roots democracy or there is no such tradition. 
As a result the urban poor do not serve as a source of useful ideas, such as those from 
indigenous technical knowledge in decision-making in MCC, hence, they cannot help 
tailor technical ideas imported from outside, so that such innovations are more workable 
under local conditions. The voice of the urban poor lacking in decision-making has led to 
development projects without commitment to alleviate poverty, thus irrelevant 
development. The urban poor as stakeholders, therefore, lack the capacity to influence 
and share control over priority setting, policy-making, resource allocations and program 
implementation. This affirms that representative democracy, indeed, does not necessarily 
mean that the concerns of the most vulnerable like the urban poor in society will be taken 
into consideration in real decision-making. The urban poor are denied co-determination 
and remain disempowered. Robb (1999) also adds that representative democracy is not 
enough when political decisions are made. It should therefore be complemented by 
elements of direct democracy. 
5.4 Summary 
 
There is a critical need for good local governance that is responsive to the needs of the 
Lesotho citizens, particularly the poor. Good urban and rural governance through local 
governance that concentrates on making cities and the rural more inclusive in direct 
support of marginalized groups living in poverty who are excluded from the political 
process by representative democracy stifled by dominant political party play are yet still 
missing and needed in Lesotho. Good urban and rural governance ensure that everyone 
regardless of status, gender, race, age or religion, is enabled to participate productively 
and positively in the opportunities local areas have to offer. Stren (2005) emphasizes that 
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social inclusiveness is an important goal for local governance. It is just, it is democratic 
and it is productive. Social inclusion is central to sustainable local development. 
Development thinking is also increasingly stressing the importance of human capital, that 
is, the important contributions all people including the poor can make to development.  
Decentralization has, furthermore, focused attention on the local level, as good entry 
point for addressing wide range of social issues including poverty. However, the 
participation of the ‘urban and rural poor’ in Lesotho local governance through LGUs 
(MCC, DCs and CCs) is inherently restricted by representative democracy promoting 
indirect participation instead of direct one. Decision making on behalf of the urban-rural 
poor still disempowers them in terms of (budget) prioritization and poverty specific local 
development projects. As such, local governance achieves naught in addressing local 
poverty only surmountable through direct social inclusion. The urban poor thus still 
remain in the low-income stratum and continue to be marginalized in actual decision 
making processes and hence left out in effective functioning of the political processes. 
Insufficient, ineffective and inefficient participation of the poor in Lesotho local 
governance cannot serve as a pre-requisite for sustainable human development and 
poverty reduction. The local poor who lack power to pass decisions concerning their lives 
need not have their participation confined to sporadic opinion expression of erratic public 
gatherings and mere voting of councillors as is now the case. 
 
The historical overview of Lesotho’s decentralization and its political economy in this 
chapter has further illuminated and substantiated the study’s argument shown in the 
preceding chapters stating that while decentralization may have had prospects for the 
efficient and effective delivery of rural-urban development goals elsewhere like in 
Europe, in Lesotho there has been peculiar socio-cultural-political institutional 
constraints militating against the possible prospects of such decentralization. Such 
challenges are found in the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial legacies, traditional 
and political systems of this country, urban and rural governance and participation in the 
decision making structures.  The account of this evolution has also affirmed the study’s 
argument that there is an absence of the prerequisites for successful decentralization in 
Africa but particularly in our case study, Lesotho in this chapter. Furthermore, in this 
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chapter and the following ones, it can also be realized that politics also account for such 
prerequisites and constraints. That is the lacking political will to fully implement such a 
decentralization policy due to foreseeable absent political benefits/goals to the (political) 
bureaucrats in business and/or heavy political losses/costs. The chapter has explored the 
various socio-political-economic-institutional constraints militating against the efficient 
and effective adoption of decentralization for development delivery in Lesotho. It has 
illuminated the socio-systemic rituals in action against the proficient execution of this 
potential development-policy. It has historically revealed the degree to which 
decentralization has been prosperously embarked upon in Lesotho with success/outcomes 
indicators in developmental-service delivery, though field findings in the next chapters 
further do so more comprehensively. It gives Lesotho’s LG policy’s contextual evolution, 
nature, as well as its prospects and challenges. It constitutes a critical analysis of peculiar 
institutional constraints to decentralization in Lesotho. The chapter has basically argued 
and shown that Lesotho has had ‘glimpses of decentralization’ evolution since the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial era but hampered by socio-political-economic 
institutional constraints uncovered in this chapter and the next ones (6, 7 and 8) which is 
particularly on chieftaincy’s role in decentralization, Lesotho’s decentralization nature 
and its measurement, respectively. These obstacles are insufficiently addressed and 
continue to impede the efficient and effective adoption of decentralization for 
development delivery as is now the case in Lesotho, further revealed in the following 
chapters (6, 7 and 8).  
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CHAPTER SIX: CHIEFTAINCY’S CHALLENGES IN DGD 
6.0 General Introduction 
 
After discussing Lesotho’s experience in decentralization and the concerned challenges 
in the preceding chapter, this chapter’s purpose is to consider the roles and the 
challenges of traditional leadership/chieftaincy in decentralization for development 
delivery in Lesotho. It deals with the challenges of chieftaincy in decentralized local 
government in this country. The chapter argues that chieftaincy as a traditional institute 
poses a role conflict in terms of power allocation and use and allocation of local 
developmental leadership functions
9
. It thus constitutes an institutional constraint to the 
DGD’s smooth implementation and local development delivery. This expounds further 
on the thesis’ argument that DGD indeed has some socio-cultural institutional 
challenges that require attention if decentralization is to be effectively and efficiently 
adopted for successful development delivery in Lesotho. The chapter firstly provides 
how Lesotho actually endorsed decentralization or DGD. Secondly, the political system 
also forming the preliminary part of the chapter is discussed setting a background to the 
existence of traditional leadership in Lesotho. Thirdly, the chapter debates chieftaincy 
and colonialism and the validity of an argument justifying the role of chieftaincy in the 
modern DGD and its role in the era of such democracy/DGD as well as its fundamental 
institutional roles. Fourthly, the chapter analyzes the relations between the democratic 
local authorities and chieftaincy in Lesotho as well as the role of such chieftaincy and 
its constraints in the decentralized system of Lesotho. 
6.0.1   How Lesotho Endorsed Decentralization 
 
                                                
9. 
In the current context of Lesotho and tradition, chiefs help the King to rule the country. As traditional leadership they 
have to contribute towards stability, safety, peace and tranquility of people under their charge. Chiefs are the custodians 
of the Basotho culture and traditions. Their functions include: (a) to help people identify lost items including livestock; 
(b) to uphold the rule of law, to prevent crime and to charge offenders (petty/minor offences); (c) to protect community 
development projects; and (d) to keep records of birth, death and marriages of their people (LG Act 1996, GoL, 2004, 
GoL 2005 and LG Act 2004). There are also more details later given in this chapter mainly on the basis of in-depth 
interviews/fieldwork conducted (Title 6.5.0.1).   
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There is a widespread belief that the design of governance in the pre-colonial Lesotho 
(early 1800 to 1868) has greatly been local based on the now almost defunct institution of 
chieftaincy (Machobane, 1991). Before the 1868 British colonial/protectorate era on 
Lesotho, such traditional ‘local governance’ premised on chieftaincy structure was 
organized in a manner that every village had own appointed chief on merit (acts of 
bravery in wars, charisma, generosity, brilliance and other valued demonstrated 
leadership traits) exercising administrative, judicial and some legislative functions. These 
functions were implemented through the traditional local court (‘khotla’/court) composed 
mainly of socially experienced male elders who formed the chief’s (advisory) council. 
Public gatherings (‘Lipitso’) also constituted one of the main consultative forums for 
public opinion mobilization and decision making by village chiefs (Ibid).  
 
The 1868 colonial British rule on Lesotho through the Cape Colony imposed 
‘commissioners’/colonial masters as the new authority that subdued and subjected 
chieftaincy to an instrument through which British indirect rule was  maintained. The 
administrative, judicial and legislative powers were taken up by the commissioners 
(British authoritative natives) who worked through the newly established police force, the 
treasury and colonial courts (civil/Roman-Dutch law institutions), all directly controlled 
by the British officials under the commissioner. Various taxes (e.g. hut/house tax, ‘sand 
use tax’ and other user charges and various fines) were used to maintain the colonial 
administrative system. Chiefs were left with reduced (fining) powers on minor (petty-
crime) issues. Colonial administration used chieftaincy mainly as its mouth organ and as 
a mere consultative body. Gazetting became very instrumental in reducing traditional 
powers of chiefs and in subduing them to the British colonial control (Native 
Administration Proclamation of 1938). Colonial ‘legal legitimacy’ modified, weakened 
and replaced ‘traditional legitimacy’. The two forms of oppression on the commoners and 
their exclusion in these decision making structures  necessitated formation of new 
(interest) political groups by the commoners (e.g. ‘Lekhotla la Bafo’/Council of 
Commoners founded by the trade unionist called Lefela and later the elites and chiefs 
who belonged to Christian churches particularly the Lesotho Evangelical Church/LEC 
actively backing formation of the Basutoland (Basotho) Congress Party/BCP in the late 
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1950s and the catholic church actively supporting formation of the Basotho National 
Party/BNP in the early 1960s) who put public protests and pressure seeking for political 
independence that was attained in 1966 (Machobane, 1991).                 
 
The political independence of 1966 with its 1965 first general elections placed the BNP 
government which passed the Local Government Repeal Act in 1968 abolishing the 1950s 
colonial district councils. This further centralized the state. Then in 1969 the BNP 
government introduced the 1969 Local Government Act that introduced less democratic 
local/village development committees (VDCs) that entailed chiefs as chairpersons and main 
decision makers in allocation of resources particularly land. The BNP leadership has 
historically been mainly under the senior chiefs’ leadership and membership, not to talk of 
its main founder Chief Leabua Jonathan greatly backed by the Catholic Church. This pro-
chieftaincy political party apparently acted and has continued to act along conservative lines 
of preserving traditional undemocratic powers and be a counteracting political force against 
the ‘commoners’, the BCP (with junior chiefs and mostly the commoners as its base) who 
sought political power to be given back to the grassroots. The manifestos of the two political 
parties usually sharply differ on the allocation of powers to the chiefs. The BCP which due 
to the 1994 split and formed the ruling faction the Lesotho Congress for Democracy/LCD 
has ever since the late 1950s been seeking to install local authorities that would empower 
the commoners (democratic local governance) contrary to the BNP (GoL Reports, 2000).  
 
As such the second 1970 general elections won by the BCP that was going to cause power 
shift to the commoners were nullified by the government of the day, the BNP that had won 
the 1965 general elections but lost the 1970 one. The BNP immediately suspended the 
constitution to create a centrally one party dictated state, refusing to relinquish power to the 
commoners for democratic rule. This marked the era of dictatorship, exiles, imprisonment 
and unaccounted hundreds of killings on active BCP membership by the oppressive BNP 
regime. The armed para-military unit/PMU (which was named Lesotho Defence Force in 
1980) that the BNP used to commit these acts of violent suppression became so anarchic 
and uncontrollable that it became a competing threat and concern over military order, 
jurisdiction and functions to the army generals who then led it to topple the BNP regime in 
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1986. The military regime introduced the Order No3 of 1986 installing the development 
committees but now with a three-tier structure of village development committees, wards 
and district development committees (GoL, 2000).  
 
International and local civil pressure demanded reinstatement of the democratic rule from 
the military rule. The reinstatement of such resulted in 1993 general elections where the 
BCP won and restored the constitution but now with the new section of 106 that stated that 
“the Parliament shall establish such local authorities as it deems necessary to enable urban 
and rural communities to determine their affairs and to develop themselves. Such authorities 
shall perform such functions as may be conferred by an Act of parliament.” This gave way 
to the 1997 decentralization Act. Despite the hinted constraints to local governance, for 
some prospects’ sake, Lesotho has embarked on the process of decentralization enactment 
since 1997. This process, as is the case in Lesotho, is usually heavily funded by the 
concerned government, the World Bank and African Development Bank. An endorsement 
of decentralisation produced the ambitious 1997 Decentralisation Act and the Lesotho Local 
Development Programme Concept Paper denoting decentralisation process to be followed 
so as to attain development oriented Local Authorities (LAs) in Lesotho. The aim is to 
pursue good governance and developmental goals including the highly embraced Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP) and the Kingdom of Lesotho National Vision of 
2020.  The Vision states that by 2020 the country of Lesotho will be a stable democracy, 
united prosperous peaceful nation together with its neighbours. It will have a healthy and 
well developed human resource-base, strong economy, well managed environment and 
established advancement in technology. The 1997 enactment has been followed by the 
April, 2005 Local Government/LG elections resulting in 128 Community Councils (CCs in 
urban and rural areas) and existence of structures including the Municipal Council/Maseru 
City Council (MCC being piloted as the only municipal in the capital city, Maseru) and the 
District Council (Urban Boards) consisting of membership from both the CCs and the 
chieftaincy in both urban and rural areas, for integration and smooth coordination between 
urban areas, rural areas and traditional authorities/chiefs under the same newly established 
Ministry of Local Government/MLG. The Concept Paper indicates that Local Governance 
system of Lesotho will follow political devolution and decentralization of functions, staff 
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and finances within the framework of a unitary state. The principles of decentralization 
followed include firstly, political decentralization through integration or incorporation of 
some previously centralized or decentralized service sectors into holistic local government 
structures functioning within the framework of the constitution and other national policies. 
This is the devolution of decision making power to the lower government tiers. Secondly, 
financial decentralization in which local governments have powers to pass own budgets 
indicating own priorities, mandatory expenditure to attain national standards, levy local 
taxes as a source of revenue generation for local councils while central government still 
continues to finance through grant system. Thirdly, administrative decentralization in which 
local governments are empowered to recruit, discipline and dismiss own staff. Fourthly, 
changed central-local relations whereby there will be intergovernmental relations with 
central government having overriding constitutional powers with line ministries becoming 
policy-making bodies, capacity-building and supportive, monitoring and quality assurance 
bodies. This embraces forms of decentralization including deconcentration, devolution, 
delegation and privatization (GoL, 2006).  
 
6.0.2 Chieftainship and the Political System of Lesotho 
 
Lesotho is the only constitutional monarchy in southern Africa
10
. Her legislature is 
composed of a bicameral parliament. The National Assembly constitutes the lower house 
of the parliament. It consists of 80 members elected from the constituencies through the 
first-past-the-post electoral model. It also includes the other 40 through proportional 
representation since the 2001 constitutional amendment. The amendment was a response 
to the 1998 general elections political protests and instability that made the country 
ungovernable. The political protests severely destroyed (burning down of properties and 
looting) the economy. They were made by the opposing parties’ unruly membership 
against the Lesotho Congress for Democracy/LCD that had won all the 78 out of 80 seats 
in the parliament. As thus, Lesotho is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy state. The 
executive powers belong to the democratically constituted parliament. The country’s 
                                                
10.  Swaziland is a mixture of this with the absolute monarchy, lately in the last 20 years, unlike in Lesotho where the Parliament and 
the Senate pass laws, the Swazi king is an absolute decision/law maker, customarily titled the ‘Ingwenyama’ (‘the lion’), that is one 
with absolute customary powers.  
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system of governance follows a two tier structure. The one tier is chieftainship and the 
other tier consists of democratically elected representatives some of whom are appointed 
as the executive members. The parliament is made up of two houses of the legislature, the 
Senate/Upper House and the National Assembly/Lower House. The former house serves 
to ratify, modify, delay and/or approve the formulated bills into laws. The latter house 
drafts laws for such approval. Since the 22 principal chiefs form a significant 
membership of the Senate, this has given them an often opportunity to oppose and 
frustrate passing of the new laws for reforms that redistribute their traditional political 
powers to the LGUs. The Prime Minister is appointed from the political party with more 
seats in the parliament. Most of the Ministers are appointed from the National Assembly 
and the few from the Senate. Some of the Ministers are then appointed to form the ruling 
cabinet. The monarch system is in such a way that (22) principal chiefs rule over wards, 
(1200) customary chiefs under the principal chiefs look after demarcated areas in the 
ward with the help of (506) village chiefs/headmen in the communities. Lesotho has 
adopted mixed member proportional model (MMP) before the 2002 general elections. 
This combined the first-past-the-post (FPP) and proportional representation (PR) systems 
(GoL, Reports, 2000-2006).  
 
The change from pure FPP was prompted by the 1998 political riots over its 
exclusiveness in that other parties saw the only one party taking all the seats to have 
rigged the elections. The riots of 1998 caused damage on property worth of more than 
USD200 million. The Southern African Development Community/SADC had to 
intervene militarily using armed forces from the Republic of Botswana and South Africa. 
Protests barred the parliament from opening. Seventy lives were lost. SADC (of which 
Lesotho is a member) forces from Botswana and RSA intervened in the upsurge of 
violence and disorderliness. Then the opposition parties were included through the newly 
formed Interim Political Authority/IPA with the mandate to review constitution with 
regard to the general elections process. This gave birth to an electoral code combining 80 
parliament seats competed for through the first-past-the-post and the proportional 
representation of 40 seats. The National Assembly consists of 120 elected members, 80 
of those through FPP model while 40 are elected through PR model.   The Senate as the 
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upper house has 33 members whose 11 are nominated by the king through the prime 
minister’s advice and State Council. The other membership of 22 from that 33 is 
composed of all the principal chiefs also forming the main part of the royal lineage and 
the traditional structure deployed in the ten administrative districts of the country to head 
the local communities with gazetted chiefs responsible for wards and headmen directly 
for a local community. The 22 principal chiefs also constitute the college of chiefs 
responsible for issues in tradition, chieftaincy, local rule and administration and 
traditional succession appointment of the king to reign. The king is traditionally and 
politically expected to reign
11
 and not to rule
12
. The power of ruling is jointly exercised 
by the chiefs and the elected politicians in the constituencies through the parliament and 
the senate as well as through the LGUs encompassing their representation at the 
community (community council), district (district council) and MCC level. General 
elections since 1993 have been taking place after every legislative period of five years. 
The king is the head of the state while the prime minister is the head of the government 
with the leverage to partake in politics of which the king is restricted. The senate 
scrutinizes the bills from the lower house though this may be bypassed for a royal assent 
for law making (GoL, Reports, 2000-2006).  
 
The senate mainly consists of conservative principal chiefs, this structurally and by 
default, puts chieftaincy as a legal delaying procedural opposition to democratic reforms. 
Power struggle is also created between the two houses, whereby the Parliament seeks 
expedient reforms while the Senate chieftaincy remains conservative seeking to maintain 
the status quo of concentrated traditional-political power on chieftainship. This 
opposition and power struggle will be clearer when dealing with our case study later. The 
22 principal chiefs in the Senate reportedly voted against the passing of the bill for the 
now known as the 1997 decentralization Act. This delayed for a long time turning such a 
bill of 1994 into an Act until just 1997 after several modifications to accommodate the 
interests of severely opposing principal chiefs/’royal senators’. Unlike in the former 
local/village development committees, the new bill did not observe chiefs as automatic 
                                                
11. to hold a royal title and be head of state while possessing only limited (ceremonial) powers, as in a constitutional monarchy. 
Basotho perceive their King just as a symbol of national unity supposedly to be politically neutral in national politics. The college of 
chiefs constitutionally declares the heir along the patriarchal succession lines or the regent but who need not be a male choice.  
12. to exercise sovereign power or a controlling influence over a country, especially to pass laws for a country. 
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chairmen and members of the LGUs. They also had to be elected. Chiefs perceived this 
as a ploy to rip them of (customary representative, decision making) power and as a 
political onslaught to demolish the nation’s tradition.  The government of the day had to 
suspend implementation of this Act in response to protesting public statements and 
pressure by the chiefs compounded by defying opposing pro-chieftaincy BNP political 
party rallies until late in 2005 when elections for LG were held. This was after the bill 
had reconsidered to involve chiefs as ex-officio members as on table 6.1 below but not as 
chairmen of councils. The Parliament deems the Senate as undemocratic and not elected 
by the people and therefore representing no body, having no mandate. The Senate 
perceives the Parliament as ‘bochaba-sere’/the public says-people who are pursuing their 
own political agenda of demolishing customarily collective representative chieftaincy and 
Basotho traditions. Decentralization as one political institutional reform for local 
democratic governance has to take place in societies that have had their traditional ways 
of self-governing. Such a traditional way with the longest history is cultural institutional 
lineage leadership called chieftaincy. Before the influential winds of colonialism, 
democracy and globalization this structural form of leadership used to take the 
responsibilities almost equivalent to that one of the government but in the traditional 
communistic-collective industrious way of rule involving mainly a male-elderly 
consultative style and traditional patriarchal autocracy rather than a very clear capitalistic 
individualistic democratic mode of life. Chieftaincy as traditional authorities therefore 
poses many challenges to DGD. These difficult challenges at times tend to be a conflict 
and competition over any form of power over resources, policy and the communities. 
This chapter is about unearthing these challenges that stand in the way of DGD and 
realizing the validity of the role of chieftaincy as that may help consolidate the success of 
decentralization and prosperity of the local communities in Lesotho (Field Interviews, 
May, 2011 and GoL Reports, 2000-2006).  
 
After becoming a British protectorate in 1868, Lesotho was officially declared a 
sovereign state to enjoy political independence in 1966. The Basotho National Party/BNP 
(customary leadership propagating conservative political party) won the first elections of 
1965 but seized power and suspended the constitution in 1970 refusing to concede after 
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losing the general elections to the Basotho Congress Party/BCP (Commoners’ political 
rule propagating less conservative political party). Undemocratic rule by BNP reigned to 
its internal downfall by its formed military seizing power from 1986 to 1993 after which 
general elections or some democratic rule was restored. Relatively unstable democracy 
with some degree of party inclusiveness through proportional representation has existed. 
The LCD (the currently  dominant party split from the former dominant BCP by floor 
crossing with the founder (Ntsu Mokhehle) of BCP due to internal struggle for party 
control) has still been the dominant political party always winning above 54% of the 
votes (GoL Reports, 2000-2006).  
 
The current political system has resulted in the following table of distribution of chiefs in 
the CCs and DCs as well as councillors countrywide and figure 6.1 below: 
 
Table 7.1: Composition of Community Councils/CCs and Representation of Chiefs in Them 
District Chiefs in 
Community 
Councils 
Composition of 
Community 
Councillors/CCs 
including Chiefs 
District 
Councillors/DCs 
Chiefs in 
District 
Councils 
  Total Male Female   
Leribe 36 219 79 99 38 2 
Berea 19 124 50 54 22 2 
Mafeteng 24 142 58 60 26 2 
Mohale's 
Hoek 
27 172 71 74 30 2 
Quthing 20 124 51 53 22 2 
Qacha's Nek 20 123 47 56 23 2 
Mokhotiong 30 184 74 80 32 2 
Thaba Tseka 23 149 63 63 28 2 
Botha Bothe 20 114 44 52 23 2 
Maseru 30 177 68 82 33 2 
Totals 249 1508 612 679 276 20 
    Source: GoL Reports, 2006 and 2009. 
 
For the first time in 2005, Lesotho had local elections and established local (community 
councils/CCs) and regional or district councils/DCs (provincial) for increased citizen 
participation. Leadership challenges and political party divisions tend to occur in line 
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with certain preferred personalities other than on grounds of policy differences (GoL 
Reports, 2006 and 2009). 
 
Lesotho Local Government Act of 1997 empowers local urban authorities to control 
urban development and provide services which include solid waste management; opening 
and rehabilitation of roads; development control; primary education and public health 
through the local government figure 6.1 below followed by its objectives; 
 
Figure 6.1: Lesotho's Local Government Structure 
       
 
 
 
Source: GoL Reports, 2004. 
 
Objectives of the Lesotho local government include; the provision of a democratic and 
accountable government, the provision of sustainable services and the promotion of 
social and economic development by giving priority to basic community, the promotion 
of the involvement of the community and organizations and individuals in local 
government issue, the enhancement of participation in national and community 
programmes, the combination of the municipality and urban boards which are to be 
combined to the rural and urban areas, thus creating a mechanism which will integrate the 
historically separate parts of economies (GoL Reports, 2006 and 2009). 
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6.2.0 Chieftaincy and Colonialism: 
 
As the colonial era began winding down, pro-independence forces criticised the 
chieftaincy for its accommodationist if not collaborationist policy toward European 
overlords. This was an unfair criticism in that chieftaincy tried and continued to try in 
vain to prevent British and French domination (Esman, 1988 and Miles, 1993). But anti-
chieftaincy criticism had an even deeper source. Pro-independence politicians viewed 
chieftaincy as an anachronistic, retrograde or reactionary force with no place in the 
upcoming ‘new’ independent Africa (with new institutions, new leaders and new 
mentality). Thus chieftaincy was not considered as a serious instrument for progress, 
development or national unity. Other former British colonies tried or even succeeded to 
abolish chieftaincy (Tanzania, Sierra Leone). Some former colonies just expected 
chieftaincy to continue owing loyalty to rulers of the colony-turned-nation 
unquestionably as under colonialism, what differed was just the degree of such loyalty. 
Regardless of individual failures chieftaincy represented a comfortable image of stability, 
continuity and familiarity. As an institution, the chieftaincy also suffered more from 
neglect through colonial non-recognition than any deliberate anti-chieftaincy policy. In 
some regions the French and British just appointed trusted ‘assessors’ as authorities to 
bypass chieftaincy. Assessors acted as intermediaries between locals and colonial 
authorities. Assessors resolved minor disputes, referred more serious (statutory) crimes to 
colonial District Agent. They also provided advice to the colonial agents on sentencing, 
all which was supposed to be done by excluded chieftaincy. Resultantly in such regions 
chieftaincy became discarded in traditional customary life providing other justification 
grounds by pro-independence movements but without clear ideal role in modern times 
(Esman, 1988 and Miles, 1993). 
 
6.2.1 The Validity of an Argument Justifying the Role of the Traditional 
Chieftaincy in modern Decentralized Government for Development/DGD 
 
In the light of the fact that before the advent of colonialism societies traditionally locally 
governed themselves through traditional rulers or chieftaincy, the legacy of this is still 
justified even in the modern DGD era, though chieftaincy’s relevance is debatable. 
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Lesotho is one of the British protectorates which has had traditional leadership before the 
colonial era, continued to preserve and practice this chieftaincy during and after the 
colonial era. The British colonial impact on this leadership has not been exceptional in 
Lesotho. The question then remains in this context, does Lesotho really still need this 
chieftaincy if it tends out to be a formidable structural threat and challenge for power 
struggle particularly in decentralization. Reviewing the related literature in this light 
could help clear the mist between chieftaincy and decentralization in Lesotho. First of all, 
Miles (1993) argues that though paramountcy of chieftaincy was undone by colonial rule, 
it served as important adjuncts (add-on) in the administration of post-colonial 
government in both Africa and Oceania. He argues that chieftaincy is an agent of 
administration on which governments have all come to rely on its assistance in 
development activities. He describes chieftaincy as traditional pre-independence 
governance. Its five modern functions in DGD are (1) linkage/’brokering’ between 
grassroots and capital/central government usually located in the capital city, (2) extension 
of national identity through the conferral of traditional titles, that is the propagation of 
nationality and unity through the awarding of customary honorary prizes, (3) low-level 
conflict resolution and  judicial (legal) gate-keeping. (4) ombudsmanship, (5) institutional 
safety-valve for overloaded and sub-apportioned bureaucracies in DGD. He also argues 
that creation of educated chieftaincy significantly enhances its effectiveness in 
contributing in DGD thus educating traditional leadership translates it to relevant helpful 
backing administration in decentralization. These are discussed further in 6.2.2.1 below. 
 
There is a widespread belief that Western models of administration and socio-economic 
change are not perfect models for the developing societies, whether it be mixed 
government and dual authority. Traditional modes of governance need to be recognized 
for effective administration on the part of national governments. In Africa, mobilization 
(sometimes demobilization) of chieftaincy by governments acceding to independence has 
reflected colonial patterns previously established by European powers. The classic 
contrast is between the French and the British. For example the French incorporated 
pliable chiefs into their own bureaucracy, strictly as executioners of French 
administrative policy or appoint non-royals who demonstrated loyalty to the French cause 
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by prior service where such chieftaincy lacked. But the British conferred greater 
autonomy (sometimes bolstering/boosting it) to chieftaincy within their colonies 
including Lesotho. Stricter adherence to traditional norms of chiefly accession was 
practiced. Resultantly chieftaincy under British colonial rule emerged at independence 
with greater power and authority vis-à-vis national government that did counterparts in 
former French territory.  France and Britain had different ideas about how local 
government should be established. Overall retention of chieftaincy and its use as an agent 
of governance was agreeable to both powers but how much authority should this 
indigenous institution be granted remained an ambiguous issue. French suspected 
chieftaincy to be seeking independence before it is ready to accord it (Esman, 1988 and 
Miles, 1993).   
 
6.2.2 The Role of Chieftaincy in the Era of Democracy/DGD 
 
In this era of global democratization, chieftaincy as a symbol of pre-modern politics and 
non-democratic governance, may still serve as a valuable adjunct to the process of 
development (Miles, 1993).  
 
6.2.2.1 Linkage Role: (‘middleman’ or ‘broker’ role) chieftaincy is instrumental in 
serving as intermediaries between government and populace. 
 
1. Chieftaincy relates with national government on advisory and balanced level but 
sometimes in other places in a directive and coercive manner by governments. 
2. Government leaders rely more and more on chieftaincy for as the appropriate 
mechanism for non-partisan popular exchange.  
3. It is incumbent upon chieftaincy to educate masses as to the direction of 
government developmental policy irregardless of whether the system is 
egalitarian or authoritarian.  
4. The linkage function is generally performed in two ways at grassroots level, 
firstly, is the direct convocation of local chiefs by representatives of the national 
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and/or local government. Secondly it is convocation at national level followed by 
information dissemination down the chieftaincy hierarchy (Ibid). 
6.2.2.2 The Chieftaincy’s function of entitling for national unity:  
 
Conferring of honorary chieftaincy titles on figures of national prominence ‘in 
appreciation of the recipient’s service to the community’ promotes national unity. Such 
entitlement confers local legitimacy on national personalities. It also reinforces local 
community’s or region’s sense of belonging to the wider nation which the honouree 
represents either formally or informally. Bestowing governing commemorative medals to 
model citizens including chiefs (even by universities) is widely acknowledged for its 
nation building symbolism (Esman, 1988 and Miles, 1993). 
6.2.2.3 Traditional rulers are keepers of the peace function: 
 
Chieftaincy helps national governments in maintaining law and order outside the capital 
and other main cities, that is in the rural, otherwise such governments would be hard 
pressed. Police forces are often severely understaffed and lacking in popular support. 
Access to regular courts is often limited, local chiefs are indispensable in resolving low-
level conflicts which would overwhelm meagre police and judicial resources. Chieftaincy 
serve an invaluable role as conflict gatekeepers, prioritizing problems and deciding which 
ones do require outside, higher-level restraint adjudication. At times chiefs’ jurisdiction 
vis-à-vis the police may need to be resolved especially on religious and customary 
disputes. Without chieftaincy hyper litigation and an overtaxing of formal legal 
institutions would be (Miles, 1993). 
6.2.2.4 Chieftaincy helps with the function of tax assessment and taxation: 
 
Where chieftaincy advisory or assessing role as chieftaincy has intimate knowledge of 
constituent’s taxability. Where chieftaincy was used as or associated with fiscal 
oppression or usurpation overall legitimacy becomes in jeopardy. Specialized local 
government services must bear the responsibility of tax collection (Miles, 1993). 
 
 
 177 
6.2.2.5 Functions of the Chief as Ombudsman: 
 
Chiefs have historically served as societal ombudsman in centralized, diffused, and 
segmented systems. Though this needs to be formalized and upgraded it still continues. 
Ombudsman function needs to be distinguished from judicial one; it implies formality 
and sanction imposition while judicial is not. It also needs formal training and systematic 
modernization. But ombudsman-chieftaincy needs to be kept divorced from partisan 
politics and undue administrative interference. The constitution needs to promote it 
(Esman, 1988 and Miles, 1993). 
6.2.2.6 The function of solidarity safety-valve by chieftaincy: 
 
The most important tangible function of chieftaincy is serving as a symbol of community 
solidarity (i.e. ‘father’ or ‘mother’ of the people). ‘Chieftaincy is an institution in which 
the African… places his trust. His legal and constitutional horizon… reaches as far as his 
chief, but not to his capital. For many Africans the chief is still the personification of the 
moral and political order, protection against injustice, evil and calamity (Nieuwaal, 
1987a:23)’. The institutional importance of chieftaincy as a second level of legitimacy 
may not be underestimated. Public agencies simply become overextended, 
overcommitted and overwhelmed and chieftaincy offers a second tier of dual authority, 
i.e. safety-valve, safety-net when formal political and social institutions fail because 
administration functions smoothly only when less is expected of it.  
 
Criticism against traditional rulers assumes them to be ignorant illiterate backward and 
retaining them holds back progress and development. But chiefs are part of the learning 
modern society and are part of wider political business competent elite. The educated 
ones actually find themselves under-utilized. Furthermore the educated ones are usually 
more relevant to the new dynamic development challenges. As such chieftaincy may not 
be anachronistic. It needs to be contemporary, knowledgeable, legitimate, customary, 
communication-channel readily available and be parallel to the government structures 
and respond positively to the changes for maintaining relevance in development 
initiatives (Esman, 1988 and Miles, 1993). 
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6.3.0 Institutional Roles of Chieftaincy 
 
In the run-up to independence, the colonial authorities envisioned a continuing role for 
chieftaincy after their departure. Chieftaincy thus retained control of local government as 
head of the Native Authority/later Native Administrative structure. Royalty were often 
elected to respective Houses of Assembly, and to the national House of Assembly though 
were not guaranteed representation at these levels. Some countries introduced the House 
of Chiefs with more powers but with some equivalence to the British House of Lords. 
Military coups and constitutional changes reduced powers of chieftaincy at local levels 
introducing elected leadership (e.g. chairmanship of councils), native 
authorities/traditional authorities with reduced powers with basic functions like advisory 
to local government and government in general, responsibility for tax collection, religious 
matters, customary law, arts and culture and chieftaincy matters. As a result the 
chieftaincy lacked executive power and remained periodically lobbying for more powers. 
By the end of the colonial era, in French colonies chieftaincy was relied upon as the best 
counterweight to more radical progressive nationalist leaders despite the initial strategy 
of ‘crush and destroy’. France had no chiefs and understood postcolonial administration 
and government to be modelled on the metropolitan model. Thus French colonialists put 
little stock on chieftaincy and its associations as an authoritative group (Miles, 1993).  
 
However, chieftaincy represented a utilitarian institution
13
 whose worth lay in its 
contribution to nation’s development efforts. Other than parties and military inspiring 
more fear, it enthusiastically remained the most viable mechanism for directing and 
mobilizing the masses thus providing linkage function between the policymakers in 
capital and villagers throughout countryside for non-democratic development. Oftentimes 
when electoral democracy/multi-party system developed, chieftaincy experienced under 
representation and difficult proper role redefining moment as it condoned non-
egalitarianism during   colonialism (Esman, 1988 and Miles, 1993). 
 
                                                
13.
   That is an institution left primarily for practical use rather than its beauty or relevance in DGD. 
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6.4.0 Relations between Democratic Local Authorities and Chieftaincy in 
Lesotho 
 
This portion will be dealt with through the historical and the contemporary perspective. 
Historically, it can be reiterated that in the pre-colonial era, Basotho had no experience of 
popularly elected democratic local authorities. All powers were vested with chiefs 
assisted by advisors. Chieftaincy administered the tribal territory for the welfare and good 
governance of society. The tribe was consulted on decisions made and developmental 
issues affecting their communities through ‘lipitso’/public meetings. Then during the 
colonial period, District Commissioners were introduced and took over most of the 
administrative powers of the chiefs.  The central government established a local National 
Treasury into which revenues through fines imposed for example on stray animals, 
‘matsema’ levy/levy on working schemes/groups, and others were paid. This arrangement 
denied and deprived chiefs of resources to undertake development activities of any 
significance. The District Commissioners also reduced the number of chiefs through the 
system of ‘gazetting’ chiefs. That is considering a chief to be one only on the length of 
service as a chief and the size of the population of his tribe (GoL, Reports, 1995).  
 
Nonetheless, before independence, a form of local government was introduced by the 
colonial government in 1959 with the establishment of District Councils. These were 
elected by the people and their functions included overseeing agricultural, commercial, 
educational and other developments at the local level. The Principal Chiefs were the 
presidents of these District Councils. Though still subject to some measure of central 
control, these bodies encouraged popular participation at the local level and were 
instrumental in the economic development of the country. The District Councils received 
a certain though inadequate amount of money from the central government. This 
structure of local government is the one that was abolished in 1968 by the Basotho 
National Party government that perceived itself not deserving to coexist with the 
democratic local government institutions dominated by membership of an opposition 
party, the Basotho Congress Party (GoL Reports, 1995). 
 
 180 
The contemporary perspective on relations between democratic local authorities and 
chieftaincy begins after independence. This is the period when the Chieftainship Act No. 
22 of 1968 was introduced to regulate the administration of chiefs, their discipline, duties 
and powers. The Principal Chief recommended to the minister the gazetting and 
appointment of a chief. Chiefs’ functions remained the same, that was the good 
governance of their territories and land allocation, until the latter function was revoked 
with the establishment of Development Councils. The military regime resuscitated Local 
Authorities in 1986 in the form of Development Councils at village, ward and district 
levels. Village Development Councils have thus incidentally been in every village with a 
gazetted chief and the term of office of members used to be three years. The chief soon 
lost the legal power to be the automatic official chairman but had to be elected to be the 
chairperson or remain then as an ex-officio member. The Basotho National Party legacy 
(1970-1985 dictatorship) used to put a chief as an automatic chairman but when the 
military regime (toppling Basotho National Party in 1986) critical of chieftaincy 
somehow, stripped them of such legal power to making them ex-officio members. 
Chieftaincy was being blamed for widespread corruption and suppression. The chairman 
of the Village Development Council (VDCs) was elected by members. VDCs’ functions 
were to promote development and community participation in development projects and 
to allocate land.  The Ward Development Council acted as a link between the VDCs and 
the District Development Council, collating projects from the former and communicating 
them to the latter. The District Development Council considered projects and promoted 
development for the general welfare of the people in that district. It was supposed to 
control a development fund and derived revenue from grazing fees but Basotho resisted 
this effectively to its failure stating that the military regime never created enough jobs or 
improved any pastures to impose grazing fees/tax. The central government paid sitting 
allowances to members of Ward Development Councils and District Development 
Councils while VDCs were voluntary. Reportedly, there were 8,000 VDCs, 24 Ward 
Development Councils and 10 District Development Councils. These bodies were largely 
ineffective and their calibre of membership personnel in terms of competency, quality, 
qualifications and skills left much to be desired. They could therefore as structures not be 
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maintained as they were in the then to be the new incoming Local Government of 
1997/98 (GoL Reports 1997 and 1998). 
 
The chieftaincy also promoted development projects, acted as a link between the central 
government and the community and are still responsible for the maintenance of law and 
order. They shared the responsibility of land allocation with their Village Development 
Councils as ex-officio members. Chiefs are still being blamed for corruption of 
backdating land allocations to periods when they were only legally entitled to doing so to 
get bribes. This used to create a conflict between the Councils and chiefs who wanted to 
continue operating illegally and frustrate the task of land allocation by the Councils (GoL 
Reports 1997 and 1998).                   
 
6.5.0 Role of Chieftaincy and its constraints in decentralized system of 
Lesotho 
 
Chieftaincy has been accommodated in the latest adopted local governance mainly for an 
advisory role and for the sake of maintaining peace and stability, both locally and 
nationally. Incorporation of chieftaincy into this new local governance is meant to 
harmonize traditional structures with the modern democratic systems so that there is no 
parallel structure to democratic local government (GoL Reports 1997 and 1998). 
 
New administrative geographical boundaries for including chiefs in the LGUs had to be 
done. The purpose was to promote ease of access to developmental services. Boundaries 
were determined on the basis of communications infrastructure, human geography, 
population features, economic activities and resource base. The College of Chiefs (22 
principal chiefs) has the responsibility of selecting chiefs to serve in the capacity of ex-
officio members in the new local authorities. There is still a big challenge on how to 
integrate traditional authorities into the democratic system of local governance. The 
College of Chiefs is still given the responsibility of finding out how best to incorporate 
chieftaincy in the new local governance and democracy (GoL Reports 1995 and 1997).            
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Chieftaincy perceives itself as non-partisan to political parties and thus appropriate for 
facilitating and delivering services and development in a just manner while Local 
Authorities are biased officials representing only a particular political party’s interests 
and are therefore likely going to distribute development benefits, information and 
opportunities along political inclinations. The chiefs see themselves to be more legitimate 
than the party representatives and represent the entire communities and not its parts. 
Local Authorities view chiefs as political affiliates to the BNP, having no public mandate 
as they are not elected representatives and not answerable to anyone. Some ordinary 
people still perceive chiefs as custodians of law and security providers to the vulnerable 
community sectors like the widows, orphans and so on at village level. Chiefs still reduce 
hyper litigation in that they preside and judge over ‘petty’ offenses and pass serious 
criminal offenses to courts of law or the police for action. They are thus seen as the 
extension of the devolved customary judiciary for peace and stability maintenance. 
Chieftaincy sees itself as representing the identity of the people of Lesotho including the 
politicians and that democracy is an imported system alien to the people (Field 
Interviews/Survey, 2009).         
 
It is necessary to have the right institutional arrangements and a clear line between 
administrative and developmental responsibilities if decentralization is to succeed in 
Lesotho. The chieftaincy opposing decentralization comprises almost the entire 
membership of the Senate house. This institutional arrangement poses a retarding effect 
on the process and efforts of decentralization. It somehow empowers traditional 
opposition against democracy. Hence the continuity of the tug-of-war between the 
Parliament (elected ‘subjects’) and the senate (appointed ‘royals’) in terms of power, 
roles and functions. The parliament has managed to influence local personnel, Local 
Authorities and some chiefs of the importance of decentralization. Furthermore, local 
administration is still greatly effected through chieftaincy while development issues are 
left for the councillors at the community level, urban boards in urban areas and district 
level and the Maseru City Councils as the municipal established in 1983 for the capital 
city only.  This optimistic tendency of self-competing or unclear division of power 
between the opposing institutions in action has maintained chieftaincy well against 
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decentralization for decades in the form of the dictatorial ruling and opposing Basotho 
National Party, Senators (law-making/approving structure) and grass root administrators. 
They have at some point been automatic chairpersons of Village Development Councils, 
that is before 1994 during the military rule of 1986. They have also become ex-officio 
members of the councils. Unfortunately, integrating them anyhow has maintained them 
as a formidable force opposing the smooth operation of decentralized governance. In 
defiance of the law of decentralization chiefs continued to allocate land because they felt 
stripped of ‘birth’ powers to rule and perform their duties. This created tensions between 
chieftaincy and the Ministry of Local Government overseeing decentralization. The 
ministry took many of them to court and were found guilty. This tended to belittle chiefs 
further as they form part of the customary judiciary. Basically chiefs find decentralization 
to be a mechanism of allowing unworthy ‘commoners’ to rule them as the worthy royal 
clergy/elite. The tug-of-war of competition over control and power has actually affected 
some development initiatives at the local, district and urban level. The central 
government is not able to intervene except where clear human rights have been offended. 
In cases where the government intervened, it uses arbitration when it is supposed to 
promote citizen diplomacy so that communities can solve their own problems. Exerting 
authority by local councils is also put under check by the territorial boundaries 
demarcated on the basis of chiefs’ wards that resist the new authority of local 
governance. The power, responsibilities and functions or roles and activities still 
allocated to chieftaincy and local authorities has and can continue to frustrate all 
development efforts at the local levels (GoL Reports, 1997 and Shale, 2004).                
 
Concisely, chiefs constrain effective decentralization by illegal actions of backdating land 
allocation documents known as Form Cs for accessing lease titles to a period prior to 
1979. The passed 1979 Land Act effectively curtails their unilateral powers in doing so, 
which they so much cling to and love as affirmed by the many cases in the courts of law. 
LGUs encompassing chiefs are now supposed to legitimately exercise this power. The 
extension of the frustration has been severely constraining where in the courts of law 
councils/LGUs have lost cases to chiefs who on grounds of lack of clear regulatory 
specifications (on ‘burial grounds’ control) chiefs offered written permission to bereaved 
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families to bury their deceased on plots also used for residency other than in cemeteries. 
Furthermore, chiefs still continue to solely control other natural resources like grazing 
lands and thatching grass, firewood, medicinal plants and natural springs which are 
important to the survival of many ordinary Basotho. They informally collect user fees, 
penalties and fines on these resources but these resources usually require further 
participatory developmental initiatives for sustainable and equitable use and can be 
instrumental for the currently lacking financial capacity of the LGUs particularly the CCs 
still without any bank accounts and income sources. By-laws clearly redistributing 
powers on this control of these resources are not yet in place though such powers are also 
given to the LGUs by the 1997 LG Act. Chiefs also maintain their non-compliance with 
LGUs’ passed resolutions though are represented in these councils. They blame this on 
the lack of timely feedback from their representatives in the councils. The 1997 LG Act is 
also unclear or silent on such matters of accounting/reporting, answerability, effective 
coordination and timely efficient dissemination of information or passed decisions. This 
renders local governance ineffective as also compounded by the fact that chieftaincy is a 
nested hierarchy (‘red tape’) whereby a chief reports only to his/her next immediate 
superior chief and other chiefs in the area of jurisdiction, unbound to report beyond that. 
This delays information flow or effecting of passed resolutions, stifles effective 
coordination and delivery in DGD (Field Interviews/Survey, 2009).  
 
Chiefs striving for power to control resources and monies for use of such resources have 
also been able to maintain poor non-cooperative relations with councils expressly 
claiming that councillors seem to ‘lack knowledge of the limits of their work and infringe 
on the functions of the chiefs, in fact councillors behave as if they are chiefs and no 
longer listen to the chiefs.’ This attitude portrays a clear contestation for power by the 
chiefs as they also expressly state that offices of the councils are closed at 4:30 p.m. 
forcing people to come to them for needed emergency services (e.g. 
recommendary/referencing letters and permits/affidavits). Yet such councillors are better 
paid (R1,000/month) than them (R400/month) who serve people round the clock. Chiefs 
therefore resist LGUs stating that LGUs are a form of discrimination against them by the 
central government. Chiefs have also expressed that the central government has not 
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‘informed’ them of what LG is and its functions, not to talk of their uninformed subjects 
who continue coming to them for services ‘probably’ supposed to be given by the LGUs. 
As such chiefs continue to deny and deprive LGUs of the little potential for effective 
decentralization and local development delivery (Field interviews, May, 2011).             
 
Political struggle between chieftaincy and local authorities may escalate. Most of the 
functions of the local authorities to be discussed later here, are by themselves causes of 
conflictual power struggle as some of them have been traditionally the domain of the 
chiefs. The chiefs fear the loss of the functions and power to local authorities. They 
therefore attempt to cling to power by illegally continuing to perform such tasks and 
frustrate local authorities’ efforts by non-cooperation in community mobilization in 
which they are essential. The functions of the local authorities are also limited still 
leaving a need for the central government to keep on performing other functions not done 
by the councils due to lacking in capacity. The decentralization law of Lesotho does not 
clearly indicate the implications of the decentralized functions in terms of how the local 
authorities will relate to their central government in implementing such functions. It 
simply states that local authorities will control natural resources and environmental 
protection without differentiating different types of natural resources stipulating ones to 
remain with the central government. Confusion and duplication of efforts thus happen to 
be incidental where the central government repeats the tasks performed by authorities in a 
locality. Spelling out how the various sectors of the central government will relate and be 
involved at the local level has become critically needed to prevent confusion and 
duplication of efforts. The central government needs to also be clear and decisive on the 
definite allocation of powers on administrative and developmental roles competed for by 
the chieftaincy and the local authorities. The challenge is how do local authorities 
mobilize and maintain peoples’ participation, plan and implement development without 
the administrative or leadership power. At times for development to take place as already 
indicated it may require both soft and hard approaches. This is intrinsically valuable from 
the thrust of Lesotho’s decentralization purported to promote socio-economic welfare of 
all citizens aiming at service delivery and good governance/popular participation. This 
service delivery/development and good local governance comprise objectives and roles 
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and functions already indicated and set within the 1997 Local Government Act and 1998 
Government Elections Act on local authorities elections encompassing objectives such as 
to provide for good governance, ownership and accountability in matters of public policy, 
-to facilitate democratic control over the development planning process, -to move 
decision-making, resource allocation and local level development planning into the hands 
of the people, -to provide for the equitable distribution of human, institutional, 
infrastructural and financial resources across the country, - to enhance the effectiveness 
of developmental activities by creating opportunities for elimination or reduction of 
duplication in development efforts, - to facilitate sustainability through matching 
development decision with local conditions, - to facilitate greater speed and flexibility of 
decision making as a result of reduced central direction and control, - and to facilitate 
mobilization and maximization of local resources, technologies and skill. Besides these 
objectives, the roles and functions of the local authorities include; control of natural 
resources and environmental protection, public health, land/site allocation, grazing 
control, allocation of burial grounds, control of building permits, local administration of 
central regulations and licenses, care of mothers, young children, the aged and integration 
of people with disabilities, mortuaries, burial of bodies of destitute persons and 
unclaimed bodies and forestry preservation and improvement of designated forests in 
local authority areas (Ministry of Local Government/MLG, 2003:2 and Shale, 2004).             
 
6.5.0.1 Measurement of the Role and Constraints of Chieftaincy in Lesotho’s  
Decentralization!
 
On the basis of the in-depth interviews conducted in this study, it is also ideal to have a 
view of the measure of the role of chieftaincy in Lesotho’s decentralization and the 
concerned cultural-institutional constraints against its development-delivery. This in itself 
provides a further analysis of the relationship existing between LGUs and the local 
customary leadership. The involvement of chiefs in LG encompasses their traditional and 
statutory functions. Some of these functions are both statutory and traditional as also 
stipulated by the law. Others are regarded as primary or secondary as weighed against the 
traditional local needs and the law. Appendix B analytically helps us to comprehend the 
extent of the involvement of chiefs in decentralization as examined by the councillors and 
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the LGUs’ personnel. Chiefs’ role includes (1) traditional and customary affairs (e.g. 
traditional decision making in chieftaincy succession and fixed assets inheritance and 
disputes solving among family/community members), (2) mobilizing and linking the 
local community even for political-developmental participation or public health issues, 
(3) being represented in LG and incorporated into LG civil service, (4) performing 
judicial functions, (5) forming political structures like the Senate and the College of 
Chiefs to overseer the monarch system, (6) providing social protection and safety 
particularly for the vulnerable and the local community at large, (7) keeping of law and 
order, resolve conflicts in the community, (8) keeping records of births and deaths to 
facilitate legal certification of such, including traditional marriages (lobola/bridal 
payments documenting), (9) providing authentic information concerning legalization and 
issuing of documentation affirming citizenship (for passport or identity documents 
issuing/referencing for access of legal guns for individual commercial projects), (10) 
facilitating developmental services delivery, (11) keeping census of owned livestock as 
well as licensing livestock sales, (12) issuing official documentation affirming socio-
economic-customary transactions among community/families’ members and ownership 
and sale of other assets and resources, (13) issuing community entry permits and letters 
of migration as well as (permissions) allowing of (public/private-family) functions 
(burials, ceremonies, feasts, groupings/gatherings, weddings e.t.c.), (14) participating in 
burial ceremonies of the locals and (15) in controlling access to, use and allocation of 
resources (land, quarries/stones/soil use/vegetation use, sand, springs, community forests 
e.t.c.) (Field interviews, May, 2011 and the Act of 1968). 
 
Councillors and LGUs’ staff have also reported and prioritized these following 
constraints to do with chieftaincy in decentralization, (1) chiefs resist relinquishing the 
power of control even against new laws redistributing rights of resources’ allocation for 
fear of loss of power and private rewards they used to gain. This creates confusion, 
conflicts and competition over resources’ use and control and hampers development 
delivery in LG. (2) Chiefs view councillors as political instruments of division in 
communities seeking to commoditize resources that are customarily communally owned 
and controlled for unfair money making from the poor and therefore canvass and 
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mobilize some community members against decentralization activities, thus destabilizing 
councillors’ consultative gatherings and LG’s progress. (3) Chiefs perceive councillors as 
rival leaders of contesting packs for their traditional power over licensing/permits of 
access/use, ownership and control of resources like land, grasslands and thatching grass, 
sand, quarrying of building stones, communal forests, graveyards and others, including 
certification of livestock and property ownership and permits on their sales and authority 
on issuing of various permits.  (4) In cases where the chief is not in support of 
decentralization and/or some council members, such mobilization is not done deliberately 
to sabotage the council’s programmes. Councillors do not yet have powers to call public 
gatherings. (5) LG’s information dissemination among the chiefs is limited and very 
slowly. This keeps other communities unaware and not conscientized of the other 
activities resulting in vandalizing of some activities like parks or hand pumps. (6) Low 
education of most of the chiefs hinders their effective participation in LGUs’ decision 
making processes as some literacy level is essential for digesting various reports at times 
even written in English. (7) Chieftaincy lack sufficient knowledge of law, Acts and 
regulations. This hinders LGUs in the delivery of justice resulting in overloaded 
centralized judiciary system. (8) Chieftaincy has often acted as a political opposition 
through its political structures blocking political decentralization bills meant to empower 
local communities in the management of their development affairs for a reason that they 
view decentralization as a way of destroying chieftaincy to give too much power to the 
politicians who are their subjects or commoners. (9) Chiefs have often been blamed for 
corruption in their dealings like abducting fields supposed to be inherited by widows or 
orphans, apportioning resources already allocated for bribes, usurping developmental 
services like public hand pumps for personal gain, favouritism, nepotism and biases. This 
ultimately stifled needed community driven development and continues to do so in 
decentralization. The main problem is that most of the locals are still traditional and thus 
mainly use chiefs instead of LGUs. (10) Some old legal boundaries of areas under the 
chiefs’ jurisdiction are criss-crossed by new LG wards confusing local administration and 
management of local affairs. This has rendered LG ineffective as most of the locals are 
still familiar with chieftaincy (Field interviews, May, 2011 and Appendix B). 
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6.6.0    Summary 
 
The role of community mobilization or participatory processes in Lesotho is still 
traditionally left with the customary leadership, chieftaincy. Many of such crucial roles of 
peace and stability keeping, community organization, information dissemination and 
others indicated are still traditionally in the hands of the chiefs. However, there is a need 
to train and increase the capacity of chieftaincy to be able to cope with and be part of 
democratic changes. Such changes involving redistribution of powers in resources control 
for local development need to be inclusive of chiefs for power sharing and alleviation of 
fears of power loss to the LGUs. Most importantly chieftaincy is crucial for social and 
customary functions as well as economic ones including information provision for tax 
assessment and coordination between the central government and local communities at 
rather lowest costs and little equipment, unlike with more costly LGUs. Their functioning 
as a supplementary body to LGUs for poverty alleviation can create room for cost-
effectiveness and traditional voluntarism for functions like community’s safety keeping, 
solidarity, law and order and other social functions that councillors may limitedly do. It is 
often easier to facilitate and maintain participatory development with the inclusive 
approaches even on indigenous structures while strategically introducing participatory 
reforms for the better quality of life in local communities. Professional/expertise (elite 
interaction) rule encompassed by LG and indigenous rule by chieftaincy usually need 
each other to overcome their limitations in development delivery.   
 
The role conflict between the chiefs and the LGUs, besides power struggle between the 
two, over resources and community’s control, is further perpetuated by the lack of clear 
regulations stipulating how both the chiefs and LGUs should exercise their duties and 
functions. The striking observation is that in section 6(1) and 7 of the Chieftainship Act 
of 1968, duties and functions number 2 and 3 state that chiefs are too to serve the people 
in the areas of their authority and promote the welfare and lawful interests of people 
within their jurisdiction. These functions are extremely broad and easily (thus conflictual) 
entail all the functions of the local authorities enacted by the amended local government 
Act of 1997. The former Act is the chiefs’ product heaping all power on them through 
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their BNP rule; the latter Act contrarily attempts to redistribute such power to the 
commoners but without sufficient clear redistributive regulations.     
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CHAPTER SEVEN: LESOTHO’S DECENTRALIZATION POLICY NATURE 
 
7.0  General Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to debate both the secondary and the field findings on the 
main features of the new local government legislation of Lesotho. The chapter focuses on 
the policy aspects of devolution of powers and more on issues of efficiency and 
effectiveness in the adoption or implementation of the decentralization policy for 
development delivery in this country. It is mainly about the nature of LG in Lesotho. It 
focuses on the relations within the LG and administrative efficiency issues in its adoption 
for political-development delivery. The contextual aspects to this effort necessitate 
discussion of how efficiently management of decentralization was done in Lesotho, how 
is the participation planned though more of the actual examination of citizen-participation 
by the insiders (beneficiary-assessment) for more details will be in the next chapter. 
Issues on the nature and devolution aspects of the LG policy are included and synthesized 
with some expository analysis of constraints to LG’s development delivery in Lesotho.  
 
The chapter argues that Lesotho’s decentralization policy nature suffers from imbalanced 
power relations, that is recentralization by the central government instead of effective and 
efficient power devolution for local poverty reduction. It also argues that such 
recentralization has foiled possible efficient and effective adoption of decentralization for 
successful socio-economic-political development in Lesotho. The chapter’s expository 
analysis together with the next chapter as part three of the thesis, affirm further the 
study’s argument that decentralization in Lesotho has had constraints that negatively 
affected and/or impeded its efficient implementation process and hence its local 
development delivery.  
 
The main task will be to pragmatically apply and synthesize the theoretical framework 
for assessing decentralization efficiency and effectiveness in Lesotho. Such framework 
has been discussed in chapter 4. The application will cover (1) the actual nature of 
Lesotho’s decentralization: approach and adoption efficiency, (2) demonstration of 
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political commitment and leadership support in Lesotho, (3) the clear promulgation of 
legal framework for jurisdiction? (4) devices for LGUs’ monies and procedural 
monitoring, (5) availability of competent staff for LG’s efficiency in Lesotho, (6) 
management procedures for coordination for LG’s efficiency in Lesotho, (7) 
technological instruments for policy execution as Lesotho’s LG efficiency? (8) efficient 
fiscal and administrative devolution for Lesotho’s LG efficiency, (9) Lesotho’s 
decentralization participation indicators, (10) and indicators for efficient preparedness for 
participatory local democracy, (11) answerability/accountability and responsiveness of 
LGUs in Lesotho, (12) elections and representation as LG’s efficiency and competences 
of LGUs in Lesotho as well as substance of powers and the nature of LG’s devolution in 
Lesotho. 
 
7.0.1  Real Nature of Lesotho’s Decentralization: Approach and Adoption 
Efficiency 
 
After providing some critical historical evolutionary and structural nature (chapter 5 and 
6) of Lesotho’s decentralization and its efficiency theoretical framework in chapter 4, 
here below such an analytical framework is applied in the context of Lesotho. The 
analysis uses decentralization efficiency indicators grouped in three efficiency and three 
participation indicators. The segment for every indicator consists of three parts. The 
following lessons considering efficiency indicators indicated in chapter 4 within the 
management of the decentralization at the centre may be learned; 
 
7.0.2 Demonstration of Political Commitment and Leadership Support in 
Lesotho 
 
The MLG as the line ministry responsible played a pinnacle role in the creation of the 
decentralization policy process. The first undertaking was to launch this ministry in 1994. 
This was in line with the 1993 constitution that provided for the formulation of LGUs. 
The Inter-Ministerial Task Force was built up to actually finalize this task in 2002. This 
task force produced responsibilities of the central government in the decentralization 
process which included; (1) development of national policies and establishment of 
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standards for Local Councils in their community development endeavours; (2) 
monitoring of local authority work regarding its alignment with national plans and 
policies; (3) support of local authorities with funding and expertise; (4) make local 
authorities to be accepted as creditable agencies of development; (5) and decentralization 
of some of central government functions and responsibilities to the local authorities. The 
task force outlined the responsibilities of the Minister of Local Government as (i) 
establishment and facilitation of the functioning of local government authorities; (ii) 
assisting local authorities to lead the communities effectively in development; and (iii) 
coordination of policies between the two levels of government. The main aspects like 
provision of financial resources, setting of standards and the devolution of functions were 
left as the central government activities. MLG’s first responsibility obviously implies the 
leadership and coordination role to the minister of LG. The Inter-Ministerial Task Force 
appointment by the Cabinet meant its support for the decentralization process. The 
central government also integrated decentralization objectives into an overall 
development strategy in documents like Poverty Reduction Strategy and others which 
were compiled by one of the key ministries in decentralization for developmental 
implementation being the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP). 
Nonetheless, the inter-ministerial cooperation between MLG and MFDP, was not 
efficient because a joint working group (Fiscal Decentralization Task Team) given the 
task of determining fiscal aspects, never operationalized such fiscal aspects. Resultantly 
there became no coordinated and coherent strategy of fiscal devolution consented upon. 
This is often a huge constraint against efficient implementation of decentralization for 
development-delivery in many African countries. Nonetheless, MLG demonstrated great 
determination by preparing and implementing LG elections against severe criticism and 
political opposition (GoL, 2004:19-21 and Pfeiffer et al, 2005).     
 
7.0.3 Clear Promulgation of Legal Framework for Jurisdiction 
 
The efficiency framework analysis (chapter 4) has indicated that the central government 
of Lesotho has to provide a clear regulatory framework if decentralization in Lesotho is 
to effect development delivery successfully. Among the roles identified, the central 
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government had to provide national standards and regulations as one of its primary tasks. 
LG Act provides the legal foundation for LG’s launching and functions’ devolution.  It 
explains the structural formulation of LGUs and the manner in which they ought to 
function. The first main flaw, though, is with the lack of thorough explanation of the 
functions of CCs and DCs. They are hardly comprehensible. Secondly, officially 
recognized competences are inadequate. Public administrative skills without employment 
of civil works/technical skills the local level has provided an incomplete recipe generated 
by the short-sightedness of the legal framework. There may be no delivery as is and will 
remain the case. CCs and DCSs frankly may not know how to do everything. Plans 
become obsolete with backlogs waiting for the technical personnel only rarely limitedly 
available from the DA’s office. Thirdly, execution of all those inadequately stipulated 
functions need several complementary regulations with legal amendments, for instance, 
general financial regulations and accounting procedures for LGUs. There is also some 
confusion and conflict with regard to certain policy areas where functions still legally 
remain in the control of other central ministries yet also legally allocated to LGUs. This 
requires legal adjustments to consider decentralization and LG’s role. The LG Act in 
section 95 contains an unhelpful general clause stating that provisions of the LG Act 
prevail over other laws in the event of inconsistencies or conflicts. This is in LG Act and 
not in the un-amended Acts for Environment, Agric and Food Security and Works 
ministries which seemingly happen to be conflicting over the same roles with LG. That is 
interrelations of legal procedures and the adequate timing of measures tend to be ignored. 
As such it is difficult to recognize, in this context, a thorough and clear regulatory 
framework for smooth coordination of procedures preparing the legal ground for the 
decentralization process and therefore there is no clear legal separation of functions, 
except duplication, confusion and conflicts. For instance, financial regulations for LG 
were fashioned in the MLG without involving MFDP responsible for state finances and 
public sector reform (LG Act, 1997 and Pfeiffer et al, 2005:8). 
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7.0.4 Devices for LGUs’ Monies and Procedural Monitoring 
 
Mechanisms for financial and technical monitoring of LG constitute important criteria for 
efficiency in decentralization as indicated in the theoretical framework in chapter 4. The 
observation made is that the LG Act inaugurates a number of control measures for the 
LGUs in Lesotho. It is important that the Act maintains some degree of supervision on 
the LGUs by the central government together with some stipulated and sizable self-
regulating and autonomy for effective local development-delivery. Such a balance is not 
readily observable in the 1996 LG Act and the 2004 amended LG Act. If not re-
centralization expansion or centralization solidification the portrayed picture is 
deconcentration with the same effect. The amended LG Act still empowers the LG’s 
minister to: 
• declare Community Council areas (Section 3; 83); 
• ensure conformity of District Development Plans to the National Plan through the 
District Planning Unit (Section 30); 
• amend by regulation the schedules of the act (referring to the functions of local 
authorities; Section 32); 
• stop local government by-laws from becoming effective through rejection of 
approval without the obligation to give reasons (Section 44); (this is recentralizing) 
• review regularly statements of receipts and disbursements on the communities’ bank 
accounts (Section 51; 60); 
• limit the borrowing of Councils and reject borrowing that exceeds the total CC 
income of the preceding two years (Section 52); (incapacitating and recentralizing) 
• regulate powers of local authorities to impose and levy rates and to publish a list of 
items that can be subject to taxes or service charges(Section 56; 57); 
• implement audits once a year and an extraordinary audit whenever the Minister 
wishes (Section 63); 
• suspend Councillors, to dissolve the Council after inquiry procedures and to appoint 
an administrator to a Council in case of refusal, failure or inability of the institution 
(Section 65); 
• make rules of procedure for guidance of Councils (Section 66); 
• appoint a Local Government Service Commission and through this Commission a 
Local Government Service Tribunal (Section 75); and 
• make any regulations giving effect to principles and provisions of the LG Act 
(Section 84). 
 
The above absolute authorizations by the minister serve as one form of institutional 
constraints to local self-administration as they stand from the LG Act. They are not 
mechanisms for monitoring LGUs’ monies and procedures but are unchallengeable 
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over-controlling (recentralizing instead of allowing them to monitor) mechanisms by the 
political minister who may act on will and at whim without any 
accountability/answerability. This affirms the argument that Lesotho’s decentralization 
policy nature suffers from imbalanced power relations, that is recentralization by the 
central government instead of effective and efficient power devolution for local poverty 
reduction. Clearly, such recentralization foils possible efficient and effective adoption of 
decentralization for successful socio-economic-political development. So far, the minister 
has never wished conducting of any audit in the LGUs; the above law empowers and 
allows this. The observable trend with Lesotho’s decentralization is that it is not about 
devolution but about control and domination of the grassroot masses. Most importantly it 
is not about development delivery but about political power only. According to the field-
interviews with Councillors (May, 2010) such power is concentrated at the ministerial 
level as shown (figure 7.1) below, entrenched by the cultural proverb and philosophy that 
‘the law (power of control) begins at the higher house to the lower house’, contrary to 
local democratic empowerment; 
 
Figure7.1: Concentration and Distribution of Power in Lesotho's LG 
 
Source: Field-Interviews with Councillors and Staff, May to December, 2010. 
 
The Cabinet with the MLG’s minister passes all 
administrative, political and resources use and allocation 
decisions in LGUs as if lower government tiers are their 
subordinate loyal integral structure. 
DCs, CCs and personnel are functionally 
clumped together as one 
consultative/advisory and top-down 
instructions implementing body. 
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Reportedly, instead of ensuring reasonable utilization of public funds in LGUs, senior 
politicians are the ones with severe unprecedented financial procedural malpractices with 
great impunity. The minister is not there to effect, facilitate or monitor political, 
administrative and financial devolution as observable from above legal clauses. The 
minister is to counter-act such a process ‘legally’. Essentially all the ‘leviathan-power’ of 
centrality taking all initiativeness upon oneself as the central, including formulating LG 
policies, approving or rejecting them has left locals/LGUs helplessly out there as neither 
policy formulators nor implementers, not talking of monitoring or evaluating. They only 
gather in councils to play a passive consultative role. Too much controlling power is 
vested upon the MLG’s minister. Financial and technical monitoring parameters and 
procedures are missing; instead the controlling recentralizing mechanisms are in place 
ensuring non-delivery and failure of Lesotho’s decentralization. The efficiency indicator 
of financial and procedures monitoring is missed by the LG Act in this decentralization. 
The legal nature of this decentralization is self-defeating with regard to development-
delivery and/or local empowerment by vesting unchallengeable powers on the minister 
(Thomi, 2002, Pfeiffer et al 2005 and Field-Interviews with Councillors and Staff, May to 
December, 2010).       
 
Furthermore, in the list of central government responsibilities indicated in the framework, 
the function of LG supervision in relation to monitoring of financial procedures is not 
priority task. Issues of concern on macroeconomic destabilization through fiscal 
decentralization are not addressed in the revised government documents. It is difficult to 
assess the effectiveness of the local government control mechanisms in this context. 
LGUs simply gradually assume their functions, they only had own heavy-handedly 
controlled from the top own budgets in 2006. That was when only the administrative staff 
was just recruited. The implementation of supervision and control through the MLG is 
above all constrained by the ministry’s own failure to timely produce the necessary 
regulations for LGUs. It was only in June 2006 that the Fiscal Decentralization Task 
Team decided which financial regulations would be applied for the LGUs. Such 
regulations are not known by the senior LGU’s staff and council members, safe to say 
they think and do express non-existence of such regulations as will be confirmed by more 
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primary data in the next chapter. The failure of the MLG to setup an operative audit 
system for its own accounts undermines the credibility of the flawed absolute supervision 
and control mechanisms by the incapacitated minister. Why not have the supervision and 
control mechanisms under an autonomous legal body with sanctioning powers like the 
special judiciary with the function of training LGUs also? (Thomi, 2002, Pfeiffer et al 
2005 and GoL 2006:10 and Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).   
 
7.0.5 Availability of Competent Staff for LG’s Efficiency in Lesotho 
 
For LG to be successful, councils need to be equipped with the relevant and competent 
human resources for delivering the allocated functions. The LG Act has established the 
Local Government Service Commission as responsible for recruiting personnel with 
administrative capacities into the councils. The Act has placed this commission as 
answerable to the minister who can reject or approve its decisions and/or act independent 
of such a commission. Reportedly the minister has already imposed a number of 
administrative personnel on the councils without involving either the concerned councils 
or the commission. Such minister’s recruited staffs are identified as highly active 
affiliates to the ruling political party and are also a personal preference if not in certain 
relationship to the minister.   Functions having been devolved through decentralization 
policy, the respective staff has been transferred from the, reportedly, deconcentrated 
branch offices of the line ministries to the DCs and CCs, respectively. Additional staff 
has also been recruited. The LG Act names the CCS, the DCS and support staff for both 
of them with qualifications in financial management. The first recruitments took place in 
April 2005 when Community and District Council Secretaries assumed office. At that 
same time, the MLG collected data on numbers and qualifications of existing staff in the 
districts from the different line ministries and identified the positions to be transferred. 
Without changing the practice in the field, countrywide 3.262 former line ministry staff 
were transferred in October 2005. Salaries and operational budgets for these officers were 
assigned from the line ministries to the District Councils only at the beginning of the 
fiscal year 2006/2007. Other line ministry staff in the districts performing functions not 
considered local government responsibility remained as part of the central government in 
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the Public Service. This refers to approximately 1.800 officers who report through the 
DA to the line ministries yet their functions are still not regarded as LG’s responsibility 
(GoL, 2004:7, GoL 1997, Pfeiffer et.al, 2006:9-11 and Interviews, May, 2010). 
 
Another round of recruitment for the LG came into effect in April 2006. Since that month 
each DC has besides the DCS also an Administrative and a Finance Manager and a 
Human Resource, a Senior Legal and a Procurement Officer. To support the CCS each 
CC received an Accounts Clerk, a Clerical Assistant and 5 support staff such as typists, 
cleaners and messengers. The new recruitments increased the staff dealing with local 
affairs by 34%. The recruitments were mostly implemented by the Local Government 
Service Commission equally for each DC and CC irrespective of their size. This resulted 
in LGUs in districts with small CCs employing significantly more personnel relative to 
population than LGUs in districts with bigger CCs. There is some 50% of the CC staff 
belonging to the lowest salary grade reflecting low qualification while among the DC 
staff only 25% fall into this category (Thomi, 2002, Pfeiffer et al 2005 and GoL 
2005:92). 
 
Senior DC and DA positions including the DCS and the DA were advertised and 
competitively acquired. Here contracts are limited in time with performance based 
remuneration components. The majority of Community Council Secretaries are university 
graduates with BA degrees in public administration, management or related majors, but 
often lack professional experience. When they assumed their office in April 2005 they 
were confronted with very poor working conditions like missing office facilities and 
several month delays in salary payments. Information on the upcoming implementation 
of further decentralization measures such as transfer of staff to their authority trickled 
down to them only erratically. Until September 2005, all CCS from the whole country 
received only a five-day-training for all of them together. The major limitation with this 
available administrative staff as already indicated is technical insufficiency. Technical 
staff are lacking. This has turned many activities into a backlog and thus development 
non-delivery. Adding technically competent staff could increase the efficiency capacity 
of the decentralization policy execution (Ibid).  
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7.0.6 Management Procedures for Coordination for LG’s Efficiency in 
Lesotho 
 
This part of efficiency in decentralization is about management systems for horizontal 
and vertical coordination. Weakly managed administrative systems and poor internal 
cooperation and communication have reportedly created inefficiencies resulting in poor 
developmental-service delivery (Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). Worthy 
to note that introduction of LGUs has increased the number of administrative units, 
necessitating interaction between a larger number of institutions. Certain coordination 
mechanisms and functions have become imminent. The CCs channel information from 
and to the villages and formulate development-priority-needs; the DCs integrate and 
harmonize the expectations from the CCs into a coherent district policy. The central 
government’s activities on the district level are coordinated by the DA. At the same time 
the line officers in the District Administration are closely connected to their parent 
ministry on the central level. Harmonization between the central and the local 
government’s policies is ensured on the one hand by technical support and supervision 
and on the other hand by the DDCC that additionally takes into account input from other 
district level governance stakeholder groups. However, the roles and functions of the 
DDCC are unclear. LG Act provisions and role’s description given in the Cabinet’s 
Decentralization Implementation Programme are conflicting. The former requires 
DDCC’s approval to district development plans (Section 81), the latter calls the DDCC 
only an “advisory body”. Furthermore, only members representing the DC have voting 
power, thus it is unclear why deliberations cannot be implemented in a special session of 
the DC but need an own body. Other than that, the role of the District Planning Unit 
(DPU) has to be specified. Consisting of different senior line officers from the District 
Administration the DPU is supposed to provide planning services to the Councils and to 
ensure the conformity of the district plan with the National Plan. The DPU according to 
the LG Act has to finalize the DDP “having regard to the recommendations by the 
Council”. This provision degrades also the DCs to advisory bodies. Without clarification, 
the cooperation of the different tiers of government on development planning is likely to 
be hampered by disputes over competences. Coordination of the districts is happening in 
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the current system merely in the central government. An institution horizontally 
harmonizing the DCs and representing their entirety on the central level is missing (LG 
Act 1996 and 2004, Thomi, 2002, Pfeiffer et al 2005 and Interviews with Councillors, 
May, 2010).  
 
7.0.7 Technological Instruments for Policy Execution as Lesotho’s LG 
Efficiency? 
 
Part of the criteria to Lesotho’s efficiency in the decentralization policy planning and 
implementation capacity is the availability and use of technical equipment for such policy 
implementation. For a developing country like Lesotho, the Decentralization 
Implementation Programme also refers to the necessity of infrastructure provisions for 
the newly established LGUs. DCs have to utilize administrative facilities at the district 
level but small administrative structures need had to be launched for CCs. The office, 
meeting space and basic office equipment like desks, chairs and filing cabinets constitute 
basic needs. These are nonetheless, inadequate as needed basic equipment to effectively 
fulfil any local functions. The internet and the occasionally available fax line are always 
almost all year round reportedly and observably dysfunctional (Field-Interviews with 
Councillors, May, 2010). There is no clear guideline as to how such have to be addressed. 
Few CCs observably have a permanent office still under construction with limited 
furniture of one table and few chairs in a rented small building. Most of the utilized 
facilities belong to other institutions like agricultural department, local courts, clinics, 
chief’s houses or churches. The solar panels installed for electricity provision are either 
partially operative and/or cannot generate enough electricity for smooth and continued 
telecommunications service for activities coordination and thus development delivery. 
Some remote CCs lack adequate housing for the CCS. As such a number of CCS resides 
in district towns, reportedly, depriving local councillors of adequate interaction for 
guidance and effective use of the availed administrative personnel. This affects timely 
decision-making and hence timely delivery. DCs do not yet have their own buildings. 
They share small facilities with the DA, the Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) 
buildings or any ministry’s limitedly available buildings and facilities in the district 
towns.  Decentralization needs to be the framework of the devolution process involving a 
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transfer of assets including office buildings combined with a redistribution of existing 
facilities. This would promote efficient and effective functioning of the DCs further 
(GoL, 1997, Thomi, 2002, GoL, 2004, Pfeiffer et al 2005 and GoL 2006 and Field-
Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).   
 
7.0.8 Efficient Fiscal and Administrative Devolution for Lesotho’s LG 
Efficiency? 
 
Fiscal decentralization and administrative efficiency also form part of the critical 
indicators for decentralization’s success in development delivery as already indicated. 
Lesotho’s Decentralization Implementation Programme pronounces the financial 
dimension of this policy as primary principle of the entire process. Let us note once more 
that there are no traditions of implementing public funds independent from the national 
budget. Fiscal decentralization is a completely new strategy for Lesotho, though in some 
of the deconcentrated branch offices of the central government experiences with 
autonomous budgeting do exist. Concerning the provision of resources for LGU, sections 
47-66 of the LG Act has stipulated the general framework for local government finances. 
The Council’s “Fund” (budget) is constituted by all revenues of a Council, which is own 
revenues from levies and fees, donations, gifts and grants and sums made to the order of 
the Council by the National Assembly. Nonetheless, the Cabinet still acknowledges that 
‘notwithstanding the powers of LGUs to levy taxes as a source of their income, central 
government will still remain the primary financier of LGUs through a grant practice.’ 
LGUs receive grants covering the cost of personnel, allowances for Councillors and some 
operation costs. Allocations are made subject to the salary entitlements of the transferred 
and recruited staff and the number of Councillors. On the basis of the big range of CCs’ 
size, budget allocations for CCs per capita vary significantly. Small LGUs benefit most. 
This type of the transfer of financial resources to the LGUs is not yet adequate for 
efficient and effective development-service delivery. LGUs still lack financial resources 
to effect development. They cannot expense or generate income/funds for their 
development needs. This puts development delivery into jeopardy. Decentralization is 
mainly about financial and administrative devolution including the autonomous authority 
and the capacity/empowerment to locally generate funds in a sustainable way for 
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sustainable development/local development-delivery (GoL, 1997, Thomi, 2002, GoL, 
2004, Pfeiffer et al 2005, GoL 2006 and Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).    
 
The Fiscal Decentralization Task Team, a joint working group of the MLG and the 
MFDP, after its reactivation in spring 2006 agreed on a method to allocate capital 
budgets to the LGUs. The national budget includes a title ‘Development Fund for 
Councils’ for this purpose. Then the 75% of the fund amount would be distributed 
according to each CC’s share of population. Lacking reliable population data, the number 
of registered voters became the basis for this allocation. The remaining 25% of these 
development funds are distributed according to a CC’s share of Lesotho’s surface. The 
MLG originally preferred a distribution based on the comparative development and 
poverty level of a CC. However, reliable CC statistics on poverty were not available. 
Furthermore, these indicators would be easier to manipulate for political reasons. More 
pressing than the allocation formula is actually the low amount of the capital budget. The 
designated sum amounts only to 10% of the funds transferred for recurrent expenditure, 
being salaries, allowances and operation. In the long-term, regardless of the obvious 
donor fatigue and impoverishing tied-aid with cumulative-compounding charged interests 
by international financial lenders in state’s development, international donors are still 
expected to provide additional funds for this purpose. This is pathetic as it affirms the 
observed situation by Olowu (2000, 2002 and 2005) and Cameron (2005) that African 
states’ decentralization process is greatly constrained by inadequate capital budget and 
weak central governments themselves. Furthermore, these states have not managed to 
make decentralization work as they also only decentralized in order to qualify for donor 
funding. The central government’s sector programmes mostly in the district 
administration level are still retaining the functions ought to now be devolved to LGUs. 
The given excuse is that LGUs are not technically competent. Why not devolve those very 
competent sector programmes retaining functions that are supposed to be devolved, 
remains an unanswered question.  There is obvious political hesitation to embrace a 
decision on the design of a comprehensive system of intergovernmental transfers 
effecting devolution of capital resources and funds generation and management to the 
LGUs (Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). Instead, the central government 
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expressly hopes to be supported by donors to establish a Local Government Finance 
Commission or Board to responsible of assigning funds to the CCs with an incentive 
structures for community development projects to be given by donor support through a 
wished District Development Fund. The terrible attitude of dependency syndrome is now 
perpetually being transferred by the central government into decentralization policy 
which ought to root it out. The central government has legally protected itself; audits may 
be done only if the minister prefers to do so. Government also reportedly represses 
independent audits by the General Auditor’s office. The established Anti-Corruption Unit 
can only act with the approval of the government’s structures. There are no audits, or any 
substantial financial accounting procedures/accountability systems attract such donor 
funding wishfully thought for and expressed as a desire preserving inaction in policy 
documents (Ibid and Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).  
 
Revenue generation capacity by LGUs as already partly indicated forms an essential 
requirement for LG’s efficiency in development-delivery. The LG Act, section 47, lists 
possible revenue sources for LGUs including: (a) fines and penalties; (b) rates, taxes, 
duties, fees and other charges levied under authority of the Act; (c) all sums realized by 
sales, leases or other transactions; (d) all revenue derived by the Council from any 
property vested in the Council, or by the administration of any utility services;  (e) and all 
donations, gifts and grants to the Council in the course of the exercise of its powers, 
duties and functions. The constraint here is that no significant revenues may be raised 
from any of these sources. Let us cautiously note this constraint together with the real fact 
that collected revenue are mostly collected as cash by LGUs lacking proper financial 
systems for the very collection/recording and disbursing, vulnerably promoting any form 
of corruption, not to talk of the report that many LGUs have no banking accounts yet for 
specific ongoing cash generating activities. Is it real that we do not have money/capacity 
to raise it or that our hands, pockets and savings are leaking? Gross errors as signs of 
mismanagement are so observable in these LGUs financial management and raising 
activities but this is not the main scope of this thesis. Property rates are limitedly effective 
only in Maseru. Revenue from fees collected by the MLG in the districts is negligible 
(Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). The potential to raise funds locally is at 
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the moment, besides obvious lack of political will (governance reluctance) to do so in 
fear of loss of popularity and local political support, remaining ignorably insurmountable 
as there is no decision or intention to design an investment plan in development to build 
the ‘local revenue capacity’ (licensing fees, property taxes, rents, various user fees 
(public toilets and parking areas, electricity, piped water e.t.c) and levies as well as the 
accountable institutional capacity all which would minimize being cash strapped and 
inefficient/corrupt). This pragmatically effectively blocs any poverty alleviating 
initiatives by the decentralization originally officially purported for that. It then justifies 
and affirms the argument of this thesis beyond the expected point that decentralization in 
Lesotho is not only donor driven but further serves as a practical precondition for 
accessing more donor support, also observing the wish list with inaction by the 
governments of Lesotho. The excuse is that poverty further limits the possibilities for 
collecting revenues but policy programmes vacillate and reverse towards centralization 
re-solidification through deconcentration in decentralization. Collected revenue at the 
local level, such as pound and grazing fees, sanitary and refine fees, market fees, 
community hall and public toilets, is currently not properly deposited in bank accounts. 
These monies are often kept in cash very difficult to properly account for from their 
collection throughout to any stage even of possible mismanagement (GoL 2006:2, 
Pfeiffer et.al. 2005:12-18 and Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). 
.  
One other essential indicator for efficiency in decentralization for development-delivery 
already theoretically alluded to is the cost efficiency/effectiveness. Lesotho’s 
decentralization needs to optimally utilize financial and administrative resources for 
maximum output in development delivery to be named efficient or successful. May we 
recall that the institutions of LG purport to bring development-services closer to local 
citizens thus improving the provision level, which indeed is referred to as the 
effectiveness of the services. However, cost-effectiveness/efficiency is not an explicit 
objective in Lesotho’s decentralization programme. For instance, the criterion did not 
take any crucial role for the Administrative Boundaries Commission. Obviously Council 
boundaries did not consider already other existing administrative boundaries for effective 
coordination, resources use and distribution and administrative efficiency. The LGUs’ 
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boundaries cut across political constituencies ideal for voter registration, citizen 
participation organization and elections management at both the national and local levels. 
They also cut across traditional/customary chiefs’ administrative territories confusing 
pre-existing local customary governance that founded this nation, not to talk of the 
essential role chiefs play in development delivery as shown in the earlier chapters. They 
do the same for the other urban areas as already indicated (Hlotse and Butha-Buthe). This 
also brings in contradictions in terms of spatial jurisdiction critical for local participation 
organization and service delivery, not excluding the consequence of confusing channels 
of information flow (Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). The accessibility of 
rather unspecified type of services is said to have been the main criterion but independent 
of cost-effectiveness even in the delivery of such services whether administratively or 
otherwise (Ibid).  
 
Furthermore, while section 31 of the LG Act states that each CC will be an own legal 
entity (body-corporate) employing administrative staff led by the CCS, every position is 
still recruited for by either the MLG’s minister or the LG Service Commission 
answerable to the minister. This type of re-centralization is not only causing staff 
inadequacy through recruitment backlog causing LGUs’ incompetence but it also overly 
stretches these central bodies’ capacity on irrelevant activities of recruitment for LGUs 
instead of monitoring and capacitating their performance in development delivery. This is 
non-optimal use of structures consequently adding to administrative and financial 
mismanagement compounding development non-delivery in LGUs.  Moreover, the LG 
Act has the provision that the CCS and any of two officers specially authorized by the 
Council for that purpose shall sign all orders or cheques for payments from the Council’s 
account. That is to say each Council has at least two staff beside the CCS with 
appropriate financial management competence. These two staff members are still lacking 
in most of the LGUs, depriving these LGUs any financial competence for cost-
effectiveness in local development-service delivery. At the moment additional recurrent 
administrative expenditure due to the decentralization programme including formation of 
its new LGUs is inefficiently too high. While administrative costs for any development 
programme may acceptably be at most 10% of the budget and the remainder for 
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development delivery or production, Lesotho’s LGUs rather spend or consume their 
budget in the other way round, which is 10%, is left for limited development activities, 
indicating significant development non-delivery. The administrative costs are far away 
from being cost-effective because for each of the 128 CCs a secretary and seven assisting 
staff were newly recruited. Every CC also has to pay allowances for 9 to 15 Councillors. 
A Councillor’s position is regarded as a full-time job. These allowances reportedly 
surpass the salaries of low qualified support staff (Field-Interviews with Councillors, 
May, 2010). Furthermore similar recruitment for all CCs but of different size led to 
significant differences in administrative overhead costs of the Councils. Lack of cost 
efficiency is seen in that districts with small CCs resultantly employed many more people 
in relation to the population size than districts with larger CCs. Such a disparity indicates 
inefficiency in administrative resources deployment and thus non-cost effectiveness 
(Pfeiffer et.al. 2005 and GoL, 2006:3 and Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). 
 
7.1.0 Lesotho’s Decentralization Participation Indicators 
7.1.0.1 Indicators for Efficient Preparedness for Participatory Local 
Democracy 
 
Applying the already discussed theoretical framework efficiency in chapter 4, it needs to 
be noted that decentralization and the establishment of LGUs in Lesotho has observably 
and reportedly been a top-down approach
14
 started by the central government and 
supported by donors/external development agencies like GTZ (German Development 
Agency), United States of American Aid (USAID), World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund/IMF, Ireland Aid, United Nations Development Programme/UNDP and others. 
Checking on the low turnout in the LGUs’ elections affirms that a large share of the 
Basotho population is probably not yet ready or properly conscientized for participatory 
local democracy. Experience with participation in local affairs management is also 
generally low though slightly differing regionally. The LGUs highly lack civic culture, 
even the one that ever pre-existed. For instance, LGUs’ establishments have not 
augmented on initiatives whereby locals took up own effort on HIV/AIDS related 
                                                
14
.  Top-down in the sense that it was initiated and funded by the central government and external donors and more dangerously,    
   in the sense that it was planned at the centre with no regard for the views and aspirations of  the grassroots  masses or local level  
   state. 
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activities of organizing themselves into support groups for home care and various 
neighbourly support to the local orphans, widowers and widows and the affected. In 
certain areas with partial NGOs’ support, local dwellers formed associations for 
rangeland management and grazing control involving monetary compensation schemes. 
The fines for cattle grazing in cultivated fields and preserved pastures for grass/fodder 
production have often been collected by the local chief or other locally entrusted persons. 
While in some cases, locals collected money among themselves to contribute in 
government capital projects benefiting the entire locality; we may recall the small 
irrigation dams and rural water supply as other existing examples. Working committees 
with by-laws saw to it that there is no misuse of such funds by the locally entrusted 
persons. Nevertheless, LGUs formation and functioning lacks including an organized 
participation of these groupings. Furthermore, a systematic citizen participation involving 
the joint articulation of political demands is relatively a new concept for Basotho people 
who mainly survived on migratory labour system, some transhumance, subsistence 
farming and limited service economy and exploitative textile industry, all now in 
recession as some near extinction, particularly the migratory labour system from 
depletion of mines and gold depreciation in RSA. In the late 1980s male migrant labour 
force was above 52% mainly in RSA exceeding 89,000 men but it is now around 35, 000. 
LGUs have not clearly incorporated agricultural and other various income generating 
schemes for these retrenched and sometimes badly injured and disabled poor exploited 
mineworkers. To the passive Basotho, the idea of being politically responsible for local 
affairs management is relatively new indeed. Decisions used to be made by a distant 
bureaucracy or a local chief through traditional authority. That is to say democratic 
convictions, culture and attitudes are not yet very deeply rooted though knowledge about 
democracy is fast growing. Councillors and chiefs also lack information about LG’s 
activities; this causes delays that put at risk the prevailing enthusiasm of other local 
government stakeholders (Gay, 2006:1 and Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010). 
 
The efficiency criterion issue of the promotion of a civic culture and local political elites 
is also assessed by the decentralization policy ‘insiders’ in the next chapter for more 
assessment on citizen participation. Nonetheless, findings generally confirm Olowu’s 
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(2000, 2002 and 2005) argument that developing African countries lack effective civic 
culture as very few people are members to the limitedly functioning NGOs. Lesotho’s 
decentralization strategy states the goals of widening public access to the government 
structures and promotion of citizen participation. This includes provisions for a capacity 
building programme and for the development of a community based planning 
methodology to serve as a key tool for the implementation of participatory planning 
within the framework of the new local government structures. Surprisingly, 
decentralization in this country lacks integral civic education and emancipation. There are 
no LGUs’ budgets for training courses and capacity building. Instead of budgeting for 
that, investment budget has been used only once by MLG, limitedly for this purpose in a 
five-day workshop. Unfortunately such sporadic capacity building trainings have also not 
included key persons to local development issues being the chiefs still responsible for 
local affairs management. Potential voters in local elections wondered what would be the 
function of Councillors after the local elections and how the system would function. This 
was worsened by the fact that fragmentary regulatory framework of Lesotho is still 
unclear, which prevented the central government campaigns about decentralization from 
clarity provision to the general public. NGOs’ capacity to promote civic culture and 
support democracy education is quite limited as membership in associations is also very 
low. Around 12% are active members in community development or self-help 
associations. Membership in business and farmers associations and in trade unions is 
even lower. Only one NGO named Transformation Resource Centre acting nationwide in 
democratic education developed textbooks for pupils and manuals for teachers on the 
constitution and on local democracy (Gay, 2006, Green/Chikwanha 2006 and Field-
Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).  
7.1.0.2 Answerability/accountability and Responsiveness of LGUs in Lesotho 
 
It is essential to note that this aspect has also been subjected to the decentralization policy 
insiders’ assessment in the next chapter. Such analysis will augment this one mainly 
inclined on decentralization efficiency while the former is based on locals’ examination 
to complement this one. Accountability and responsiveness of LGUs also constitute a 
critical element of efficiency in LG. Decentralization is frequently motivated by the 
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phrase, ‘bringing government closer to the people’. Unlike above, here we deal with 
whether LGUs in Lesotho are prepared to really respond to the needs articulated by the 
local people. This aspect of efficiency directly hinges on the transparency and access to 
information by the LGUs’ staff and councillors as well as the local citizens. The LG 
regulations promulgated in May 2005 demand Councils to function openly. That is 
Council meetings need to be public allowing public contributions. Minutes of the 
meetings ought to be accessible to everyone on request. LG Act, section 44, provides that 
by-laws of LGUs have to be published in the government gazette before coming into 
operation. The regulations further stipulate the duty of Councillors as to regularly hold 
public gatherings (lipitso) in the constituencies in order to have the concerns of the locals 
and to inform them about issues discussed in the Council. The limitation here is that there 
is no system/standard in place to monitor performance in this task. Informal interviews 
with more than twenty interviewees have confirmed that councillors are inaccessible and 
lack enough time to report. There are no known fixed scheduled public reporting sessions 
except CCs’ indoor un-open meetings in very small offices denying public attendance. 
Again, organized civil society associations may voice their concerns at the district level 
in the DDCC but this institution meets only once a year not to mention that NGOs lack 
sufficient information on how they are to relate and work or participate in the LG. 
Organized flow of information from the community into the political bodies and vice 
versa is basically flawed and non-existent. Furthermore, the codified rules do not address 
the access of citizens or local government Councillors to files and documents of the 
administrative apparatus of the districts and the central government. The Councillors are 
to monitor the work of the staff under the Council and the implementation of the 
approved plans but still, their individual or collective rights to query are not defined yet. 
Reportedly, CCs take minutes in the councils but in the absence of enough technical 
equipment even among the Councillors themselves, this is said to be hardly done. At 
times CCs lack writing paper not to talk of printing one or toner. Photocopiers are 
limitedly available at the DC office, if made available at the CC, power failure and 
frequently required repairing is an often hurdle. This puts councils and the staff at CC in 
a blindly groping working environment whereby issues to be followed up, not 
accomplished and so on may not be efficiently handled for local development delivery. 
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Minutes are fundamental to efficient management of local affairs. LGUs also face the 
widespread lack of any reliable communication infrastructure so that even the calling of a 
meeting can be a serious logistic challenge. Invitations must often be carried by people 
who are coincidentally on their way to the locality where a Councillor lives. In many CCs 
permanent office is not yet there or is very small and meeting facilities are not adequate. 
This makes it more difficult for people to approach their CC directly. The encountered 
Councillors reported their occasional implementation of public gatherings in their 
electoral divisions. The gatherings are normally coordinated by chiefs as this is the way 
information on local affairs is transmitted. However, councillors reported that this at 
times gets blocked by chiefs not calling public gatherings when they are not in favour of 
certain policy aspects, issues or the political party the councillor is affiliated to. At times 
chiefs refused permission for public gatherings due to personal differences with local 
councillors. This has adversely affected councillors’ transparency, responsiveness and 
accountability to the locals. Local media like radio stations and newspapers do not exist. 
The central government’s radio is not addressing this lack adequately though radio has 
the best outreach. Lesotho’s LG is not yet well prepared for efficiency through 
accountability, responsiveness and transparency, all hampering decentralization process 
for development-delivery, we may conclude (GoL, 2005, Gay, 2006 and Field-Interviews 
with Councillors, May, 2010). 
7.1.0.3 Elections and Representation as LG’s Efficiency 
 
In the context of the difficulties in the flow of information the conduct of the local 
government election ought to receive due attention. As a matter of fact, free elections 
presuppose access to information about the candidates and the given alternatives. After 
community boundaries were determined only in October 2004, preparation of the voter 
lists and candidate nominations took place under a very tight schedule. The time frame 
for sensitization and campaigning was so short. The Local Government Election Act was 
approved in 1998. Remarkably, an amendment to the Act in 2004 by the male-dominated 
National Assembly reserved 30% of the seats solely for female candidates. Due to the 
first-past-the-post electoral system, the government had to select arbitrarily electoral 
divisions where only women were allowed to run. After this was legally challenged this 
 212 
provision was upheld in both instances by the High Court. As a result of tough deadlines 
and the pre-determination of the sex of the admitted candidates it happened, that in some 
of the electoral divisions either no or only one candidate could run for office. Apart from 
that, the NGO, Transformation Resource Centre, assumes that many women were 
encouraged to run by the 30% quorum. Thus the quorum should have increased the 
overall number of candidates and the choice for the voters. Where the elections had to be 
cancelled completely, new elections were organized in May and June 2005. Local 
government elections are the primary mechanism in which people express their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the accounts of the political leadership in their local 
Council. Though the 2005 local elections were the first ever multi-party local elections in 
Lesotho, this mechanism started to operate. Many of the candidates presented themselves 
with their good ‘accounts’ from previous community activity. In total, 3.896 candidates 
ran for the Councillor posts. These numbers indicate that voters in many places were able 
to choose between alternatives. The term of office was reduced for the first Councils 
from five to only two years in order to conduct the next elections simultaneously with the 
national elections. Facing the capacity limitations of the local authorities this might be 
too early to present any substantial accounts to the electorate. On the other hand the 
allowances for the Councillors are high enough to justify an early re-decision on who 
deserves to be a people’s representative (Ibid). 
 
Despite the negative experience made on the national level with a pure first-past-the-post 
electoral system it was opted to use this system at the local level. Thus inclusiveness of 
the system is low and opposition or fringe groups are not represented in the Councils. At 
least in rural areas the virtues of this system might well prevail because constituencies are 
widely homogenous in terms of socio-economic status and ethnicity. The enthusiasm 
shown for the elections was much higher in rural than in urban areas. The turnout in the 
latter was much lower. The role of political parties is somewhat unclear. Councillors in 
many cases emphasized that party membership is irrelevant in the Councils. However, 
election statistics indicate the absolute dominance of the ruling LCD that nominated 26% 
of the candidates but gained 76% of the Councillor posts whereas independent candidates 
and opposition parties lost ground. The problem of low inclusiveness is even more 
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relevant in the case of DCs. The members are nominated by majority decisions in the 
CCs. Thus even opposition groups that successfully placed their candidates in a few 
electoral divisions completely lack representation at the district level. The problem was 
slightly litigated but not solved by the minister’s intervention in May 2005 as was 
decreed that opposition parties constituting at least 25% of a CC can send an additional 
representative to the DC. After the 2005 election this is the case in five CCs nationwide. 
The predominance of the ruling LCD is still manifested. Strong opposition is unlikely to 
emerge. The development of political alternatives depends on the pluralism within the 
LCD (GoL, 2005:507-508, GTZ, 2005, TRC, 2005, Green 2006 and Field-Interviews 
with Councillors, May, 2010). 
7.1.0.4 Competences of LGUs in Lesotho  
 
The challenge here is to find the right means to this end as it involves devolution of such 
competencies for decentralization efficiency at the local level. This part addresses the 
process of the competence transfer and their relevance for efficient decentralization in 
Lesotho. To achieve this, it is important to understand firstly how efficiently the transfer 
process was done. The implementation of the transfer began with the recruitment and the 
formal establishment of the new administrative structures in April 2005 followed by the 
LG election in the same month. In the following months the Councils met for their first 
meetings, some training for Councillors and for Council Secretaries were conducted. The 
transfer of staff came into effect in October 2005, for that financial year still without 
budgets. With the beginning of the financial year 2006/ 2007 in April 2006, budgets for 
personnel and parts of operation costs were transferred to the DCs. At the same time 
newly recruited staff assumed office in the DCs and the CCs. So far, the step-by-step 
expansion of local authorities took place. However, talks with local government 
stakeholders on the ground conveyed the impression that the process to a big extent 
lacked predictability. Implementation decisions often were taken in an ad hoc manner on 
the central level. Affected staff received the notifications on their transfer and first 
information on its implications only in September, 2005. Heads of line ministry 
departments in the districts were not involved in the process. The Inter-Ministerial Task 
Force already in May 2004 prepared a Report on the Proposed Functions for Local 
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Authorities over the period 2004-09. The report specifies the very broad and imprecise 
provisions of the LG Act on the functions and competences and lists for each ministry a 
breakdown of functions to be decentralized in phases. However, timing for the devolution 
is not suggested and the staff transfer finally happened in one big bang. A manual book 
used for training of Councillors and LG staff in the chapter on functions of local 
authorities refers only to the schedules of the LG Act deemed imprecise by the Task 
Force report. There seems to be a problem of elusive functions of local authorities 
according to the law on the one hand and practical activities of the local Councils that are 
somewhat detached from the envisaged functions on the other hand. Thus responsibilities 
are formally devolved and continuously implemented but not dealt with in the Councils   
(GoL, 2004, GoL 2005:19 and Field-Interviews with Conucillors, May, 2010). 
7.1.0.5 Substance of Powers and the Nature of LG’s Devolution in Lesotho 
 
Clear jurisdiction also contributes towards efficiency of decentralization. Section five of 
the LG Act in two lists specifies very broadly the tasks and functions of LG. While the 
first schedule refers to tasks that shall fall under the responsibility of DCs, the second 
names the functions under the authority of the CCs. The first schedule lists the following 
matters: 1. Control of natural resources (e.g. sand, stones) and environmental protection 
(e.g. gullies, pollution). 2. Public health (e.g. food inspection, refuse collection and 
disposal). 3. Physical planning. 4. Land/site allocation. 5. Minor roads (e.g. bridle-paths). 
6. Grazing control. 7. Water supply in villages (maintenance). 8. Markets (provision and 
regulation). 9. Promotion of economic development (e.g. attraction of investment). 10. 
Streets and public places. 11. Cemeteries. 12. Parks and gardens. 13. Control of building 
permits. 14. Fire. 15. Education. 16. Recreation and culture. 17. Roads and traffic. 18. 
Water resources. 19. Fencing. 20. Local administration of central regulations and 
licenses. 21. Care of mothers, young children, the aged and integration of people with 
disabilities. 22. Laundries. 23. Omnibus terminals. 24. Mortuaries and burial of bodies of 
destitute persons and unclaimed bodies. 25. Public decency and offences against public 
order. 26. Agriculture: services for improvement of agriculture. 27. Forestry: 
preservation, improving and control of designated forests in LAs (LG Act, 2004 and 
Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).  
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The second schedule lists the following matters as competences of CCs: 1. Control of 
natural resources (e.g. sand, stones) and environmental protection (e.g. dongas, 
pollution). 2. Land/site allocation. 3. Minor roads (also bridle-paths). 4. Grazing control. 
5. Water supply in villages (maintenance). 6. Markets (provision and regulation). 7. 
Burial grounds (Ibid). 
 
The LG Act then in section 42 allows Councils to make or to adopt by-laws regulating 
the issues under their responsibility. By-laws include the option of imposing penalties 
and fines. Likewise the payment of allowances to Councillors shall be subject to a by-
law. The introduction of taxes and rates is subject to limitations as may be specified by 
the minister (LG Act, section 56-58). The provisions in the schedules are ambiguous 
because all seven matters in the second schedule overlap with the first and clarification is 
left open to regulation by the minister. On the one hand this ambiguousness is conducive 
because districts remain flexible to take care of certain issues if a CC is not capable to 
find adequate solutions. Larger CCs in urban areas are likely to develop stronger 
capacities to handle the competences than small rural CCs. On the other hand, this 
confusion might easily lead to disputes over competences between CCs and their DC. 
This risk points to another weakness of the LG Act. It fails to specify even rudimentary 
regulations for dispute resolution. This concerns not only the relations between CCs and 
DCs but also potential conflicts between the minister and a Council on the approval of a 
by-law. By-laws do not take effect until they are approved by the MLG/minister. This is a 
very restrictive and time consuming procedure. Furthermore, neither the LG Act nor the 
Decentralization Implementation Programme makes any provisions regarding the 
competence to decide on the size of a Council’s administration. The Act (section 38) 
merely stipulates that the salary, allowances and conditions of service of an executive 
officer of a Council shall be determined by the Local Government Service Commission 
(LGSC), established by the LG Act (section 67). Likewise an elaboration of the rights of 
the Councils to approve the budget is missing (GoL, 1997, LG Act, 1996 and 2004 and 
Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).  
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As noted earlier, for the time being the MLG decided to recruit staff equally for each CC 
and DC. Staffing is not adjusted to the needs. No choice is left for the Councils to shift 
funds from the recurrent to the capital budget. The LGSC is responsible for the personnel 
of the local authorities. While it seems reasonable to ensure countrywide equal conditions 
for local government servants, it makes no sense to exclude the local authorities from 
nominating Commission members. The LG Act puts this competence solely into the 
hands of the MLG and Councillors or Council employees are explicitly banned from 
membership. A similar problem exists with regard to the Local Government Service 
Tribunal that is supposed to deal with appeals against decisions of the LGSC. According 
to the LG Act, section 75, the members of the Tribunal are appointed by the Commission 
after consultation with the minister. Neither local authorities are involved nor is the 
Tribunal impartial under these conditions. Competences of the Councils will have to be 
clarified also in relation to the DA. The issue of development planning has already been 
addressed above but it may be observed that according to section 30 of the LG Act, the 
District Planning Unit/DPU under the DA ‘finalizes the District Development Plan’, 
though physical planning and promotion of economic development are competences of 
the local authorities as stipulated in the schedules of the same Act (Ibid).  
 
7.2.0 Summary 
 
In practice the coordination and cooperation within the central government so far are 
insufficient and fail to provide a regulatory environment conducive to a smooth effective 
and efficient autonomous functioning of the LGUs. Rather, provision of absolute powers 
is made to the MLG’s minister, consequences of which are naturally known in Africa 
currently, mainly development-non-delivery, putting aside the worst others. The MLG 
lacks the capacity to exercise such powers as supervision is not a matter of priority. 
LGUs still lack policy planning and implementation capacity as are legally-politically 
constrained. The District and Community administrations still have most of their 
functions left centralized in the DA’s office. Many competences and resources are still 
held there in favour of continued centralization, confusing most of these LGUs’ officers. 
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Considering policy planning and implementation capacity at the community level, staff 
competency is questionable, as reportedly, there has been recruitment of largely 
unqualified personnel which exacerbated the extremely bottom heavy structures. CCS’ 
capacities for appropriate management of the staff assigned to a CC are overstrained. 
They always have to try and do more than they can due to lack of support from limitedly 
skilled support of their juniors. Furthermore, the flow of information to them is 
reportedly insufficient. There is need for an institutional design with a framework 
enabling vertical and horizontal cooperation of different institutions and tiers of 
government. Inadequate technical infrastructure is clearly a limiting factor for efficient 
and effective work of the newly created administrative units especially at the CC level 
(Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).   
 
Lesotho’s preparations for decentralization process largely ignored the fiscal implications 
and hence a non-cost efficient policy process. The implication is that decentralization 
may in the short-run and long run remain a failure in the delivery of sustainable 
development for poverty alleviation. Not unless imbalances causing cost inefficiency are 
well addressed. The central government failed to develop a workable system of effective 
equitable intergovernmental transfers and recruitments for LGUs’ competence in poverty 
reduction though the intention to complement the political dimension of decentralization 
with a financial one is clearly stipulated in the LG Act and in other approved legal 
documents. The requirements for proper financial management of LGUs still remain 
unclear. Demarcation of Councils’ boundaries, recruitment procedures and current 
allocation pattern has been a hasty ad hoc decision making ignoring cost efficiency in 
development delivery. Instantly, small CCs have incurred too high administrative 
overhead costs. The central government has ignored the obvious alternative of reducing 
recurrent cost in favour of community investments for sustainable development/poverty 
reduction (Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).   
 
Preparedness for participatory local democracy still leaves much room for more 
improvement to effect constructive local self-administration. Some few traditions to build 
on are existent. Very few people are engaged in political management and the 
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organization of joint community activities. Where they are, their activities restrictively 
normally relate only to the village in which they live, not to the CC area consisting of a 
number of other villages. The ad hoc financing of capacity building and training 
measures without a separate budget item gives another indication that these issues lacked 
the necessary priority in the preparations for the implementation of the decentralization 
process in Lesotho. These constraints contribute perpetually to the failure of potential 
decentralization in Lesotho’s development-delivery. While locals may now raise issues 
on the community or the district level and address an administration that is less 
fragmented than before regulations theoretically ensure transparent procedures within the 
Councils. Lack of an adequate basic office and telecommunication infrastructure limit 
transparency. Citizens and Councillors lack instruments to monitor and control the work 
of the administration. Local democracy may now be limitedly be exercised for the first 
time through the LGUs, still, the design of the CC boundaries and the electoral system 
have revealed defects. Opposition groups are still marginalized. It seems almost 
impossible for them to gain representation at district level. A one-party DC may in the 
long run support patronage and further weaken the control of the district level 
administration.  
 
Concerning LG competences the main problem is the impreciseness and incompleteness 
of the provisions of the LG Act. LGUs still lack the sovereignty over the budget 
expenditure which is an essential core competence. The freedom of choice of the 
Councils is significantly restrained. LGUs also lack sufficient influence on human 
resource issues. They are not adequately represented in the Local Government Service 
Commission and in the associated Tribunal. No provisions are made for the case of 
arising disputes over competences with other institutions such as the MLG, the DA or the 
chief on the community level. Currently the MLG retains decisive influence on the 
businesses of local self-administration. This is no devolution of powers if not re-
centralization through deconcentration. A transparent agenda and a consistent concept for 
the devolution process are missing. Processes are managed more in an ad hoc centralized 
manner. The challenge seems to be to make the Councils proactive in dealing with the 
competences and choices they have. On the basis of this analysis it is possible 
 219 
conclude that Lesotho has not adopted and managed some of the critical and main factors 
of decentralization’s success efficiently and effectively for development-delivery, 
affirming the argument that this policy has institutional limitations hampering it even 
against poverty reduction (Field-Interviews with Councillors, May, 2010).   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ASSESSMENT OF DECENTRALIZATION IN LESOTHO 
8.0 General Introduction 
 
The last chapter mainly dealt with the nature of Lesotho’s decentralization. The 
fundamental aim of this chapter is to further address, mostly through my questionnaire, 
interviews and examination of primary data, the following: 
• The degree of decentralization and its contribution towards political-development 
attainment/service-delivery in Lesotho. Indices which have been used for such 
measurement through the conducted questionnaire included; (a) the degree of 
local government autonomy in the selection of local staff, (b) the ability of local 
government to access national government (c) and influence national local 
government policy, (d) the range of local government functions, (e) the degree to 
which local political parties can make decisions independently of their national 
structures (f) and the degree to which local governments can raise their own 
sources of revenue independent of higher tiers of government.  
• The extent, effectiveness, and impact of decentralisation in Lesotho.  
• The assessment of the public and developmental administrative nature, type of 
relations between Local Government Units/LGUs and customary chieftaincy and 
central government, financing/budget, political and electoral systems and 
institutional and human developmental effects of decentralization,  
• The identification and assessment of decentralization’s constraints and 
improvements and the demographic aspects of the Councillors together with the 
staff so as to analytically investigate on issues of competency in policy execution 
as well as efficiency and effectiveness aspects of citizen-participation inclusive of 
development delivery.  
 
The chapter argues and critically demonstrates through field findings analysis that 
decentralization in Lesotho has experienced key specific intervening factors that thwarted 
and eroded its potential local democratization and development delivery or effective local 
governance.  
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8.1 Demographic Aspects of Lesotho’s LGUs Personnel 
 
Still in the same application of this conceptual framework within Lesotho’s context, let us 
observe the demographic aspects of the LGUs’ councillors and personnel. There is no 
doubt from the table 8.0 below that gender-wise women in Lesotho are greatly involved 
in LGUs. The age range participating is from 21 to about 71, though age group 41-50 is 
the highest (30%), followed by 31-40 (27%), 51-60 (16%), 61-70 (15%) and 21-30 
(10%). Higher women’s involvement in LG is due to higher male labour migrancy and 
low remuneration in LG (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
.   
According to my field survey and interviews (summarised in Table 8.0 below), the 
aspects of poverty, on the direct immediate beneficiaries of Lesotho’s decentralization, 
that is the LGUs’ staff and councillors, can be readily confirmed by the fact that most of 
them occupy below 4 habitable rooms, yet most of their household size is between 3 to 4 
and 5 to 6 persons almost equal in terms of occurrence/frequency. This range of 
household size justifies the need for habitable rooms to be at least mostly 5 to 6 (better 
level of life widely accepted) for better living conditions without congestion, limited 
privacy and for healthy environment. Furthermore, more than half (51%) of the LGUs’ 
administrative personnel including councillors has no useful livestock and arable land 
(55%). Table 8.0 created from the interviews I conducted indicates (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010) that the existing council areas have single 
mothers with 3 or more children ranging between at least one household to eight of such 
poor families. Income level is very low in any terms, it is entirely earned from LGUs as 
allowances and almost all of the councillors are unemployed. This gives some degree of 
needy household structure, vulnerability and poverty stricken aspects of local population 
that decentralization is encountering in Lesotho. This neediness level by immediate direct 
participants affirms extreme local poverty constituting a constraint to LG for local 
resources mobilization/revenue/productive base, thus local development delivery (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).     
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Lesotho’s LGUs’ personnel competency from the demographic data below is observably 
very low as only 15% has university education while 56% has primary education only. 
These extremely low levels of education underpin very low levels of technical, financial 
and administrative capacity. This is compounded by the fact that the elected (90%) 
councillors and staff have less than 4 years experience in LG. Many (27%) have to be 
commuting from outside council’s area stretching funds through commuting or travelling 
allowances, limiting timely responsiveness and decision-making on local needs and thus 
efficiency and effectiveness of LGUs in development delivery. The one strong (79%) 
political party-affiliation to the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy/LCD condones 
political-social exclusiveness and political-clientelism (Field Survey/Interviews, July 
2009 to July, 2010).    
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Table 8.0: Respondent's Demographic Data 
Variables   Fill Ins/Category        Frequencies Percentage  
Female 33   45 Gender 
Male 40  55 
21-30  7  10 
31-40 20  27 
41-50 22  30 
51-60 12  16 
61-70 11  15 
Age 
71+ 1  1 
1  0  0 
2  12  16 
3  19  26 
4  22  30 
5  11  15 
6  6  8 
Number of owned/rented habitable 
rooms 
7+  3  4 
1to2  8  11 
3to4  21  29 
5to6  22  30 
7to8  12  16 
Household size 
9+  10  14 
None 37 51 
Pig 12 16 
Horses/Donkeys  23  32 
sheep/goats  35  48 
Cattle  21  29 
Livestock owned 
Fowls  20  27 
1to2  19  26 
3to4  3  4 
5to6  2  3 
7to8  12  16 
Number of Households with single 
mothers & 3 or more children 
0  37  51 
0  40  55 
1 16 22 
2  5  7 
3  6  8 
4  3  4 
Number of fields owned 
5  3  4 
Married  63  86 
Single  5  7 
Widowed  5  7 
Divorced  0  0 
Marital status 
Separated  0  0 
Primary  41  56 
Secondary  8  11 
Highest Qualification 
High school  10  14 
 Tertiary/college  3  4 
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 University 11  15 
Unemployed  58  79 
self-employed  1  1 Type of work/Main occupation 
Employed  15  21 
1year  0  0 
2years 5  7 
3years 21  29 
4years 30  41 
5years  17  23 
Years of experience in Council 
6years +  0  0 
community-council  46  63 
district-council 31  42 Office held/office type occupying 
MCC 18  25 
Employed 7  10 
Elected  66  90 
How was position 
obtained/elected? 
Appointed  0  0 
community-councillor 48  66 
MCC-Councillor 15 21 
MCC-Professional 
staff member 3 4 
district-councillor  31  42 
CC-Secretary  4  5 
DC Secretary/Staff 3   4 
Chief in MCC 2 3 
Chief in CC  2  3 
Respondent's Position 
Chief in DC  2  3 
None  12  16 
LCD  65 89 
ABC  1  1 
BNP     
Other party     
Party affiliation 
Independent     
in council's area 73  100 
Place of residence 
outside council's area  20  27 
Elsewhere and distant 
other than at council’s 
place/office     
Right at the city/MCC 18 25 
 Right at the 
urban/district council 24  33 
Place of council 
 Right at the 
Community Council  31  42 
 1-2  10  14 
 3-4  48  66 
 5-6  11  15 
 7-8  0  0 Range of income in 
thousands/month?  9-10 and above 4 5  
 Employment from 
the Council 73  100 Income sources 
 Other formal 
employment     
 Informal/casual 
employment/sales  31  42 
 
Self-employed-
professional  1  1 
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Source: Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
 
8.2.0 Strategic Indicators of Decentralization and Local Governance/LG in 
Lesotho 
 
The above demographic aspects of direct participants in Lesotho’s decentralization 
designing, implementation and evaluation also as key informants in this study indicated 
some institutional constraints argued as prevalent against the success of local 
decentralization. Nonetheless, the actual measurement of Lesotho’s decentralization in 
line with the above conceptual framework needs to be done and enhanced by the 
indicators of such success or failure as here below; recalling that, “The success of policy 
is observed by looking at outcome indicators…concerned with whether policy 
(decentralization) goals are achieved and whether people are satisfied with the results 
(Parnell et al, 2002:252).”  
Councillors were interviewed on the strategic indicators of LG in Lesotho, for example,  
the community council’s elected chairperson in Qacha district in the council area called 
White Hill, Mr. Makoko has stated that,  
 
“The political signs indicating some decentralization in our country are that we 
hold elections for our councillors, once after every five years. We have council 
meetings twice a month, a general council meeting and committees’ meetings but 
we do not have standard legal mechanisms for accounting to our communities. 
Concerning devolution of administration, I think we are still behind because it is 
still the minister who hires and manages the personnel. The ministry is totally 
responsible for recruitment and control of staff. With regard to resources 
decentralization; I can say councils do not yet have sources of revenue by 
themselves. We do not have specific taxes we can use to raise funds. The money 
comes from the ministry (Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).”   
 
Owned business   5  7 
Rentals (rooms) 5 7 
Pensions 1 1 
Spouse’s income from 
other formal 
employment 6 8 
 
Migrant remittances  3  4 
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A 76 year old community councillor, Mr. Tokelo Mohlophe, in Qacha district, in Khomo-
Phat’soa council area also stated that,  
“Members of the councils select their own chairpersons. The ministry gives the 
money and controls it. Some donations are from the Germans (GTZ) and other 
donors. They are transferred to our councils through our ministry that controls 
how we are supposed to use the money. Audits are not done. I have not seen them 
performed, published or posted on any regular basis (Field Survey, Interviews, 25 
August, 2009).”   
 
8.2.1 Political Decentralization Indicators 
 
The operational indicators serving as results for measuring or indicating degree of 
success of LG in Lesotho with regard to political decentralization were formulated and 
translated into questions for obtaining responses (interviews) from the key informants as 
done in the tables (8.1 and 8.2) below:  It can be confirmed that there are LGUs 
established with elections after every five years and working committees membership 
elected annually. All which meet at least once every month as scheduled. They also elect 
own LGUs’ chairpersons. However, these LGUs do not approve their own plans and 
budgets. The 100% of key informants stated that, MCC councillors provide prioritized 
urban community needs for inclusion into the budget to be discussed and approved by 
them as a council for direct funding by the government’s cabinet but the minister usually 
makes major changes on the plans and the budget (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to 
July, 2010). 
 
Table 8.1: Political Decentralization Indicators 
Political Indicators        Response Frequency Percent 
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(a) How often are there 
fair and free (regular 
interval) local council 
elections? 
 
 
(b) How regular and 
frequent are there 
meetings of the                                                                  
local council?     
 
(c) How can you 
explain whether there is 
approval of plans and 
budgets by the local 
council?  
 
 
 
 
d) How can you explain 
whether local council 
selects its own 
chairperson? 
-After every 5 years for MCC, DCs and CCs.  
 
-Councillors elect each other for working committees annually while 
those committee members elect their chairperson. 
 
-There are monthly & emergent meetings for MCC & its 6 Council 
Committees made of 5 councillors. 
-DCs and CCs often meet monthly including working committees. 
There are also emergent meetings as well.    
 
-MCC councillors provide prioritized urban community needs for 
inclusion into the budget to be discussed and approved by them as a 
council for direct funding by the government’s cabinet. The minister 
usually makes major changes on the plans and the budget. 
-CCs and DCs councillors and the personnel produce local budgets 
for modification, approval and/or rejection by the political minister 
as well. Councils mainly provide information about local needs for 
the minister to approve as a budget for modification and granting. 
 
-MCC, CCs and DCs membership vote for their chairperson. The 
chairperson of the MCC becomes the Mayor of the MCC. Councils 
also elect their deputy chairpersons.  
73 out of 73  
respondents 
 
53 out of 73 
respondents 
 
18 out of 
18MCCs. 
55 out of 55 
DCs and CCs 
respondents 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
73 out of 73 
Respondents 
100 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
CCs and DCs and the personnel produce local budgets for modification, approval and/or 
rejection by the political minister as well. Councils mainly provide information about 
local needs for the minister to approve as a budget for modification and granting. Then 
Lesotho’s LGUs are mere consultative bodies accountable to the minister and not to 
local citizens, which is recentralization if not deconcentration, constituting policy 
reversal/vacillation as self-repeating regime/institutional constraint against effective LG 
in development-delivery (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
 
 
8.2.2      Administrative Decentralization Indicators  
 
Besides the reversed political decentralization in Lesotho as assessed by key informants, 
it could be good to let them also assess whether at least there has been any administrative 
decentralization. As shown below; Lesotho’s LGUs’ still lack authority. The minister 
approves requests for disbursements on a monthly basis for LGUs. They also still lack 
authority to recruit or manage their own staff, this is answerable to the minister. There are 
no performance, management or financial systems or standards for LGUs, the MLG’s 
given grant is fully controlled by the minister. This lack of administrative 
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decentralization puts this policy to an idle decentralization process with regard to 
development delivery as then local needs are not effectively addressed other than political 
goals of the ruling LCD, nationwide. The study’s findings affirm that there has not yet 
been administrative devolution (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Table 8.2: Administrative Decentralization Indicators 
Administrative  
Indicators        
Responses Frequency Percent 
(a)What could 
be the % of total 
government 
expenditure in 
LGU 
jurisdiction as 
controlled by 
LGU? 
 
(b)Could you 
explain how the 
LGU hires, 
manages, and  
evaluates 
government 
personnel 
working          
in the LGU area 
(percent hired, 
managed, 
evaluated?) and 
what records are 
available on 
that? 
 
(c)To what 
extent does 
LGU personnel 
perceive donors 
and government 
to be supportive, 
coherent and 
coordinated in 
their work with 
the LGU? 
 
-MCC is financially run exactly like a government ministry entirely answerable 
to the political minister of Local Government (LG). LGUs basically lack any 
jurisdiction over expenditure currently. The minister approves requests for 
disbursements on a monthly basis. LGUs still lack the capacity in terms of skilled 
personnel, financial and management systems to effect control or exercise full 
jurisdiction in expenditure. They still lack autonomy and capacity to disburse 
funds. 
-Local Government Service Commission consisting of 5 MCC members 
belonging to the ruling LCD political party hires needed staff but the minister 
from MLG has also surprisingly been filling some senior vacancies by personal 
appointments of personnel openly affiliated to her ruling LCD political party. 
The staff also clearly takes working instructions from her and reports to her the 
minister, directly. There is no staff performance appraisal or management system 
in MCC. The LG service commission also hires for the CCs and DCs but under 
the absolute scrutiny of the minister. Councils are not yet empowered to hire, 
manage and evaluate own personnel. It is distributed by the commission under 
the minister of LG.  
-At the moment there is no external funding, MLG grants MCC as the central 
government and also uses its raised road fund. The grant is directly controlled by 
the MLG resulting in uncontrolled uncoordinated improper infrastructural 
developments (evidenced by improper overly consumptive poor street lights 
e.t.c.) done by central government’s minister appointed incompetent contractors 
unknown to the MCC, not supervised/monitored. The annual grant is usually 
inadequate, around R50 Million while the budget required for city’s 
infrastructural development and maintenance according to the MCC’s yearly 
budget is well over R700 Million per year. Direct external funding is seized by 
the central government. The central tier controls all the funding and its use, 
prioritizing its national political goals of continued dominance and long stay in 
power thus lacks effective support, coherence and coordination needed for local 
development.  
-LGUs in Lesotho receive controlled grants from the MLG. Donors like GTZ 
(German Development Agency), UNDP and the international financial 
institutions still occasionally donate decentralization through the MLG under an 
illusion that the funds will be well managed, coordinated and used properly to 
directly support LGUs in a coherent manner. There is no transparency and 
effective/adequate support in the use of such resources for LGUs. MLG controls 
LGUs’ everything and does not support them towards autonomy and self-
sustenance. It could be better for LGUs to directly access and account for 
resources from donors and Lesotho Revenue Authority (LRA) responsible for tax 
collection and raising of LGUs’ road fund. Direct dealings between LGUs and 
sponsors are essential to minimize power abuse and corruption which are 
probably among the main impediments of LGUs’ progress in Lesotho.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
18 out of 
18MCCs, 
55 out of 55 
CCs and 
DCs 
respondents  
 
 
40 out of 73 
respondents
, 13 could 
not 
comment on 
MCC, they 
lacked 
knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
100 
 
 
 
100 
100 
 
 
 
 
55 but 
18% 
did not 
know 
much 
about 
MCC 
here 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
8.2.3  Resource Decentralization (Fiscal and Personnel) Indicators in 
Lesotho’s LGUs 
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Key informants confirmed that decentralization in Lesotho lacks both political and 
administrative devolution. One of the most critical pre-requisites for the success of 
decentralization in development delivery is the devolution of resources, that is capital, 
personnel and financial resources to the LGUs. There are many opportunities for the 
MCC and DCs to raise funding for their urban development budget, for instance, possible 
charges on car parking, public toilets, tollgate fees and so on but surprisingly from the 
table (8.3) below, LGUs in Lesotho can hardly raise any funding. They lack any effective 
billing system and have not embarked upon retailing needed most profitable public 
utilities like water and electricity. These are still centralized in the parastatals lacking 
country coverage, Water and Sewage Authority/WASA and Lesotho Electricity 
Corporation/LEC. The central government lacks the political will to stipulate any specific 
taxes to preserve popular support. The limited grant to LGUs is completely controlled by 
the MLG. Furthermore, lack of resources devolution from the table 8.3 below can be 
confirmed by the fact that 100% of the key informants have agreed that ‘clientelism and 
political loyalty to the ruling LCD political party and MLG’s minister matter most in 
almost all aspects of personnel management. There is no staff performance appraisal.  
Many staff members feel insecure and are busy secretly seeking alternative employment. 
The range of unfilled vacancies from 40% to 60% for skilled personnel is very high 
confirming the need to let LGUs recruit for themselves instead of the MLG’s minister or 
LG commission under the minister. The untrained and inexperienced CCSs are regarded 
by the central government as the supportive staff for training LGUs for increased 
capacity and competency in the yet unrealized local development delivery.  Resources are 
not devolved as confirmed table 8.3 below, this is an illusive decentralization (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
Table 8.3: Resource Decentralization (Fiscal and Personnel) Indicators 
Resource  Indicators      
  
Responses Frequency Percent 
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(a) What are the sources 
and amount of total 
revenue of the LGU? 
 
 
 
 
(b) What is the trend of 
and how much is the per 
capita revenues of 
LGU? 
 
 
(c) Percent of revenues 
LGU raises from local 
sources and specific 
taxes used (Explain)? % 
raised from local 
sources? Specific taxes 
used? 
 
(d) What is the 
Percentage of revenues 
transferred to the LGU 
with only general 
guidelines and goals 
(Explain)? 
 
(Personnel Issues) 
(e) Does the LGU use 
standardized procedures 
in all aspects of 
personnel management 
(Explain)?  
 
(f) What is the 
Percentage of LGU 
senior/managerial slots 
filled with qualified 
persons (Explain)? 
 
(g)Number of person-
days of visits by 
national personnel for 
training and other 
assistance to local 
personnel and other 
support of LGU 
(Explain) 
-MCC just has about R50 Million as a yearly grant from the MLG 
and raises less than a percent of that per year from the property rates, 
business and building permits, public toilet fees, clinics, market 
stalls/fees and waste disposal fees. The entire system of the LG 
basically depends on the controlled grant from the MLG. Such a grant 
is said to be10.8% of the country’s total revenue.  
-Payments are not regular; there is so much evasion and avoidance as 
there is no effective billing systems and law enforcement to make 
MCC become effective in revenue collection. Per capita revenue is 
dwindling every year due to such inefficient billing system and 
massive migration into the city. This makes LGUs to lack reliable 
data for the accurate per capita revenue besides the fact that grants 
from MLG never increase substantially to respond sufficiently to the 
local developmental needs.  
-The MLG has been reluctant to introduce any taxes through MCC, 
CCs or DCs, in fear of loss of popular political support, thus no 
taxation is done yet.  
-Almost all of the funding is from the MLG and is closely controlled 
through the minister’s instructions on senior personnel who also 
usually divert funds among MCC’s departments at will and at whim 
without any financial accounting or justification to anyone, including 
the cabinet that approved funding as there is not even any internal 
auditing. There are no amounts transferred with only general 
guidelines and goals, disbursements directly get approved by the 
minister. 
-Clientelism and political loyalty to the ruling LCD political party 
and MLG’s minister matter most in almost all aspects of personnel 
management and there is no staff performance appraisal.  Many staff 
members feel insecure and are busy secretly seeking alternative 
employment.  
-Only around 60% of the senior managerial slots are filled as so many 
critical posts like the Works-Engineer, Building Control Officer e.t.c. 
have been vacant for years with obvious illegal improperly located 
mall buildings developing and owned jointly by political ministers. 
For other LGUs only 40% of vacancies is filled. Vacancies spent 
years unfilled. 
-There is no form of any support, assistance or training from the 
MLG to the MCC or LGUs in general. Supportive training sessions 
are quite unknown or reported not to exist. 
-Community council secretaries are regarded by the central 
government as national personnel for training and assisting LGUs. 
55 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
41 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
!
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
60 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
68 out of 73 
respondents  
5 out of 73 
respondents 
 
75 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
82 
 
 
93 
 
7 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
8.2.4 LGUs’ Transparency in Lesotho 
 
One other strategic indicator for the successful decentralization for good governance is 
transparency. Local citizens need to be up to date with the developments in their LGUs 
for their participation in decision making and contributions in development activities 
addressing their local needs. The aspect of transparency in Lesotho’s LGUs is 
constrained by the fact that venues for the scheduled meetings are small and inaccessible 
to the local dwellers. The used closed government boardrooms and halls of hotels for 
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meetings bar participation of the locals. This in itself disempowers local population in 
enforcing local accountability and relevant development projects for poverty alleviation. 
It puts LG at an inaccessible unresponsive position characteristic of the central 
government.  Physical structures accessible and open to the local communities are not 
used. Meetings are scheduled on a monthly basis but they are not publicly posted, 
announced and made open to the public. This severely limits needed citizen-participation 
in decentralization for poverty alleviation (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
 
Audits though so critical and essential for financial transparency are not done. They may 
be done according to the minister’s demand according to the decentralization Act. This 
puts accounting to the local public as a matter of no priority. It creates a conducive 
environment for financial mismanagement, corruption and impunity. It has indeed 
promoted impropriety and unaccounted funds diversion and personal misuse as reported 
mainly by the LGUs’ senior staff who would like to remain anonymous. 
Structures/vacancies that could effect financial monitoring, management and proper 
accounting standards are left unfilled for years. Many of the staff members cannot 
remember when the last audit was made. They want to safely argue that there are such 
financial requirements in the government ministries including the LG. The central 
government hopes that international donors will put money in the LG to boost efforts to 
reduce local poverty. Most of such donors as prerequisite to donating development seek 
well maintained yearly audit records to be guaranteed that their freed funds will be indeed 
properly used and managed. Probably, LGUs’ lack of transparency is also due to lack of 
effective opposition parties in the LGUs. As has been observed from the demographic 
aspects of the respondents earlier, almost every councillor is a member to the ruling LCD 
political party. Contrary to the norm whereby local council meetings ought to be publicly 
posted, announced and made open to the local population, audits having to be performed 
regularly and be published and posted in accordance with the stipulated law in the Act of 
decentralization, Lesotho’s LGUs operate for years without those hoping that at one time 
the minister may call for an audit as the law operates on the basis of such minister’s will 
and discretion (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).   
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Table 8.4: Transparency Decentralization Indicators 
Transparency  Indicators        Responses Frequency Percentage 
(a) Are Local council meetings 
publicly posted  
and announced and open to the 
public (Explain)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Are audits performed, 
published and posted on a 
regular basis as required by 
law (Explain)? 
 
 
 
-MCC’s meetings long time ago when it began used to be 
public in community halls where the public could freely 
participate by asking questions, debate issues and even 
provide information about their development needs but of 
late they are held in the closed private boardroom of the 
Mayor quite inaccessible and unknown to the public’s 
participation. Other LGUs also hold council meetings in 
closed halls of hotels and other government buildings. 
Physical structures accessible and open to the 
communities are not used. Meetings are monthly 
scheduled but are not publicly posted, announced and 
made open to the public.    
-Dates for LGUs are publicly known so people can freely 
come and participate. 
 
-There are no internal and external audits made at MCC, 
except one of long time ago when MCC was being 
introduced as there is also no internal auditor. This 
abnormal practice has resulted in uncountable 
consequences of unaccounted missing physical and 
financial resources, not to talk of non-delivery of essential 
developmental quality services. Other LGUs are not 
audited as well. 
70 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
3 out of 73 
respondents 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
100 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
8.2.5  Lesotho’s LGUs and the Rule of Law 
 
It can be observed from above that transparency is limited in Lesotho’s LGUs but 
furthermore, for decentralization to be efficient and effective there is need for it to be 
implemented within the institutional framework able to keep and maintain the rule of 
law for its smooth functioning and development delivery. All respondents (100%) 
from the table 8.5 below confirm that there are set standards and regulations for MCC 
only on the paper but what is practiced is the direct will of the political minister. 
Meetings are inaccessible to the public, personnel actions have to follow direct 
instructions from the minister of the MLG. Plans and budgets made through 
councillors only constitute a consultative exercise as funds usually get diverted 
anyhow, unaccounted for and under absolute control by the minister. There are no 
tendering procedures adhered to though written down, MLG has for many times 
imposed unsupervised unknown development contractors particularly in Maseru city 
without involving MCC, this has severely compromised developmental service 
delivery and standards. LGUs’ personnel to a greater extent has no opportunity or 
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Table 8.5: Rule of Law Indicators 
Rule of law  
Indicators        
Responses Frequency Percent 
(a)Does LGU 
personnel follow 
national and 
locally required 
procedures for 
meetings, 
personnel 
actions, planning, 
tenders, service 
standards, 
budgeting bylaws 
etc (Explain)?  
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Does LGU 
executive follow 
lawful 
instructions of 
local councils 
and other organs 
of the 
government 
(Explain)?   
 
 
(c) Are Election 
requirements and 
procedures 
followed 
satisfactorily 
(Explain)?   
 
(d) How do (and 
Can) Citizens 
bring grievances 
regarding the 
LGU to 
independent 
adjudicatory 
bodies (Explain)?
  
-There are set standards and regulations for MCC on the paper but what is 
practiced is the direct will of the political minister. Meetings are inaccessible 
to the public, personnel actions have to follow direct instructions from the 
minister of the MLG. Plans and budgets made through councillors only 
constitute just one consultative exercise as funds usually get diverted anyhow, 
unaccounted for and under absolute control by the minister. There are no 
tendering procedures adhered to though written down, MLG has for many 
times imposed unsupervised unknown development contractors particularly in 
the city without involving MCC, this has severely compromised 
developmental service delivery and standards. LGUs’ personnel to a greater 
extent has no opportunity or much room to follow national and locally 
required procedures for meetings, personnel actions, planning, tenders, service 
standards, budgeting bylaws and other acceptable standards because they are 
directly micro-managed by the minister without adequate capacity for 
efficiency effectiveness. Tenders are unfairly given, only our ministers know 
about them. A lot of money has disappeared in the name of LGUs.  
-Practical executive powers contrary to the expected legal normal standards 
rest with the minister. MCC and other LGUs are overly politicized and lack 
any form of practical autonomy. Only political will and instructions from the 
MLG are followed and thus not lawful ones originating directly from the 
grassroots. The staff can only keep this trend to also preserve their jobs. The 
MCC and other LGUs’ executive follow lawful instructions of councillors to a 
very limited inconspicuous extent in this scenario. 
-Elections for councillors in the MCC and other LGUs are held after every 
five years but unfortunately follow the ‘first-past-the-post’ model where the 
winner takes all the seats on the basis of nominal figures ignoring 
representation and participation of the necessary opposition. As such, LGUs in 
Lesotho lack opposition and are ‘yes men’ of political ministers. Legal 
procedures followed are to the disadvantage of real inclusive democratic 
participation. They are unsatisfactory because they lack proportional 
representation of other political parties except the dominant ruling party. 
-Citizens have occasionally and are expected to use media and the office of 
the Town Clerk in bringing up grievances about the MCC, however, the public 
has just often acted against MCC’s billing decisions and activities, at times 
through vandalism on MCC’s imposed projects. Other LGUs being CCs and 
DCs are just legally regarded as entities that may be taken to court but there 
are no clear structures through which to raise grievances.   
-Community members do not raise grievances formally, they may only 
complain to the councillors.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
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73 out of 73 
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71 out of 73 
respondents  
 
2 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
97 
 
3 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
much room to follow national and locally required procedures for meetings, personnel 
actions, planning, tenders, service standards, budgeting bylaws and other acceptable 
standards because they are directly micro-managed by the minister without adequate 
capacity for efficiency and effectiveness. It is widely believed that tenders are unfairly 
given, only the ministers know about them. A lot of money has disappeared in the name 
of LGUs. Citizens lack knowledge on how to address their grievances about the LGUs. 
The first-past-the-post electoral model used is exclusive and promotes dominance by the 
 234 
LCD ruling party. Rule of law is legally undermined in Lesotho’s decentralization (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
 
Conducted interviews with councillors about the rule of law and electoral procedures also 
revealed the following; 
“Concerning the rule of law and procedures in elections, I can say that, election 
procedures were followed satisfactorily in 2005 for electing councillors but the 
opposition parties are complaining that the first-past-the-post election method 
used across the country in local governance is not including them, unlike at the 
national level where 40 seats are reserved for mixed membership. The only place 
in Lesotho, where some seats were given to the opposition through mixed-
membership proportion is in the district of Mokhotlong but only the ABC and 
BNP parties managed to get around 3 seats only. It is our minister who allowed 
that arrangement in Mokhotlong (Mr. Mohale Maluke, DC, Thaba-Khubelu, 25
th
 
of August, 2009).” 
 
8.2.6  LGUs’ Accountability Decentralization Indicators in Lesotho 
 
Besides transparency and rule of law indicated above, one other aspect of efficient and 
effective decentralization is LGU’s accountability to the locals. This constitutes good 
governance, facilitates development delivery and curbs corruption. For such 
accountability to prevail, LGUs need not only consist of elected councillors and their 
sector management personnel but have to regularly and frequently hold open meetings 
with the local public for consultation and citizens’ participation. LGUs’ personnel also 
need to produce regular reports to the MLG about local conditions, maintain compliance 
with national plans while prioritizing local needs, adhere to set service standards and 
established LGUs’ operations and activities, plans, budgets, revenues, expenditures and 
audits. It is also crucial for the MLG to respond effectively to the LGUs’ reports with 
suggestions, recommendations and assistance (Olowu et al 2006:187). Contrarily for 
LGUs in Lesotho, key informants (62%) reported that councillors and staff use rare 
public consultative meetings compared to their often used political gatherings. This is 
politically exclusive. The personnel often works together with the councillors and chiefs 
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for facilitating public meeting in other LGUs beside MCC, specifically for initiating new 
public projects as well. Other key informants (32%) further confirmed that councillors 
and staff rarely hold consultative meetings with locals, there is no clear plan or 
programme or schedule for such a practice to effect accountability.  Every respondent 
(100%) agreeably noted that LGUs’ accountability is also undermined and compromised 
by the fact that Basotho are a very passive people in politics because their tangible 
interests are not addressed by these political structures which they also do not understand 
their functions, the ‘first-past-the-post’ model of elections different from the proportional 
country’s general elections have provided the ruling party, LCD, through the MLG still 
such terribly unmarked and unchecked political domination as successive councils tend to 
consist of the entire LCD’s political membership too loyal to the will and whim of the 
minister. The one dominant party system deprives citizens of equitable participation and 
power balance giving absolute power to the minister in the MLG unaccountable to the 
citizens but to the ruling political elite. This is the trend for both the MCC and the other 
LGUs. The minister is the one actually receiving reports from the LGUs not the public 
through any form of request. MCC’s staff have also reported that there is a circular often 
released from the minister’s office reminding them that no form of any information may 
be made available to any one requesting for it. This insulates Lesotho’s LGU’s from local 
accountability and disempowers locals from participating, barring political opposition 
and shielding malpractices of any form including curbing local pressure for 
developmental delivery. 
All the respondents (100% on table 8.6 below) have reported that accountability in 
Lesotho’s LGUs is also compromised by the fact that decentralization in Lesotho does 
not comply with public accountability or consultative practices, its specific objectives of 
attaining the provision of a democratic and accountable government, sustainable services 
provision, promotion of social and economic development by giving priority to basic 
community, promotion of the involvement of the community and organizations and 
individuals in local government issues, enhancement of participation in national and 
community programmes and the combination of the municipality and urban boards to 
include rural areas. All of the respondents substantiated that MCC’s provided services 
have no sustenance due to lack of adequate budget and self-fund raising development 
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projects’ activities for such a developmental purpose of maintenance. All other LGUs 
also fall in the same bracket. MCC’s development services cannot have sustainability 
because it lacks legal protection to enforce proper control on the so many illegal 
developments (malls) directly owned by senior politicians in the city or urban areas. Such 
sub-standard developments have also compromised safety standards and impede smooth 
flow of the traffic though the public would blame the powerless MCC and the DCs (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
. 
All the key informants (100% on table 8.6 below) also confirmed that accountability is 
further hampered by the fact that audits are not made but plans, budgets, revenues and 
expenditures are made and put under the control of the MLG through the minister and are 
basically approved by the cabinet for all the LGUs. Worst of it, the MLG hardly responds 
to the recommendations and/or reports by the LGUs. Mrs. ‘Manapo Matlali, an elected 
district councillor in Rat’soleli council in Qacha district further explained that, “the 
ministry of local government does not respond satisfactorily to our reports with 
suggestions and recommendations. We get little assistance from the ministry for our 
developmental needs (Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).” Existing laws allowing 
the LGUs some autonomy, for instance, in decision making to raise funds and solve its 
various limitations including financial ones lack adequate specific stipulation, practice 
and enforcement. There is no support from the MLG. Accountability is also constrained 
in that LGUs’ activities are still limited, other various functions are still centralized in the 
hands of the chiefs, mainly of the District Administrators/DAs and MLG for the lower, 
middle and central tiers respectively (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
.          
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.6: Accountability Decentralization Indicators 
Accountability  
Indicators        
Responses Frequency Percent 
(a) Do the elected 
LGU and sector 
management 
personnel attend open 
-MCC’s elected and sector management personnel hold consultative 
public meetings particularly on new development projects not 
necessarily on a regular and frequent basis as a norm. The working 
population’s opinion is usually collected through hand delivered survey 
45 out of 73 
respondents  
62 
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meetings to consult 
with the public on a 
regular and frequent 
basis (Explain)? 
(b)Does LGU 
personnel provide 
regular reports to 
national government 
ministries regarding 
local conditions 
(Explain)?  
How regular are the 
reports? 
 
 
 
 
(c)To what extent is 
there LGU’s 
compliance with 
national plans and 
service standards 
(Explain)?  
How is the 
compliance with? 
(i) provision of a 
democratic and 
accountable 
government,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) sustainable 
services provision,
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) promotion of 
social and economic 
development by 
giving priority to 
basic community, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
questionnaires to their households about particular new development 
projects. Most of the councillors are affiliated to the ruling political 
party and represent this party locally. They use rare public consultative 
meetings compared to their often used political gatherings. This is 
politically exclusive. The personnel often works together with the 
councillors and chiefs for facilitating public meeting in other LGUs 
beside MCC, specifically for initiating new public projects as well. 
-Councillors and staff rarely hold consultative meetings with locals, 
there is no clear plan or programme or schedule for such a practice.  
- MCC’s personnel produces weekly reports for the committees and the 
council. Other LGUs do the same. Quarterly and annual reports are 
provided for the MLG. Special reports and project proposals may also 
be produced. Some reports include evaluation and procurement reports. 
Most of the reports are made for the minister in the MLG.   
-MCC adopts the country’s developmental vision of 2020 in its plans. 
The plans comply with the goal of creating labour-based programmes 
and attain socio-economic development. The minister modifies both 
MCC’s plans and other LGUs’ to ensure compliance with the 2020 
vision and the Poverty Reduction Strategy/PRS as well as the 
Millennium Development Goals/MDGs. Nonetheless, there are no clear 
service standards set for the LGUs.  
-Basotho are almost a very passive people in politics, the ‘first-past-the-
post’ model of elections different from the proportional country’s 
general elections have provided the ruling party, LCD, through the 
MLG still such terribly unmarked and unchecked political domination 
as successive councils tend to consist of the entire LCD’s political 
membership too loyal to the will and whim of the minister. The one 
dominant party system deprives citizens of equitable participation and 
power balance giving absolute power to the minister in the MLG 
unaccountable to the citizens. This is the trend for both the MCC and 
the other LGUs.    
-MCC’s provided services have no sustenance due to lack of adequate 
budget and self-fund raising development projects’ activities for such a 
developmental purpose of maintenance. All other LGUs fall in the same 
bracket. MCC’s development services cannot have sustainability 
because it lacks legal protection to enforce proper control on the so 
many illegal developments (malls) directly owned by big politicians in 
the city. Such sub-standard developments have also compromised safety 
standards and impede smooth flow of the traffic though the public 
would blame the powerless MCC. 
-MCC and other LGUs are the political-wing of the ruling dominant 
political-elite who practically adopt an absolute top-down approach to 
development delivery. Right after the councillors and staff have gone 
through the budgetary and needs prioritization process of the city’s 
community, CCs and DCs, MLG sets own different specific tasks, 
targets and inadequate budget allocation for the MCC’s departments and 
other LGUs. The budget allocations just also get vired and diverted 
among the votes and departments ultimately ending up unaccounted for 
with no delivery. Promoting socio-economic development by 
prioritizing basic community is just a wish, provision of trading 
opportunities and licenses or business permits is not oriented towards 
helping the urban and the rural poor. There is a ‘crowd out effect’ 
whereby business opportunities and lucrative jobs and/development 
contracts are in the hands mostly of foreigners having the ruling 
political-elite as the main share-holders and beneficiaries, right from 
ownership of (streets) cleaning companies, rubbish and waste disposal, 
roads-building to  (gravel-quarries and other precious 
resources/minerals) mining and masonry. Senior ruling politicians are 
the ones freely investing in and personally owning so much of 
infrastructural development (business-malls) for personal gain. The 
MCC and other LGUs are not prioritizing or investing in any 
community-driven development projects targeting the poor. The labour-
based programmes remunerating far below real survival minimum wage 
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(iv) promotion of the 
involvement of the 
community and 
organizations and 
individuals in local 
government issues,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(v) enhancement of 
participation in 
national and 
community 
programmes,  
 
 
 
 
(vi) and the 
combination of the 
municipality and 
urban boards to 
include rural areas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d)What are the 
LGU’s operations and 
activities?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(e)How are LGU’s 
plans, budgets, 
revenues, 
expenditures and 
audits made and 
controlled? 
 
(f)How satisfactory 
do national ministries 
respond to LGU 
reports with 
suggestions, 
level are only accessible to the LCD loyal membership through the 
MLG’s minister’s appointments and the politically dictated to Local 
Government Service Commission supposed to be independent in 
employing newly needed staff.    
-There is a belief that MCC prioritizes the local community by its 
provision of solid waste management services, roads building, street-
lights and employment of labour from the locals. The other LGUs 
together with the MCC at least serve as some advisory bodies about 
local needs to the minister.      
-The one-dominant-political-party system and constitutionally biased 
model of local elections still keep on stifling proper and effective 
involvement of the MCC’s and other LGUs’ communities, grassroots 
organizations and individuals in local government issues. Only 
councillors predominantly belonging to the ruling LCD political party 
are involved, so far.    
-MCC promotes participation in national and community programmes 
by collecting peoples’ ideas through environmental assessment studies 
and other questionnaires, public gatherings and media programmes 
which are turned into national and local environmental conservation 
programmes for approval and implementation by the National 
Environmental Secretariat (NES). Other LGUs completely lack clear 
structures, standardized mechanisms and resources for diffusing 
information to activate peoples’ good participation locally and 
nationally.  
-MCC has a community development office that takes care of the 
developmental issues that affect both the city area and the rural 
areas/outskirts. This is about settling disputes over use of resources 
(land/cemeteries, quarries e.t.c.), newly expanding or changing 
boundaries and coordination of activities. It is actually the district 
council composed of the rural local/community councils’ representation 
with towns’ councillors that address rural and towns’ development 
needs. The legal municipality unit is still confined to the main/capital 
city of Maseru as a pilot project. DCs combining representation as a 
provincial or regional tier cater for the other (towns) smaller urban areas 
and the rural.     
-MCC’s activities include development and maintenance of 
infrastructure/roads and parks, some street lights, solid waste 
management,  (health, environmental) awareness campaigns, provision 
of health services and advertizing billboards, public toilets and business 
and building permits and sites and burial grounds allocation and 
collection of property rates. DCs also deal with refuse collection in the 
towns, sites and cemeteries’ allocation, roads building and maintenance, 
public toilets and market stalls provision for a levy and business permits 
for street vendors and other smaller businesses. CCs control grazing and 
concerned grassland offences and community forests, burial grounds, 
sites and fields (land) allocation, some village water supply projects, 
minor roads development and registration of livestock. Other various 
functions are still centralized in the hands of the chiefs, mainly of the 
District Administrators/DAs and MLG for the lower, middle and central 
tiers respectively.            
 
-Audits are not made but plans, budgets, revenues and expenditures are 
made and put under the control of the MLG through the minister and are 
basically approved by the cabinet for all the LGUs. 
 
 
-The MLG hardly responds to the recommendations and/or reports by 
the LGUs. Existing laws allowing the LGUs some autonomy, for 
instance, in decision making to raise funds and solve its various 
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recommendations 
and/or assistance 
(Explain)? 
 
limitations including financial ones lack adequate specific stipulation, 
practice and enforcement. There is no support from the MLG.   
respondents  
 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
8.2.7.0 Lesotho’s LGUs Indicators of Participation in Decentralization  
 
It can already be observed from the key informants’ assessment that decentralization in 
Lesotho has not been efficient and effective as it lacks political, administrative and 
resources decentralization, transparency, rule of law and accountability which also serve 
as aspects of good governance and effective local governance for poverty alleviation. 
Brynard Petrus (1996:133-134) regards citizen participation “as purposeful activities in 
which people take part in relation to a local authority area of which they are legal 
residents…it lays emphasis on the person rather than the state in the participatory 
relationship.” Participation generally includes involving and educating the public, 
mechanisms for democratizing the development planning process, creative network 
potential, equality fostering and non-exclusion, maintaining a balance between the central 
government demands and control and the requirements of local government and 
administration and access to information concerning local conditions, needs, desires and 
attitudes. It is not only about receiving information but includes actual power sharing in 
shaping final decisions. Olowu, et al (2006:186) perceives it concisely through indicators 
of efficiency in decentralization as the percent of the electorate voting in LGU elections 
and as the number of members of local organizations including Non-Governmental 
Organizations/NGOs, the private sector and sub-LGUs attending the open LGU forums.  
The table 8.7 below exposes Lesotho’s LGUs’ experience in participation to be too low, 
confirming passiveness and inefficiency in involving and educating the local public, 
promoting mechanisms for democratizing the development planning process locally, 
enhancing local creativity, fostering equality and non-exclusion, maintaining a balance 
between the central government demands and control and the requirements of LG and 
administration and access to information concerning local conditions, needs, desires and 
attitudes as voter-turnout is only around 5% with no civic participation in the LGUs at all 
(Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
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Table 8.7:  Participation Decentralization Indicators 
Participation  
Indicators                                               
Responses Frequency Percentage 
(a) What’s the 
percentage of 
the electorate 
 that votes in 
LGU elections 
(Explain)?  
 
(b) Number of 
local 
organizations 
(NGO, private,  
sub- LGU) that 
attend open 
LGU forums? 
-Only around 5% of voters do actually participate in voting for councillors 
in the MCC and other LGUs.  
-There is a very low voter turn-out because the locals put more of their faith 
in general elections than LGUs’. 
 
-There are no local organizations (NGOs, private sub- LGU) that attend 
LGUs’ meetings as their forums are also not so practically open/public. 
Scheduled monthly meetings are actually held in the closed doors of the 
Mayor’s boardroom for the MCC. Participation of the civil society is not 
inculcated and this has resulted in a lot of negligence and low maintenance 
of democratic, human and developmental rights and non-delivery. Monthly 
meetings for the DCs are also held in closed doors of central government’s 
facilities or hotels, almost private inaccessible venues.  
67 out of 73 
respondents  
6 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
92 
 
8 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
 
Confirming the findings in the above 8.7 table, a district councillor, in the Patlong 
council in Qacha district, Mr. Thabo P. Thatho expressed that, “our communities are still 
passive in governance. They are not participating actively. I think that this is their 
fundamental right but we have not yet created enough platforms that facilitate genuine 
engagement with them on matters that affect them.  Sometimes we have public meetings 
with them together with the staff, I can say on discretionary basis, integrating their 
interests satisfactorily cannot be said (Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).” A 
community council chairperson of the Mosenekeng council area in Qacha district, Mrs. 
Molungoa Moloi has also told that “we do not have local non-governmental organizations 
in our councils that could attend our open forums. There are also no such open forums 
given (Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).”   
 
8.2.7.1 Political Participation Forms by Grass root Communities in Lesotho’s LGUs 
 
Table 8.7(i) below shows that key informants (100%) strongly believe that communities’ 
political participation in Lesotho’s LGUs is very limited as they reported that there is no 
effective local communities’ political participation in Lesotho except for merely voting 
political party representatives who are directed by the ministers and ceaselessly attend 
 241 
political ‘talk-shows’ for sitting allowances in LGUs. Limited political participation has 
also been confirmed by the following responses;  
Mr. Mothepu Sebilo, a district councillor from Thaba-Khubelu council in Qacha district, 
explained the concern that, “…political participation in our councils is not satisfactory 
because there are no clearly legally stipulated mechanisms and ways that actually foster it 
for the benefit of our people (Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).”  “My view is 
that our communities have fewer choices, the Local Government Act is not articulating 
how our communities can really participate for their development, it is short of enough 
public participation bodies that can institutionalize regular political participation, we need 
more of such structures (Mr. Tsebo Lerotholi, the Ha Sekake Community Councillor, in 
Qacha, Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).”  
 
According to the LG Act (2004), only the MLG’s minister has powers to pass laws in 
LGUs. Respondents (100%) also confirmed this, reporting that councillors initiate 
recommendations for amendments and introduction of new laws through higher spheres 
like district councils, particularly the minister and the members of the parliament. 
Participation also involves communities holding public gatherings to express their 
developmental priorities through the councillors who help transform local needs into 
development plans and budgets. Nonetheless, the MLG’s minister approves, rejects and 
modifies these budgets and plans and decides on approving their grant (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).   
.  
A worrying trend is observable here as all (100%) respondents stated that political parties 
nominate candidates to be voted by local communities into decision making councils. 
This trend has consequences of the only one dominant ruling party being represented 
socially excluding smaller membership-sectors of the society. Table 8.7(i) below affirms 
this limited political participation that is only conducive for actual observable 
recentralization. It also further confirms that there has not yet been political 
decentralization in Lesotho since councillors do not really make laws, implement, 
monitor and evaluate them, specifically for their LGUs (Field Survey/Interviews, July 
2009 to July, 2010).  
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Table 8.7(i): Forms of Political Participation by Grass root Communities in LGUs 
LGU’s inputs/political activities                             LGU’s outputs/outcomes Frequency Percent 
-Local communities elect councillors to 
represent them in the councils for decision 
making and formulation of policies. 
 
-Communities hold public gatherings to 
express their developmental priorities 
through the councillors.  
 
 
-Councillors help transform local needs 
into development plans and budgets. 
 
 
-Councillors initiate recommendations for 
amendments and introduction of new laws 
through higher spheres of e.g. district 
councils, the minister and the members of 
the parliament.  
 
-Political parties nominate candidates to be 
voted by local communities into decision 
making councils.  
 
-There is no effective local communities’ 
political participation in Lesotho except 
for merely voting representatives who are 
directed by the ministers and ceaselessly 
attend political ‘talk-shows’ for sitting 
allowances LGUs. 
-local legal political and 
representative structures are 
made up for communities.  
-Political gatherings for self-
expression of developmental 
needs are attained. 
 
-Local development plans for 
service delivery are made.  
 
-Acts and laws beneficial to 
locals are in place. 
 
-Political parties’ manifestos 
are implemented at the local 
level 
 
-Several expensive 
consultative forums bearing 
no community-driven 
development. 
 
55 out of 73 
respondents  
 
18 out of 73 
respondents  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
75 
 
 
25 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
 
Ruling political party domination is also affirmed by table 8.7(ii) below indicating that 
Lesotho’s LG suffers from recentralization through the ruling political party. This is one 
of the crucial elements of real extent of political decentralization to be considered as its 
effects of such decentralization are often negated by party centralization now incidental. 
Party politics in LGUs in Lesotho are exclusive and dominating. This transforms LGUs 
into instruments for central government use and not for local development (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
. 
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Table 8.7(ii): The Role of Party Politics Gauging Political Decentralization 
Features of party politics Degree of application? Frequency Percent 
Candidates have to be selected by the 
party. 
Candidates are entirely selected as 
political nominees for LGUs’ elections by 
their political parties’ senior 
administrative structures.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
A distinct policy programme is made 
for a local party group. 
There is no distinct policy programme 
formulated for a local party group.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
A party election manifesto, to which 
all party candidates are expected to 
adhere, both during the election 
campaign and once elected, is 
produced. 
Councillors pursue and adhere to their 
party election manifesto used during the 
election campaign once elected locally. 
This manifesto is usually focusing at the 
country’s general elections lacking 
relevance to local needs but focusing on 
national issues mainly concerned with 
central governance. This transforms LGUs 
into instruments for central government 
use and not for local development.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
An attempt is made to implement the 
manifesto in the event of the party 
winning a majority of seats on the 
council.  
The LCD now ruling usually wins almost 
all of the seats and freely wrongly puts its 
national manifesto as a blueprint for local 
development. This perpetuates political 
domination by the central government and 
the political majority at the expense of 
proper community driven development 
measures and effective democracy through 
a flawed first-past-the-post electoral 
model enabling only one dominant 
political majority ruling party.   
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Councillors are organized into party 
groups for the purposes of allocating 
committee places and other positions 
of leadership and responsibility, to 
develop and co-ordinate party policy, 
to determine strategy and tactics and 
to ensure group discipline.  
There is only one party dominating 
council membership. Where few 
negligible seats are won by the opposing 
party, councillors are not organized into 
party groups.    
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Group leadership, comprising an 
individual leader and usually a 
committee of group executive 
officers, is elected by the members of 
the group. 
Committees elect their leaders. They 
usually consist of three to five members 
who are usually from the same dominant 
political party. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Pre-council & pre-committee party 
group meetings are convened to 
enable party members to agree on 
policy and plan debating & voting 
tactics. 
Caucus meetings are not essential as most 
of the membership belongs to one main 
ruling party.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
8.2.7.2 Indicators of Empowerment in Lesotho’s Decentralization  
 
Empowerment in decentralization, in terms of empirical indicators for a successful 
development delivery, generally refers to the “number of NGOs active in the LGUs… 
sub-LGU community and neighbourhood governance organizations…number of 
meetings between LGU senior or elected personnel and representatives of NGOs, sub-
LGUs and women/vulnerable groups (Millet, Olowu and Cameron, 2006:187).” Key 
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informants from the table 8.8 below and above have confirmed that LG in Lesotho 
completely lacks NGOs’ activeness in any form. There are no meetings between LGUs’ 
personnel or councillors and the NGOs’ representatives. A discouraging statement from 
these key informants is that ‘there has not yet been any plan to encompass the disabled 
and the weak in an institutionalized manner in the LGUs’. This type of political-social 
exclusion can only consequentially ensure inefficient and ineffective LG in development 
delivery. NGOs naturally embody the spontaneous socio-economic interests of the 
collective needs of the locals. It is their participation in LGUs that may only 
automatically direct LG into being relevant to the local community’s developmental 
needs. While chiefs form part of the ex-officio representation in the LGUs, as one other 
form of local traditional elite, representation of the collective needy local groupings is not 
guaranteed as such do not constitute membership of either the traditional elite or the 
political-elite or the elected councillors’ constituency. Chiefs are elected by chiefs’ forum 
to represent them in the LGUs, councillors are mainly elected by own political parties’ 
membership to be their proxy. Only traditionalist and political interests are represented in 
the LGUs. The potential expression of local collective needs is left out, rendering 
Lesotho’s LG ineffective in development delivery (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
       
Table 8.8: Empowerment Decentralization Indicators 
Empowerment  Indicators        Responses Frequency Percentage 
(a) Number of NGOs active in 
LGU?  
 
(b) Number of sub-LGU 
community and neighbourhood 
governance organizations 
active in LGU? 
 
 
 
(c) Number of meetings 
between LGU senior or elected 
personnel and representatives 
of NGOs, sub-LGUs and 
women’s/vulnerable groups?  
-There are no NGOs active in the MCC and 
other LGUs. 
-Except for the two chiefs as ex-officio 
members and the six working committees 
made up of elected councillors there are no 
sub-LGU community and neighbourhood 
governance organizations active in MCC. The 
same goes for other LGUs.  
-There are no meetings at all between LGUs’ 
senior or elected personnel and representatives 
of NGOs, sub-LGUs and women’s/vulnerable 
groups.  
-There has not yet been any plan to encompass 
the disabled and the weak in an 
institutionalized manner in the LGUs. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
71 out of 73 
respondents  
 
2 out of 73 
respondents   
100 
 
 
100 
 
97 
 
 
3 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
   
Findings in the table 8.8 above were also confirmed by this following councillor’s 
opinion, “I wouldn’t say our councils themselves are empowered enough because there is 
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still no clear demarcation of functions between chiefs and us, chiefs still continue their 
illegal allocation of land without consulting us. They still control range-management and 
other natural resources and fines. They don’t understand our functions and some refuse 
our decisions in local matters. The representative chiefs do not pass information in a 
satisfying manner to others outside the councils (A district councillor from Thaba-
Lit’soene community council in Qacha district, Mrs. ‘Mat’sepo, Interviews on 25 August, 
2009).”   
 
8.2.8 Lesotho’s LG Indicators for Efficiency in Key Services, Public Goods 
and Regulatory Functions 
 
Indicators for efficiency in key services, public goods and regulatory functions in 
Lesotho need to include beneficiaries’ assessment as on table 8.9 below on (a) percent of 
capital budget spend in areas outside the LGU seat (only for rural LGUs), (b) percent of 
LGU population with access to potable water, (c) level of local conflict, (d) number of 
local business persons trained or otherwise assisted by the LGU, (e) LGU’s role in 
regulating access to and use of natural resources such as water, forests, grasslands and so 
on. Respondents (100%) have reported that there is no percentage of capital budget spent 
in areas outside any LGU’s seat. LGUs have also not yet trained or assisted any local 
business persons. The data on the table further indicates that real devolution of key 
functions for service delivery is not yet implemented in Lesotho’s LG. This goes back to 
issues raised in the last chapter that traces of recentralization in terms of regulatory 
framework in Lesotho’s LG are so obvious which is significantly confirmed by the non-
devolutions of key production services and functions. This in itself creates an impasse in 
development delivery by LG in Lesotho (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 
2010).  
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Table8.9: Production of Key Services, Public Goods and Regulatory Functions Indicators 
Services-Goods-
Regulatory  
Indicators        
Responses Frequency Percentage 
(a) Percent of capital 
budget spent in areas 
outside the LGU seat 
(only for rural 
LGUs)? 
 
 
 
(b)Percent of LGU 
population with 
access to potable  
water? 
 
 
 
 
(c)Level of local 
conflict (Explain)? 
 
 
 
 
(d) Number of local 
business persons 
trained or otherwise  
assisted by the LGU?  
 
(e) LGU’s role in 
regulating access to 
and use of natural  
resources such as 
water, forests, 
grasslands, etc 
(Explain)? 
Water? 
 
 
Forests?   
 
 
Grasslands? 
 
 
Others (Specify) 
 
 
 
-There is no percentage of capital budget spent in 
areas outside any LGU’s seat. 
-Some wards of the MCC have been encroaching 
by using gravel-quarries not belonging to them for 
small roads.   
 
 
-The supply of potable water in Maseru city is the 
responsibility of the parastatal, Water and Sewage 
Authority and not the MCC. There is no population 
with access to potable water by the MCC. As for 
the other LGUs, particularly the CCs, it could be 
estimated that at least 5% of the households have 
been supplied with potable water by funds from 
MLG.  
 
-MCC and other LGUs consist mainly of 
councillors with a full affiliation to the ruling LCD 
party only seeking to offer their loyalty to the 
leadership of their minister in the MLG. There is no 
obvious/observable conflict in the LGUs.  
 
-LGUs have not yet trained or assisted any local 
business persons.  
 
 
 
-MCC (in the capital city) and DCs (in the towns) 
do not really play the role of regulating access to 
and use of natural resources such as water, forests, 
grasslands and the like except for CCs in the rural, 
they concentrate on the offering of other 
developmental infrastructural services/civil works, 
clinics and primary health care, city parks, solid 
waste management and environmental conservation 
programmes for NES, market stalls provision and 
control of (gravel, sand, stone) quarrying and 
physical developments. Land allocation is mainly 
done by the Lesotho Housing Corporation and 
Lands Survey and Physical Planning with partial 
inspection of the MCC.  Water and Sewage 
Authority is the parastatal responsible for potable 
water provision, electricity supply is the 
responsibility of Lesotho Electricity 
Corporation/LEC, forests and grasslands are 
controlled by the NES and the new Ministry of 
Forestry and Conservation. These parastatals are 
directly answerable to the different relevant central 
government ministries just like the MCC itself, thus 
still preserving much of centralization in real terms 
with the DAs under MLG still doing most of the 
functions that were supposed to be devolved in 
districts and towns.      
73 out of 73 
respondents  
18 out of 73 
respondents 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
 
25 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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8.2.9 Opportunities for Women and Vulnerable Groups in Lesotho’s LGUs 
 
Besides NGOs representation in the LGUs as an indicator for LG efficiency, there is need 
for clearly availed opportunities for women and vulnerable groups in Lesotho’s LGUs. 
Currently as reported in table 8.10 below, by respondents (100%) the percentage of 
locally elected offices held by women is 53 in all the LGUs countrywide and 66 in the 
MCC but zero for the members of religious or non-home peoples’ groups. Unfortunately, 
these are the only ruling political-party affiliated women. Opportunities are thus 
effectively for the ruling political party/LCD, not for women, vulnerable groups, 
agriculture/local business or children’s education (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to 
July, 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 248 
 
Table 8.10: Opportunities for Women and Vulnerable Groups 
Women-Vulnerable-
groups’-Opportunities  
Indicators        
Responses Frequency Percentage 
(a) Percent of local 
elected offices held by 
women %,  
members of religious%, 
ethnic minorities %,  
or by non-home peoples’ 
groups %?  
 
(b)Number of women 
and members of 
vulnerable groups 
receiving occupational, 
organizational, or 
governance-related 
training ___ (Explain)?   
(c) In rural areas, percent 
of children enrolled in 
elementary schools __? 
(d) In urban LGUs, the 
percent of all children 
enrolled in elementary 
school _______? 
 
(e) In rural areas, the 
percent of the LGU 
budget spent on 
programmes focused on 
small or marginal 
farmers____? 
 
(f) In urban LGUs the 
percent spent to assist 
small and medium 
enterprises__?       
-The percentage of locally elected offices 
held by women is 53 in all the LGUs and 
66 in the MCC but zero for the members of 
religious, ethnic minorities, or non-home 
peoples’ groups.  
-Women are slightly more than men in 
most of the councils. 
 
-There are no women and members of 
vulnerable groups receiving occupational, 
organizational, or governance-related 
training by the LGUs. 
 
 
-MCC, DCs and CCs do not enroll children 
in elementary schools as this is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education 
and Training (MoET) through the 
programme of ‘free and compulsory’ 
primary education.  
-CCs in rural areas do not deal with 
agriculture and thus have no budget spent 
on programmes focused on small or 
marginal farmers. Agricultural functions 
are still centralized in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security (MAFS). 
 
- MCC and DCs have no budget to assist 
small and medium enterprises in the city 
and towns respectively.  
65 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 8 out of 73 
respondents 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
89 
 
 
11 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
(Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010) 
 
The following statement also affirms findings in the above 8.10 table; “Women are 
more than men in almost all of our local councils countrywide but they still need 
proper training in leadership skills to handle community development issues 
successfully. Although our culture trusts men in decision-making, we still leave much 
space for women especially in homely issues (Mrs. M. Ramoeletsi, Qacha’s district 
councillor, Interviews on the 25
th
 of August, 2009).” 
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8.3.0 Lesotho’s LG Indicators 
 
LG indicators for efficiency generally include political-oriented indicators, resources 
management abilities and sustainable developmental-service-delivery.  Political-
indicative-aspects refer to the extent to which LG addresses the following in 
implementation as assessed below (table 8.3A) by key informants: (a) institutional 
autonomy of LG, (b) quality of participation in LG, (c) depth of democratic participation 
in elections, (d) transparency of information flows between public bodies and civil 
society and (e) accountability of LG officials; staff and elected councillors. 
 
Table 8.3A: Political Indicators of Decentralization 
Political/Institutional 
Dimension Indicators  
Responses Frequency Percentage 
To what extent is there?  
(a)institutional autonomy of LG 
 
 
 
(b)quality of participation in 
LG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)depth of democratic 
participation in elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d)transparency of information 
flows between public bodies 
and civil society. 
 
 
(e) accountability of public 
officials; staff and elected 
personnel? 
 
 
 
-MCC lacks any institutional autonomy, politically, 
financially and administratively. The case is the same 
for other LGUs. Legal power for functions, decision 
and policy making is centralized in the MLG’s 
minister. 
-The non-empowering political participation in MCC 
is limited to the only one dominant ruling LCD 
political party loyal membership from the uneven 
electoral model results of the first-past-the-post to 
top-down decision making by senior politicians. The 
trend is the same for other LGUs. 
-All the seats in the MCC and in almost all of the 
other LGUs are won and owned only by the ruling 
LCD party; there is neither opposition nor civil 
society as ex-officio members to effect political 
pressure for local development delivery. The 
percentage that votes is even negligible, usually less 
than 5% as citizens have no political confidence in 
the LGUs.  
-LGUs do not network, work or share information 
with the civil society. As such transparency of 
information flows between public bodies and civil 
society is non-existent. 
 
-Public officials; staff and elected personnel in the 
LGUs literally regard themselves as civil servants 
accountable to the minister in the MLG. The labour 
code and benefits applied to them are the same as 
those used for government employees. 
-Staff and councillors are accountable to an elected 
central government. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
72 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
1 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
99 
 
1 
 
 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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Respondents (100%) have reported that LGUs lack autonomy because the MLG’s 
minister is the one with legal power for functions, decisions and policy making. This 
affirms recentralization. They also reported that public officials; staff and elected 
personnel in the LGUs are literally civil servants accountable to the MLG’s minister. The 
labour code and benefits applied to them are the same as those used for government 
employees. They also emphasized that staff and councillors are accountable to an elected 
central government, that is the ruling party/LCD or the MLG’s minister. The expected 
indicated political standards/indicators are not prevalent in Lesotho’s LG as civil servants 
are still completely accountable to the MLG’s minister. They also do not share any 
information/network with civil society whose political pressure is vital for development-
delivery. This recentralization is further confirmed by tables below (8.3A(i) and 8.3A(ii)) 
affirming that LGUs still lack own political autonomy, treasury, taxes, budget, accounts 
and personnel or procedures for operating (Field Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
 
Table 8.3A (i): Measurement of Decentralization/DGD through Its Other Classical 
Definition 
To what extent are 
LGUs  
Responses Frequency Percentage 
•constitutionally 
separate from central 
government and 
responsible for a 
significant range of 
services? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•having own treasury, 
separate budget and 
accounts, own taxes as 
significant part of 
produced revenue? 
 
 
 
 
 
The Act and by-laws for 
decentralization or the constitution 
itself, in Lesotho, clumps the two 
together empowering the minister 
in the MLG to direct, approve and 
publish and gazette functions and 
policy directives for the LGUs. 
This type of decentralization has 
extended centralization.    
-There is no difference between 
LGUs and the MLG. 
LGUs in Lesotho do not have their 
own treasury, separate budget and 
accounts, own taxes as significant 
part of produced revenue. They all 
receive limited grant from MLG 
with absolute approvals of how to 
use by the minister. 
 
 
65 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
8 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
89 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
 
100 
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•having their own 
personnel with the 
powers to employ  
and discipline or fire 
own employees? 
 
 
 
•able to elect local 
policy,  predominantly 
consisting of  
local representatives? 
 
 
 
 
 
•having central 
government only 
playing an indirect  
advisory, supervisory 
and inspectorate role  
 
LGUs in Lesotho do not have their 
own personnel with the powers to 
employ and discipline or fire"! The 
employees are recruited as 
complete central government 
personnel deployed in local 
councils. 
While local representatives may be 
elected as new councillors after 
every five years, no policy 
recommendation can be applied at 
any level without approval, 
publication and gazetting of the 
MLG minister. Representative 
structures are mainly of LCD 
membership and serve as 
consultative committees only. 
The central government mainly 
plays a direct instructive, 
supervisory and inspectorate role 
through the cabinet and the 
minister. 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
The situation below (8.3A (ii) further confirms that there is no devolution yet. There is to 
a greater extent deconcentration. The range of functions is still limited and to a greater 
extent still centralized. Control for financial management/resources, politics and 
administration are still centralized and heaped upon the MLG’s minister belonging to the 
dominant ruling political party (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
Table 8.3A (ii): Comments on Nature and Degree of Autonomy of Lesotho’s LGU on 
Certain Indicators 
Indicators Qualities of Degree of Autonomy   Frequency Percent 
Personnel: The personnel is recruited 
through central government structures and 
treated as all other government employees 
in every way. It is directly accountable to 
the minister.  
The political minister approves and directs 
operations by the personnel. There is upward 
reporting and accounting only. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
The Integrated System: Autonomy in 
revenue collection and its administration are 
non-existent. The minister has to approve 
any method of revenue raising, LGUs are 
mainly funded by central government’s 
absolutely controlled grants. There are no 
specified kinds of local taxation approved 
by the central government yet. 
There is no administrative, political and 
financial devolution yet. There is to a greater 
extent deconcentration. 
70 out of 73 
respondents  
96 
The Unified System: The financial 
regulatory methods and systems by the 
central government are said to be non-
existent. Pre-set financial systems are 
removed; every programme and activity has 
The minister approves and controls the 
budget, expenditure, designing of 
development plans and their 
implementation. There is no autonomy to 
empower the poor.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
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to receive minister’s permission.   
Other personnel indices: The minister does 
personally appoint employees to fill 
vacancies, instructs transfers and yearly 
operations.   
The central government recruits, disciplines 
and fires employees and does not provide 
them with training for more capacity in 
delivery.  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Access: The ability of LGUs to influence 
the central government is limited because 
they serve as consultative avenues and lack 
any legislative powers to effect policy 
changes. 
LGUs are political structures without 
legislative power and/or function to pass or 
effect laws for any change. They are tied to 
government approved operational activities. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Functions: The legally stipulated functions 
are still centralized in other ministries. 
These include: 1. control of natural 
resources (sand, stones, e.t.c.) and 
environmental protection (pollution, soil 
erosion e.t.c.) 2. Public health (food 
inspection, refuse collection and disposal 
e.t.c.) 3. Physical planning, 4. Land/site 
allocation, 5. Minor roads and bridle-paths, 
6. Grazing control, 7. Water supply in 
villages, 8. Markets provision and 
regulation, 9. Economic development 
promotion (foreign investment attraction), 
10. Streets and public places, 11. Burial 
grounds, 12. Parks and gardens,  
13. Building permits control, 14.Fire  
15. Education, 16. Recreation and culture 
17. Roads and traffic, 18. Water resources, 
and 19. Fencing     
Other Acts put almost all of these functions 
under mainly centralized ministries. There is 
no concurrent amendment to these Acts to 
allow LGUs of smooth operating and 
delivery. The incoherence, conflicts and 
contradictions emerging in the stipulated 
various Acts do constrain LGUs to perform 
almost all of these functions. Synchronizing 
amendments practically enabling effective 
decentralization still remains just a wish.    
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Party politics: Unfair party politics through 
one dominant ruling party and biased 
electoral model for councillors have stifled 
other forms of democratic participation like 
the civil society, local community based 
associations/groupings, the vulnerable 
groupings, other political parties and 
individuals.   
Party politics have allowed senior political-
elite capture of LGUs. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Finance and autonomy: LGUs survive on 
government’s inadequate completely 
controlled grants.  
LGUs still have no financial autonomy of 
any kind. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Nature of revenue base: There is no 
legislative framework stipulating clearly the 
revenue base of LGUs in Lesotho. 
 
Revenues’ control and allocation is still 
centralized. There is no financial devolution.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Elasticity of sources of revenue/tax base: 
This is still outside the scope 
decentralization. 
Decentralization is still constrained by lack 
of clear taxes it should use as sources of 
funding for local development. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Amount of financial discretion over 
expenditure: Expenditure is entirely 
controlled and approved by the minister 
through direct meetings with the staff, 
monthly, quarterly and yearly reports.  
Expenditure is still centrally controlled in 
LGUs. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Local expenditure as percentage of total 
central expenditure: The central government 
or MLG has still concentrated itself with all 
of the resources and facilities, just 
allocating or approving expenditure for 
LGUs as per programme or activity. This is 
one other severely limiting factor to the real 
implementation of decentralization. The 
budget for the central government is not 
known but obviously all resources including 
technically skilled personnel and facilities 
are misallocated in the hands of the central 
government structures.     
There is no practical devolution of finances. 
It is therefore impractical and impossible to 
have a fair local expenditure as percentage 
of total central expenditure reflecting good 
implementation of decentralization. Funds 
are not decentralized but are deconcentrated. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
 253 
Respondents (100%) stated that party politics have allowed the ruling LCD’s senior 
political-elite capture of LGUs. Table (8.3A(iii) below further proves that we still have 
formal  
 
Table 8.3A (iii): Hierarchical Relations as an Indicator of Decentralization or 
Recentralization 
Administrative Control 
Mechanisms Possible 
Commends 
indicating more 
practiced mechanism 
Frequency Percentage 
(1)Approval of decisions, 
decisions can only come into 
effect after approval by the higher 
authority. 
This is actually the 
main and the only way 
of operating in our 
decentralization 
process.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
(2)Directives/instructions; 
ordering local authorities to do or 
refrain from doing some act. 
The minister is the 
one giving 
instructions all the 
time. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
(3) The power of suspension; this 
is where higher tier authority has 
the power to suspend the activities 
of the local authorities. 
NA NA NA 
(4) The power of annulment; 
decisions of the local authority can 
be overturned. 
NA NA NA 
(5) The power of reformation; 
decisions of the local authority can 
be modified. 
NA NA NA 
(6) The power of substitution; the 
higher authority can act in place of 
a lower one 
NA NA NA 
(7)Higher tier control including 
circulars laying down policy, 
inspectors, and the requirement of 
reports on progress in specific 
services. 
It is usual for the 
MLG to control 
everything about 
decentralization. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
(8)Effective delivery system, (c) 
and (d)) 
NA 73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
(9)Political decentralization with 
accountability to local citizens, 
This is non-existent. 73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
(10)Administrative decentralization 
with autonomy, 
This is non-existent. 73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
(11)Resource decentralization with 
human and fiscal dimensions 
This is non-existent. 73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
 
 254 
administrative mechanisms through which MLG control over LGUs’ powers is currently 
maintained/recentralization. Reportedly, it is usual for the MLG to control everything 
about decentralization (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Commenting on the features of their LG, key informants (100%) on table (8.3A (vi)) 
below further affirmed that LGUs lack a well-defined area of jurisdiction. Incoherence, 
conflict and confusion in the Acts in terms of powers and functions remain unresolved. 
Top-down control impedes LGUs from implementing their legal mandate and obligation 
to serve all their inhabitants with basic services, particularly localized development 
objectives, LGUs’ do not pass any laws at all. They lack such autonomous power. It is 
the minister who passes any by-laws through gazettes.  LGUs offer limited services, not 
safety in terms of road safety, traffic control, civil protection, fire brigade, ambulance 
services and so on. Participation is mainly limited to political membership of the 
dominant ruling party having its nominees elected as councillors who constitute a 
consultative representation for the MLG (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 
2010).  
 
Table 8.3A (vi) Comments on More Indicators Measuring Degree of DGD: Features of 
Local Authorities/LAs 
Extent these Features below are in 
Lesotho’s LGUs 
Commends on LGUs’ Decentralization 
features 
Frequency Percent 
Local authorities having a well-defined 
area of jurisdiction? 
LGUs lack a well-defined area of 
jurisdiction. Incoherence, conflict and 
confusion in the Acts in terms of powers 
and functions remain unresolved.  
71 out of 73 
respondents  
97 
Local authority having a legal mandate 
and obligation to serve all its 
inhabitants with basic services, in 
particular localized or contextualized 
Development objectives besides the 
normal legislative functions, that is 
poverty-reduction oriented and 
responsive enough to local needs? 
Top-down control impedes LGUs from 
implementing their legal mandate and 
obligation to serve all their inhabitants 
with basic services, in particular localized 
or contextualized Development objectives 
besides the normal legislative functions, 
that is poverty-reduction oriented and 
responsive enough to local needs. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Local authorities operating in 
conformity within the legal framework 
of the national and middle-level 
framework. They may not pass laws in 
contradiction with those of the above 
levels. The important feature here is 
having autonomous power to pass some 
laws? 
Local authorities are not operating in 
conformity within the legal framework of 
the national and middle-level framework. 
They do not pass any laws at all. They 
lack such autonomous power to pass some 
laws. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Having legislative powers to pass by-
laws or regulations for orderly 
development and well being of the 
urban or rural area? 
It is the minister who passes any by-laws 
through gazettes. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
While are to promote provision of the 
social, political, physical, educational, 
LGUs offer limited services, not safety in 
terms of road safety, traffic control, civil 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
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cultural and economic development to 
the citizens; they are to provide safety 
in terms of road safety, traffic control, 
civil protection, fire brigade, ambulance 
services and so on? 
protection, fire brigade, ambulance 
services and so on. 
They are to employ own staff to do their 
daily business? 
MLG, the higher tier employs own staff to 
do LGUs’ daily business. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
They should determine, prioritize, and 
translate local development needs into 
financial plans? 
MLG, through the minister determines, 
prioritizes, and translates local 
development needs into financial plans. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Ninthly, they need to promote local 
participation. They must be consultative 
in any decision they take and thus 
involve local people in decision-
making? 
Participation is mainly limited to political 
membership of the dominant ruling party 
having its nominees elected as councillors 
who constitute a consultative 
representation for the MLG. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
They need to regularly communicate 
and inform the locals of their policies, 
decisions and plans so as to have an 
informed local citizen? 
LGUs lack mechanisms to regularly 
communicate and inform the locals of 
their policies, decisions and plans so as to 
have an informed local citizen. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
They must have regular free and fair 
elections to elect new councillors? 
Elections are legislatively faulty enabling 
the participation of the dominant political 
party only. They are exclusive and do not 
involve representation of other vulnerable 
groupings of the local communities. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
LGUs lack mechanisms to regularly communicate and inform the locals of their policies, 
decisions and plans so as to have an informed local citizen for effective citizen-
participation (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
  
8.3.1 Resource Management Abilities in Lesotho’s LGUs 
 
The level of capacity of LGUs in resources management include indicators such as the (a) 
ability of local institutions to mobilize, allocate and manage funds,  (b)fairness and 
efficiency of LG institutions’ procurement of goods and services from the private sector 
and (c) the ability to attract and retain motivated personnel. All the respondents as on 
table 8.3B below, have reported that the central government is ‘reluctant to introduce user 
fees like vehicles parking fees, taxes and other levies in fear of loss of political popularity 
and the potential of inviting public and political pressure and protests demanding 
transparent financial accountability and development-service-delivery to tax payers and 
their real participation. Respondents believe that there is the ability to mobilize, allocate 
and manage funds by MCC and the DCs but the controlling MLG lacks such a political 
will. There are so many untapped sources of funds for the MCC, including that one of a 
climatic comparative advantage of massive production of flowers for export to the 
European Union with relatively longer and severe winter yet are high consumers of 
flowers. However, the population in the CCs suffers 80% unemployment making it quite 
 256 
difficult for the CCs to mobilize funds locally (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to 
July, 2010). 
  
Fairness and efficiency of LG institutions’ procurement of goods and services from the 
private sector in Lesotho are still lacking. Responses from the collected data indicate 
malpractices in tenders and contracts’ distribution by the senior ruling political elite. At 
the moment this may be said to be one of the serious problems of corruption in Lesotho 
and RSA’s LGUs if several media reports are indeed correct. There is reportedly so many 
incompetent development contractors working in the city of Maseru and other towns 
known to be owned or in shares with senior public/political figures. This has undermined 
quality and proper standards in development-delivery. MCC and DCs have no say over 
the poor service delivery distributed through contractors approved by ministers. Such 
contractors are not monitored or inspected in their infrastructural developing operations 
and strikingly deliver poor quality of service or infrastructural development (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Table 8.3B below further indicates that the ability to attract and retain competent 
personnel in Lesotho’s LGUs is constrained by the fact that the private sector and the 
RSA offer better incentives to qualified local staff and cause much brain drain to LGUs 
and other ministries.  
 
Table 8.3B: Resource Dimension Decentralization Indicators 
Resource  Indicators   Responses Frequency Percentage 
To what extent is there?  
(a)ability of local institutions 
to mobilize, allocate and 
manage funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-MCC is controlled by the MLG/the central government 
that is reluctant to introduce vehicles parking fees, taxes 
and other levies in fear of loss of political popularity and 
the potential of inviting public and political pressure and 
protests demanding transparent financial accountability 
and service delivery to tax payers and their real 
participation. There is the ability to mobilize, allocate 
and manage funds by MCC but the controlling MLG 
lacks such a political will. There are so many untapped 
sources of funds for the MCC, including that one of a 
climatic comparative advantage of massive production 
of flowers for export to the European Union with 
relatively longer and severe winter but are high 
consumers of flowers. The same applies to DCs in the 
towns but the population in the CCs suffers 80% 
unemployment making it quite difficult for the CCs to 
mobilize funds locally.  
-The government has centralized procurement and 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
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(b)fairness and efficiency of 
LG institutions’ procurement 
of goods and services from 
the private sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) ability to attract and retain 
motivated personnel  
 
 
tendering, MCC is no longer doing this, instead the 
MLG does it for the MCC but with clear lack of fairness 
and efficiency in such procurement of goods and 
services from the private sector as reportedly only 
‘private companies’ having shares with the ministers 
and/or senior bureaucrats or ‘greasing their hands’ 
(bribing them) win such tenders/contracts. There is 
reportedly so many incompetent development 
contractors working in the city and towns known to be 
owned or in shares with senior public/political figures.    
-Government remuneration scale is demotivating, almost 
every civil servant jumps for the next better opportunity 
made available. In fact there is recordable high labour 
turn-over in the ministries including the LGUs. There is 
low labour productivity, self-absenteeism, laziness, too 
much ‘rent-seeking’ (bribery seeking) due to low staff 
morale from poor remuneration. This is also confirmed 
by many (especially senior engineering posts) vacancies 
constituting 40% to 60% in the MCC that have lasted for 
years without being filled. Some staff members resign 
because they dislike a working environment where a 
politician will just ebb too low and instruct your 
subordinates or just tell you what to do.   
-The private sector and the Republic of South Africa 
offer better incentives to qualified local staff and cause 
much brain drain to LG though this is a better paying 
ministry compared to others. 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
70 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
More of councillors’ responses on the ability of LGUs to mobilize resources locally 
affirming findings in the above table 8.3B are as follows; Chief ‘Mualle Letsie, the 
district council member representing chiefs in Qacha from Thaba-Lit’soene area said,  
“I think there can be better money for local governance than now, the  municipal 
and the district councils can generate it and control it but the ruling party is 
reluctant to introduce user fees like vehicles parking fees, taxes  and other levies 
in fear of loss of political popularity and the potential of inviting public and 
political pressure and protests demanding transparent financial accountability and 
development-service-delivery to tax payers and their real participation (Field 
Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).”   
The district councillor in Qacha district, Mr. Katiso Mabusetsa from Rat’soleli 
community council area also told that, “Our councils consist mostly of the loyal members 
of the ruling LCD party, it is not necessary to squeeze our poor communities monies they 
do not have and cause public dissatisfaction. So, our councils have not yet started 
wanting taxes from our people (Field Survey/Interviews, 25 August, 2009).” 
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8.3.2  Development-delivery Indicators in Lesotho’s LGUs 
 
It can be observed from the table 8.3C below that one of the indicators of development 
delivery is the LGUs’ capacity to provide basic infrastructure and services that reduce 
poverty. However, all the key informants in explaining how far decentralization has 
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Table 8.3C: Developmental Dimension Decentralization Indicators 
Developmental  
Indicators        
Responses Frequency Percent 
How far has 
your LGU 
achieved the 
following?  
(a)provision of 
basic 
infrastructure and 
services which 
contribute to 
reduction in 
poverty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-MCC lacks adequate budget by more than 700% 
to be able to attain sufficient provision of basic 
infrastructure and services which can reduce 
poverty. The MLG grants MCC around R34 
Million per year for service delivery and around 
R50 Million per year for new roads building when 
the budget required is at least R700 Million plus 
for effective and adequate delivery to reduce 
poverty.  As for other LGUs the situation is even 
worse there is complete underfunding by the more 
than the indicated percentage and the MLG is 
never transparent in financial issues as to how 
much is exactly funded to the DCs and CSs.  
-MCC has used a ‘community contracting 
approach’ and a ‘public-private-partnership’ (PPP) 
by contracting rotated unemployed poor urban 
community labour to collect waste from 
households to collection points for an agreed 
remuneration. MCC also leases out contracts 
including one year contracts for the full operation 
of door to door waste collections, litter picking and 
weeding along the streets. MCC then pays the 
private lease contractors through collected fees 
from city households and businesses the agreed 
monthly amounts. The paid out amounts are barely 
enough for hand-to-mouth survival not for 
effective poverty alleviation. Community 
contracting involves the MCC assisting city 
communities to set up community waste 
management and local public health committees. 
The communities agree on fees to be paid for the 
collection of waste, then committees select waste 
collectors for public areas/streets and individuals 
who collect waste from households to collection 
points. All this unemployed labour gets rotated. 
Committees facilitate collection of fees from 
households and overall management local public 
health issues. Households deposit service fees into 
joint management bank accounts opened together 
by both the MCC and the communities. This 
community contracting public-private-partnership 
has been ideal for the peri-urban areas including 
Motimposo, Naledi, Khubetsoana, Ha Mabote, 
Lithabaneng, Ha Abia, Lithoteng and Qoaling. The 
lease contracting has been beneficial to urban areas 
including Maseru Central Business District (CBD), 
high and middle income suburbs such as 
Hillsview, Friebel, White City, Old and New 
Europa, Maseru East, Lower Thetsane, Arrival 
57 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22 
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Centre, Happy Villa, Florida and Race Course. 
The UNDP is the one that introduced the PPP 
concept paper and proposal. It sponsored a 
workshop involving key stakeholders on how it 
could be implemented by MCC.    
-In an attempt to address provision of services to 
the poor, MCC, in early 2009, entered into another 
PPP with a local private health services provider to 
manage two MCC’s clinics in Maseru city to 
provide curative services, ante-natal and post-natal 
services, monitoring of children’s health under the 
age of five, family planning services, TB treatment 
and HIV and AIDS counseling and treatment 
including ARVs supply to AIDS patients. PPP 
arrangement usually has specifications on the 
caliber, quality and quantity of medical staff to be 
employed, other essential services to be provided, 
performance and quality standards as well as 
reporting obligations and penalties to be incurred 
in non-performance by service providers and 
MCC’s obligations in monitoring and payments. 
PPP has also extended to three local companies to 
manage some 277 street advertising signs of 
various kinds (e.g. billboards) which have 
generated revenue of over R550, 000 per year for 
the MCC. PPP will also be used in future to 
manage municipal cemeteries, parks and 
recreational facilities, to maintain and manage 
municipal roads, street parking and street lighting.     
-MCC’s provision of infrastructure and services 
that could reduce poverty is also constrained by 
the very fact that its 60% of more than 450, 000 
population lives below poverty line and cannot 
afford fees they are expected to pay. The 
unemployment rate is also above 50%. The HIV 
prevalence rate is around 40% creating a non-
viable population in terms of derivable 
income/fees for development. The rapid 
urbanization worsened by limited availability of 
physical space and unplanned nature of many 
settlements has created severe pressures on the 
provisions of developmental services and utilities. 
The growth of many unplanned settlements due to 
overpopulation and heavy rural-urban migration 
makes it be very difficult to have adequate and 
proper construction, delivery and management of 
efficient networked urban services and facilities 
including roads, water and sanitation systems, 
electricity grids, solid waste management services, 
bus and taxi ranks and urban markets.     
-MCC’s provision of developmental infrastructure 
and services that could reduce poverty is 
constrained by many factors such as the following; 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
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(b)facilitation 
and/or 
authorization of 
private economic 
initiatives 
(c)facilitation of 
use of 
community 
resources such as 
land, water, 
forests e.t.c  
 
 
 
(d)effective 
resolution of 
conflicts among 
local citizens 
 
ever increasing competition for scarce land 
resources between residential, industrial and 
commercial users and for the delivery of water, 
electricity and sewerage services. This is worsened 
by the lack of coordination of city planning and 
management activities, especially for the delivery 
of developmental services and utilities. There is 
also a limiting problem of ever increasing and 
unsustainable vehicular and pedestrian congestion. 
The bus and taxi terminuses are extremely 
crowded, particularly around the bus stop area. 
The proliferation of licensed and unlicensed street 
vendors along the main thoroughfares also 
worsens congestion and violation of MCC’s by-
laws for cleanliness and health environmental 
standards. There are increasing volumes of solid 
and other waste and illegal waste dumps creating 
an unclean, unhealthy and hazardous urban 
environment.      
-MCC and DCs have only been able to give and 
control licenses and market stalls to street vendors. 
There are no big private economic initiatives yet. 
The LGUs are not yet empowered by law to attract 
foreign direct investment. The ministry of trade is 
entirely responsible for this function.  
-There is a need for review of the legislative 
framework to separate functions and roles clearly 
to empower MCC and DCs to effectively facilitate 
use of community resources such as land, water, 
forests and others because other ministries are still 
owning the control and access to such resources. 
So far MCC and DCs have only been giving 
business and building permits. CCs have to a 
limited extend in conflict and competition with 
chiefs facilitated use of community resources such 
as land, water, forests and others. 
-No conflict among local citizens needed LGU’s 
resolution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
delivered development in their localities, stated that DCs and MCC’s provision of 
infrastructure and services that could reduce poverty is constrained by the fact that 
MCC’s 60% of more than 450, 000 population lives below poverty line and cannot afford 
fees they are expected to pay. Unemployment rate is also above 50%. HIV prevalence 
rate is 40% creating a non-viable population for derivable fees for development. Rapid 
urbanization worsened by limited availability of physical space and unplanned nature of 
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many settlements has created severe pressures on provisions of developmental services 
and utilities (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Growth of many unplanned settlements due to overpopulation and heavy rural-urban 
migration makes it be very difficult to have adequate and proper construction, delivery 
and management of efficient networked urban services and facilities including roads, 
water and sanitation systems, electricity grids, solid waste management services, bus and 
taxi ranks and urban markets.  Provision of developmental infrastructure and services that 
could reduce poverty is also constrained by the ever increasing competition for scarce 
land resources between residential, industrial and commercial users and for the delivery 
of water, electricity and sewerage services. This is worsened by lack of coordination of 
city planning and management activities, especially for the delivery of developmental 
services and utilities. There is also a limiting problem of ever increasing and 
unsustainable vehicular and pedestrian congestion. The bus and taxi terminuses are 
extremely crowded, particularly around the bus stop area. Proliferation of licensed and 
unlicensed street vendors along main thoroughfares also worsens congestion and 
violation of LGUs’ by-laws for cleanliness and health environmental standards. There are 
increasing volumes of solid and other waste and illegal waste dumps creating an unclean, 
unhealthy and hazardous urban environment (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 
2010). 
 
8.3.3 Indicators for Sustainable Development by LG in Lesotho 
 
Indicators for an efficient and effective decentralization in sustainable development 
among others need to show the extent to which LGUs assisted local people in the 
following: (a) assisted local women in the reduction of their the triple role, gender 
division of labour, time allocation from gendered tasks (gender-workload), less leisure, 
non-wage labour, subordination to the state and the market on their sold produce, 
strategic gender needs, (b) assisted local people to attain self-reliant development within 
natural resource constraints, (c) assisted local people to attain self-sustaining production 
without environmental degradation, (d) assisted local people to attain health control, 
appropriate technologies, food self-reliance, clean water and shelter for all of their 
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households (e)  and assisted local people to attain community driven development and 
administration system flexible enough to correct itself. Table 8.3D below confirms that 
LGUs in Lesotho have not yet achieved such indicators/sustainable development. Mainly 
such tasks are still centralized and limitedly done by LGUs, affirming recentralization. 
 
Table 8.3D: Sustainable Development Milestones/Decentralization Indicators 
Table 9.3D: Sustainable Development Milestones/decentralization indicatorsle Development Indicators        Responses Frequency Percent 
To what extent has LGU assisted local people 
in the following:  
Assisted local women in the reduction of their 
the triple role, gender division of labour, time 
allocation from gendered tasks (gender-
workload), less leisure, non-wage  labour, 
subordination to the state and the market on 
their sold produce, strategic gender needs? 
 
Assisted local people to attain self-reliant 
development within natural resource 
constraints?  
 
 
 
Assisted local people to attain self-sustaining 
production without environmental 
degradation?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assisted local people to attain health control, 
appropriate technologies, food self-reliance, 
clean water and shelter for all of their 
households?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assisted local people to attain community 
driven development and administration system 
flexible enough for self-correction? 
-MCC and other LGUs have not 
yet adopted gender-workload 
reducing related development 
projects. 
-MCC so far only concentrated on 
refuse collection projects through 
community contracting and public 
private partnership. DCs’ and CSs’ 
expenditure is mainly on recurrent 
costs and limited capital 
investment. Helping local people to 
attain self-reliant development is 
not yet embarked upon. 
-MCC only conducts 
environmental assessment studies 
and prepares proposals for 
approval and implementation by 
the National Environmental 
Secretariat/NES. Self-reliant 
schemes for communities have not 
yet been adopted even in other 
LGUs. 
-LGUs have not yet fully assisted 
local people to attain health 
control, appropriate technologies, 
food self-reliance, clean water and 
shelter for all of their households. 
These are still left mainly as the 
responsibilities of other central 
ministries. MCC’s health 
committees and its two clinics play 
a limited role in this regard in the 
city while CCs just facilitate little 
supply of clean water to rural 
households through community 
taps and handpumps.   
-LGUs have not yet launched 
community driven development 
projects. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
43 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
30 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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One other form of assistance LGUs have failed to do for locals is the creation of human, 
financial, social, natural and physical capital as table 8.3D(i) below further confirms. 
Limited financial capital formation is in issuing of trading licenses for street vendors and 
offering them with market stalls. Community labour is also hired to collect waste. 
 
Table 8.3D (i): LGUs Activation of Capital Formation in Lesotho 
Forms of capital formation                                           
  
Activities/Inputs Outcomes/Outputs Frequency Percent 
(a) Human capital (the skills, 
knowledge and ability to work 
depending on adequate nutrition, health 
care, safe environmental conditions and 
education)? 
 
 
(b)Financial capital (income primarily 
from the sale of labour and sometimes 
the sale of other household assets)? 
 
 
 
(c) Social capital (networks of mutual 
support that exist within and between  
households, extended family and 
communities, to which people have 
access)? 
 
(d) Physical capital (assets that include 
housing, tools, and equipment that 
people own, rent or use, public 
infrastructure and amenities that people 
have access to)? 
 
 
 
(e)Natural capital (environmental 
resources such as land, common 
property resources and open access 
natural resources which people use to 
have access to in their  
livelihood strategies) 
LGUs have not yet started 
contributing towards 
forming human capital.    
 
MCC issues trading licenses 
for street vendors and offers 
them with market stalls. 
Community labour is also 
hired to collect waste. 
 
-LGUs are not contributing 
towards social capital 
formation. 
LGUs have to a limited 
extent made some roads, 
public toilets, parks, street 
lights, market structures and 
rentable dust bins for 
rubbish collection.  
 
-LGUs have not yet done 
anything to activate natural 
capital.  
 
 
NA 
 
 
-Orderly informal 
sector generating 
income for the 
unemployed.  
 
 
NA 
-Improved 
accessibility, public 
sanitation facilities in 
place, clean and safe 
streets and small-
scale business 
opportunities in the 
urban streets.  
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
 
58 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
NA 
 
15 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
NA 
NA 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
NA 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
Concerning physical capital formation LGUs, particularly MCC, have to a limited extent 
made some roads, public toilets, parks, streetlights, market structures and rentable 
dustbins for rubbish collection. LGUs’ developmental effects are not yet realized as table 
8.3D(ii) below shows no impact on production, consumption-patterns, trade, capacity in 
revenue mobilization for local development, income, services distribution and local 
welfare (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
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Table 8.3D (ii): Indicators of Decentralization-Developmental-Policy Impact: LGUs’ Effects 
in Lesotho 
Other Forms of 
Developmental 
Effects of 
Decentralization 
Developmental Effects of LGUs Frequency Percent 
-Effects on Prices? There is no clear macro-economic policy or 
productive activities of any supply that influenced 
inflation in any direct manner. 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
100 
-Effects on 
production (quantities 
on outputs and 
inputs)? 
There is no clear macro-economic policy or 
productive activities of any supply that influenced 
production clearly for economic growth. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
- Effects on local 
consumption 
patterns/demands? 
Communities are beginning to be conscientized 
towards complete self-administration. More 
political demands are slowly beginning to be 
forged through towards attaining local 
development. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Effects on trade? There is no clear macro-economic policy or 
productive activities of any supply that influenced 
trade clearly for economic growth. The informal 
sector has provided some survival strategy for the 
unemployed through urban market opportunity. 
The effect of this may not be claimed to push any 
one to a transformed life above poverty line.  . 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Effects on local 
budgeting capacity 
(tax receipts and 
public expenditure)? 
Local budgeting capacity is initiated but throttled 
by absolute approval and rejection of the political 
minister who has to make sure that LGUs’ budges 
and plans conform to the central government 
development plans and not necessarily to local 
prioritization. National goals by the central 
government are often about economic growth and 
not necessarily real transformative sustainable 
local development. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Effects on (equity) 
income and services 
distribution?  
Service delivery is not yet widely recognized. 
LGUs have severe budget constraints and lack 
local economic base. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Effects on local 
social welfare? 
Vulnerable sectors of the communities are not yet 
included as direct beneficiaries of LGUs’ 
activities. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Specific effects on 
urban development? 
   
-on solid waste 
management;  
Rotated casual jobs for collecting and piling waste 
for disposal by hired services of individuals 
generate some short-term employment and income 
for surviving. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-opening and 
rehabilitation of 
roads; 
The little budget does not allow for maintenance of 
many constructed roads and new desperately 
needed ones. This is not sustainable development. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-development 
control;  
Some functions are still in the hands of the central 
government. This hampers development control in 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
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the urban areas.  
-primary education Primary education is mainly the responsibility of 
the central government through the free and 
compulsory primary education programme.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-and public health The two few clinics targeting the HIV/AIDS 
patients run out of medical supplies and are always 
under pressure to serve too many patients. 
Resources are not adequate to attain effective 
health system. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Specific effects on 
rural development 
   
-Control of natural 
resources,  
Chiefs and the central government still control 
natural resources. Effective devolution of such 
powers is not yet practically attained by LGUs to 
have the significant positive impact on local 
development. Limited control given may not bring 
a good impact. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Public health (e.g. 
ARVs provision by 
who/how), 
The central government has turned the HIV/AIDS 
into a cross cutting priority. Almost all the central 
government ministries have a budget put aside for 
treatment and care for workers, orphans and the 
poorest of the poor through a centrally controlled 
social welfare department and rural and urban 
clinics to roll out subsidized ARVs. LGUs have 
not yet clearly budgeted for this pandemic though.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Physical planning,  Other ministries in the central government are still 
taking the responsibility of physical planning, 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Land/site allocation, LGUs together with chiefs as ex-officio members 
control site allocation in the rural areas. Some 
nepotism and favouritism in the former allocation 
of land is minimized and there is some striving for 
equitable access to land.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Minor roads, Minor roads have been built to a very minute 
extent because the budget for investment in capital 
infrastructure is too low. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-grazing control, Chiefs still control grazing and charges on offenders. In 
some cases grazing associations continue to collect fines 
on illegal grazing.. This confusion and lack of policy 
clearance have left LGUs constrained. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-water supply in 
villages  
The ministry of natural resources is still in the hands of 
the central government. Devolution is essential to attain 
any developmental impact. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-and Markets CCs have not yet provided any markets. 73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
-Migrant-remittances 
dependency of local 
households  
LGUs have adopted labour intensive infrastructural 
development activities to accommodate many of the 
retrenched mineworkers from the RSA. There are also 
specific development projects (irrigation) by the 
ministry of agriculture to help them with productive and 
business skills.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
Besides the invisible LGUs’ developmental impact on the macro-micro economy, this 
table also affirms that functions for urban and rural development are still greatly 
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centralized and thus LGUs have nothing to deliver for development besides the fact 
that they are denied such a potential capacity by recentralization as one councillor 
also confirmed stating, “I see a severe lack of capacity for the councils; they do not 
have enough money and officers and facilities. They need authority and independence 
in making their own money. They should have such legal powers, be supported and 
guided by the ministry all the time, the ministry needs to just lead but not control 
everything councils intend to do as it is doing now (District councillor, Mrs. 
‘MaMotlatsi, from Qacha Ha-Ramat’seliso community area, interviews on the 25
th
 of 
August, 2009)”.   
8.4 The Impact of Lesotho’s LG on Local National Development Priorities 
 
There is a strong belief that if decentralization is to reduce country’s poverty, it also 
needs to synchronize its activities with the national development priorities as well as its 
LG’s prioritized development objectives. In the case of Lesotho, the national 
development priorities to be related to the LG’s execution in order of importance are (1) 
combating HIV/AIDS, (2) eradicating extreme poverty, (3) achieving universal primary 
education, (4) promoting gender equality and empower women, (5) reducing child 
mortality, (6) improving maternal health, (7) ensuring environmental sustainability, (8) 
and developing a global partnership for development. Appendix A shows that in Lesotho 
there is a weak link between LG and prioritized objectives. This has brought limited 
outcomes for Lesotho; including only two clinics built for health care provision in the 
MCC area which trained a few support groups for caring for HIV/AIDS patients. Casual 
jobs by the MCC and DCs offer a limited short-term employment lacking impact on 
poverty, LGUs do not offer or sponsor universal primary education-this is still a 
centralized function in the MoET. LGUs have no strategic programmes to redress gender 
imbalances. MCC’s two clinics do very little to reduce child mortality and improve 
maternal health. The function of environmental conservation is still centralized and LGUs 
have no development networking or partnerships (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to 
July, 2010). 
 
 268 
Appendix F (field interviews) also provides key informants’ assessment on specific LG’s 
development objectives of Lesotho including: (9) providing a democratic and accountable 
government, (10) and sustainable services, (11) promoting social and economic 
development by prioritizing basic community, (12) promoting involvement of the 
community, organizations and individuals in LG issues, (13) enhancing participation in 
national and community programmes and (14) combining municipality with urban boards 
and rural areas. Such specific development objectives of LG are not yet realized as all 
respondents (100%) affirmed that administrative, political and human and financial 
resources devolution are not yet effected by Lesotho’s LG, thus there is constrained 
nominally participatory democracy and non-accountability. LGUs have not yet 
introduced development projects fully owned and driven by the local communities for 
such sustainable services including gender equity development programmes. Only 
councillors are getting involved in LGUs’ issues, community organizations and 
individuals are still excluded even in national development issues. Chiefs are also 
representatives of the urban and rural communities in the municipalities to maintain a 
link and smooth flow of information between the urban/district councils, 
rural/community councils and the municipality. This is often limited by the fact that 
chiefs’ forums for disseminating information are not clearly specified and/or formed 
beside the fact that most of the reports are mainly made by the staff in English only for 
the MLG’s minister’s access. Chiefs’ low literacy and inaccessibility of information limit 
their role in information flow, there are no clear sufficient structures linking the urban 
and the rural.  
 
8.5  Measurement of DGD Effectiveness in Line with Good Governance for 
Solving LG Challenges 
 
One other important way of measuring decentralization’s effectiveness in development 
delivery is assessing its extent of adoption of the values and principles of good 
governance also valuable in overcoming the very challenges of LG. Key informants’ 
opinion constituting beneficiary assessment is crucial in examining such effectiveness. 
Such principles of good governance to be examined normally need to include (a) local 
governments’ ability to provide services that are in part dependent upon their ability to 
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mobilize taxes locally, (b) where most part of the revenue base is coming from and how it 
is transferred and the challenges thereof, (c) how LGUs overcome or prevent capture by 
local elites as local governments may be vulnerable to local elites who then receive a 
disproportionate share of public spending on public goods.  The challenge then becomes 
the extent to which decentralization processes enable the poor to access publicly provided 
goods, (d) the effective and efficient delivery of public goods and services, at the local 
level as dependent on the good co-ordination of delivering agencies. What is important 
here is how do LGUs avoid coordination failure, namely redundancy (resulting when two 
or more organizations/agencies perform the same task in which case resources are 
wasted), lacunae (resulting when no organization performs a necessary task, in which 
case service delivery gaps occur.), incoherence (resulting when policies, programmes, 
projects or agencies with the same clients have different goals and requirements which 
may trigger conflicts between agencies and organizations over resources and clientele. 
Making  synchronization of policy across ministries and departments, at the local level, to 
be a major challenge), (e) determining specific service delivery functions that are 
decentralized leading to a loss of economies of scale (the direct implication of which is 
the loss of efficiency), (f) the extent to which individuals knowledgeable about the 
running of LG are available/employed/deployed to LGUs and undertake such tasks as to 
be taken by LG and (g) what the central government is doing to enable citizens to get 
better quality goods and services. 
 
Appendix C provides us with the field findings on these aspects that; Lesotho’s by-laws 
do not stipulate specific taxes LGUs can use to fund the supply of services locally. There 
is legally no capacity or clear premises to mobilize taxes. There are no jobs, so taxation is 
impossible and LG cannot mobilize any taxes. There are no taxes LGUs are able to 
mobilize and are specifically assigned to mobilize. Most part of the revenue base comes 
from the central government constituting more than 98% as a grant transferred and 
approved by the cabinet in line with the budget approved by the MLG’s minister (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
 270 
Decentralization in Lesotho is reportedly captured by the ruling political elites from its 
conception or design due to its biased adopted electoral model (first-past-the-post) 
advantageous to the dominant ruling LCD political party with loyal membership 
majority, in practice and statutorily. This type of centralization expansion poorly 
considers needs of the poor except party’s political interests of power and dominance 
maintenance (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
Coordination failure is unavoidable in Lesotho because LGUs operate without 
networking with other development agencies in their localities. Service delivery gaps are 
severe because there is usual annual under funding. There are also no joint projects, 
outsourcing or adequate donations to address LGUs functions (Field Survey/Interviews, 
July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Chieftaincy is still struggling and resisting to relinquish traditional political power over 
resources and local community leadership to the elected councillors. Furthermore, Lands 
Survey and Physical Planning/LSPP, ministry of forestry and land reclamation, 
parastatals like Water and Sewage Authority/WASA, Lesotho Electricity 
Corporation/LEC and Lesotho Revenue Authority/LRA (taxes collecting authority) as 
agencies over the same client with LGUs have different goals and requirements. These 
agencies are still controlling land allocation, use of forests and grasslands, water and 
sewage, electricity supply and imposition and collection of taxes for the central 
government, respectively. This has resulted into a major constraining legislative 
incoherence on decentralization and needs urgent synchronization (Field 
Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Functions are still centralized in the hands of ministries and parastatals under such 
ministries. The main trend of decentralization has been a process whereby much of power 
in the hands of chiefs is modified and redistributed to the elected locals. Main 
developmental functions are still in the hands of the central government. The 
decentralization process also included massive privatization process of many 
developmental service delivering institutions like Coop Lesotho that was responsible for 
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the supply, sale and storage of subsidized agricultural inputs countrywide through the 
government storage facilities. Food security for the poor has worsened because Coop 
Lesotho has lost its inputs distributive storage facilities and thus countrywide distribution 
efficiency especially in the remotest parts of the country. LGUs could have been given a 
statutory role here to own and control properties from Coop Lesotho so as to improve 
local food security; instead all is lost through privatization for the benefit of senior 
politicians as the main individual shareholders and rent collectors.    
Community Council Secretaries/CCSs and District Council Secretaries/DCSs as well as 
the Town Clerk, the Mayor and other senior staff in the LGUs know and understand the 
proper decentralization process; this includes even most of the elected councillors but are 
employed directly and used as civil servants legally answerable to the political minister in 
the central government/MLG. They are not answerable to the local councils/communities 
and can only undertake such tasks as to be taken by their directing central 
government/MLG’s minister (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
The central government is doing nothing to provide training in professional skills, 
performance appraisal, clear responsive channels/avenues of raising grievances about 
poor service delivery in LGUs (Appendix C). Mr. Pheello Rapase, a district councillor 
from Maseepho community, in Qacha, also stated that, “…most of the employees in the 
councils still lack training in community development management and fund raising 
(Interviews, 25
th
 of August, 2009).”     
Concerning other ideals of good governance in Lesotho’s LG, key informants (100%) 
have reported that almost all of the entire membership of councillors is of the ruling LCD 
political party. The Executive Committee of the ruling party nominates, appoints and 
approves other community nominees to be on the list that may be voted into LGUs.  This 
has reduced the freedom of LGUs from an often tendency towards the development of 
patron-client relationships between central government level politicians and local level 
politicians whereby locally elected councillors and staff are often sanctioned by the party 
hierarchy at national level, particularly the MLG’s minister, upon whom they depend not 
only for patronage resources but also for their appointment to party electoral lists and 
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Table 8.11A:  Measuring Decentralization Within Principles and Values of Good Governance:  
Decentralization and Leadership  
Patron-client relationships  Responses Frequency  Percentage  
How free is your LGU from an often 
tendency toward the development of 
patron-client relationships between 
central government level politicians and  
local level politicians. Whereby locally 
elected officials are often sanctioned by 
the party hierarchy at national level, 
upon whom they depend not only for 
patronage resources but also their 
appointment to party electoral lists and 
hence political office?  (Such a 
clientelist system results in formidable 
obstacles to the political participation of 
non-party constituencies of local 
communities and promotes 
deconcentration rather than devolution.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, how do the communities 
elect the political leadership at the local 
level? 
(1) the first-past-the-post- 
model;_______ 
(2) the proportional representation 
model-- 
(3) non-party participation_______.   
 
 
Almost all of the entire membership of 
councillors is of the ruling LCD political 
party. The Executive Committee of the 
ruling party nominates, appoints and 
approves other community nominees to be 
on the list that may be voted into councils.  
This has reduced the freedom of LGUs 
from an often tendency towards the 
development of patron-client relationships 
between central government level 
politicians and local level politicians. 
Whereby locally elected councillors and 
staff are often sanctioned by the party 
hierarchy at national level, upon whom 
they depend not only for patronage 
resources but also for their appointment to 
party electoral lists and hence political 
office. This clientelist system has resulted 
in formidable obstacles to the inclusive 
political participation of non-party 
constituencies of local communities and 
has promoted deconcentration if not  re-
centralization  rather than devolution.  
 
The communities elect the political 
leadership at the local level mainly 
through the first-past-the-post- model. 
This has happened in all the LGUs except 
to a limited extent where some 
proportional representation model was 
used limitedly with around three seats 
against ten in Mokhotlong district council 
simply because the opposition of the ‘All 
Basotho Convention’ political party was 
stronger.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
hence political office. This clientelist system has resulted in formidable obstacles to the 
inclusive political participation of non-party constituencies of local communities and has 
promoted deconcentration if not re-centralization rather than devolution.  
 
All the respondents further stated that the communities elect the political leadership at the 
local level mainly through the first-past-the-post electoral model. This has happened in 
all the LGUs except to a limited extent where some proportional representation model 
was used limitedly with around three seats against ten in Mokhotlong district council 
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simply because the opposition of the ‘All Basotho Convention’/ABC political party was 
stronger (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Consequences of this (as table 8.11B below shows) are that instead of LG promoting 
good governance principles such as participation, accountability, transparency, rule of 
law, strategic vision, consensus orientation, efficiency and effectiveness in poverty 
alleviation, responsiveness, equity, inclusiveness and corruption minimization; (1) 
Lesotho’s LGUs are dominated by the majority membership loyal to the ruling LCD 
political party. LGUs are politically captured by the ruling political elite. They only serve 
as low consultative political committees because legally and in practice the minister 
directs every programme’s activities. There is no recommendation, policy or anything 
that can be done without the minister’s official approval, gazetting and publishing. (2) 
Decentralization has resulted into deconcentration, recentralization and political elite-
capture by the central government, unaccounted use of resources, disempowered local 
communities, dominant ruling party politics and control of LGUs and irrelevant and/or 
ineffective development projects on poverty alleviation. (3) There is only a downward 
trend of directives. LGUs’ structures lack clear details about control and use of resources. 
There is a top-down administration and political activism. (4) State control is entirely in 
the hands of the ministers and not its LGUs. (5) Poverty alleviation strategies are not 
implemented as interests pursued are mainly political-power-oriented. (6) There is but 
consultative absolute control of LGUs by the ministers promoted by the exclusive first-
past-the-post electoral model and dominant ruling political party. (7) There is no 
effectiveness and efficiency in poverty alleviation. (8) There is an escalating political 
regrouping mechanisms to perpetuate political domination without community driven 
poverty alleviating projects/programmes. (9) There is intensifying inequality and poverty. 
(10) There is severe exclusiveness to the needs of the poor and their participation. (11) 
Corruption is reportedly to be the main threat at the stage of putting this state at its brink 
of collapsing. This is confirmed by non-accountability and non-auditing statutorily done 
as the minister wishes, arbitrary political directives in contracts allocation and personnel 
recruitment and control and non-delivery. 
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Table 8.11B:   How Lesotho’s LGUs Promote Values of Good Governance 
Inputs/activities Outcomes Frequency Percent 
Participation: Political parties 
nominate candidates to stand for 
local councils’ elections. Elected 
councillors mainly represent their 
political parties. They hold public 
gatherings for local communities’ 
participation in the making of 
decisions, development priorities 
and receiving feedback. 
Councillors hold mainly monthly 
meetings, working committee 
monthly meetings and some 
emergency meetings to plan on 
how to involve communities in 
service delivery activities, give and 
receive feedback from the LGUs’ 
personnel.    
LGUs are dominated by the majority 
membership loyal to the ruling LCD 
political party. LGUs are politically 
captured by the ruling political elite. 
They only serve as low consultative 
political committees because legally and 
in practice the minister directs every 
programme’s activities. There is no 
recommendation, policy or anything 
that can be done without the minister’s 
official approval gazetted and 
published.   
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Accountability: LGUs and their 
personnel, including tender boards 
are directly controlled and 
accountable to the political 
minister. LGUs lack clear reporting 
mechanisms to local communities 
except to the minister through 
various reports. The personnel, just 
as a procedure, reports to the 
councillors lacking structured 
mechanisms like media 
programmes and public meetings to 
account to the communities 
effectively. Essentially, reports are 
passed to the minister to have 
progress on the directives he/she 
made. Financial accounting and 
auditing systems and practices are 
abandoned and not done since 
2006.  
Decentralization has resulted into 
deconcentration, re-centralization and 
political elite-capture by the central 
government, unaccounted use of 
resources, disempowered local 
communities, dominant ruling party 
politics and control of LGUs and 
irrelevant and/or ineffective 
development projects on poverty 
alleviation.   
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Transparency: Local communities 
are not in the clear picture of use 
and control of resources, 
development plans and their 
implementation; Their knowledge 
of what is budgeted for is treated 
just as a draft budget for approval, 
modification, control and (partial) 
rejection by the minister. 
Administration and political 
structures are directly controlled by 
the minister without any 
consultation with the LGUs. There 
is only upward reporting and 
downward directing.      
There is only downward trend of 
directives. LGUs’ structures lack clear 
details about control and use of 
resources. There is a top-down 
administration and political activism.   
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Rule of law: Activities, State control is entirely in the hands of 73 out of 73 100 
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programmes, standards, 
procedures, processes and 
maintenance of law and order 
adhere to the political supervision 
of the minister and not to the 
LGUs. 
 
the ministers and not its local 
communities. 
respondents  
 
Strategic Vision: The 2020 vision, 
Poverty reduction strategy 
programme, Millennium 
development goals and all other 
locally oriented development goals 
strategies without empowerment of 
LGUs only provide Lesotho with 
unimplemented good visionary 
papers on poverty alleviation. 
Major developments ever 
implemented often bear ministers’ 
benefiting entirely or sharing. 
-LGUs lack the legal, financial, 
capital and technical capacity to 
conceive and implement poverty 
alleviating strategic visions. 
Poverty alleviation strategies are not 
implemented. 
52 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 of 73 
71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Consensus orientation: Political 
structures like LGUs are only 
currently being manipulated, 
maneuvered and heavy-handedly 
controlled by ministers. There is no 
element of bottom-up approach.  
There is but consultative absolute 
control of LGUs by the ministers 
promoted by first-past-the-post electoral 
model and dominant ruling political 
party. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Effectiveness and Efficiency: 
Ministers independently approve 
most of the contracts for service 
delivery. The impunity of these 
unmonitored contractors offering 
irregular sub-standard service 
delivery causes irreparable damage 
of unrecoverable and unaccounted 
resources.  
There is no effectiveness and efficiency 
in poverty alleviation. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Responsiveness: The passive local 
communities lack power and 
institutions to effect responsiveness 
from LGUs.  
There is an escalating political 
regrouping mechanisms to perpetuate 
domination without community driven 
poverty alleviating 
projects/programmes.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Equity: There are no equity 
oriented programmes. 
There is intensifying inequality and 
poverty. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
100 
Inclusiveness: Only political 
nominees participate in LGUs 
mainly as consultative structures. 
There is severe exclusiveness to the 
needs of the poor and their participation. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Corruption minimization: There are 
no proper accounting procedures to 
the communities as well as other 
systems and practices to curb 
corruption. Development-donors in 
MCC have reportedly pulled out 
for unaccounted resources, 
mismanagement and 
misappropriation of funds.     
Corruption is reportedly to be the main 
threat at the stage of putting this state at 
its brink of collapsing. This is 
confirmed by non-accountability, 
arbitrary political directives in contracts 
allocation and personnel recruitment 
and non-delivery.  
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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The signs of lack of corruption-minimization by Lesotho’s LG are further confirmed by 
the tale 8.12 below affirming that forms of corruption existent in Lesotho’s LG have in 
various ways included the misuse of money or favours for private gain, inappropriate 
exchanges of money or other goods and services for undue influence or power; violations 
of public interest or norms of behaviour for special advantages or self-serving purposes, 
tax evasion, inequitable distribution of public resources as public services become 
disproportionately accessible to those who pay bribes, denying those services or similar 
quality of services to those who do not pay bribes. Bribes have also enabled service 
providers to ignore established standards of provision of goods and services as contracts 
have not been awarded to the highest quality provider at the bid price but to the firm that 
offered the highest bribe/shares; it has also been difficult to force bribing providers of 
services to provide better services or rectify problems associated with services already 
rendered. There has reportedly been corruption undermining the rule of law and scaring 
away potential investors/suppliers as it arbitrarily increases transaction costs and this has 
been anti-developmental as it reduces the opportunities available to people, particularly 
the poor increasing their insecurity. Corruption in the form of nepotism, bribery or 
patronage, stifling meritocracy, resulting in an increasingly inefficient and brutal 
bureaucracy are observable and reported (Table 8.12 below).  
 
Table 8.12: Effectiveness of Lesotho LGUs in Tackling Forms of Corruption  
Forms of corruption     Responses Frequency  Percentage  
(1) The misuse of 
money or favours for 
private gain 
 
 
 
 
 
(2) Inappropriate 
exchanges of money or 
other goods and 
services for undue 
influence or power; 
 
 
 
(3) Violations of public 
interest or norms of 
Nobody knows how tenders are offered in 
the MCC, including the responsible senior 
staff, everybody just sees things happening. 
There is no accounting of funds diverted, 
vired and used. There is also no internal and 
external auditing on quality performance 
and financial systems even in other LGUs. 
Funds diversion and virements are done 
without any justification or authorization in 
the MCC. This is misleading and deceiving 
to the Cabinet that approved financial 
allocations in line with the minister’s 
approved budget. Other LGUs do not yet 
have much funds to be controlled though all 
are controlled by the minister. 
Many senior politicians in the central 
government directly tell tender boards by phone 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
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behaviour for special 
advantages or self-
serving purposes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4)Tax evasion as the 
transaction is not 
reported by either party, 
thus denying the 
treasury or tax revenue 
authority income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(5)Inequitable 
distribution of public 
resources as public 
services become 
disproportionately 
accessible to those who 
pay bribes, denying 
those services or similar 
quality of services to 
those who do not pay 
bribes  
 
 
 
 
 
(6)Bribes enabling 
service providers to 
ignore established 
or word of mouth which service suppliers are to 
be given contracts, if not heeded to they do not 
approve the procedurally appointed service 
providers and recommend which ones are to be 
given contracts. Such suppliers are often 
inexperienced, incompetent and lack excellent 
workmanship but instructions to pay them are 
done in the absence of monitoring, inspecting 
and evaluating their work oftentimes not done to 
perfection and completion.   
 
Lesotho Revenue Authority is an 
independent legal entity for tax collection 
and not LGUs yet. Known main taxes 
include General Sales Tax/GST, Pay as You 
Earn/PAYE, some import taxes on goods 
from outside Southern African Customs 
Union (Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland) consisting of member states that 
proportionally share custom duties on trade 
across their borders. However, MCC 
collects little from market fees evaded by 
many street vendors, public toilets use fees 
with severe under reporting from 
employees, highly evaded property rates 
and building permits because many malls 
are approved by ministers and other 
physical development controllers like LSPP. 
There is no law enforcement on levies by 
MCC or specific taxes stipulated for LGUs 
in general.     
 
Many services are not yet decentralized so 
the problem of inequitable distribution of 
public resources where public services 
become disproportionately accessible to 
those paying bribes, denying those services 
or similar quality of services to those who 
do not pay bribes is not yet significant. 
Nonetheless, MCC is reportedly blamed for 
the irregular observance of safety and other 
construction standards in the issuing of 
building permits resulting in many city 
business buildings left unfinished, 
abandoned and dangerous while others are 
approved but erected where they block the 
smooth flow of traffic or on or too close to 
main sewage lines or dumping areas.  
 
Tender boards play by the ruling of political 
ministers. It is an often observed pattern 
that contracts are not awarded to the highest 
quality provider at the bid price but to the 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
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standards of provision 
of goods and services 
offered in two ways: (a) 
contracts for example 
are not awarded to the 
highest quality  
Provider  at the bid 
price but to the firm that 
offers the highest bribe; 
 
 
(b) it is often difficult 
for those who have 
received bribes to ask 
providers of services to 
provide better services 
or rectify problems 
associated with services 
already rendered. 
 
(7)corruption 
undermining the rule of 
law and scaring away 
potential  
investors as it arbitrarily 
increases transaction 
costs 
 
 
 
 
(8)corruption being 
anti-developmental as it 
reduces the 
opportunities  
available to people, 
particularly the poor 
increasing their 
insecurity 
 
(9) corruption in the 
form of nepotism, 
bribery or patronage, 
stifling meritocracy, the 
result of which is an 
increasingly inefficient 
and brutal bureaucracy 
firm appointed by the minister in charge. At 
least this can be confirmed with many 
contracts in roads and city parks building 
being of sub-standard and irreparable 
quality. Normally, these contractors lack 
enough equipment and resources/machinery 
and may not be recalled for rectifications as 
are also not inspected or monitored. 
 
Arbitrary decisions by the political 
ministers on the allocation of contracts 
prevent highest and competent service 
quality providers in sustainable 
developmental service provision. The 
seeking of the ‘under the table transaction-
costs’ (bribes/’kick-backs’) results in biased 
and unfair incompetent contracts and 
quality compromise.   
 
Most of the developmental projects 
currently taking place are not community 
driven or directly planned, approved and 
controlled by the LGUs. They are under the 
ministers’ eyes and not poverty-reduction 
oriented but are said to be strategically 
meant for political popular support winning, 
with meager short-lived or no direct 
benefits to the poor. 
 
The offering of contracts independent of 
tender boards’ standards by political and 
bureaucratic seniors is reportedly following 
lines of nepotism, bribery or patronage, 
stifling meritocracy, resulting in an 
increasingly inefficient and brutal political 
bureaucracy.  
 
 
 
Suppliers/service providers and officers 
openly report that without bribery, 
‘connections’ or ‘affiliations’ no tender can 
be offered or ‘won’.   
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
This situation conforms to respondents’ opinion (100%) that Lesotho’s LG in terms of 
promoting equity or human development and creating enabling environment as one form 
of measurement in decentralization is not performing. Lesotho’s LGUs are reportedly not 
making any efforts to enhance productivity, equity, sustainable development and local 
 279 
communities’ empowerment except for street vendors’ licensing by MCC, providing a 
window opportunity for meager income generation in the informal sector (Interviews, 
July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
 
“Please openly and boldly put it in your research report that, donors must put this condition: no diversion of funds between 
and/or within a department. I have seen more than enough of it whereby funds in the MCC just get vired, misallocated and 
misdirected but without concrete evidence of the work funds were diverted for. What is the use of planting plants in the parks 
and not use their money for watering them but use it elsewhere where there is no evidence that it was used there. There is a 
circular from the Town Clerk disallowing all staff members to communicate to anyone, researcher or any media but this is not 
helping our work. The cabinet just approves and passes the budget money and take it in the name of watering parks that never get 
watered. Nine people have not been replaced and the management keeps on saying there is no money for the created budgeted for 
positions that became vacant when some resigned…contracts are given to unknown unmonitored contractors in such an 
unscrupulous manner by the big ones without consulting us the experts or heads of sections. I do not understand what is the use 
of these tender boards! Everything is completely controlled by the government (An Indian Expatriate and Director of Parks at the 
Maseru City Council/MCC for 3 years, Mr. Hiren Najiar, Interviews on the 2nd of December, 2009).” 
 
“MCC lacks legal protection, we can’t control anything or impose property rates fairly on all businesses, big malls are just 
mushrooming around, anywhere in the city, without proper procedures of approval, safety standards and monitoring of 
developers, contracts are just given behind our back and you will find it is by your most senior political boss owning shares 
there, you just have to be silent and protect your job in the ministry. Even if you are the chief engineer or the treasurer (Senior 
Professional Worker in the MCC for 2 years, Interviews on the 2nd of December, 2009).” 
 
“Look, don’t think the documented financial accounting procedures are adhered to here, you just get instructions, often by phone 
from the ministry on how to allocate money, into which accounts and votes you must shift it and so on you can be instructed 
likewise from the ministry to welcome a newly employed personnel, completely unprocedural instructions to you as a 
professional technical person and what can you do? Look for a new job or cross the bridge (international border)! (One other 
most senior professional worker at MCC, interviews on the 2nd of December, 2009).” 
 
 
8.6 Has Lesotho’s Decentralization Succeeded? Dimensions of Success and 
Challenges 
 
Key informants’ assessment on whether LG has indeed succeeded only cements the thesis 
that prevailing institutional constraints are adversely holding it at bay in terms of 
development delivery as they (100%) (Appendix D) stated that the MLG and other 
central ministries still possess and exercise entire legal power of access and control over 
available resources. This stalls any geographical advantage that Lesotho’s LGUs may 
have, including being located in an area with an adequate economic base like sources of 
mining and irrigation. 
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Furthermore, the 1968 chieftainship Act and other various Acts still give the same powers 
and functions for LGUs established in 1997 Act to the chiefs and various central 
government ministries, the MLG itself and other government-parastatals. Well-defined 
responsibilities in a satisfactory legal framework are still lacking in Lesotho’s 
decentralization/deconcentration (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Besides being legally constrained LGUs lack the capacity to mobilize sufficient 
resources. They lack skills, resources, financial-political-administrative-communication-
infrastructural-institutional systems and adequate data for effective development planning 
and delivery. The MLG is not involving LGUs in a bottom-up manner in policies and 
decision-making, selecting and implementing development projects locally relevant, 
spending and management of centrally granted resources. The current deconcentration 
gives no room for supportive central government activities. Those are not done, neither in 
the form of training nor in any form of political-administrative-resources devolution 
(Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
There are no appropriate management practices for human and other various resources. 
Human and other resources and financial management systems and standards are not in 
place. The top-down management practices by the will and whim of senior political 
enclave with over concentrated micro-management protective legal powers have 
displaced such a possibility. The relationship between the central government and LGUs 
constitutes a master-servant relationship. LGUs are directly controlled by the political 
minister in the MLG (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
There are no specified/expected quantity and quality of services and other outputs to be 
delivered. The setting of development goals and implementation is centrally controlled 
and there is no form of quality assurance (Ibid). 
LGUs in Lesotho function in isolation of the civic society, other development agencies 
and disadvantaged local societal groupings and associations. There is no legal networking 
 281 
for the development of productive internal and external relations. There are no clear 
strategic plans for such (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
The relationship between the LGUs and the community including NGOs is not effective. 
Councillors lack enough information and knowledge about the activities of the central 
government in their areas. The limited once a month council meeting with occasional 
verbal casual reporting of LGUs’ activities by the personnel disempowers the councillors. 
Written reports are usually in English, a language barrier for effective participation, 
feedback and good delivering working relations between the personnel and poorly literate 
councillors and community members. Councillors’ scheduled community (progress) 
reporting is not an integral system for monitoring and evaluation of LGUs. LGUs may 
not be subjected to any performance standards as there are none. They operate 
independent of the possible pressure for delivery and presence of the civic society.  
Communities are to a greater extent characterized by voter-apathy and political spectators 
who have lost hope in local government (Ibid). 
 
LGUs traumatically know and accept it as a Sesotho cultural entrenched proverb and 
traditional excuse that (Mmuso-hao-tate) ‘the central government is never expedient’. 
This culture has transformed LGUs into advisory and consultative bodies engulfed by 
dominant political party majority councils’ missionary membership pursuing the 
national-manifesto-party-agenda and not local development.  No councillor or LGU-
official can claim there is satisfactory responsiveness to constituents. Sluggishness and 
non-delivery are worsened by politically strategic public-eye catching initiatives for 
polls’ winning and not necessarily for local poverty alleviation. LGUs generally lack 
adequate information about their funding, spending and how they are managed or to be 
managed (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
The central government responsible for granting the LGUs yearly also struggles with 
budget deficits. This predicament is confirmed by the 2009/09 budget with a decline in 
funding capital expenditure but remarkably loans and grants (borrowed from various 
international donors with less control and performance accounting standards) funding the 
 282 
same capital expenditure to LGUs, especially MCC rose by 388%. Non-accounting and 
financial-procedures-management lacking/neglecting LGUs/MCC have actually become 
a development-non-delivery liability siphoning tax income through organized 
‘officialized’ unchecked corruption (unknown unmonitored centrally imposed 
development contracts) cemented by protective central government’s ‘collective 
responsibility’. The ministry of finance and planning, for instance, may not implement its 
mandate of auditing government monies in the MLG for years now. Councillors 
absolutely know naught about LGUs’ finances. The Auditor General may only audit 
sections as approved and instructed by the ministers in the ministries. The national 
treasury is also controlled in the same fashion. Consequently no financial accounting is 
done or reports for open access. Main supervisors to financial institutions with their 
unquestioning loyalty to preserve their ‘jobs’ are answerable to political bosses 
ultimately, not to the ethos of professionalism, state and real democracy.  The 
compilation, storage and retrieval of financial information is insulated by circulars 
instructing the concerned politically recruited personnel not to release or produce any 
information. Councillors and personnel expressed their strong belief that there are no 
financial management systems for revenue collection, budgeting, auditing, debt 
management and expenditure. Surprisingly, financial regulations for government sections 
including the MCC are in place but rather unfortunately abandoned and never 
enforced/made known to the personnel (Ibid). 
LGUs lack local revenue sources, that is direct local taxes; they earn limited user charges 
from public toilets. Their revenue and MLG’s grants are not proportional with inflation, 
rapid urbanization and population growth.  There is no reasonable growth rate for LGUs’ 
local expenditures, both recurrent and capital local expenditure to support a range of 
significant social and infrastructural services, not even enough to maintain the offered 
few (Ibid). 
There is no post now, low or senior is free, from political scrutiny or manoeuvre. Almost 
every section in LGUs has more than an acceptable labour turnover due to demotivating 
government remuneration and poor working conditions. There is reportedly 60%-70% of 
vacancies unfilled resulting from high labour turn-over and ever unfilled positions due to 
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unattractive benefits and politicized recruitment method. The shocking situation is that 
given tasks and workload keep on increasing (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
Observing key areas of performance for LGUs, barriers perpetuating this situation as 
reported by respondents (100%) (table 8.13 below and appendix E) include the fact that 
(1) LGUs still lack the right to mobilize or borrow and manage their funds, so they lack 
the capacity to cause any form of developmental or administrative transformation beyond 
the practice of voting. The state may control money but people also need to initiatively 
address their own local problems. LGUs lack fiscal autonomy. Local moral hazard on 
monies should be monitored by the central government, this is what respondents expect 
the central government to do at least. (2) There is no clear legislative framework and a 
specific programme purported to initiate and enhance the capacity of the LGUs in terms 
of the human and fiscal resources management. Consequently, there are no established or 
implemented core local government systems or standards like performance management 
systems and quality delivery standards. There is lack of financial, human and capital 
resources as well. Councillors lack legal power to call public gatherings for effective 
communities’ participation, chiefs with such power have at times refused to cooperate 
and effect grassroots participation. (3) There is no adequate LG’s management capacity 
and capability. Engineering/civil works/technical, administrative, clerical, semi-skilled 
and unskilled manpower is severely undersupplied in the LGUs. There is no proper 
planning, coordination and networking. There is no synergy of devolved activities. (4) 
There is a problem of increasing inequalities and disparities as other wards already have 
better infrastructure and better performing councils. (5) Councillors lack the standardized 
practices, mechanisms and adequate information to supply as feedback to their 
communities. The party-politics create informal influences condoning non-accountability 
to the communities and promote MLG’s capture and direct control of the LGUs. (6) 
Monitoring and evaluation are not done as there are no set standards and systems. Proper 
financial and programmes management, adequate engineering and plans for better 
organizational development are not in place. There is no vision and mission or effective 
strategic planning towards sustainable growth and development (Field Survey/Interviews, 
July 2009 to July, 2010). 
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(7) Developmental-service delivery is mainly hampered by the budget constraints and 
lack of legislated clear sources of revenue including but not limited to local taxation, 
levies and user charges only. Lack of adequate financial, capital and human resources as 
well as the problem of several Acts allocating same powers and functions to other central 
ministries and organs impede LGUs from effectively delivering the services of control of 
natural resources (grasslands, sand, stones, e.t.c.) and environmental protection 
(pollution, soil erosion e.t.c.), public health (food inspection, refuse collection and 
disposal e.t.c.), physical planning, sites allocation, minor roads and bridle-paths, water 
supply in villages, local marketing provision and regulation, foreign investment 
attraction, streets and public places improvements, burial grounds control, parks and 
gardens improvements and maintenance and good control of building permits. The 
functions of preventing and controlling fire, provision of education, recreation and 
cultural facilities and roads and traffic services, water resources and fencing are still 
legally owned and severely contested for by other central government’ agencies. (8)  
Delivered development-services are deteriorating and have no maintenance plans. (9) 
Political party majority representation sways off required local community representation 
for local economic development/LED. Decentralization in Lesotho is mainly a top-down 
process well intended to increase the political grip of one dominant ruling party system 
from the grassroots to the top-most through the centrally, captured, dictated and owned 
LGUs. This approach has prioritized political goals of maintaining local popularity 
country-wide, one dominant party participation, building of sole representative party-
structures and systems at the expense of neglecting LED. Local communities are not 
represented at all in the councils, instead the dominant party now ruling is over 
represented with councillors representing and pursuing party’s agenda. (10) Vulnerable 
groups are still excluded, this neglects poverty. (11) LGUs still lack financial viability as 
they have no legally stipulated revenue base, practiced and maintained financial systems 
for accounting, controlling credits, debts or bills/advanced prepaid bills or apportioned 
supplies of electricity and water for redistributive rates to counter poverty levels and 
promote equitable access, use and development among various social-geographical 
groups with different income levels (‘progressive/redistributive mechanisms and 
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taxation). (13) Technical competence, career opportunities and good motivation are still 
lacking. 
 
 
Table 8.13: Key Performance Areas of Lesotho’s Local Authorities and the Challenges 
 
Key performance 
areas of Las 
Main Constraints/Challenges Frequency Percent 
1. Institutional 
capacity and municipal 
transformation 
-Have you established 
and implemented core 
local government 
systems e.g. 
performance 
management systems 
etc? 
 
-Is there adequate 
LG’s management 
capacity and 
capability? 
-Which high vacancy 
levels does this LG 
have?  
 
-Accountability 
mechanisms problems? 
 
-Serious challenges in 
the areas of  
Financial-
management,  
programme 
management,  
Engineering and  
organizational 
development 
LGUs do not yet have the right to 
mobilize or borrow and manage their 
funds, so they lack the capacity to 
cause any form of developmental or 
administrative transformation beyond 
the practice of voting. The state may 
control money but people also need 
to address their own local problems. 
LGUs lack fiscal autonomy. Local 
moral hazard on monies should be 
monitored by the central government. 
 
There is no clear legislative 
framework and a specific programme 
purported to initiate and enhance the 
capacity of the LGUs in terms of the 
human and fiscal resources 
management. Consequently there are 
no established or implemented core 
local government systems or 
standards like performance 
management systems and quality 
delivery standards. There is lack of 
financial, human and capital 
resources as well. Councillors lack 
legal power to call public gatherings 
for effective communities’ 
participation, chiefs with such power 
have at times refused to cooperate 
and effect grassroots participation. 
 
There is no adequate LG’s 
management capacity and capability. 
Engineering/civil works/technical, 
administrative, clerical, semi-skilled 
and unskilled manpower is severely 
undersupplied in the LGUs. There is 
no proper planning, coordination and 
networking. There is no synergy of 
devolved activities. 
-There is a problem of increasing 
inequalities and disparities as other 
wards already have better 
infrastructure and better performing 
councils. 
 
66 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
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Councillors lack the standardized 
practices, mechanisms and adequate 
information to supply as feedback to 
their communities. The party-politics 
create informal influences condoning 
non-accountability to the 
communities and promote MLG’s 
capture and direct control of the 
LGUs. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation are not 
done as there are no set standards and 
systems. Proper financial and 
programmes management, adequate 
engineering and plans for better 
organizational development are not 
in place. There is no vision and 
mission or effective strategic 
planning towards sustainable growth 
and development. 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
2. Basic service 
delivery and 
infrastructure 
-Services delivered 
include? 
-Pace and quality of 
services delivered? 
-Backlogs in services 
deliveries? 
Services delivery is mainly hampered 
by the budget constraints and lack of 
legislated clear sources of revenue 
including but not limited to local 
taxation, levies and user charges 
only. Lack of adequate financial, 
capital and human resources as well 
as the problem of several Acts 
allocating same powers and functions 
to other central ministries and organs 
impede LGUs from effectively 
delivering the services of control of 
natural resources (grasslands, sand, 
stones, e.t.c.) and environmental 
protection (pollution, soil erosion 
e.t.c.), public health (food inspection, 
refuse collection and disposal e.t.c.), 
physical planning, sites allocation, 
minor roads and bridle-paths, water 
supply in villages, local marketing 
provision and regulation, foreign 
investment attraction, streets and 
public places improvements, burial 
grounds control, parks and gardens 
improvements and maintenance and 
good control of building permits. The 
functions of preventing and 
controlling fire, provision of 
education, recreation and cultural 
facilities and roads and traffic 
services, water resources and fencing 
are still legally owned and severely 
contested for by other central 
government’ agencies.      
-Delivered services are deteriorating 
and have no maintenance plans.  
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
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3. Local economic 
development (LED) 
-Prevalent dimensions 
of poverty locally?  
Impacts of LG on such 
poverty so far?  
-LGs’ LED strategies 
effectiveness/success 
so far?  
-Enough of LG’s LED 
specialists 
Political party majority 
representation sways off required 
local community representation for 
LED. Decentralization in Lesotho is 
mainly a top-down process well 
intended to increase the political grip 
of one dominant ruling party system 
from the grassroots to the top-most 
through the centrally, captured, 
dictated and owned LGUs. This 
approach has prioritized political 
goals of maintaining local popularity 
country-wide, one dominant party 
participation, building of sole 
representative party-structures and 
systems at the expense of neglecting 
LED. Local communities are not 
represented at all in the councils, 
instead the dominant party now 
ruling is over represented with 
councillors representing and pursuing 
party’s agenda.   
-Vulnerable groups are still excluded, 
this neglects poverty. 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
4. Financial viability 
and management 
-Billing systems 
available/used by LG?  
-How adequate 
/efficient are billing 
systems? 
To whom is this LG 
indebted? 
How does LG manage 
debt? 
How does the LG get 
credited?  
Which credit control 
systems does the LG 
have? 
-How effective and 
efficient is the LG’s 
financial management 
capacity & systems? 
-LG’s revenue base 
include?  
-How adequate is the 
revenue base? 
LGUs still lack financial viability as 
they have no legally stipulated 
revenue base, practiced and 
maintained financial systems for 
accounting, controlling credits, debts 
or bills/advanced prepaid bills or 
apportioned supplies of electricity 
and water for redistributive rates to 
counter poverty levels and promote 
equitable access, use and 
development among various social-
geographical groups with different 
income levels 
(‘progressive/redistributive 
mechanisms and taxation).  
-technical competence, career 
opportunities and good motivation 
are lacking in LGUs 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
5. Good governance 
-Is there stability 
within and between 
political and 
administrative 
domains? 
 
-How effective is 
Elements of good governance 
including effective participation by 
the grassroots, responsiveness by the 
LGUs and the central government, 
transparency and accountability and 
others are greatly compromised by 
one dominant party influence and 
system. Political actors are after 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
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communication 
between council and 
communities? 
 
-Are all the 
committees 
functioning 
effectively? 
 
party’s loyalty and continued 
favouritism of its leadership for 
being nominated on party’s list of 
nominees for next political 
opportunities/jobs like standing for 
council elections and any other 
positions. Elections are done mainly 
along party affiliation lines and not 
real grassroot level representation. 
Councillors mainly communicate 
with their political constituencies as 
they usually give the limited 
feedback to their local party 
membership in the local occasional 
party constitutional activities.  In this 
way there is no effective 
communication between councils and 
communities.  
-There is no effective representation, 
LG structures are given many 
responsibilities without authority and 
resources to implement plans. 
 
Committees mainly comprise of 
loyalists to the ruling political party 
and serve as advisory bodies to the 
minister and personnel, not as 
executive implementers of councils’ 
decisions. They are thus all not 
functioning properly and effectively.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
The weak capacity and interrelations between the central government and the LGUs, 
reportedly, add to the limitations against decentralization. Key informants (100%) 
(Appendix E) stated and re-emphasized that MLG has no capacity to implement effective 
decentralization process. LGUs do not account to their communities; instead they are 
answerable to the minister and cannot address local development except national political 
goals including expansion of power-recentralization. Proper devolution is being replaced 
by consolidation of centralization lacking self-sustaining measures locally. 
Developmental-service delivery and performance standards are missing, including 
financial and accounting procedures. Councillors lack powers even to call community 
meetings, chiefs with such powers often prevent local participation by refusing to call 
needed public gatherings. Capital, human and financial resources are limited (Interviews, 
July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 289 
 
8.7 Summary 
 
The process of decentralization in Lesotho has taken the route of deconcentration and/or 
recentralization. Positive results towards political-development attainment/service-
delivery are not yet realized. LGUs have no autonomy and adequate ability to access 
national government and influence local government policy. The range of local 
government functions is still centralized and limited. Local political parties cannot make 
decisions independently of their national structures as the one dominant majority party 
occupying almost all the LGUs seats is centrally controlled. LGUs cannot raise their own 
revenue independent of higher tiers of government. These constraints and others limit the 
effectiveness and efficiency of LG as a developmental policy in Lesotho. Devolution has 
not yet taken place. Inclusive citizen-participation for local development delivery is not 
yet effected. Extreme inadequacy is seen in the legal structure in defining and 
establishing LGUs and permitting them to function as decentralized, national 
government’s style of managing in line with decentralized management, quality of 
personnel posted to LGUs and the councillors (in terms of experience, education, 
effective representation), grants from the government and lack of local revenue base. 
There is inadequate central government support and LGUs do not yet fully participate in 
the decisions making, policy making and implementation and evaluation process 
according to the key informants’ assessment. 
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CHAPTER NINE: STUDY’S ANALYTIC SUMMARY 
 
9.0   General Introduction 
 
The general aim of this research study was to contribute to knowledge and scholarship on 
the political-developmental policy of decentralization’s prospects and challenges in the 
developing world, using Lesotho as a case study. All the last chapters have mainly been 
about the expository analysis of the socio-political-economic institutional constraints 
militating against the efficiency and effectiveness of the adoption of decentralization 
towards poverty alleviation or development delivery in Lesotho. The study has 
intertwined the degree to which decentralization has been prosperously embarked upon in 
Lesotho with success/outcomes indicators in service delivery. This included 
decentralization’s contextual evolution whereby chapter two in a global context is an 
overview of decentralization. Chapter three dealt with the prospects and challenges of 
decentralization. Chapter four worked on the main methods of measuring adoption of 
decentralization and the capacity and limitations of such methods. Such methods have 
been adopted in this study particularly in chapter five through to chapter eight (part two 
and three of the study).  
 
While chapter one has been introductory, two to four constituted the study’s theoretical 
framework applied in the following chapters, as part one of the study. Part two consisted 
of chapter five giving the specific experience of decentralization in Lesotho and the 
concerned challenges. This also includes chapter six dealing with chieftainship 
particularly. Part three is composed of chapter seven dealing with the nature of Lesotho’s 
decentralization and eight assessing the degree and the efficiency of the adoption of 
decentralization in Lesotho with regard to its success in poverty alleviation or 
development delivery. Part two and three are based on fieldwork that included 
conducting of face to face interviews and desk studies/documentary analysis by the 
researcher. Part two and three mainly applied the theoretical framework in part one, to 
actually measure the degree of the adoption of decentralization and how it was effectively 
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and efficiently implemented in Lesotho with regard to development delivery. This has 
also covered the prospects and challenges of this potential policy in democratization and 
development delivery throughout all the chapters. The study can conclude that while 
decentralization has the benefits of deepening local democracy and development 
delivery, this has been constrained among others by the lack of human resources and 
financial management, limited fund raising capacity, low education background/skills 
and competence/experience of the elected councillors and poor unsupportive relations 
between the central government and the councils, particularly in the developing world 
where both institutional and administrative state capacity are greatly lacking. This has 
rendered local service delivery ineffective and inefficient.      
 
Guiding particular research objectives in the conducting and writing of this public and 
political-development administrative assessment research, the study included tracing the 
progression of Lesotho’s policy of decentralization to local authorities/local government 
units (LGUs), since 1997 and examining the role and the extent to which it contributed to 
the main objectives of the Lesotho local government including; (1) the provision of a 
democratic and accountable government, (2) sustainable services and (3) the promotion 
of social and economic development by giving priority to basic community, (4) the 
promotion of the involvement of the community and organizations and individuals in 
local government issues, (5) the enhancement of participation in national and community 
programmes, (6) and the combination of the municipality and urban boards which are to 
be combined to the rural and urban areas, thus creating a mechanism to  integrate them as  
parts of economies that used to be separate.These Lesotho’s LG objectives serve as the 
prospects for this country’s decentralization but the challenges summarized below in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of LG’s adoption section have withheld these benefits and 
thus barred its local development delivery. The specific purpose was thus to examine 
Lesotho’s evolution of decentralization, its nature, relations between democratic local 
authorities/LGUs and chieftaincy and the central government, its financing, electoral-
political systems, its extent/measure/degree by process and outcomes indicators (as on 
findings-summary Table 9.1 below) vis-à-vis efficiency and effectiveness in its adoption 
for positive local rural-urban developmental impact/poverty alleviation.   
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This chapter aims at offering this study’s analytic summary on the key findings and 
conclusions. It provides us with lessons for Lesotho, how decentralization needs to be 
rethought in Lesotho for efficient and effective poverty alleviation theoretically, and 
practical recommendations and conclusions. Firstly, lessons for Lesotho in 
decentralization are discussed involving offering an analytic summary of the extent to 
which LG has been efficiently and effectively adopted, then, secondly the way forward is 
summarized. This involves rethinking decentralization within Lesotho’s context, 
theoretically and implementation wise. This constitutes some recommendations. Thirdly, 
conclusions on arguments and assumptions and research question of this study are made.  
 
The study has argued that while decentralization may have had prospects for the efficient 
and effective delivery of rural-urban development goals elsewhere like in Europe, in 
Lesotho there are peculiar socio-cultural-political institutional constraints militating 
against the possible prospects of such decentralization. The study has also argued that 
decentralization is constrained by an absence of the prerequisites for successful reform 
efforts. That is there are a number of social, cultural and institutional constraints in 
Lesotho, but above all, the major barrier to successful DLG is the lack of political will. 
The reason for the slow pace of decentralization and/or its inefficiency in implementation 
in developing countries is primarily political. That is the lacking political will to fully 
implement such a policy due to foreseeable absent political benefits/goals to the 
bureaucrats in business and/or heavy political losses/costs. This is one of the main 
reasons for the incidental recentralization in Lesotho. Furthermore, the role of 
institutional and economic constraints, this study has analyzed mainly on Lesotho, cannot 
be underestimated or ignored in explaining why there is recentralization in Lesotho (see 
Ariyo et al, 1999: 201-213, Yarrow, 1999:157-168 and Ramamurti, 1999: 137-155). 
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9.1 Lessons for Lesotho in Decentralization 
 
9.1.1 Lesotho’s Decentralization Evolutionary Aspects: Power-Relations 
and Electoral-Political System 
 
It can be learned that decentralization since its evolution during the pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-independence epoch, has been an issue before the actual establishment of local 
government/LG that recently became a political priority in 1997 by the ruling Lesotho 
Congress for Democracy/LCD. The ‘khotla’/traditional court system before the colonial 
era has continued to entrench the traditional hierarchy of local and regional chiefs loyal to 
the king at the top of the customary governance system. We also learn that till late in 
2005, when the first elections for democratic local authorities’ were held, chiefs were still 
in charge of local land allocation and disputes settlement. Chiefs used to exercise 
administrative, judicial and legislative functions (Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).   
 
British colonial rule (1868) undermined this traditional authority structure and launched a 
National Council which substituted the national ‘pitso’ (public gathering of the chiefs). 
This customary leadership continued to prevail parallel to the new colonial system until 
political independence gain in 1966 and through to this democratic era, thus core-existing 
with the elected local authorities and administrative staff. The pro-chieftaincy Basotho 
National Party/BNP, the Senate consisting mainly of chiefs together with individual 
chiefs have continuously opposed and resisted relinquishing power of control and access 
to resources and administration to the democratically established units fully to the point 
of efficient and effective decentralization. The British created the elected district councils 
in 1945. Chiefs were included as ex-officio members. The councils were merely 
consultative bodies with little influence. They also had limited fiscal autonomy and 
power for by-laws making (Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
 
In 1968, after the political independence the councils were suspended for political 
reasons. They posed a threat to the local political dominance and influence of the then 
ruling BNP as their majority membership consisted of the then opposing BCP’s main 
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political members. They were restored in the 1970s at village level only as advisory 
bodies to the chiefs. The 1980-85 integrated rural development project of Thaba-Tseka 
adopted through the decentralization programme being donor dependent collapsed when 
foreign donation was phased out but then left this region as the tenth new district. While 
the 1997 Act of decentralization efforts are constrained by political recentralization by 
the central government and resistant chieftaincy, as well as political, legal, institutional, 
human-resource and technical challenges indicated in chapter three, four and five (may 
also see Parnell and Pieterse, 2002:79-91) such a 1980-85 decentralization project was 
stifled mainly by resistance to a decentralized budget and resources by the ministries and 
their bureaucrats who did not like to relinquish power of control over their field staff. 
They continued to make unilateral decisions in the district undermining decentralization 
programme to counter what they called “Canadians” (the then donor/decentralization-
sponsoring government) and their “Project” (Werlin, 1992, discussed in chapter 3 and 
James Ferguson, 2003:194-227).  
 
The trend that has also been existent in Lesotho is that till today as affirmed by my field 
interviews and field findings in chapter six, seven and eight, (traditional and political 
elites) traditional bureaucrats/chiefs and government bureaucrats/civil servants and/or 
political bureaucrats have together with the lack of state’s institutional capacity militated 
against the efficient and effective efforts of decentralization in this country (see chapter 7 
of this study and Ramamurti Ravi, 1999, George Yarrow, 1999 and Ademola Ariyo et al, 
1999 for the same analogy). For example, while District Administrators/DAs are said to 
be given authority over all district (provincial) matters and staff to enhance 
decentralization, in practice, such staff continue to report to their ministries in the capital 
city, Maseru. These ministries are directly controlled by the political ministers, who also 
control the DA’s functions directly. This is particularly reported and observable in 
financial, technical and professional matters. The political ministers still absolutely 
control the budgets, resources and the staff (Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 
2010).   
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This is where we see a shift/further centralization (deconcentration) of authority rather 
more from the local authorities to the central government and some tussle over power by 
the chiefs. This has always brought a dilemma on decentralization in Lesotho. The 
dilemma is in choosing effectively between complete restructuring including getting rid 
of chieftaincy and maintaining a balance by integrating the two systems of tradition and 
democracy for the sake of maintaining ‘peace and stability’. The country has tried to 
adopt the latter but then with clear structural ambiguity (lack of clear lines of command, 
authority and power) and thus enabling disabling recentralization/political elite capture 
and some traditional/chieftaincy elite capture over ‘vacillated decentralization’.  The 
powers of the local authorities and the concerned staff are not well specified not to talk of 
un-transferred political, administrative and financial powers and functions, particularly in 
the assigning of levies, taxes and funds raising and use, that is resources mobilization and 
control. The silence of the decentralization policy of Lesotho on this, further worsen the 
already limited (financial and staff) capacity of the local authorities. The real policy 
making body with executive powers is the political minister. This has created political-
clientelism instead of devolution of political, administrative and political power and 
functions to the local authorities (Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 2010).   
 .          
The Urban Government Act was passed in 1983, this resulted in urban authorities 
existence. The military rule of 1986 (after the BNP undemocratic rule of 1970-1986) 
established development councils at village, ward and district levels. Chiefs became 
chairpersons of development councils in the areas of their jurisdiction. They had to 
facilitate the process whereby they all would share their powers but they did not 
cooperate. The military rule restored democratic rule in 1993 by facilitating general 
elections. The 1993 constitution introduced local political self-administration and 
provided for the establishment of LGUs by the parliament. The Ministry of Local 
Government/MLG was also established in 1994. The LG legislation was made effective 
in 1997 through the LG Act amended in 2004 that was followed by 2005 LGUs’ elections 
countrywide. The first-past-the-post electoral model adopted in LGUs with reserved 
(30%) seats for women has perpetuated political exclusion of the poor and powerless and 
the civil society. It has promoted a one-dominant political party state with political 
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monopoly, favouritism and unquestioning loyalty to the ruling party by the LGUs, un-
opposable and un-challengeable practices and malpractices in administrative, political 
and financial acts of the ruling party (Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 2010).   
 
9.1.2  The Efficiency and Effectiveness, Extent and Nature of LG in Lesotho 
 
When integrating the field findings (as also in Table 9.1 below) of this research study to 
an overall assessment regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of LG/decentralization’s 
adoption and its contribution in development delivery in Lesotho we can adopt in 
summary a focus on the decentralization’s efficiency indicators firstly embracing 
management of the decentralization process at the central government, secondly its 
efficiency indicators in policy planning and implementation capacity in LGUs and thirdly 
the efficiency indicators in its fiscal decentralization and administrative efficiency. This 
also reflects on the main prerequisites of decentralization adoption and degree in Lesotho 
being real political, administrative and resources/financial devolution aspects.  
 
Findings in the management of the decentralization process at the centre indicate very 
poor demonstration and practice of political commitment as the overall government 
support in terms of training, supportive visits and technical and staff support are reported 
not to be done by the central government (also Table 9.1 below). There is little to suggest 
that LG’s objectives are prioritized in its execution and hence no development delivery 
currently. Non-synchronization of these objectives includes the country’s poverty 
reduction strategy’s objectives as well as its national development priorities that were 
only declared for attracting foreign development aid. There has been an insignificant 
budget for such objectives, primarily expecting foreign aid. The same is happening with 
decentralization as the government has openly stated in its reports that may be foreign 
donation will come in to help LG deliver developmentally. Thus we find that, in effect, 
and despite its admirable objectives, the decentralization programme in Lesotho is not 
essentially a development plan but, rather, mainly another kind of structure for marketing 
the country for foreign driven development, dependency syndrome in the face of such 
dwindling underdeveloping foreign tied aid through impoverishing ever increasing 
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national debt servicing with undeveloping policies as aid (pre)conditions (e.g. SALPs) for 
continued access to such debts causing national cyclic poverty, foreign control with funds 
mismanagement (Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 2010)..  
 
Under the central management stream for decentralization we also learn that there has not 
yet been the provision of a clear regulatory framework (also Table 9.1 below) due to the 
existing weak regulatory environment for the smooth, effective and efficient introduction 
of LG. This is worsened by a lack of coordination with other ministries. Such ministries 
are still withholding the functions declared as decentralized, making this policy to remain 
a recentralization and deconcentration policy observably unfit/irrelevant for local 
development delivery. We also see no autonomy for LGUs (Table 9.1 below), 
particularly concerning the mechanisms for financial and technical monitoring of LGUs. 
The Ministry of Local Government/MLG has necessarily centralized legal powers, only 
the minister has power to pass LG laws/by-laws. The regulatory and legal procedures 
either for such law making and/or monitoring in finances and procedures are still unclear 
and unavailable. The MLG is legally left as the main top-down leading ministry in 
decentralization, reconstituting LGUs merely as consultative bodies suit to ‘toe the line’ 
of the ruling LCD majority party political dominance to which they form its externally 
controlled local membership. This has fully prioritized political party interests of power 
maintenance and influence from the elections for representation in LGUs and the whole 
running of LG and not local needs for development delivery as MLG continues to remain 
an only powerful driving force in decentralization with unaffected limited loyal political-
party leadership capacities of party-elected determined and recruited leadership 
(Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Efficiency in the policy planning and implementation capacity of LGUs is hindered by 
lack of availability of competent staff and councillors. LGUs do not manage their staff 
instead the large staff transferred to LGUs is still centrally managed by the MLG 
(deconcentration as on Table 9.1 below). While DCSs are qualified there is the problem 
of large and low profiled CCSs as local overloaded administrators. There are no 
structures for management systems for horizontal and vertical coordination (Table 9.1 
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below) as such clear flows of information are lacking and local communities usually lack 
information for collective and individual participation consequently promoting social 
exclusion. The efficiency is also constrained by the lack of technical equipment for 
decentralization policy implementation at the CCs and insufficient at DCs. Many places 
still lack the most basic infrastructure for effecting decentralization for development 
delivery (Interviews/Field Survey, July 2009 to July, 2010).   
 
Fiscal decentralization and administrative efficiency in Lesotho’s LG is hampered by the 
lack of provision of resources for LGUs. There is still no clear intergovernmental transfer 
system. The minister apportions the grants with unchallengeable legal decision making 
power. It is reported that the implemented allocations are based on staff numbers and 
population density in the CCs. This type of resources management by the minister is the 
exact resemblance of still other normal centralized ministries and functions (Table 9.1 
below). Clear plan for devolution of resources is not in place.  LGUs at the district level 
could generate their own revenue for development delivery through various user charges 
but there is no political will to effect or tap this potential. Key informants feel that the 
ruling party is hesitant for the sake of maintaining political popularity and avoiding 
eminent accountability. The possibility of revenue generation in rural areas is not 
significant. This adds to the problem of lack of general financial capacity. The success of 
decentralization in development delivery heavily depends on the devolution of resources, 
that is capital, personnel and financial resources to the LGUs. Opportunities for the MCC 
and DCs to generate funding for their urban development budget include possible charges 
on car parking areas, public toilets, tollgate fees, property taxes, licensing fees, levies, 
various user charges and public utilities. Key informants also feel that the lack of political 
will to specify and effect such taxes and levies is again due to a need to avoid public 
pressure on the demand for creation of more jobs and increased remuneration to offset 
low income levels per person. While there is such a potential for revenue, LGUs in 
Lesotho can hardly raise any funding because they lack an effective billing system. They 
have not yet embarked upon retailing needed most profitable public utilities like water 
and electricity. Cost efficiency is also having hindrances from the process of LGUs’ 
boundary demarcation that was without consideration of administrative efficiency which 
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in turn consequently has high administrative overhead cost preventing development 
delivery so far (Field Survey/Interviews, July 2009 to July, 2010).  
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Table 9.1: Framework Analysis for Local Governance and the Development (Log-Frame Analysis) 
Inputs Outputs Outcomes Goals 
What inputs are there to effect 
Legal statutory reforms to 
strengthen local governance: 
administration, political and 
resources dimensions?  
Administration? 
Councillors in LGUs pass 
recommendations to the LGUs 
that draft the policy 
recommendation to be a 
drafted bill through the 
minister to submit for 
amendment by the parliament.  
The minister may 
reject/approve and gazette. 
 
Political reforms? 
Councillors hold public 
gatherings and submit people’s 
suggestions in the council that 
requests for parliament review 
or amendments through the 
minister. 
Resources (human + financial) 
There are no clear mechanisms 
to increase the capacity of the 
LGUs’ personnel and resources 
mobilization and use. 
 
Which local governance 
focused projects and 
programmes sponsored by 
central governments, donors & 
NGOs? 
LGUs have no such projects 
and have not yet networked 
with the NGO’s, they just 
deliver some services. 
 
Who is responsible for and 
how is the coordination among 
donors, governments and 
NGOs in local governance 
projects and Programmes? 
There is no such coordination 
or networking with donors and 
NGOs 
To what extent has decentralization 
brought legitimate lawful LGUs and 
democratic participation? LGUs’ 
have been enacted by a defective 
exclusive legal process maintaining 
the first-past-the-post electoral 
model lacking inclusive proportional 
representation.  
To what extent has decentralization 
brought about strengthened local 
finances, revenue sources and their 
management? More centralization 
has been effected because the 
minister actually controls 
everything, there are no financial 
systems/clear financial legislation, 
no accounting procedures, no 
financial manual, no sustainable 
revenue sources like supplying of 
apportioned water, electricity and 
the like to be offered by MCC 
through the efficient prepaid billing 
systems, no measuring yardstick in 
terms of service delivery and 
agreements’ &performance stds. 
To what extend has decentralization 
effected transparent, effective and 
accountable local administration? 
There is no political will to 
relinquish political, administrative 
and financial and human resources’ 
control by the political rulers. The 
lower spheres of governance just 
legally exist as consultative forums 
not as autonomous functionary 
spheres with any power.  
To what extent has decentralization 
resulted into effective partnerships 
among LGUs, governments, NGOs 
and donors?   MCC and other LGUs 
completely lack any partnerships 
with any other institutions or civil 
society. Lack of such effective 
partnerships normally creates LGUs 
free from any pressure thus no 
delivery if not poor one, all being 
here the case. 
How has decentralization 
contributed towards basic 
education & what is the % of 
children enrolled in schools 
due to it? 
Ministry of Education and 
Training has taken entire 
responsibility of education 
through a free and compulsory 
education. LGUs do not 
provide education. 
 
How has decentralization 
contributed to the access of 
potable water & what is the % 
of LGU Population with 
water? 
WASA and Rural Water 
Supply departments are central 
parastatals responsible for 
potable water supply. CCs 
limitedly installed piped water 
to 5% of rural households. 
How has decentralization 
contributed to the survival of 5 
year olds & is the percent of 
such children who survive to 
five year? 
MCC has through PPP two 
clinics on this programme and 
at least more than 50 of such 
children are given health 
services per week. 
What is the percent of increase 
in number of businesses 
licensed in previous year in 
LGU? & percent of change in 
number of violent  
incidents from previous year in 
LGU? 
Business licenses are mainly 
for street vendors at 15% 
increase per year, it is difficult 
to control them as many are 
illegal due to the fast growing 
informal sector. 
What has been 
the impact of 
decentralization 
on  
(a)education 
None 
(b)environment 
Creation of 
parks & 
environmental 
projects owned 
by NES 
(c)health 
Clinics with 
various health 
services 
(d)good 
governance 
Legal structures 
are nominally 
there contrarily 
functioning to 
the  values of 
good 
governance 
(e)gender equity 
No such 
programmes 
though elected 
women 
constitute 73%  
of councillors 
(f)poverty 
reduction 
Rotated 
community 
contracting and 
intensive labour 
are used in 
refuse collection 
and road 
building by 
MCC. 
(g)local peace  
and tranquility 
There are no 
conflicts so far. 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
These challenges also reportedly included a poorly and politically expediently designed 
decentralization policy not carefully thought out to be a long-term, intricate and iterative course 
of action for political reforms for local development delivery. There are no corresponding public 
sector reforms to increase the LGUs’ capacity. In practice, and despite the original intentions, 
what we find is a deconcentration of decision making as opposed to decentralization. This is a 
critical point, demonstrating the lack of political will to execute decentralization policy 
fully. There is no plan or any indicator that Lesotho’s LG is either wholesome and 
comprehensive or incremental and strategically selective. Its official stance is that it is made with 
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the expectation that foreign aid may be available for financing it. The complexity of the dilemma 
is compounded in that, currently, proper financial and management practices are reportedly not 
upheld across including condoning acts of absolutely arbitrarily distributed tenders, malpractices, 
funds mismanagement reports and lack of auditing. All required by any potential donor. No donor 
may fund where traces of corruption are so clearly visible and treated with impunity. Corruption 
may be found to be often compatible with the current political-elite capture of the process of 
decentralization affirmed by absolute control by the political ministers of MLG. This has so far 
stifled LG’s efficiency indicators including LGUs’ institutional autonomy, local accountability 
and effective quality citizen-participation at both an individual level and civil society and thus 
transparent information flows and empowered citizens and non-exclusive democratic elections 
not condoning current political-clientelism-patronage (Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to 
July, 2010). 
9.2 The Way Forward for Decentralization in Lesotho 
 
Our analysis of LG in Lesotho affirms the need for rethinking it theoretically and 
pragmatically within the local context for it to attain relevant development delivery. Let 
us at the foremost consent that while decentralization by definition requires effective 
political will to devolve politically, administratively and resource-wise particularly 
financially, it remains strictly essential to empower/capacitate both the national 
government and the LGUs of Lesotho. For any state institutions to operate effectively 
genuine legitimacy/authority/national-democracy, legal statutory and public sector 
reforms need to be in place to strengthen both the national government and the LGUs. 
The state has to also come to terms with the reality that it may not do everything but has 
to create an enabling environment for the development and actual participation of the 
civic society and the private sector as well as strategic partnering (with effective 
coordinative structures and practices among ministries, donors, civil society and LGUs’ 
programmes) with these sectors (private-public-partnerships) especially in development 
programmes targeting (LGUs’ focused projects and programmes for self-sufficiency) the 
poor. The state may have to do only what it is capable of doing most effectively and 
efficiently which is empowering and monitoring for local-self-administration not heavy-
handed centralized ruling/control which has for centuries failed the poor. Empowerment 
needs to include restructuring the civil service from patronage, seniority and mediocrity 
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to professionalism, merit and performance based appraisal in poverty oriented 
programmes. It also needs to encompass bottom-up citizen-participation for enhanced 
local accountability and other principles of good governance for corruption minimization 
at all government spheres and solving of the current political-capture of LGUs from the 
dominance of the majority ruling party. Let us publicly agree that other than serving as 
ruling party-extensions/out-posts and consultative bodies, LGUs in Lesotho still lack real 
citizen-participation at individual and collective levels. This limitation also hampers 
possibilities of local feasible taxation essential for resource poor countries like Lesotho. 
Citizen-participation can through consensus enable listing and introduction of 
(progressive taxes, property rates and user charges for equity) taxable activities and user 
charges.  
 
Empowerment needs to focus on statutory reforms, boosting the capacity of LGUs to 
attract, recruit, retain and manage the scarce professional and managerially skilled 
personnel. That is develop careers for personnel, provide further training opportunities, 
specialized support welfare. Devolving or transferring human resources without having 
done this ignores the fact that LGUs are also competing in the labour market. It is not 
ideal to have LGUs without institutional autonomy and control over their staff.  
Bureaucracy needs to account to its clients (customer-oriented for relevant service 
delivery) and not toe the line of the ruling political elite. The skilled local personnel can 
help in effective local revenue mobilization, management and proper accounting 
standards internally and externally. 
 
Chiefs in Lesotho are part of the bureaucracy as a traditional one requiring continued 
training in governance and development to be able to appreciate and adapt to new 
emerging developments and systems for their effective participation. Their role is proved 
as immense in facilitating community development through community mobilization, 
disputes settlement, maintaining social security and local leadership provision beyond the 
capacity of the limitedly available ‘professional’ bureaucracy. Chiefs specifically need to 
join hands with LGUs, which the national government also needs to do even in power 
sharing, devolution and redistribution from these two for effective self-administration for 
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local sustainable development delivery. Decentralization with reforms often requires 
power restructuring which has potential conflicts/competition but inclusion and 
involvement of the institutions that have to lose some power to be gained by new others 
is unavoidable. The approach of strategic power sharing is often a more workable one but 
cautiously without increasing the red tape (win-win approach).  
 
It is important for LG in Lesotho to review itself and adopt establishing effective 
preconditions necessary to avoid its already indicative failures in development delivery. 
There is need to revisit the reorganization of the locals into really the smallest boundaries 
possible corresponding with the already existent administrative (customary and 
political/official) territories of jurisdiction for efficiency and effectiveness of LG, other 
than to be crossing over or encroaching causing confusion and administration of local 
affairs. Such areas also need to correspond to the local problem situations important to 
the lives of the locals. Real learning in LG needs to be facilitated and provided by the 
central government continuously to the elected, nominated and recruited LGUs’ 
personnel and the locals for them to acquire collective and individual awareness, skills, 
competence and experience in tackling local developmental problems. Learning enhances 
the capacities and opportunities taking individually and collectively, it promotes 
understanding and creative participation.  
 
This is also one form of empowerment needed to effect pro-active decision making and 
action taking capacity in addressing local developmental needs. In this manner, 
institutions can be held accountable (downward accountability instead of only upward 
accountability) to the locals with knowledge and abilities to act/implement their policies 
and manage their affairs. Continued learning with the capacity of decision making and 
implementation can enable locals to reform and redesign the LGUs to suit addressing 
their local developmental needs instead of pursuing the political interests of the majority 
ruling political party which are irrelevant to their local needs. This can promote initiation 
of locally owned community-driven development programmes, local autonomy (upward 
accountability through monitoring) and authority and thus reduction of dependency 
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syndrome locally and nationally. When locals are such empowered then predation by the 
powerful, corrupt and capturing elitism will be prevented.  
 
Empowered citizens would be able to counter the overwhelming superior actions of the 
central government resulting in ‘national’ priorities ignoring local priorities. They could 
also have the cognitive ability to properly integrate local plans with the national goals 
thus maintaining good links with the other line ministries and sectors for effective 
coordination and implementation. They would be able to invite and appreciate continuous 
systematic and well coordinated support system from the national government currently 
reportedly not offered. They would be able to overcome challenges of resources 
constraints and sustainability challenges as they would be in control of their own 
programmes and resources. This type of empowerment can prevent poor targeting of the, 
for a long time, neglected and marginalized poor communities in the rural and the urban 
sectors. It is this type of empowerment that can overcome challenges of resources 
mismanagement, corruption and lack of monitoring, supervision and evaluation 
procedures on local development programmes and promote understanding and adoption 
of local programmes’ performance-driven-resource allocation to effect development 
delivery and overcome the chronic problem of non-delivery in LGUs.        
 
Central to the success of decentralization in Lesotho is the ability of LGUs to raise local 
revenue, attract and retain competent personnel. At the moment the limited capacity to do 
so is also worsened by the surmountable obstacles of low income per capita from unequal 
income distribution, funds mismanagement and reported corruption. Political obstacles to 
local revenue raising include fear of loss of political popularity and support for the ruling 
political party, public pressure for more accountability and citizen participation as well as 
increased demand for jobs. The concept paper of the decentralization policy in Lesotho 
heavily hopes for international donor support with a clear lack of political will and 
financial commitment on the part of the central government of Lesotho. Currently, 
LGU’s indicators/degree of capacity in resources/revenue mobilization can be 
summarized as follows; 
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• The MCC has about R50 Million as a yearly grant from the MLG and raises less 
than a percent of that per year from the property rates, business and building 
permits, public toilet fees, clinics, market stalls/fees and waste disposal fees. The 
entire system of the LG basically depends on the controlled grant from the MLG. 
Such a grant is only 10.8% of the country’s total revenue.  
• Payments are not regular; there is so much evasion and avoidance as there is no 
effective billing systems and law enforcement to make MCC and DCs become 
effective in revenue collection. Grants from MLG never increase substantially to 
respond sufficiently to the local developmental needs.  
• The MLG has been reluctant to introduce any taxes through MCC, CCs or DCs, in 
fear of loss of popular political support, thus no taxation is done yet.  
• All of the funding is from the MLG and is closely controlled through the 
minister’s instructions on senior personnel who also usually divert funds among 
MCC’s departments at will and at whim without any financial accounting or 
justification to anyone, including the cabinet that approved funding as there is not 
even any internal auditing. Disbursements directly get approved by the minister. 
• There is no staff performance appraisal.  Clientelism and political loyalty to the 
ruling LCD political party and MLG’s minister matter most in almost all aspects 
of personnel management  
• There is no form of any support, assistance or training from the MLG to the MCC 
or LGUs in general. Supportive training sessions are quite unknown or reported 
not to exist (Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010). 
 
Findings in the last three chapters (5, 6 and 8) also confirm that the legal nature of 
decentralization in Lesotho maintains a ‘centripetal unitary’
15
 state. This still raises the 
need for devolved political-administrative powers and resources to the local authorities, 
other than a cosmetic process of decentralization whose significant objective is to 
                                                
15.  The constitution of Lesotho together with its decentralization Act (1997) and amendments (2004) basically create a one central 
state, albeit weak, with all other tiers of governance neither autonomous nor independent but as mere appendages of the executive. 
This is the nature of the decentralization of Lesotho and how the central government relates with the LG in Lesotho.    
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‘window-dress’ this state for international fashionality and limited unsustainable foreign 
donations. Section 106 of the Lesotho 1993 constitution explicitly over empowers limited 
representative democracy/parliamentarians other than local citizen participation whereby 
policy designing, execution, monitoring and evaluation are done by the LGUs. The 
rhetoric or lip-service is so obvious as it states that “Parliament shall establish such local 
authorities as it deems necessary to enable urban and rural communities to determine 
their affairs and to develop themselves. Such authorities shall perform such functions as 
may be conferred by an Act of Parliament.” The last part of this legal section contrarily 
stifles enabling local communities from determining their own affairs because it deprives 
them of autonomy or independence to formulate own policies, execute, monitor and 
examine them. Repeals/amendments and functions may only originate from the 
parliamentarians. According to this constitution and LG’s 1997 Act, by-laws/regulations 
can only be applied by LGUs provided the political minister has approved and gazetted 
them. The specific powers of the LGUs in Lesotho are not necessarily explicitly 
adequately entrenched in the constitution. There is no clear separation of powers. This is 
compounded by the disheartening reluctance of the central government to decentralize 
services and specify readily affordable levies, user-charges and taxes and the inability to 
decentralize fully the process of budgeting and its control.       
 
If decentralization is to deepen democracy and improve service delivery or alleviate 
poverty in Lesotho then a good framework/preconditions among others including the 
following must be met: 
• Constitutional and legal framework of Lesotho must establish, entrench and define 
the exact powers of LGUs and their autonomy with regard to the central government 
to avoid current ‘recentralization’ and/or deconcentration.  
• LGUs need to be enabled legally and resource-wise through devolution to have the 
required financial, political, administrative and the technical, capital and human 
resource capacity. The central government needs to create such supportive essential 
infrastructure and capacity. This is also a matter of political will and commitment. 
• Supportive networks to the LGUs need to exist and impart relevant skills through 
continuous training to the human resources in the LGUs for proper exercise of 
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powers, efficient and effective resources management and service delivery. This 
includes tapping from and working with the civil society. 
• Clear mechanisms for local citizen participation and provision of empowering 
feedback to the locals are necessary. Such measures need to encompass accountability 
mechanisms for both the LGUs and the central government. This mainly entails ‘good 
governance’ enabling environment discussed analytically in chapter 2 and 4 of this 
study. 
• The first-past-the-post electoral model is not as inclusive as the mixed member 
proportional representation. A shift from the former to the latter is necessary.  
 
In our view, the current constraints of decentralization in Lesotho basically 
encompass a bad framework adopted for this policy. There is need for a good 
framework if there is to be realized benefits. So, if decentralization is to be successful 
in Lesotho with regard to strengthened democracy and effective development 
delivery, the specific challenges that the central government needs to prioritize 
addressing include among others the following:  
• Lacking financial and human resources capacity require rigorous sustainable fund 
raising programmes, competitive remuneration packages and benefits with career 
development for staff retainment. This has to integrate institutionalized life-long 
formal on job training. 
• The central government need to refrain from recentralization by indeed really 
decentralizing the seven functions legally declared as decentralized which it has not 
practically decentralized or denied their offering.  
• Lacking autonomy for LGUs in decision and policy making requires urgent remedial 
empowering legislative framework. The current dictation by the central government 
needs to be legally curbed through devolution of powers. 
• Revenue collection by the LGUs need not be suppressed, prevented and/or controlled 
by the central government. LGUs ought to collect own revenue and fund their own 
programmes in a sustainable manner. LGUs also need to have own bank accounts 
while subjected to monitoring, financial accounting standards and procedures and 
yearly internal and external auditing.  
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• The conflictual allocation of roles between the councillors and the chiefs need to be 
legally ironed out with the involvement of all the concerned parties. This could help 
improve the co-existence and smooth functioning of the democratic and traditional 
institutions. Chiefs have always wanted more power and the decentralization policy to 
be fashioned in a manner that benefits them most. They have done this through 
individual resistance to councils and through the institutional ways (senate, political 
forums and the pro-chieftainship political party of Basotho National Party/BNP). The 
current conflictual legacy between the two can be solved and their complementarity 
can be beneficial in maintaining law and order and service delivery. This can also 
overcome the continued conflictual effects of chieftaincy/lekhotla system with the 
current challenges of the (i) lacking clear demarcation  of functions between the 
chiefs and the LGUs, (ii) continued illegal allocation of land by chiefs without 
involvement and consultation with the LGUs, (iii) chiefs’ lack of understanding of the 
functions of the LGUs, (iv) chiefs’ resistance and non-compliance with LGUs’ 
resolutions, (v) poor communication between representative chiefs in the LGUs and 
their counterparts outside the LGUs, (vi) conflicts between chiefs and LGUs over the 
control and access to natural resources like woodlots, trees/community forests, 
quarries, burial sites and range management, (vii) administratively confusing area 
boundaries of community councils that do not consider chiefs’ areas of jurisdiction 
and convenient access to services by the local communities (viii) and strife between 
the chiefs and the LGUs over who should fine the trespassing animals in range 
management.  
• The legal ironing out suggested above needs to also have regulations on the relations 
and functions between the central government and LGUs, members of the 
parliament/MPs owning constituencies usually with dominating political influence 
and control over the local councillors affiliated or not affiliated to their ruling 
political party. Few independent councillors find the dictation of the MPs unbearable, 
with quick demands for public reporting and enquiries. The MPs at times and the area 
chiefs are reported by key informants as often self-imposers and pressurizing 
demanders seeking councillors to act as their subordinates and/or followers, wanting 
them to take instructions from them as area chiefs or MPs who also claim jurisdiction 
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in the demarcated LGUs’ areas. The poor and conflictual relations between the 
central government, LGUs/councillors, chiefs and MPs severely affect information 
flow and coordinative communication and thus efficient development delivery by 
decentralization.    
• The Ministry of Local Government/MLG has to overcome its lacking technical, 
administrative and training (also targeting low educational levels of council or 
councillors), guiding and monitoring and evaluating leadership and infrastructural 
(office space and furniture, housing and other working facilities/equipment) support 
to LGUs in among others in planning local developments, financial management and 
fund raising capacity. This includes revitalizing the department of rural development 
and as well as locating it strategically and functionally in the organizational structure 
of the MLG for local development delivery. Currently, this department is not 
structurally involved in the MLG, legislatively and organizationally. How then can 
the LG deliver without this arrangement, remains an impossible task and question to 
answer. There are no clear legal and mandatory relations between this department and 
the MLG to effect decentralization. This affirms the point that functions said to be 
decentralized are not yet really decentralized, that is from the other ministries.       
 
Decentralization in Lesotho has been donor driven and as such lacked citizen 
participation and involvement of the vulnerable groups and civil society in the decision 
making processes. This has rendered LG as non-responsive to local needs. This 
component is important for good governance and relevant quality service delivery. Local 
citizens need not be limited to voting in elections only, as is now the case. Practical 
constitutional mechanisms and structures involving legally scheduled feedback provision 
and accountability to the local citizens need to be instituted. That has to include 
promoting voluntary actions by citizens and providing them with clear legal meaningful 
opportunities, arrangements and processes for them to participate as citizens. 
Furthermore, such participation ought to facilitate communication and discussions, 
planning, funding and execution of local developmental goals. It also has to influence in a 
bottom up manner policy making so as to assist in its implementation for the benefit and 
survival of all in the local area. It needs to embrace institutionalized formal and informal 
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roles as well as supportive roles by the local people. This can increase government 
capacity in local services delivery particularly if the legislative framework specifies the 
duties, responsibilities and roles local citizenry is expected of. Citizens need to be 
mobilized and recruited into partaking in LG decision making, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation processes. Institutionalized participatory structures for the 
local citizens are not yet in place and need to be urgently created. There is no legalized 
interaction and accountability between CCs and the local citizens except the assumed 
one. The 1997 Decentralization Act so far turns citizens into passive actors as their 
participation is not legally specified and mandatory. Current citizens’ electoral 
participation ought to extend to citizens’ action, involvement and obligatory participation. 
In essence, there is a need for the central government of Lesotho to develop the necessary 
conditions for the establishment of a functional and viable system of LG.  Fiscal, 
political, administrative and resources devolution are paramount to such conditions.  
9.3 General Conclusions of the Research Study 
The degree to which decentralization has been adopted efficiently and effectively in 
Lesotho has already been discussed through various indicators of assessment of such 
efficiency as well as the extent to which it contributed in development delivery. 
However, the extent to which it has assisted with development delivery is questionable. 
As we see, this has not happened. Clearly, there are many reasons for this, some of which 
are unrelated to local government. However the evidence suggests that local government 
has not made any substantial headway in addressing or promoting local development. 
The poverty line of Lesotho has forever remained as 55% with the same national 
unemployment rate and poverty gap which is the depth of such poverty below this line. 
Even at an individual level, key informants as direct participants and beneficiaries in LG 
can still be categorized as poor in terms of their income levels still below the consumer 
price index of R2, 500 recently worked out by the monthly newsletter of the national 
NGO working on issues of human rights and political education campaigns called 
‘Resource and Transformation Centre’ (Peace and Justice Newsletter, 2009). The 
numbers of rooms they occupy in relation to their family sizes indicate some level of 
poverty as characterized by congestion from more than two persons in a room. Their low 
level of assets accumulation and ownership is also very low though most of them have 
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already spent more than four years participating in LG.  Data confirmed that LG has not 
yet positively contributed to the formation of human, financial, social, physical and 
natural capital. Effective local autonomy and authority, sufficient resources for localities, 
effective local institutions of collective action and open and accountable local political 
process for effective and efficient LG delivering development are reportedly not yet 
realized. Table 9.1 also affirms the same showing that the impact of decentralization on 
education has so far been none, on environment, there has been some limited creation of 
parks and environmental projects owned by NES, in health only two MCC clinics with 
limited health services are available to the city’s population and in good governance there 
are legal structures that are nominally there contrarily functioning to the values of good 
governance (recentralization), in gender equity there are not yet such developmental 
programmes though elected women constitute 73%  of councillors (due to high male 
labour migrancy), most specifically in poverty reduction rotated community contracting 
and intensive labour are used in refuse collection and road building by MCC but these are 
once off short-term occasional opportunities with no impact on income levels and 
consumption patterns of the poor.  
 
Besides having argued and shown throughout this study in all the chapters that 
decentralization has numerous socio-cultural institutional constraints hampering its 
positive effect on development delivery, particularly in Lesotho, the study also argued 
and assumed that there is possible social-economic-political exclusion of the poor in the 
LG of Lesotho thus hindering its developmental delivery or poverty reduction locally. 
This has been analytically exposed by the study through the aspects of the exclusive first-
past-the-post electoral model and non-participation of the civil society in LGUs and the 
exclusive dominance of the ruling political-party in all spheres of the LGUs, as well as 
power centralization only upon the MLG’s minister, unstructured and inaccessible 
information flows for participation and unclear statutory reforms among others. These 
aspects and issues have among others also affirmed the argument that Lesotho’s LG has, 
unfortunately instead of devolution which is real decentralization, adopted re-
centralization cemented through thoroughly entrenched deconcentration, a vacillation 
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policy approach which has for decades been blamed for failure in development delivery 
in many writings and by the World Bank and African Development Bank.   
 
These arguments, assumptions that decentralization generally has both prospects and 
challenges and the research question of how efficiently was decentralization adopted and 
the extent to which it impacted on poverty or produced development delivery in Lesotho 
have systematically been addressed in all the chapters whereby chapter two generally 
dealt with the background on decentralization globally and locally, chapter three with the 
pros and cons of decentralization, chapter four with the theoretical requirements and 
measurement of decentralization, five with the experience of Lesotho in decentralization, 
six on chieftaincy’s relevance and its challenges in LG, seven on the nature of the  
decentralization policy in Lesotho and the challenges, eight  on the assessment and the 
other dimensions of decentralization adoption in terms of more indicators of efficiency 
and effectiveness in Lesotho and more constraints/failures and lastly nine with the study’s 
analytic summary and conclusions. We can also note that in chapter two the 
conceptualized key terms of this study provided a general overview of decentralization 
globally, in the developing world and Africa. Such conceptualization went a long way in 
the following chapters on Lesotho as it enabled the researcher to conclude and make the 
reader understand that LG in Lesotho is not necessarily a separate/autonomous sphere of 
government that could efficiently deliver development effectively, locally, confirming the 
study’s thesis that it has socio-cultural-economic-political-institutional impediments 
needing an effective political will and attention by the central governments in the 
developing world. It has also set a necessary explanatory preliminary background to 
chapter three in this study that dealt sufficiently with the pros and cons of 
decentralization and its necessary preconditions for its success and the methods for 
measuring adoption of decentralization as well as challenges involved in such methods in 
chapter four. Lack of regional variation on the 3 selected study areas in Lesotho confirm 
lack of political will and commitment to have LG with fiscal-political-administrative 
devolution, lack of autonomy and effective variable citizen participation/inclusion. This 
study can evoke further research questions like what are the perceptions of the citizens of 
this LG policy, contextual gender and felt poverty implications.  
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Appendix A: The Impact of Decentralization on Local National Development Priorities 
National 
Development  
Priorities       
Inputs/Activities Outcomes/outputs Frequency Percent 
(1 Combating 
HIV/AIDS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(2 Eradicating 
Extreme 
Poverty  
 
 
(3 Achieving 
Universal 
Primary 
education  
 
(4 Promoting 
Gender 
Equality and  
empower 
women  
 
(5 Reducing 
Child 
Mortality  
-MCC has established two clinics through PPP 
arrangement to distribute ARVs, treat and 
counsel HIV/AIDS patients. The clinics have 
also held public health campaigns about HIV 
and AIDS awareness and against the stigma 
from these diseases and other diseases so that 
urban communities are competent and 
preventative in these diseases. They also 
facilitated and trained groups; mainly of around 
ten women in the communities, called HIV and 
AIDS ‘support groups’ in how to counsel, treat, 
nurse, care  and support the (victims) people 
living with HIV and/or AIDS and on how to 
help, counsel and encourage the (affected) 
families with such patients. Support groups 
help and ensure that the patients are taking their 
medication properly, take proper diet, well 
looked after, nursed and treated, clean the 
patients and their home environment, do some 
laundry for the patients and mobilize some 
alms for the victims and the affected dependent 
ones, especially the vulnerable (orphaned/to be 
orphaned) children and the old aged ones. The 
support groups are also used in other LGUs.  
-MCC uses intensive labour programmes for 
casual employment to the locals in road 
building and refuse collection. DCs and CCs 
occasionally provide such casual jobs requiring 
physical labour in minor roads building as well. 
- Achieving Universal Primary education is the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Education and 
Training (MOET) not local government. 
 
-LGUs still lack such specific programmes that 
can promote gender equality and empower 
women. 
 
-MCC clinics have pre and post natal health 
services for the expectant mothers, as well as 
vaccination and health treatment services 
specific for the under year five children.  
 
- MCC’s clinics in Maseru city provide 
curative services, ante-natal and post-natal and 
family planning services, TB treatment and 
-Pro-longed life-
span of HIV/AIDS 
patients, de-
stigmatization of 
the plague and 
communities’ 
awareness and 
competency in HIV 
and AIDS diseases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-MCC attained 
clean streets and 
healthy 
environment. 
LGUs created 
some short-term 
employment 
opportunity for the 
unemployed local 
labour. 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
 
-MCC contributes 
towards reduced 
50 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
NA 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
100 
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(6 Improving 
Maternal 
Health  
 
 
(7 Ensuring 
Environment  
Sustainability  
 
 
 
 
(8 Develop a 
Global 
Partnership  
for 
Development  
 
And on 
specific LG’s 
development 
objectives? 
(9 Providing a 
democratic 
and  
accountable 
government 
 
(10 Providing 
sustainable 
services 
 
(11Promoting 
social and 
economic  
development 
by prioritizing 
basic  
community 
 
(12 
Promoting 
involvement 
of the 
community, 
organizations 
and 
individuals in 
LG issues 
 
 
 
 
HIV and AIDS counseling and treatment 
including ARVs supply to AIDS patients. 
-This responsibility still practically rests with 
the National Environmental Secretariat though 
MCC prepares some environmental 
programmes for implementation by this 
concerned department. CCs just control grazing 
to prevent overgrazing and soil erosion.  
 
-LGUs have not yet developed any partnerships 
for development. 
 
 
-Administrative, political and human and 
financial resources devolution are not yet 
effected by LG, thus there is constrained 
nominally participatory democracy and non-
accountability.   
 
-LGUs have not yet introduced development 
projects fully owned and driven by the local 
communities for such sustainable services.  
 
-No such programmes yet by LGUs. 
 
 
 
-Only councillors are getting involved.  
 
 
 
-No clear initiative is taken yet.  
 
 
 
 
child mortality 
 
-Improved 
maternal health by 
MCC’s two clinics. 
 
-There has been 
project proposals 
and reports on 
environmental 
issues by MCC for 
the implementation 
by NES. 
Vegetation cover 
and soil 
conservation are 
maintained.  
 
NA 
 
-No effective 
democracy and 
good 
accountability. 
 
-NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
-Limited 
consultative 
participation by 
citizenry and 
therefore poor 
service delivery.  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
NA 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
NA 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
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(13 
Enhancing 
participation 
in national 
and 
community 
programmes 
 
(14 
Combining 
municipality 
with urban 
boards and 
rural areas 
 
-Chiefs are also representatives of the urban 
and rural communities in the municipalities to 
maintain a link and smooth flow of information 
between the urban/district councils, 
rural/community councils and the municipality. 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
-shared information 
helping in decision 
making by the 
councillors. 
 
 
 
NA 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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Appendix B: Role and Constraints of Chieftaincy in Lesotho’s Decentralization: Measurement of the 
Role of    Chieftaincy in Lesotho 
Chiefs’ Role in 
Lesotho’s DGD 
Extent/Measu
re of 
Involvement 
in DGD 
(Primary or 
secondary 
function) 
Role statutory 
or only 
traditional 
A=Both 
B=Statutory 
only 
C=traditional 
only 
Challenges to DGD in order of 
priority per role 
Suggested solutions per challenge 
against DGD 
Traditional 
and customary 
affairs 
Primary 
function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A (statutory 
and 
traditional) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Chiefs resist relinquishing the 
power of control even against new 
laws redistributing rights of 
resources’ allocation for fear of 
loss of power and private rewards 
they used to gain. This creates 
confusion, conflicts and 
competition over resources’ use 
and control. 
 
-Chiefs view councillors as 
political instruments of division in 
communities seeking to 
commoditize resources that are 
customarily communally owned 
and controlled for unfair money 
making from the poor and 
therefore canvass and mobilize 
some community members 
against decentralization activities, 
thus destabilizing councillors’ 
consultative gatherings.  
 
-Chiefs perceive councillors as 
rival leaders of contesting packs 
for their traditional power over 
licensing/permits of access/use, 
ownership and control of 
resources like land, grasslands 
and thatching grass, sand, 
quarrying of building stones, 
communal forests, graveyards 
and others, including certification 
of livestock and property 
ownership and permits on their 
sales and authority on issuing of 
various permits.  
 
-The MLG needs to educate 
chieftaincy about decentralization 
and its benefits as well as such 
newly introduced decentralization 
laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
-The constitution needs to be 
reviewed and allow for a proper 
electoral model for councillors, this 
could be a more inclusive 
proportional representation.  
 
-Chiefs should also remain as 
integral parts of councils 
continuing their function of 
maintaining peace and order while 
they plan and work together with 
the elected councillors.  
 
-The legislative framework needs 
to be clear on upward and 
downward financial and political 
and administrative accountability 
and procedures, clearly stipulate 
the types of levies, fees, penalties or 
fines and taxes to be charged with 
the pre-set local communities’ 
determining legal powers of 
(financial) use in line with their 
developmental goals. 
 
 
 
 
Mobilizing and 
linking the 
local 
community 
This is a 
primary 
function for 
chiefs. 
A  (statutory 
and 
traditional) 
In cases where the chief is not in 
support of decentralization and/or 
some council members, such 
mobilization is not done 
deliberately to sabotage the 
Power needs to be vested upon 
institutions consisting of collective 
groups of people like LGUs 
including chieftaincy. 
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council’s programmes. 
 
Represented in 
local 
government 
A primary 
function 
A  (statutory 
and 
traditional) 
Information dissemination among 
the chiefs is limited and very 
slowly. This keeps other 
communities unaware and not 
conscientized of the other 
activities resulting in vandalizing 
of some activities like parks.                                                                                                                     
There is a need for an every week 
radio programme and newspaper 
to broadcast information on 
decentralization programmes so 
that chiefs may protect 
developments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Incorporated 
into local 
government 
civil service  
Secondary 
function 
C (Traditional 
only) 
Low education of most of the 
chiefs hinders their effective 
participation in decision making 
processes as some literacy level is 
essential for digesting various 
reports at times even written in 
English. 
Lesotho Institute of Public 
Administration and Management 
(LIPAM) responsible for training 
government personnel urgently 
needs to start treating chieftaincy 
as an integral part of the civil 
service requiring induction and 
various training programmes in 
administration. All newly elected 
councillors also need such training 
and enlightenment because most of 
them also have low education. 
Perform 
judicial 
functions 
Primary 
Function 
A  (statutory 
and 
traditional) 
Chieftaincy lack sufficient 
knowledge of law, Acts and 
regulations. This hinders local 
government units in the delivery 
of justice resulting in overloaded 
centralized judiciary system. 
The judiciary and LIPAM need to 
increase the capacity of chieftaincy 
in legal matters. The constitution 
also needs to be reviewed to give 
them more judicial powers to offset 
backlog of cases at the central 
judiciary system. Enforcement of 
their legal judgments would need 
to be ensured.   
Political 
structures they 
form 
-Senate 
-College of 
chiefs 
-Other specify 
 
 
Primary 
function for 
them to form 
the senate, 
college of 
chiefs, ex-
officio 
membership 
to the 
councils. 
A  (statutory 
and 
traditional) 
Chieftaincy has often acted as a 
political opposition through its 
political structures blocking 
political decentralization bills 
meant to empower local 
communities in the management 
of their development affairs for a 
reason that they view 
decentralization as a way of 
destroying chieftaincy to give too 
much power to the politicians who 
are their subjects or commoners. 
MLG has to adopt proper ‘change-
management’ practices including 
full involvement of chieftaincy in 
policy conceptions and making. 
The crisis of lack of clear 
separation of legal powers and 
division of labour/roles between 
democratic structures and the 
monarch system needs to be 
legislatively addressed.   
Other main 
roles-specify: 
-Provision of 
social 
protection and 
safety 
particularly for 
the vulnerable 
and the local 
community at 
large. 
-Keeping of 
Primary 
functions 
A  (statutory 
and 
traditional) 
Chiefs have often been blamed for 
corruption in their dealings like 
abducting fields supposed to be 
inherited by widows or orphans, 
apportioning resources already 
allocated for bribes, usurping 
developmental services like public 
hand pumps for personal gain, 
favouritism, nepotism and biases. 
This ultimately stifled needed 
community driven development 
and continues to do so.   
Councils of the elected locals need 
to absorb and work together with 
chieftaincy as total exclusion of 
chieftaincy will only result in 
conflicts and resistance to change. 
-New demarcations formulation 
need to consult and involve 
communities with their chiefs to 
offset made errors causing conflicts 
over administration of areas and 
people’s affairs.  
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law and order, 
resolve 
conflicts in the 
community  
-keeping 
records of 
births and 
deaths to 
facilitate legal 
certification of 
such. 
-Provide 
authentic 
information 
concerning 
legalization 
and issuing of 
documentation 
affirming 
citizenship 
-facilitate 
developmental 
services 
delivery 
-keep census of 
owned 
livestock 
-Issue official 
documentation 
affirming 
socio-
economic-
customary 
transactions 
among 
community/ 
families’ 
members and 
ownership and 
sale of assets, 
resources and 
livestock 
-Issue 
community 
entry permits 
and letters of 
migration as 
well as 
allowing of 
(public) 
functions 
(burials, 
ceremonies, 
feasts, 
groupings/ 
gatherings, 
-Some old legal boundaries of 
areas under the chiefs are criss-
crossed by new LG wards 
confusing local administration. 
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weddings e.t.c.) 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
 
Appendix C:  Measurement of DGD Effectiveness within Good Governance for Solving LG  
Challenges 
Values-Principles of real good governance        Responses Frequency  Percentage 
Opinion concerning local governments’ ability to provide 
services that are in part dependent upon their ability to 
mobilize taxes locally?     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which taxes are LGUs able to mobilize and are assigned 
to mobilize? 
 
 
What is your opinion about the size of the local tax base? 
How buoyant those taxes are in terms of whether they 
increase over time in line with population increase, 
inflation, real income  
growth and the extent to which local taxes impinge on the 
poor?. 
 
Secondly, is most part of the revenue base coming from 
the central government, if so explain how it is transferred 
and the  
challenges thereof? 
 
 
 
Thirdly, how do LGUs overcome or prevent capture by 
local elites?  Local governments may be vulnerable to 
local elites who then receive a disproportionate share of 
public spending on public goods.  The challenge then 
becomes the extent to which decentralization processes 
enable the poor to access publicly provided goods.   
 
Fourthly, the effective and efficient delivery of public 
goods and services, at the local level, depends on the co-
ordination of  
delivering agencies. How do LGUs avoid coordination 
failure, namely redundancy (Redundancy results when 
two or more 
organizations or agencies perform the same task in which 
case resources are wasted)? 
 
Lacunae? (results when no organization performs a 
necessary task, in which case service delivery gaps 
occur.) 
 
 
 
The by-laws do not stipulate specific 
taxes LGUs can use to fund the supply 
of services locally. There is legally no 
ability or clear premises to mobilize 
taxes. 
-There are no jobs, so taxation is 
impossible and LG can’t mobilize any 
taxes. 
There are no taxes LGUs are able to 
mobilize and are specifically assigned 
to mobilize. 
 
NA 
 
 
 
Most part of the revenue base comes 
from the central government 
constituting more than 98% as a grant 
transferred and approved by the cabinet 
in line with the budget approved by the 
minister. 
Decentralization in Lesotho is captured 
by the ruling political elites from its 
conception or design, its biased 
adopted electoral model advantageous 
to the dominant ruling LCD political 
party loyal majority membership, in 
practice and statutorily. This type of 
centralization expansion poorly 
considers needs of the poor. 
Coordination failure is unavoidable in 
Lesotho because LGUs operate without 
networking with other development 
agencies in their localities.  
 
Service delivery gaps are severe in 
Lesotho because there is usual annual 
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3 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
NA 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
73 out of 73 
96 
 
 
4 
 
 
100 
 
NA 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
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Incoherence? (results when policies, programmes, 
projects or agencies with the same clients have different 
goals and requirements in which case this may trigger 
conflicts between agencies and organizations over 
resources and clientele.  The synchronization of policy 
across ministries and departments, at the local level, is 
therefore a major challenge).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fifthly, which specific service delivery functions that are 
decentralized led to a loss of economies of scale (the 
direct implication of which is the loss of efficiency)?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sixthly, to what extent are the individuals knowledgeable 
about the running of local government 
available/employed/ 
under funding. There are also no joint 
projects, outsourcing or adequate 
donations to address LGUs functions.   
Chieftaincy is still struggling and 
resisting to relinquish traditional 
political power over resources and 
local community leadership to the 
elected councillors. Furthermore, 
LSPP, ministry of forestry and land 
reclamation, parastatals like WASA, 
LEC and Lesotho Revenue Authority 
(taxes collecting authority) as agencies 
over the same client with LGUs have 
different goals and requirements. These 
agencies still control land allocation, 
use of forests and grasslands, water and 
sewage, electricity supply and 
imposition and collection of taxes for 
the central government, respectively. 
This has resulted into a major 
constraining legislative incoherence on 
decentralization and needs urgent 
synchronization.   
Functions are still centralized in the 
hands of ministries and parastatals 
under such ministries. The main trend 
of decentralization has been a process 
whereby much of power in the hands 
of chiefs is modified and redistributed 
to the elected locals. Main 
developmental functions are still in the 
hands of the central government. The 
decentralization process also included 
massive privatization process of many 
developmental service delivering 
institutions like Coop Lesotho that was 
responsible for the supply, sale and 
storage of subsidized inputs 
countrywide through the government 
storage facilities. Food security for the 
poor has worsened because Coop 
Lesotho has lost economies of scale 
and countrywide distribution efficiency 
especially in the remotest parts of the 
country. LGUs could have been given 
a statutory role here to own and control 
properties from Coop Lesotho so as to 
improve local food security; instead all 
is lost through privatization for the 
benefit of senior politicians as the main 
individual shareholders and rent 
collectors.    
Community Council Secretaries and 
respondents  
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respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
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100 
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deployed to LGUs and undertake such tasks as to be 
taken by local government?  
 
 
 
Seventhly, what is the central government doing to 
enable citizens to get better quality goods and services? 
That is what is the central government doing to offer;:  
(1) training in professional skills;  
 
(2) improvement of facilities – buildings and equipment; 
 
(3)opportunities for promotion or at least some form of 
recognition of work well done, as well as punitive 
measures for work poorly done;  
 
(4) providing citizens with responsive avenues for raising 
complaints over goods and services poorly delivered.  
District Council Secretaries as well as 
the Town Clerk, the Mayor and other 
senior staff in the LGUs know and 
understand the proper decentralization 
process; this includes even most of the 
elected councillors, but are employed 
directly and used as civil servants 
legally answerable to the political 
minister in the central government. 
They are not answerable to the local 
councils/communities and can only 
undertake such tasks as to be taken by 
their directing central government.  
The central government is doing 
nothing to provide training in 
professional skills, performance 
appraisal, clear responsive 
channels/avenues of raising grievances 
about poor service delivery in LGUs.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
73 out of 73 
respondents  
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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Appendix D: The Extent Lesotho’s LGUs Succeeded in Having Qualities or Indicators/Dimensions of 
Success  
Indicators of 
success  
Responses Frequency Percent  
•being located in the 
area with an 
adequate economic 
base,  
 
•well-defined 
responsibilities in a 
satisfactory legal 
framework,  
 
•capacity to 
mobilize sufficient 
resources,  
 
 
 
•supportive central 
government 
activities,  
 
•appropriate 
management 
practices,  
 
 
•development of 
productive internal 
and external 
relations,  
 
•satisfactory 
responsiveness to 
constituents,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
•specified/expected 
quantity and quality 
of services and other 
outputs delivered,  
•good fiscal 
(success) 
performance 
characterized by (a) 
the budget balance 
The MLG and other central ministries still possess and exercise entire legal 
power of access and control over available resources. This stalls any 
geographical advantage that Lesotho LGUs may have, including that one of 
being located in the area with an adequate economic base like sources of 
mining and irrigation. 
The 1968 chieftainship Act and other various Acts still give the same powers 
and functions for LGUs established in 1997 ACT to the chiefs and various 
central government ministries, the MLG itself and other government-
parastatals. Well-defined responsibilities in a satisfactory legal framework are 
still lacking in Lesotho’s decentralization/deconcentration. 
Besides being legally constrained LGUs lack the capacity to mobilize 
sufficient resources. They lack skills, resources, financial-political-
administrative-communication-infrastructural-institutional systems and 
adequate data for effective planning and delivery. The MLG is not involving 
LGUs in a bottom-up manner in policies and decision-making, selecting and 
implementing development projects locally relevant, spending and 
management of centrally granted resources.  
Deconcentration gives no room for supportive central government activities. 
Those are not done, neither in the form of training nor in any form of 
political-administrative-resources devolution.  
There are no appropriate management practices for human and other various 
resources. Human and other resources and financial management systems and 
standards are not in place. The top-down management practices by the will 
and whim of senior political enclave with over concentrated micro-
management protective legal powers have displaced such a possibility.     
LGUs in Lesotho function in isolation of the civic society, other development 
agencies and disadvantaged local societal groupings and associations. There 
is no legal networking for the development of productive internal and external 
relations. There are no clear strategic plans for such. 
LGUs traumatically know and accept it as a Sesotho cultural entrenched 
proverb and traditional excuse that (Mmuso-hao-tate) ‘the central government 
is never expedient’. This culture has transformed LGUs into advisory and 
consultative bodies engulfed by dominant political party majority councils’ 
missionary membership pursuing the national-manifesto-party-agenda and 
not local development.  No council or councillor or LGU-official can claim 
there is satisfactory responsiveness to constituents. Sluggishness and non-
delivery are worsened by politically strategic public-eye catching initiatives 
for polls’ winning and not necessarily for local poverty alleviation. LGUs 
generally lack adequate information about their funding, spending and how 
they are managed or to be managed.     
There are no specified/expected quantity and quality of services and other 
outputs to be delivered. The setting of development goals and implementation 
is centrally controlled and there is no form of quality assurance in delivery.    
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sheet with more 
surpluses than 
deficits within 5 
years,  
 
 
 
 
(b) major local 
revenue sources, 
that is direct local 
taxes, user charges 
or 
intergovernmental 
transfers with 
growth relative to 
inflation and 
population,  
 
(c) local 
expenditures, both 
recurrent and capital 
local expenditure 
supporting a range 
of significant social 
and infrastructural 
services with 
reasonable growth 
rate, and the  
 
•institutional 
parameters 
encompassing  (i) 
the management of 
financial 
information, that is 
compilation, storage 
and retrieval of such 
financial 
information,  
 
(ii) the relationships 
between the central 
government and 
local governments,  
 
(iii) the financial 
management system 
with revenue 
collection, 
budgeting, auditing 
and debt 
management,  
 
(iv) the staffing 
situation with 
 
The central government responsible for granting the LGUs yearly struggles 
with budget deficits. This predicament is confirmed by the 2009/09 budget 
with a decline in funding capital expenditure but remarkably loans and grants 
(borrowed from various international donors with less control and 
performance accounting standards) funding the same capital expenditure to 
LGUs, especially MCC rose by 388%. Non-accounting and financial-
procedures-management lacking/neglecting LGUs/MCC have actually 
become a development-non-delivery liability siphoning tax income through 
organized ‘officialized’ unchecked corruption (unknown unmonitored 
centrally imposed development contracts) cemented by protective central 
government’s ‘collective responsibility’. The ministry of finance and 
planning, for instance, may not implement its mandate of auditing 
government monies in the MLG for years now. Council or Councillors 
absolutely know naught about LGUs’ finances. 
LGUs lack local revenue sources, that is direct local taxes; they earn limited 
user charges from public toilets. Their revenue and MLG’s grants are not 
proportional with inflation, rapid urbanization and population growth.    
 
 
 
 
 
There is no reasonable growth rate for LGUs’ local expenditures, both 
recurrent and capital local expenditure to support a range of significant social 
and infrastructural services, not even enough to maintain the offered few. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Auditor General may only audit sections as approved and instructed by 
the ministers in the ministries. The national treasury is also controlled in the 
same fashion. Consequently no financial accounting is done or reports for 
open access. Main supervisors to financial institutions with their 
unquestioning loyalty to preserve their ‘jobs’ are answerable to political 
bosses ultimately, not to the ethos of professionalism, state and real 
democracy.  The compilation, storage and retrieval of financial information is 
insulated by circulars instructing the concerned politically recruited personnel 
not to release or produce such information.  
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quantity and quality 
of local government 
staff, training, 
turnover rates, 
salary conditions 
and manpower 
planning, and the  
 
(v) relationship 
between the local 
government and the 
community 
including non-
governmental 
organizations  
 
 
The relationship between the central government and LGUs constitutes a 
master-servant relationship. LGUs are directly controlled by the political 
minister in the MLG. 
 
 
Council or Councillors and personnel express their strong belief that there are 
no financial management system for revenue collection, budgeting, auditing 
and debt management and expenditure but surprisingly articles and financial 
regulations for government sections including the MCC are in place but rather 
unfortunately abandoned and never enforced or made known to the personnel. 
 
 
No post now, low or senior is free from political scrutiny or manoeuvre. 
Almost every section in LGUs has more than an acceptable labour turnover 
due to demotivating government remuneration and poor working conditions. 
There is possibly 60%-70% of vacancies unfilled resulting from high labour 
turn-over and ever unfilled positions due to unattractive benefits and 
politicized recruitment method. The shocking situation is that given tasks and 
workload keep on increasing.       
The relationship between the LGUs and the community including NGOs is 
not effective. Councillors lack enough information and knowledge about the 
activities of the central government in their areas. The limited once a month 
council meeting with occasional verbal casual reporting of LGUs’ activities 
by the personnel disempowers the councillors. Written reports are usually in 
English, a language barrier for effective participation, feedback and good 
delivering working relations between the personnel, poorly literate 
councillors and community members. Councillors’ scheduled community 
(progress) reporting is not an integral system for monitoring and evaluation of 
LGUs. LGUs may not be subjected to any performance standards as there are 
none. They operate independent of the possible pressure for delivery and 
presence of the civic society.  Communities are to a greater extent 
characterized by voter-apathy and political spectators who have lost hope in 
local government. 
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Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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Appendix E: Determining Relations for Successful Decentralization Between the Central and LGs 
Indicators on strength of 
interrelations       
Responses/Limitations? Frequency Percent 
 (a) Opinion on the strength 
of the system of the LG  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) How is the LG 
participating in 
regional/district and national 
development? Any 
limitations? 
Activities?  
    
 
 
(c) How fair is the division 
of financial resources 
between the LG, District 
and National government? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) How fair is the division 
of human resources between 
the LG, district and national 
government? 
 
 
 
The MLG has no capacity to implement effective decentralization 
process. LGUs do not account to their communities; instead they are 
answerable to the minister and cannot address local development 
except national political goals including expansion of power-
recentralization. Proper devolution is being replaced by consolidation 
of centralization lacking self-sustaining measures locally. Service 
delivery and performance standards are missing, including financial 
and accounting procedures. Councillors lack powers even to call 
community meetings, chiefs with such powers often prevent local 
participation by refusing to call needed public gatherings. Capital, 
human and financial resources are limited. 
-No authority and resources are really transferred to the LGUs. They 
hardly deliver towards local developmental needs.  
LG coordinates CCs through a DC using monthly meetings, 
information provision and activities’ monitoring. The by-laws of 
decentralization deprive the DC of effective coordination in that the 
political minister in the MLG is the only one entitled to controlling 
disbursements and approve or reject activities or a policy 
recommendation without any obligation to give an explanation. This 
allows the ruling party’s national manifesto to become the 
decentralization’s focus instead of necessary local development. 
MLG provides around 10.9% of state’s total year budget as a grant to 
DCs and LGUs. This is then distributed on the basis of the population 
density to the CCs.                                            Overhead/recurrent 
costs have been very high leaving limited funds for operational 
activities/capital investment taking only around 1.3% of that. Almost 
the entire grant serves overhead costs. This has hindered LG in 
expected service delivery. Councillors usually between 9 and 13 in the 
CC receive each a monthly allowance of R1,000 and other allowances 
like traveling and hotel accommodation for CC’s chairperson and 
another council representative for at least three nights per month for 
monthly DC’s meetings.  
The provided administrators also lack transport to coordinate and 
monitor activities effectively in the field. Unfortunately all the 
vehicles, worthy of and equipped for field operations are crowded in 
the hands of the higher government tiers while CCs lack supportive 
resources to be functional. This has put many CCs behind the delivery 
schedule and funds-non-utilization. The quality and timeliness of 
services is badly affected. Money and vehicles are distributed 
skewedly, not for local development.         .  
The deconcentration process has been able to provide every CC with a 
CCS and the DCS as the main administrators in LGUs. DCs operate in 
parallel with the DAs. The former mainly focuses on LGUs while the 
latter serves as the town clerk or town administrator. This arrangement 
overly stretches the budget for the MLG. Furthermore, expertise in 
civil works and engineering is still centralized and this severely 
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(e) Any communication 
problems between the LG, 
District and National 
government, explain? 
 
 
(f) How is citizen 
participation? Forms of 
participation? 
Groups/Sectors? 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(g) How adequate is social 
and political harmony in the 
LGs? 
 
 
(h) How legally clear are 
relations between the LG, 
District and main 
government in functions and 
powers? 
 
 
 
 
(i) How does the LG effect 
changes on the legislation 
for action by the central 
government? 
hampers development delivery in LGUs because the MLG has not yet 
devolved most of the functions and essential technical expertise. Such 
already inadequate overloaded technical staff is requested for from the 
MLG/DA and may come after six or more months behind the 
scheduled local needed activity. This has been one of main reasons for 
non-delivery, backlog and obsolete plans. There is no shared central 
data base available for LGU’s  planning, decision and policy-making, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Planning and resources 
control including delivery of main services are still centralized.   
CCS and DCS may spend more than a year without a working 
internet/emailing facility, fax facility, and often a long time without 
operating telecommunication lines. CCS mainly lack 
telecommunication lines. This severely impacts upon their timely 
reporting, submission of draft plans and budgets and requests seeking 
urgent approval for disbursement, messages and enquiries for 
following up on activities and purchases, coordination, administration 
and delivery of development services in general.  
There is a problem of low inclusiveness. Citizen participation is 
confined to limited party oriented elections. Individual candidates and 
opposition hardly constitute 5% of representation in CCs. This means 
that opposition is not represented in the DCs. The minister passed a 
decision that any opposition constituting 25% of the CCs seats can 
send an extra representative to the DC. Inclusion of opposition in 
decision making is impossible as they may only constitute 5%. The, 
vulnerable groups, community based organizations like farmers 
associations, trade unions and business groups are not included in the 
decision making structures though membership to such is also 
extremely low.  
LGUs basically serve as advisory/consultative bodies contrary to their 
stipulated functions. Current citizen participation does no empower 
LGUs to design, implement and monitor community driven 
development projects. They are not actually contributing in policy 
formulation and monitoring and evaluation.   
 
 
Social and political harmony in the LGUs is strengthened by factors of 
one common native Sesotho language, same ethnicity, almost one 
dominant party affiliation and relative commonality among the 
members in terms of socio-economic statuses.  
The MLG uses the DAs at district level to implement functions that are 
supposed to be devolved and be implemented by DCSs and CCs. This 
creates disharmony and policy reversal besides the fact that the LGUs 
though empowered by the new Act still have a tuck of war over 
resources control and use and other functions with the four concerned 
central ministries (Natural Resources and Energy, Environment and 
Conservation, Education and Training, Finance and Planning) also 
empowered by non-amended old Acts giving them powers and 
functions in environmental, natural and water, land allocation and trade 
issues respectively.  
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(j) How easily are LG’s 
innovations accepted by the 
District and the main 
government? 
 
 
(k) How can you describe 
relations between LGs and 
District and main 
government? (trust and 
honesty?) 
Most of the changes effected are top-down as the minister alone has 
legal powers and the function to do so. The recommendations of policy 
change by the LGUs can be rejected or approved by the minister 
without any obligation to explain.  
The sole power of rejecting or approving recommended policy changes 
and low inclusion of other community sectors stifle the possibility of 
innovations. Only that which is acceptable o the majority ruling party 
and acceptable to its senior political elite may be adopted as an 
initiative or policy. Participation is restrained to the main dominant 
ruling party.  
The ruling party has by electoral system, by-laws and instituted 
political majority captured LGUs. The latter have become political 
extension agents directed by the ruling party senior structures.  LGUs 
serve the instructions of the MLG, there is no need for mutual trust and 
honesty in deconcentration. 
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Source:Field Survey/Interviews, July, 2009 to July, 2010. 
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Appendix F: Measurement of Decentralization and Development Attainment in Lesotho 
 
AIM: This PhD study’s aim is to assess the degree of decentralization and its contribution towards 
development attainment in Lesotho. Indices which have been used for such measurement on this 
questionnaire include the degree of local government autonomy in the selection of local staff, the ability of 
local government to access national government and influence national local government policy, the range 
of local government functions, the degree to which local political parties can make decisions independently 
of their national structures and the degree to which local governments can raise their own sources of 
revenue independently of higher tiers of government. Determined decentralization process and outcomes 
indicators from this questionnaire will help define and analyze its extent, effectiveness, efficiency and 
developmental policy impact in Lesotho. Hence the public and developmental administrative assessment of 
the nature, type of relations between Local Government Units (LGUs) and customary chieftaincy and 
central government, financing/budget, political and electoral systems and institutional and human 
developmental effects of decentralization will be obtained for policy’s constraints identification and 
improvements. 
 
(TO THE RESPONDENT: REMEMBER THAT YOUR RESPONSES AND OPINION WILL BE 
TREATED WITH CONFIDENTIALITY AND BE AGGREGATED TOGETHER WITH OTHERS 
IN THE RESEARCH REPORT.)  
Date of Interview______________     Interviewer______________      Venue__________ 
Respondent__________ Area Chief’s Name _________________ 
District’s Name____________________ Council’s Type/level __________________ 
Area’s Name______________________ Questionnaire Number _______________  Time______  
 
1. Respondent’s Demographic Data 
Variables      Fill Ins      Frequencies 
Percentage  
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2. Strategic Indicators of Decentralization and local governance  
2.1 Political decentralization indicators 
(a) How often are there fair and free (regular interval) local council elections?  
(b) How regular and frequent are there meetings of the local council? 
(c) How can you explain whether there is approval of plans and budgets by the local council?  
(d) How can you explain whether local council selects its own chairperson? 
2.2 Administrative decentralization indicators  
(a) What could be the percentage of total government expenditure in LGU jurisdiction as                                                                                                                                                                                                         
controlled by the LGU? 
(b) Could you explain how the LGU hires, manages, and evaluates government personnel working in 
the LGU area (percent hired, managed, evaluated?) and what records are available on that? 
(c) To what extent does LGU personnel perceive donors and government to be supportive, coherent 
and coordinated in their work with the LGU? 
2.3 Resource decentralization (Fiscal) 
(a) What are the sources and amount of total revenue of the LGU? 
(b) What is the trend of and how much is the per capita revenues of LGU? 
(c) Percent of revenues LGU raises from local sources and specific taxes used (Explain)? 
% raised from local sources? 
Specific taxes used? 
(d) What is the Percentage of revenues transferred to the LGU with only general guidelines and goals 
(Explain)?  
(Personnel Issues) 
(e) Does the LGU use standardized procedures in all aspects of personnel management (Explain)?  
(f) What is the Percentage of LGU senior/managerial slots filled with qualified persons (Explain)? 
(g)Number of person-days of visits by national personnel for training and other assistance to local 
personnel and other support of LGU (Explain)? 
2.4 Transparency  
(a) Are Local council meetings publicly posted and announced and open to the public (Explain)?  
(b) Are audits performed, published and posted on a regular basis as required by law (Explain)? 
2.5 Rule of law   
(a) Does LGU personnel follow national and locally required procedures for meetings, personnel 
actions, planning, tenders, service standards, budgeting bylaws etc (Explain)?.  
(b) Does LGU executive follow lawful instructions of local councils and other organs of the 
government (Explain)?   
(c) Are Election requirements and procedures followed satisfactorily(Explain)?   
(d) How do (and Can) Citizens bring grievances regarding the LGU to independent adjudicatory bodies 
(Explain)?  
2.6 Accountability  
(a) Do the elected LGU and sector management personnel attend open meetings to consult with the 
public on a regular and frequent basis (Explain)? 
(b)Does LGU personnel provide regular reports to national government ministries regarding local 
conditions (Explain)? How regular are the reports? 
(c)To what extent is there LGU’s compliance with national plans and service standards (Explain)? 
How is the compliance with? (i) provision of a democratic and accountable government,  
(ii) sustainable services provision, 
(iii) promotion of social and economic development by giving priority to basic community, 
 (iv) promotion of the involvement of the community and organizations and individuals in local 
government issues,  
(v) enhancement of participation in national and community programmes,  
(vi) and the combination of the municipality and urban boards to include rural areas  
(d)What are the LGU’s operations and activities?  
(e)How are LGU’s plans, budgets, revenues, expenditures and audits made and controlled? 
(f)How satisfactory do national ministries respond to LGU reports with suggestions, recommendations, 
and/or assistance (Explain)? 
 376 
2.7 Participation  
(a) What is the Percentage of the electorate that votes in LGU elections (Explain)?  
(b) Number of local organizations (NGO, private, sub- LGU) that attend open LGU forums?  
2.8 Empowerment  
(a) Number of NGOs active in LGU?  
(b) Number of sub-LGU community and neighbourhood governance organizations active in LGU? 
(c) Number of meetings between LGU senior or elected personnel and representatives of NGOs, sub- 
LGUs and women’s/vulnerable groups? 
2.9 Production of key services, public goods and regulatory functions  
(a) Percent of capital budget spent in areas outside the LGU seat (only for rural LGUs) ___________? 
(b)Percent of LGU population with access to potable water?_________________ 
(c)Level of local conflict (Explain)? 
(d) Number of local business persons trained or otherwise assisted by the LGU?  
(e) LGU’s role in regulating access to and use of natural resources such as water, forests, grasslands, 
etc (Explain)? 
Water? 
Forests?   
Grasslands? 
Others (Specify) 
 
2.10 Opportunities for women and vulnerable groups  
(a) Percent of local elected offices held by women _______%, members of religious_________%, 
ethnic minorities__________%, or by non-home peoples’ groups___________%?  
(b)Number of women and members of vulnerable groups receiving occupational, organizational, or 
governance-related training __________ _________(Explain)?   
(c) In rural areas, percent of children enrolled in elementary schools ________________? 
(d) In urban LGUs, the percent of all children enrolled in elementary school _________________? 
(e) In rural areas, the percent of the LGU budget spent on programmes focused on small or marginal 
farmers; ______________________________________________? 
(f) In urban LGUs the percent spent to assist small and medium enterprises_____________________?.          
 
3. Local Government Indicators 
Political/Institutional 
Dimension 
Resource Dimension Developmental Dimension 
To what extent is 
there?  
 
(a)institutional 
autonomy of LG 
 
 
 
(b)quality of 
participation in LG 
 
 
 
(c)depth of democratic 
participation in 
elections 
 
 
 
To what extent is 
there?  
 
(a)ability of local 
institutions to 
mobilize, allocate and 
manage funds 
_________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
(b)fairness and 
efficiency of LG 
institutions’ 
procurement of goods 
and services from the 
private sector 
_______________ 
How far has your LGU achieved the following?  
(a)provision of basic infrastructure and services which 
contribute to reduction in poverty 
 
(b)facilitation and/or authorization of private economic 
initiatives 
 
(c)facilitation of use of community resources such as 
land, water, forests e.t.c  
 
(d)effective resolution of conflicts among local citizens  
Sustainable development milestones: To what  
extent has LGU assisted local people in the   
following: Assisted local women in the reduction of  
their the triple role, gender division of labour, time  
allocation from gendered tasks (gender-workload), less  
leisure, non-wage labour, subordination to the state and  
the market on their sold produce, strategic gender  
needs?_______________________________________   
_____________________________________________ 
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(d)transparency of 
information flows 
between public bodies 
and civil society  
 
 
 
(e) accountability of 
public officials; staff 
and elected personnel? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) ability to attract 
and retain motivated 
personnel  
 
 
 
 
Assisted local people to attain self-reliant development. 
within natural resource constraints? 
____________________________________________ 
____________________________________________ 
Assisted local people to attain self-sustaining 
production without environmental degradation?  
____________________________________________ 
____________________________________________ 
 
Assisted local people to attain health control, 
appropriate technologies, food self-reliance, clean water 
and shelter for all of their households? 
_____________________________________________ 
____________________________________________ 
 
Assisted local people to attain community driven 
development and administration system flexible enough 
for self-correction? 
____________________________________________ 
____________________________________________ 
 
 
4(i): Framework Analysis for Local Governance and the Development (Log-Frame Analysis) 
Inputs ? Outputs ? Outcomes ? Goals 
Please explain what inputs are there 
to achieve increased administrative, 
political, human and financial 
decentralization in terms of?  
 
Programmes?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activities?________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Changed constitutional, statutory, 
facilitating? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considering the 
mentioned inputs to 
what extend have 
LGUs achieved 
Increased  
(a)administrative 
decentralization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b)political  
decentralization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) resources  
(human + financial) 
decentralization 
 
To what extend 
have LGUs 
achieved  
(a)transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b)accountability, 
upward 
and downward 
 
 
 
 
 
(c)participation 
 
 
 
 
 
Which are the key 
goods & services 
whose production 
has been 
enhanced by 
LGUs?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please list any  
opportunities  
for the poor and 
marginalized 
enhanced by 
LGUs? 
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and supervisory procedural 
frameworks for local government 
units (LGUs) ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(d)rule of law 
 
 
 
 
 
(e)empowerment 
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(Not for (Rural) Local Councillors but for all other higher Officials, DAs, MCC, DC members) 
4(ii): Framework Analysis for Local Governance and the Development (Log-Frame Analysis) 
Inputs Outputs Outcomes Goals 
What inputs are there to effect 
Legal statutory reforms to 
strengthen local governance: 
administration, political and 
resources dimensions?  
Administration? 
 
 
Political reforms? 
 
 
 
Resources (human + financial) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Which local governance focused 
projects and programmes sponsored 
by central governments, 
donors and NGOs ? 
 
 
 
 
Who is responsible for and how is 
the coordination among donors, 
governments and NGOs in local 
governance projects and 
Programmes? 
 
 
To what extent has 
decentralization brought 
legitimate lawful LGUs and 
democratic participation ? 
 
 
 
 
To what extent has 
decentralization brought about 
strengthened local finances, 
revenue sources and their 
management ? 
 
 
 
 
 
To what extend has 
decentralization effected 
transparent, effective  
and accountable local 
administration? 
 
 
 
 
To what extent has 
decentralization resulted into 
effective partnerships among 
LGUs, governments, NGOs 
and donors    
 
 
 
 
How has decentralization 
contributed towards basic 
education & what is the 
percent of children 
enrolled in schools due to 
it? 
 
 
 
How has decentralization 
contributed to the access 
of potable water & what 
is the % of LGU 
Population with water? 
 
 
How has decentralization 
contributed to the survival 
of 5 year olds & is the 
percent of such children 
who survive to five year ? 
 
 
What is the percent of 
increase in number of 
businesses licensed in 
previous year  
in LGU?_________ 
& percent of change in 
number of violent  
incidents from previous 
year in GU? 
______________ 
What has been the 
impact of 
decentralization on  
(a)education 
 
 
(b)environment 
 
 
(c)health 
 
 
(d)good governance 
 
 
(e)gender equity 
 
 
(f)poverty reduction 
 
 
(g)local peace  
and tranquility 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What has been the impact of decentralization on the following contextualized local national development 
priorities i.e. on 
(1 Combating HIV/AIDS  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
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(2 Eradicating Extreme Poverty  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(3 Achieving Universal Primary education 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(4 Promoting Gender Equality and empower women  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(5 Reducing Child Mortality  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(6 Improving Maternal Health  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(7 Ensuring Environment Sustainability  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(8 Develop a Global Partnership for Development  
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
And on specific LG’s development objectives? 
(9 Providing a democratic and accountable government 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(10 Providing sustainable services 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(11 Promoting social and economic development by prioritizing basic community 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(12 Promoting involvement of the community, organizations and individuals in LG issues 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(13 Enhancing participation in national and community programmes 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(14 Combining municipality with urban boards and rural areas 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
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6. Role and constraints of chieftaincy in Lesotho’s decentralization 
Measurement of the role of chieftaincy in Lesotho  
Chiefs’ Role in 
Lesotho’s DGD 
Extent/Measure of 
Involvement in 
DGD (Primary or 
secondary function) 
Role statutory or 
only traditional 
A=Both 
B=Statutory only 
C=traditional only 
Challenges to 
DGD in order of 
priority per role 
Suggested 
solutions per 
challenge 
against DGD 
Traditional and 
customary affairs 
    
Mobilizing and 
linking the local 
community 
    
Represented in 
local government 
    
Incorporated into 
local government 
civil service  
    
Perform judicial 
functions 
    
Political structures 
they form 
-Senate 
-College of chiefs 
-Other specify 
 
 
    
Other main roles-
specify 
 
    
 
7. What forms of Political participation do the grass root communities have in LGUs? 
List LGU’s inputs/activities    List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
8. How do LGUs activate capital formation in terms of the following? 
(a) Human capital (the skills, knowledge and ability to work depending on adequate nutrition, health care, 
safe environmental conditions and education)? 
List LGU’s inputs/activities     List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(b) Financial capital (income primarily from the sale of labour and sometimes the sale of other household 
assets)? 
List LGU’s inputs/activities     List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(c) Social capital (networks of mutual support that exist within and between households, extended family 
and communities, to which people have access)? 
List LGU’s inputs/activities     List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
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(d) Physical capital (assets that include housing, tools, and equipment that people own, rent or use, public 
infrastructure and amenities that people have access to)? 
List LGU’s inputs/activities     List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
(e) Natural capital (environmental resources such as land, common property resources and open access 
natural resources which people use to have access to in their livelihood strategies) 
List LGU’s inputs/activities     List LGU’s 
outputs/outcomes 
 
9. (The measurement of decentralization/DGD through its other classical definition): To what 
extent are LGUs in Lesotho;  
• constitutionally separate from central government and responsible for a significant range of 
services? 
 
• having own treasury, separate budget and accounts, own taxes as significant part of produced 
revenue? 
Treasury: 
Budget and accounts: 
Own taxes: 
• having their own personnel with the powers to employ and discipline or fire own employees? 
 
• able to elect local policy,  predominantly consisting of local representatives? 
 
• having central government only playing an indirect advisory, supervisory and inspectorate role  
(At interview skip to question 11, to be filled using survey records) 
10. Other indicators of the impact of decentralization from surveys/census including(Bureau of 
statistics):  
(1) an income indicator-the number of household heads earning less than minimal amount of 
earning/subsistence per month or per year as a percentage of the household heads in each smallest area 
that census data can be aggregated at (e.g. at sub district or district enumeration)____?  
(2) Education indicator- which is the number of adults 18 or older than 18 with less than standard 
6/primary education as a percentage of adults in the smallest sub area of enumeration (sub-district 
level). That is the minimum educational level required for post-school training and a constraint on 
employment opportunities____? 
(3) Unemployment indicator- representing the number of adults 18 or older who are unemployed but 
actively seeking work, as a percentage of all adults each enumerated sub-district/area. This excludes all 
non-work seekers, students and retired people_________? 
(4) Welfare indicator-the number of household heads who are single mother with three or more 
children as a percentage of all household heads in each enumerated smallest sub-area as aggregated. 
This can be the primary criterion for eligibility for a state welfare grant- proxy for the quality of family 
life_______?.  
(5) Overcrowding indicator-the number of households with over 1,5 per habitable room, as a 
percentage of all households in each smallest enumerated aggregated sub area. Overcrowding indicates 
increased risk of transmission of infectious diseases and reduced privacy within the home but excludes 
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bathrooms, toilets, kitchens and passageways. This includes habitable rooms like bedrooms, sitting 
rooms and other similar ones__________?.  
 
11.Contextual measurement of DGD effectiveness adopting the principles and values of both true local 
governance and good governance in overcoming the challenges of decentralization; 
Firstly, what is your opinion concerning local governments’ ability to provide services that are in part 
dependent upon their ability to mobilize taxes locally?     
 
Which taxes are LGUs able to mobilize and are assigned to mobilize? 
 
What is your opinion about the size of the local tax   base? 
How buoyant those taxes are in terms of whether they increase over time in line with population increase, 
inflation, real income growth and the extent to which local taxes impinge on the poor?. 
 
Secondly, is most part of the revenue base coming from the central government, if so explain how it is 
transferred and the challenges thereof? 
 
Thirdly, how do LGUs overcome or prevent capture by local elites?  Local governments may be vulnerable 
to local elites who then receive a disproportionate share of public spending on public goods.  The challenge 
then becomes the extent to which decentralization processes enable the poor to access publicly provided 
goods.   
 
Fourthly, the effective and efficient delivery of public goods and services, at the local level, depends on the 
co-ordination of delivering agencies. How do LGUs avoid coordination failure, namely redundancy 
(Redundancy results when two or more organizations or agencies perform the same task in which case 
resources are wasted)? 
 
Lacunae? (results when no organization performs a necessary task, in which case service delivery gaps 
occur.) 
 
Incoherence? (results when policies, programmes, projects or agencies with the same clients have different 
goals and requirements in which case this may trigger conflicts between agencies and organizations over 
resources and clientele.  The synchronization of policy across ministries and departments, at the local level, 
is therefore a major challenge).  
 
Fifthly, which specific service delivery functions that are decentralized led to a loss of economies of scale 
(the direct implication of which is the loss of efficiency)?  
 
Sixthly, to what extent are the individuals knowledgeable about the running of local government 
available/employed/deployed to LGUs and undertake such tasks as to be taken by local government?  
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Seventhly, what is the central government doing to enable citizens to get better quality goods and services? 
That is what is the central government doing to offer;:  
(1) training in professional skills;  
(2) improvement of facilities – buildings and equipment; 
(3)opportunities for promotion or at least some form of recognition of work well done, as well as punitive 
measures for work poorly done;  
(4) providing citizens with responsive avenues for raising complaints over goods and services poorly 
delivered.  
 
12. How effective are your LGUs in tackling corruption of following forms possible in them? E.g.(1) the 
misuse of money or favours for private gain 
 
(2) Inappropriate exchanges of money or other goods and services for undue influence or power; 
 
(3) Violations of public interest or norms of behaviour for special advantages or self-serving purposes 
 
(4)Tax evasion as the transaction is not reported by either party, thus denying the treasury or tax revenue 
authority income 
 
(5)Inequitable distribution of public resources as public services become disproportionately accessible to 
those who pay bribes, denying those services or similar quality of services to those who do not pay bribes  
 
(6)Bribes enabling service providers to ignore established standards of provision of goods and services 
offered in two ways: (a) contracts for example are not awarded to the highest quality provider at the bid 
price but to the firm that offers the highest bribe; 
 
(b) it is often difficult for those who have received bribes to ask providers of services to provide better 
services or rectify problems associated with services already rendered. 
 
(7)corruption undermining the rule of law and scaring away potential investors as it arbitrarily increases 
transaction costs  
 
(8)corruption being anti-developmental as it reduces the opportunities available to people, particularly the 
poor increasing their insecurity 
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(9) corruption in the form of nepotism, bribery or patronage, stifling meritocracy, the result of which is an 
increasingly inefficient and brutal bureaucracy 
 
13. (Equity and creating enabling environment as measurement in decentralization) How does your LGU 
promote human development in terms of  
Productivity 
Equity  
Sustainability 
Empowerment 
14. (Measuring Decentralization within ideals, principles and values of ‘good governance’: 
Decentralisation and Leadership): How free is your LGU from an often tendency toward the development 
of patron-client relationships between central government level politicians and local level politicians. 
Whereby locally elected officials are often sanctioned by the party hierarchy at national level, upon whom 
they depend not only for patronage resources but also their appointment to party electoral lists and hence 
political office?  (Such a clientelist system results in formidable obstacles to the political participation of 
non-party constituencies of local communities and promotes deconcentration rather than devolution.)  
 
Furthermore, how do the communities elect the political leadership at the local level? 
 
(1) the first-past-the-post- 
model;______________________________________________________________ (2) the proportional 
representation model _______________________________________________________ 
(3) non-party participation_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Again, how do your LGUs promote these values of good governance? 
Inputs/activities Outcomes 
Participation  
Accountability  
Transparency  
Rule of law  
Strategic Vision  
Consensus orientation  
Effectiveness and 
Efficiency 
 
Responsiveness  
Equity  
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Inclusiveness  
Corruption 
minimization 
 
 
15. Please commend on the nature and degree of autonomy of your LGU on these 
Indicators Qualities of Degree of Autonomy   
Personnel  
The Integrated System  
The Unified System  
Other personnel indices  
Access  
Functions  
Party politics  
Finance and autonomy  
Nature of revenue base  
Elasticity of sources of revenue/tax base  
Amount of financial discretion over expenditure  
Local expenditure as percentage of total central 
expenditure 
 
 
16. (Hierarchical relations as an indicator of decentralization) Please commend on the formal 
administrative mechanisms through which higher tier control over local authorities’ powers is currently 
maintained?  
(1) Approval of decisions, decisions can only come 
into effect after approval by the higher authority. 
 
(2) Directives/instructions; ordering local authorities to 
do or refrain from doing some act. 
 
(3) The power of suspension; this is where higher tier 
authority has the power to suspend the activities of the 
local authorities. 
 
(4) The power of annulment; decisions of the local 
authority can be overturned. 
 
(5) The power of reformation; decisions of the local 
authority can be modified. 
 
(6) The power of substitution; the higher authority can 
act in place of a lower one 
 
(7)Higher tier control including circulars laying down 
policy, inspectors, and the requirement of reports on 
progress in specific services. 
 
(8)Effective delivery system, (c) and (d))  
(9)Political decentralization with accountability to local 
citizens, 
 
(10)Administrative decentralization with autonomy,  
(11)Resource decentralization with human and fiscal 
dimensions 
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17. Please commend on the (More of the Indicators in Measuring Degree of Decentralization/DGD): 
Features of your local authorities                                                       
To what extent are these Features there in your 
LGUs? 
Commend on Lesotho’s LGUs 
Local authorities having a well-defined area of 
jurisdiction? 
 
Local authority having a legal mandate and 
obligation to serve all its inhabitants with basic 
services, in particular localized or contextualized 
Development objectives besides the normal 
legislative functions, that is poverty-reduction 
oriented and responsive enough to local needs? 
 
Local authorities operating in conformity within the 
legal framework of the national and middle-level 
framework. They may not pass laws in contradiction 
with those of the above levels. The important feature 
here is having autonomous power to pass some 
laws? 
 
Having legislative powers to pass by-laws or 
regulations for orderly development and well being 
of the urban or rural area? 
 
While are to promote provision of the social, 
political, physical, educational, cultural and 
economic development to the citizens; they are to 
provide safety in terms of road safety, traffic control, 
civil protection, fire brigade, ambulance services and 
so on? 
 
They are to employ own staff to do their daily 
business? 
 
They should determine, prioritize, and translate local 
development needs into financial plans? 
 
Ninthly, they need to promote local participation. 
They must be consultative in any decision they take 
and thus involve local people in decision-making? 
 
They need to regularly communicate and inform the 
locals of their policies, decisions and plans so as to 
have an informed local citizen? 
 
They must have regular free and fair elections to 
elect new councillors? 
 
 
18. To what extent have your LGUs succeeded in having these qualities or indicators/dimensions of 
success? 
• being located in the area with an adequate economic base,  
 
• well-defined responsibilities in a satisfactory legal framework,  
 
• capacity to mobilize sufficient resources,  
 
• supportive central government activities,  
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• appropriate management practices,  
 
• development of productive internal and external relations,  
 
• satisfactory responsiveness to constituents,  
 
• specified/expected quantity and quality of services and other outputs delivered,  
 
• good fiscal (success) performance characterized by  
(a) the budget balance sheet with more surpluses than deficits within 5 years,  
 
(b) major local revenue sources, that is direct local taxes, user charges or intergovernmental 
transfers with growth relative to inflation and population,  
 
(c) local expenditures, both recurrent and capital local expenditure supporting a range of 
significant social and infrastructural services with reasonable growth rate, and the  
 
• institutional parameters encompassing  
 
(i) the management of financial information, that is compilation, storage and retrieval of such financial 
information,  
 
(ii) the relationships between the central government and local governments,  
 
(iii) the financial management system with revenue collection, budgeting, auditing and debt 
management,  
 
(iv) the staffing situation with quantity and quality of local government staff, training, turnover rates, 
salary conditions and manpower planning, and the  
 
(v) relationship between the local government and the community including non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).  
 
19. (The role of party politics in gauging the extent of political decentralization is also very 
important. The existence of non-centralized party system could be the most important element of the true 
extent of political decentralization because effects of such decentralization are often negated by party 
centralization). To what extent may these distinctive features of party politics for gauging decentralization 
apply in your LGUs in Lesotho? 
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Features of party politics Degree of application? 
Candidates have to be selected by the party.  
A distinct policy programme is formulated for a 
local party group. 
 
A party election manifesto, to which all party 
candidates are expected to adhere, both during the 
election campaign and once elected, is produced. 
 
An attempt is made to implement the manifesto in 
the event of the party winning a majority of seats on 
the council.  
 
Councillors are organized into party groups for the 
purposes of allocating committee places and other 
positions of leadership and responsibility, to 
develop and co-ordinate party policy, to determine 
strategy and tactics and to ensure group discipline.  
 
Group leadership, comprising an individual leader 
and usually a committee of group executive officers, 
is elected by the members of the group. 
 
Pre-council and pre-committee party group 
meetings are convened to enable party group 
members to agree on policy and plan their debating 
and voting tactics. 
 
 
20. (For managing staff only/skip) Key Performance Areas of Lesotho’s LA’s and the challenges 
Key performance areas Main Constraints 
1. Institutional capacity and municipal 
transformation 
-Have you established and implemented core local 
government systems e.g. performance management 
systems etc? 
 
-Is there adequate LG’s management capacity and 
capability? 
-Which high vacancy levels does this LG have?  
 
-Accountability mechanisms problems? 
-Serious challenges in the areas of  
Financial-management,  
programme management,  
Engineering and  
organizational development 
2. Basic service delivery and infrastructure -Services delivered include? 
-Pace and quality of services delivered? 
-Backlogs in services deliveries? 
3. Local economic development (LED) -Prevalent dimensions of poverty locally?  
Impacts of LG on such poverty so far?  
-LGs’ LED strategies effectiveness/success so far?  
-Enough of LG’s LED specialists  
4. Financial viability and management -Billing systems available/used by LG?  
-How adequate/efficient are billing systems? 
To whom is this LG indebted? 
How does LG manage debt? 
How does the LG get credited?  
Which credit control systems does the LG have? 
-How effective and efficient is the LG’s financial 
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management capacity and systems? 
-LG’s revenue base include?  
-How adequate is the revenue base? 
5. Good governance -Is there stability within and between political and 
administrative domains? 
-How effective is communication between council 
and communities? 
-Are all the committees functioning effectively? 
 
21. Determining relations for successful decentralization between the central and LGs 
(a) Opinion on the strength of the system of the LG  
 
(b) How is the LG participating in regional/district and national development? Any limitations? 
 Activities?       
 Limitations? 
- 
(c) How fair is the division of financial resources between the LG, District and National government? 
 
(d) How fair is the division of human resources between the LG, district and national government? 
 
(e) Any communication problems between the LG, District and National government, explain? 
 
(f) How is citizen participation? Forms of participation?    
 Groups/Sectors? 
 
(g) How adequate is social and political harmony in the LGs? 
 
(h) How legally clear are relations between the LG, District and main government in functions and powers? 
 
(i) How does the LG effect changes on the legislation for action by the central government? 
 
(j) How easily are LG’s innovations accepted by the District and the main government? 
 
(k) How can you describe relations between LGs and District and main government? (trust and honesty?) 
22. Measuring government commitment/support to decentralization:  
Explain problems you know concerning the following? 
(a) Adequacy of the legal structure in defining and establishing LG units and permitting them to function as 
decentralized? 
(b) The national government’s style of managing in line with decentralized management, explain? 
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(c) How adequate is the quality of personnel posted to LG units when compared to one in main 
government? 
(d) Adequate grants from the government and local revenue base/taxes-expansion? 
(e) Quality (experience, education, effective representation) of elected officials? 
(f) Adequate political support and endorsement of decentralization by top bureaucracy, explain?    
(g) How regular and how does local community participate in the following? 
-decisions making  
-policy making, 
-policy implementation  
-policy evaluation? 
23. More indicators of decentralization developmental policy impact (for staff only) 
What are the effects of LGUs introduction on the following in your locality? 
-Effects on Prices? 
-Effects on production (quantities on outputs and inputs)? 
- Effects on local consumption patterns/demands? 
-Effects on trade? 
- Effects on local budgeting capacity (tax receipts and public expenditure)? 
-Effects on (equity) income and services distribution?  
- Effects on local social welfare? 
Specific effects on urban development? 
-on solid waste management;  
-opening and rehabilitation of roads;  
-development control;  
-primary education  
-and public health 
 
THANK YOU SO MUCH. PLEASE, REMEMBER THAT YOUR RESPONSES AND OPINION 
WILL BE TREATED WITH CONFIDENTIALITY AND BE AGGREGATED TOGETHER WITH 
OTHERS IN THE RESEARCH REPORT.  
 
 
 
